Thanks to RaviB, a BRF poster -
Part 2 and conclusion of previous post
How China sees itself
- China is not a Communist country: It is a country ruled by a communist party, that's the extent of its communism. In some ways it is like Post-Soviet republics of the USSR with a hyper-capitalist, robber baron, crony capitalist oligarchy.
- It is a Han nation. All other minorities get to wear regional costumes like dressed up monkeys when the attend a few congresses in Beijing, but they are second class. This is seen in their repression of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Partly, they want to cilvilise (or make Han) these barbarians practicing strange religions, and stuck in the past.
- China is a modern civilised country (almost western). Think Meiji restoration Japan, think Singapore. See the CCP functionaries wearing western suits, with CCP badges.
- China is on its way to restoring its place as the centre of the world. The USA is an obstacle it will need to overcome for this.
- The CCP has the mandate of heaven. All Chinese emperors needed to have this, otherwise someone with the mandate would usurp their place. CCP is the current dynasty and Xi is the current emperor (for life). Everything becomes a lot clearer when China is seen in its imperial tradition.
- China is orderly and stable. At the moment. The typical condition of China over the past 200 years has been of disorder. The Taiping rebellion, civil war, cultural revolution, etc. So finally the CCP has brought order. Order is way more important than "freedom". Freedom is something they know from Hollywood, not really for China but maybe its worth visiting Disneyworld to see what it's like.
- China is corrupt to the core and the CCP is the heart of this corruption. This is something most people find terrible and all the protests and opposition are inevitably protests against corrupt petty functionaries. But to get rid of corruption, you have to get rid of the CCP and if you get rid of the CCP, China wouldn't function. At the moment corruption is not as ostentatious as before. People are keeping their heads down because Xi was collecting heads to stabilise his rule. Since everyone is corrupt, everyone was afraid of his anti-corruption drive.
- China is a merchant empire. The CCP to sustain its corruption needs heavy trade. If the size of the pie shrinks, there will be infighting. Which will weaken its hold.
- CCP has two enemies The Chinese People and the USA. The fall of the USSR has been the biggest nightmare of the CCP, and both these factors are thought to have played a role. The CCP spends a very substantial amount on internal security, according to some accounts as much as on external security.
- China has 3 classes: Peasants (the majority, who nowadays are usually migrant workers); the nouveau riche and the rulers CCP. All three are afraid of each other. The newly rich are happy, obedient and scared to lose what they have, send their children to study abroad and hope to migrate to USA; the worker/peasants are the ones who cause disturbances and are in terrible shape. The rulers are insanely rich, insanely corrupt and insanely paranoid, everyone has at least 2 different passports for their children, apart from the chinese one.
What is China doing in Ladakh?
Based on what I have written so far I think this is a mission to subdue the periphery. The army is on an expedition to pacify the frontier and punish the uppity kingdom on the periphery, India. Show them who's the boss and then return to the heartland.
This is also about warning India not to join an alliance with the USA. For us, this might sound ridiculous but when you read how the Chinese see us, it makes perfect sense that we will not ally ourselves with the USA after receiving this warning. Ideas like humiliation being bad for relations are alien to them (humility is a virtue, they are simply showing India its place). That we might have self-respect or might actually care about strategic autonomy or be protecting our own interests are simply incomprehensible and completely out of sync with how they see us.
Several people have tried to think of the current situation in terms of military strategy. That makes absolutely no sense. It is almost certainly not about protecting the Aksai Chin highway. Firstly the PLA is not too bright in terms of military tactics, for example having 200 trucks inside a gorge seems foolish even to a civilian like me. Secondly, the empire never expects trouble or attack inside its borders. I think maybe one or two junior officers in the PLA might entertain the thought of an Indian armored attack and prepare a report on that but I think that's inconceivable for the majority. Also practically, China has enough heavy lift capability and construction skills to have a replacement highway running very quickly.
For those suggesting more fantastic ideas like a shortcut to PoK over the Karakoram pass. The Karakoram Pass is the one point on the boundary that there is no conflict about. Secondly, the Karakoram Highway has nothing to do with the Karakoram Pass. The geography of the area makes it impossible to build a road. Thirdly even the KKH is more or less a gesture for Pakistan, nothing seriously economic about it. it is far away from the economic and population heartland of China. Pakistan is a model tributary state, so it is rewarded with favors like the CPEC. From at least 2013, I have been telling anyone who would listen that it's a big joke. Some Chinese companies will get to build stuff and make a lot of money, which will be shared through the hierarchy but trade with Pakistan over the KKH makes utterly, absolutely no sense.
The current conflict is for the average Chinese, out there in Timbuktu. Tibet is already like Antarctica inhabited by the savages for the majority of them. And then there is some fight with India, a country they have heard of. It's quite an exotic place, people dance all the time, they've seen Bollywood movies. That's why I think the idea of domestic messaging doesn't quite fly. Hong Kong is easy to crush, also sends out a message about the supremacy of the CCP and the futility of democracy protests, but Tibet, as far away as it can get? With a third rate country like India? They have a vague idea that it's full of poor people who dance but is there really glory in defeating their army? That's only to be expected surely. This has also created a headache for the CCP, did high-tech Han warriors actually get slaughtered by dirty Red Turbans? [This is currently a very popular question on Chinese social media, which is being asked indirectly in many different ways].
Lessons for India
- Conflict with China is inevitable. So we must make sure we find the right time and place for it. It will not be a total war. Total war is too unpredictable and might cut into the CCPs earnings.
- Localised conflict is feasible and manageable Tibet is not worth much to the CCP. Of course a dynasty never allows its size to be reduced, but if Lhasa or Amdo or any city in Tibet or Xinjiang were destroyed, the CCP wouldn't even blink. But the CCP will at no costs see even the smallest threat to the heartland (south-west China). So escalation won't proceed beyond a certain step on the ladder
- Any war will be about temporary deterrence and not permanent victory. When we give them a bloody nose, they'll leave us alone for 30 years. But then we'll have to fight them again
- Diplomacy is about delay and obfuscation, not resolution. Talking helps pass the time until its time for military conflict. Any promises aren't worth the toilet paper they are written on. A loophole will be found as and when necessary.
- It's not Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) who's relevant to Chinese military strategy but Weiqi. I find it a bit ridiculous because The Art of War is quite elliptical and can be interpreted as one wishes. I haven't read it myself and I'm convinced most people who quote it haven't either. What Chinese Generals were also mesmerised by was the Gulf War 1. That and RMA have very much shaped their understanding of how the next war (with USA) will be fought.
- They will be hopeless at mountain warfare From everything I read, their strategy seems to be one of overwhelming the enemy. Send 2000 soldiers, 200 tanks, 500 trucks and 20 bulldozers to scare 200 enemy soldiers. This strategy might work on Tiananmen Square (as it indeed did) but not in the mountains. I don't know anything about weapons systems but I have a suspicion networked warfare is not really the best way to fight in the mountains. Massed forces are also probably not the best idea in Ladakh (perhaps with the exception of Depsang)
- This might make me sound like a Pakistani, but the Chinese have nothing to even remotely match the Indian soldier's spirit. I just tried to think of how many of my Chinese acquaintances might be willing to die for their country and I honestly can't think of a single one. In case of India obviously I have family, friends, neighbors, one doesn't need more than 5 seconds to think of 10 people. The Chinese spirit comes from Han superiority and fear of their officers, especially the political officers. This means they are ripe for desertion, and if there are non-Han soldiers they can probably be used to create disorder within their armies. The han superiority also makes them afraid of barbarians. They are always scared by people with heavy beards and scary mustaches.
- their lack of democracy means they are very brittle against information warfare. I had posted earlier how Chinese social media was relying on the messaging of the new Baba Banaras twitter account. All their news came from Indian media. If we can spread some fake videos or pics of mutilated Chinese soldiers, that will not enrage but scare them. It will perfectly fit their image of savage barbarians and the modern Chinese population is all up for CGI warfare but not to see skulls crushed with rocks.
- The planning is done by Generals, approved by Beijing, and then flows down to the soldiers. This system lacks innovation and probably won't be very flexible on the ground. Though it may very well lead to brilliant strategy in the case of experienced generals, the tactics will probably be shoddy and predictable.
- We should try to understand them and how they see us and take advantage of it. We must also be willing to adapt to their working style, which might mean giving up on values like honour and truth. We always feel betrayed by them because they act differently to our expectations. When we understand their worldview, we will be the ones taking advantage of them.
- What CCP does not want is a widespread front and protracted warfare. Traditionally such pacification exercises (Ladakh, but also Xinjiang and Tibet) were conducted in order to free the empire for more important work (like confronting the USA). We will know we have won this round when General Zhao is recalled to Beijing.