Yes. For the bold.
Are you aware that the IA used to patrol to PP 19 in 1994?
Obviously my pay grade is very low so I can very confidently tell you the Officer who was (and is still) considered one of the 'brains' for Indian Nuclear posturing and changing the fundamental outlook of IA from purely defensive to offensive posture in Op Brasstacks and who played a fundamental role in formulating the Draft Nuclear Doctrine and training set up as also was in the JWG 1 which was initially set up under PM PVNR, who got the evidence of M11s being deployed in Tibet in 1994 over Dokalam simmering tensions and who opposed withdrawal of the Kupup Brigade and troops, also opposed draw down of troops in these areas. What happened? In order to seek peace, the draw down took place with ITBP being mandated to do the needful. It is the very same organization which had a standoff in 2017 with Chinese troops at a place where there is a Chinese defensive line and jetty today.
FYI, in 1990s, due to financial constraints, armour was majorly mothballed and armoured corps troops sent into valley in CI grid. Same was the situation with Mech Inf who, at places, had to deploy BMPs to escort the ROPs in heartlands along Lolab-Bandipore-Sopore.
Don't take my questions otherwise, I just want to know your response to my understanding of the situation.
Are you saying because IA patrolled upto PP19, you could afford a standoff at LAC ( with a hot LoC, disturbed valley and ruined economy). Please read 'afford' as both militarily and financially. And would have managed the situation if things went worse ( limited or full scale war)? With your own admission of Armoured corps situation. What about your sister services? Their ability to respond during the lost decade?
Was two front war any less probable today, than it was then?
The only time that I can think of historically is op Brasstacks followed by op Falcon and Chequered board, which had led to standoff.
Now if historical situation has to be analyzed why not start with 'at home' function on Navy Day 1986 wrt Gen. Sundarji and PM Rajiv Gandhi? Please include N.D Tiwari? visit to Beijing enroute to Pongyang. Because that became the basis for 1993 aggrement.
PM and CoAS relationship
probably plummeted further with PM Rajiv and Gen. Sundarji, than under PM Indira Gandhi and Gen. Rao.
Thus militarily, you may say you have had the appetite, I don't think other arms (Finance and MEA) of the Government concurred.
Thus IA's appetite was more than the govt. of the day. Rather bringing synergy in the approach, the divide grew. And can I give Gen Sundarji a clean chit here?
At present I see writers mentioning, ITBP cannot handle tripwire situation. They forget that ITBP was placed to avoid the incident going tripwire.
The same kind of writing you can find from Gen. Choudhury just before BSF came into being. He himself had concurred to place BSF under IPS DG.
The creation of CSG is again an analogous story isn't it?
So, my assertion is superficially recommending to bring ITBP under operational control of Army, glossing over practical difficulties is not going to lead anywhere. This move has both practical and historical baggage.
On the above I have found publication from quite a few veterans, presenting the need for placing the border guards under operational control of Army. But none have pointed out what are the objections from MHA and how to address them. Just pointing to IAS and IPS 'lobby' in words and 'syndicate' in meaning, is not only amaturish but defeative because as far as I can see, they are here to stay.
I must conclude now, as I have already been branded as promotee ITBP cadre officer for taking their side.
Just can't keep on working for ITBP pro bono.