In crisis, military capability of the two sides drives policy choices
14, 2020, 8:48 PM IST
Lt Gen DS Hooda
The India-China standoff has entered its second month, and it appears that we are in for a period of protracted and tough negotiations before we see some real progress. While it is hoped that the...
timesofindia.indiatimes.com
The India-China standoff has entered its second month, and it appears that we are in for a period of protracted and tough negotiations before we see some real progress. While it is hoped that the crisis can be resolved peacefully, there have also been some discussions on the war fighting strategies and capabilities of the two militaries in the event of a conventional war.
These discussions range from a two-front threat in Ladakh, leading to a loss of areas in northern Ladakh and the Siachen Glacier to raising doubts on the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct successful operations owing to a lack of combat experience. This piece attempts a realistic assessment of the development of India’s military strategy and future prospects.
India’s strategy against China has been based on a realistic appraisal of China’s capability to conduct offensive operations along the forbidding terrain of the northern borders. After the 1962 war, India remained defensive against China, and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was thinly held to guard against any surprise attack. It was only after the Wangdung incident of 1986 that the Indian Army carried out a significant increase in the Indian deployment along the border with China.
One consequence of the Wangdung incident was that it triggered a period of diplomatic rapprochement with the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 and the subsequent signing of various border agreements. However, this period of calm also had an unintended effect. While the Indian soldiers remained deployed along the LAC, infrastructure development was neglected.
In contrast, China carried out massive infrastructure improvements in Tibet, including the operationalisation of the Qinghai-Tibet railway in 2006. It was only in the mid-2000s that India took serious note of the growing mismatch between the two militaries, and a decision was taken to build 73 strategic roads along the LAC. In 2010, two new divisions were raised to strengthen the deployment in Arunachal Pradesh, followed by the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps.
Although shortfalls remain, there has been a change in strategic thinking. Two noted experts, Anit Mukherjee and Yogesh Joshi, have pointed out that the new Indian Army strategy has shifted from “deterrence by denial” to “deterrence by punishment”.
The India Air Force (IAF) has traditionally held an edge over PLA Air Force (PLAAF) as its airfields are located in the plains enabling air operations with full payloads.
PLAAF, operating from high altitude airfields with rudimentary facilities, is forced to operate with reduced payloads. In the last decade, the IAF has shifted its attention to the northern borders. Su-30 aircraft were deployed at the Tezpur airbase in 2009, and Hasimara, in West Bengal, is being readied for Rafale aircraft. There has also been a significant increase in strategic airlift capability with the induction of the C-130, the C-17, and the Chinook helicopters.
The Indian Navy (IN) currently enjoys a huge geographical advantage, and, in conflict, will seek to block the entry of PLA Navy through the narrow straits leading from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean, and engage in commerce warfare by interdicting Chinese trade. The IN has a good maritime domain awareness capability through its P-8I Poseidons that is now supplemented by Su-30 aircraft armed with the BrahMos missiles in the newly set up squadron based at Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu.
