Chinese Vulnerabilities against Indian Airforce.
To launch any air campaign, fighter aircraft have to be deployed close to the border, roughly about 200 km to 300 km from the border of your enemy. Against India, China will have to deploy its fighter aircraft in Tibet and adjacent airfields in Xinjiang. China has 2,100 combat aircraft but most of them are deployed on its eastern seaboard. They cannot deploy all of them against India because of limited number of airfields in Tibet.
Tibet is a high-altitude plateau with mountainous terrain. China have just about five main airfields in Tibet (Kongka Dzong, Hoping, Pangta, Linzhi and Gargunsa) and another two in Xinjiang (Hotan and Kashgar). They are developing three more airfields in Tibet which are likely to be ready by 2022.
To carry out sustained fighter aircraft operations, airfields have to be mutually supporting. That if you take off from an airfield there should be another airfield nearby within 100 or 200 km, so that in case of requirement for diversion etc., you have an alternative airfield.
In the northern Xinjiang sector’s two airfields Hotan and Kashgar - the distance between them is 450 km while the distance between Hotan and Gargunsa is 550 kms. Hotan to Korla, the distance is 750 km so they are not mutually supportive. In western Tibet, there is only one airfield, Gargunsa. If Gargunsa is bombed by the Indian Air Force, there will be a gap of 1,500 km between Hotan and nearest airfield Hoping.
There is another limitation which they have. In the airfield, when you park aircraft for fighter operations, they have to be in blast protected shelters - concrete shelters. China doesn’t have any blast protected shelters at any of the airfields. After Doklam they have realised their mistake and have now started building these in Kongka Dzong (Lhasa) airfield.
The air density of Tibet region is less than 20-30% compared to sea level. The high altitude nature of Chinese airfields in Tibet, along with prevalent extreme climatic conditions seriously restrains the performance of aircraft, which reduces the effective payload capacity and combat radius by an average of 50%.
The PLAAF’s Su-27/30/ J-11/J-10s face a reduced look-down radar detection capability in the mountainous terrain, leaving the PLAAF’s meaningful early warning capability limited to medium and high altitudes. This is not helped by the five ground based radar regiments deployed in Tibet and South Xinjiang, which face the same detection issues and are unable to cover the entire Indo–China border.
Operating from airfields located near sea level elevations in plains, the IAF has no such restrictions and has the capability to effectively undertake deep penetration and air superiority missions in the Tibetan Autonomous Region with full complement of payload and fuel.
The IAF Su-30MKIs and Mirage 2000s, along with soon-to-be inducted Dassault Rafales and Tejas have a technology edge over the existing Chinese combat jets deployed in the WTC. Operating under the IAF’s Integrated Air Command & Control System, supported by the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), small groups of Su-30MKI/ Mirage 2000 will be able to counter larger PLAAF forces, confining the Chinese to anchored ground based radar cover around key communication nodes. While the IAF shares Russian supplied weapon heritage with the PLAAF, combat efficacy of home-produced Chinese weapons is yet to be tested in combat.
India may be at risk when Chinese stealthy J-20 becomes full developed & operational, backed by increased number of AWACS and refuelling types based on the Y-20 platform, which has a good high altitude operational capability. The IAF however is expected to maintain its combat edge in multi mission training at least till 2030, with autonomy of effort, unlike Chinese air crew who are still largely dependent on a ground control AD environment. The IAF focuses much more on experience in air combat and varied weapon delivery, backed by exposure at multinational exercises, to maintain a ‘qualitative’ edge over its foes.
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