India China LAC & International Border Discussions
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so it was Chinese soldier who got detained but as usual RANDtv reported it opposite.
Gautam Sarkar
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Its been raining non stop in NE for a week. It is raining right now in Tripura. That and the cyclone, well you do the math. Bangladesh is in big trouble.
Gandaberunda
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Not trying to enter they were in Indian Territory between finger 3-4Xi's great PLA getting kicked badly while trying to enter Indian territory! Paki slaves need to see how the Indian Army treats their masters!!
Bhadra
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Not so bad .... Not so bad...
The situation does not appear to that bad...
Now It seems the Indian Army has occupied their position..
That gives lot of courage to ITBP boys who most of the time are victims of their loneliness and aloofness.
Uff... loneliness at height more than 4000 m height. where you can not talk to even blade of grass.. same 10-12 faces ......
Unexceptionable sentiment. However when exactly is that option...an option? Wait too long and it might well not be one. War must always be an option on the table, take it off and it well might become inevitable.
Major Sahab RR
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In the video how come Indian soldiers have only sticks, and are picking up stones to "attack" the Chinese, who seem to be very well protected in their APCs? This is really amazing!
Also, in Kargil it was some goatherds who saw the well entrenched Pakis after a few months, and alerted the literally sleeping IA. In this case, perhaps the goatherds also were sleeping as IA had no friggin clue that chinese have gobbled up their land. Where are ISRO's satellites that can read the time of the day on your wristwatches?
Also, in Kargil it was some goatherds who saw the well entrenched Pakis after a few months, and alerted the literally sleeping IA. In this case, perhaps the goatherds also were sleeping as IA had no friggin clue that chinese have gobbled up their land. Where are ISRO's satellites that can read the time of the day on your wristwatches?
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In 1967 This Indian showed China ,Who is the Boss !
Usually the Chinese intimidation and harrassment is given a dull response from Indian sides. Indians seem to be in a state of chaos. Questioning the capability of their own military and equipment. One man was odd one out of them. Lt. Gen Sagat Singh was a legendary military leader who was involved in Liberation of Goa as well as Bangladesh.
In order to help Pakistan during the 1965 War, the Chinese served an ultimatum and demanded that India withdraw her posts at Nathu La and Jelep La.
Sagat Singh, who was GOC 17 Mountain Division and on the rank of Major General, refused to vacate Nathu La reasoning that Nathu La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed, which was the natural boundary.
The McMahon Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the watershed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue, in 1962.
Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire into India while denying the same to the Indian troops.
In response, the Chinese through loudspeakers warned the Indian troops, they made threatening postures. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into the Indian territory continued.
On Sep 11, 1967, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the Indian troops working on the wire fence. The Indian Army also retaliated causing greater damage on Chinese. The clash came to end with Nathu La intact with India.
Chinese wanted to intimidate Sagat singh and annex Nathu La, however Singh never got perturbed and stood his ground. As a result the myth of chinese invincibility was broken and Nathu La remains in Indian possession.
Chinese follow a particular behaviour in the way they handle border conflicts with all their neighbours. This roots in the teachings of Ancient Chinese military general Sun Tzu in his 'The Art of War’. Sun Tzu says that greatest art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting and make him concede defeat within his mind. SunTzu talks about harrassing, bullying your enemy and breaking your enemy's confidence.
Lt. Gen Sagat has set a pattern for Indians on how to deal with the Chinese. Indian response since then, to any kind of Chinese harrassment has been of holding up to agression without blinking an eye. It is important for a Indians to understand and respond in a mature manner.
Usually the Chinese intimidation and harrassment is given a dull response from Indian sides. Indians seem to be in a state of chaos. Questioning the capability of their own military and equipment. One man was odd one out of them. Lt. Gen Sagat Singh was a legendary military leader who was involved in Liberation of Goa as well as Bangladesh.
In order to help Pakistan during the 1965 War, the Chinese served an ultimatum and demanded that India withdraw her posts at Nathu La and Jelep La.
Sagat Singh, who was GOC 17 Mountain Division and on the rank of Major General, refused to vacate Nathu La reasoning that Nathu La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed, which was the natural boundary.
The McMahon Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the watershed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue, in 1962.
Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire into India while denying the same to the Indian troops.
In response, the Chinese through loudspeakers warned the Indian troops, they made threatening postures. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into the Indian territory continued.
On Sep 11, 1967, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the Indian troops working on the wire fence. The Indian Army also retaliated causing greater damage on Chinese. The clash came to end with Nathu La intact with India.
Chinese wanted to intimidate Sagat singh and annex Nathu La, however Singh never got perturbed and stood his ground. As a result the myth of chinese invincibility was broken and Nathu La remains in Indian possession.
Chinese follow a particular behaviour in the way they handle border conflicts with all their neighbours. This roots in the teachings of Ancient Chinese military general Sun Tzu in his 'The Art of War’. Sun Tzu says that greatest art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting and make him concede defeat within his mind. SunTzu talks about harrassing, bullying your enemy and breaking your enemy's confidence.
Lt. Gen Sagat has set a pattern for Indians on how to deal with the Chinese. Indian response since then, to any kind of Chinese harrassment has been of holding up to agression without blinking an eye. It is important for a Indians to understand and respond in a mature manner.
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Sela tunnel
The tunnel will cut across and reduce the distance between Dirang and Tawang by 10 km. It's a strategic road to counter China as it give all-weather road to access Tawang which usually gets disconnected during winter. Pass is located at 13,700 ft Baloram kutum
The tunnel will cut across and reduce the distance between Dirang and Tawang by 10 km. It's a strategic road to counter China as it give all-weather road to access Tawang which usually gets disconnected during winter. Pass is located at 13,700 ft Baloram kutum
Anandhu Krishna
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China has definitely crossed India’s Lakshman rekha but it won’t lead to 1962 again
Modi govt has brushed China's construction in Doklam under the carpet. Indians have managed to sustain the fiction of ‘victory’ at Doklam.
LT GENERAL PRAKASH MENON 29 May, 2020 1:34 pm IST
https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Ftheprint.in%2Fopinion%2Fchina-has-definitely-crossed-indias-lakshman-rekha-but-it-wont-lead-to-1962-again%2F431490%2F
https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=China+has+definitely+crossed+India%E2%80%99s+Lakshman+rekha+but+it+won%E2%80%99t+lead+to+1962+again&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheprint.in%2Fopinion%2Fchina-has-definitely-crossed-indias-lakshman-rekha-but-it-wont-lead-to-1962-again%2F431490%2F&via=ThePrintIndia
Is this going to be another 1962?’ asked my neighbour, an 80-year-old naval veteran. ‘Not at all,’ was my instinctive reply, not because I had any special insight into the ongoing military situation in Ladakh, but because 1962-type wars now linger only in military imagination and tend to get confined largely to the dustbin of history. In reality, due to the shadow of nuclear weapons, the remote possibility of such ‘big fights’ tenant the deterrence space that keeps militaries armed with the state-of-the-art weapons system. They are the substance of political threats, but their military utility is circumscribed to campaign plans.
The relevance of campaign plans lies mostly in the psychological sphere, where the real battles are mind games among opposing political and military leaderships. Territorial conquests that involved entire states have been in decline since 1945. But conquests in lesser forms have persisted. China, in particular, has been perfecting the art of ‘least war prone’ form of conquest for several decades, and its seizure of several patches of territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) bears testimony to the Chinese designs, some of which have been highlighted recently by former ambassador and foreign policy expert P. Stobdan.
Also read: China believes India wants Aksai Chin back. PLA has likely secured 40-60 sq km in Ladakh
China’s favourite game
History seldom follows a set pattern. China’s history of territorial conquests falls in the ‘fait accompli’ category. Sparsely populated/unpopulated and undefended territories have been the prime targets, and Chinese moves in East Asia, South China Sea and Sino-Indian border provide ample evidence thereof. Grabbing such territories based on claim lines that were historically fluctuating, and often expanding, has been China’s signature mode. Also, the practice has gained momentum with the growth of China’s power and concurrent internalising of a self-image of surging strength.
The current situation in Ladakh and Sikkim seems to suggest that China is playing its favourite game of seizing disputed territory that is not populated and is not permanently occupied by the border guarding forces. The confrontation in Galwan River valley, Pangong Tso, and Naku La in north Sikkim is sought to be justified as a defensive move by China due to India’s alleged aggressive acts. The official statement of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 May read: “The Indian Army has crossed the line across the western section of the Sino-Indian border and the Sikkim section to enter Chinese territory”.
Advertisement: 3:58
The fact is that disputed areas exit and have been patrolled by both sides. This has been recognised and agreements signed to avoid confrontations such as the current one.
The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) states: “When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the (LAC) where they have different views as to its alignment”. However, even 27 years later, China has avoided reconciling the differing perception of the LAC. It only allows China to claim an imagined LAC alignment, which can be exploited to buttress the argument that India is the aggressor.
Also read: Chinese aggression in Ladakh also a message for domestic and external audience: Experts
The victory at Doklam that wasn’t
Over several decades, China’s success in limited territorial grabs has been papered over by several Indian governments, often apparently in the interests of peace and tranquility. The 2017 Doklam stand-off is revealing, even though the territory in question was a matter of dispute between China and Bhutan. India, however, was a party to the dispute because it involved the tri-junction.
The dispute resolution through an agreement that was restricted only to the stand-off site has emboldened China to occupy the rest of the disputed Doklam plateau with military assets, including the creation of permanent roads and military structures. China has, in reality, carried out a blatant aggression of a manifestly disputed territory. But the Narendra Modi government has so far brushed it under the carpet; instead, for the domestic audience, it has managed to sustain the fiction of ‘victory’ at Doklam. The constructions in the area of the Doklam plateau before the confrontation in 2017 and now are revealing.
Roads near Doka La, 2014-2017
Chinese buildings and trenches have been added over this period, and the road has been widened. Image credit: Google Earth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Roads near Doka La, 2017-2018
Roads have been widened and toppedwith asphalt, and solar panels have been added. Image credit: GoogleEarth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Roads towards Torsa Nalla, 2014-2019
In 2014, only defensive trenches and foot tracks are visible. By 2018, a dirt road was added. By 2019, the road was substantially widened and new buildings were added. Image credit: Google Earth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Through its silence, India has acquiesced to China’s military occupation of the Doklam plateau, except of course at the face-off site where the status quo has been maintained. The Indian public has been misled and the media and political opposition have failed to bring out the truth. Like the current stand-off in Ladakh, both sides did not want to escalate the matter in 2017.
But unlike Doklam, where India agreed to withdraw, as long as China did not make the road just below our post at Doka La, the situation is now reversed. China has prevented the movement of our patrols and is concomitantly creating military fortifications where none existed before. It is apparent that China has taken territorial bites in Ladakh, and did so with the claim that it was necessary because India was the aggressor here. Their modus operandi is now familiar. Territorial conquest short of war is evident.
India has moved troops to contain the aggression. Eviction can happen through agreement or force. Use of force is ruled out as an option because India would not like to escalate matters. Instead, it would use the military, diplomatic and political mechanisms at different levels to restore the status quo. But all that depends on China’s objectives and actions.
Also read: Despite Covid, China will spend more on defence in 2020 than it did last year
China has gained
Speculations on China’s intentions and motivations are rife in the Indian media. Notably, unlike the Indian press, apart from some limited coverage by the Global Times, there is no indication of raising the flag of nationalism in China. There is not even a passing mention of it from the political leadership. In the prevailing global and regional strategic context, the current moves on the boundary dispute may not be about the dispute per se but leveraging it to send a message to India about who is the boss. Therefore, any moves to gang up with the West against China should be eschewed. An indication about this is evident in this Global Times article.
India’s deal on Doklam was accompanied by two placatory moves; a change of stance on Tibetans organising a thanksgiving event commemorating the Dalai Lama’s 60 years of exile, and the cancellation of a seminar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). It was followed by an attempted reset of relations signified by the Wuhan and Mamallapuram spirit. Overall, India’s approach failed the smell test of appeasement and China probably took note of it.
This time, small military bites in two places also give China more bargaining power and Beijing could be hoping that at the end of the current confrontation, which will not result in a war, the status quo could be changed in at least one place and restored in the other. China then gets to send the message across and gains marginally in territory. It is to this game plan that India must play.
Also read: India to seek ‘amicable solution’ with China amid military build-up on LAC
Choices for Indian military and political leadership
The role of India’s military forces is confined to containing the expansion of China’s territorial control in the confrontation areas. That role is relatively easy to undertake because China does not intend to expand. But it will want to keep what it has already bitten off, and use the time to build military fortifications, including roads a la Doklam. The intensity of this could vary in confrontation areas and Galwan might be what China wants to keep because of its proximity to the Darbok-Shyok-DBO road.
The political question is whether China has crossed India’s Lakshman rekha and whether certain steps to increase India’s bargaining power should be taken before serious diplomatic and political talks are undertaken. In my view, it certainly has, because China’s moves are synonymous to military occupation, though its scale is limited. No vital interest of India is directly threatened but its vital interest of strategic autonomy could be under indirect threat. China is trying to influence India’s decision-making in the context of the US-China geopolitical competition. It’s assumption springs from its experience in Doklam that India can be pressured.
The test for the Modi government is: what measures must it take to increase India’s bargaining power with China? These can be both nuanced and explicit, and range from a military quid pro quo that involves small bites to signalling change of stance in our relations with other powers that could include Tibet, Taiwan, Quad Plus, the US and so on.
Amid an expanding pandemic and a devastated economy, India must treat the situation as a Lakshman rekha having been crossed but do so quietly and not beat the nationalist drums, which is the natural proclivity of the media. More importantly, it must not be self-deluded that diplomatic virtuosity can alone handle the situation. Political sagacity and boldness are the need of the hour.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru; and former military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat. He is the author of Strategy Trap: India & Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow. Views are personal.
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Modi govt has brushed China's construction in Doklam under the carpet. Indians have managed to sustain the fiction of ‘victory’ at Doklam.
LT GENERAL PRAKASH MENON 29 May, 2020 1:34 pm IST
https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Ftheprint.in%2Fopinion%2Fchina-has-definitely-crossed-indias-lakshman-rekha-but-it-wont-lead-to-1962-again%2F431490%2F
https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=China+has+definitely+crossed+India%E2%80%99s+Lakshman+rekha+but+it+won%E2%80%99t+lead+to+1962+again&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheprint.in%2Fopinion%2Fchina-has-definitely-crossed-indias-lakshman-rekha-but-it-wont-lead-to-1962-again%2F431490%2F&via=ThePrintIndia
Is this going to be another 1962?’ asked my neighbour, an 80-year-old naval veteran. ‘Not at all,’ was my instinctive reply, not because I had any special insight into the ongoing military situation in Ladakh, but because 1962-type wars now linger only in military imagination and tend to get confined largely to the dustbin of history. In reality, due to the shadow of nuclear weapons, the remote possibility of such ‘big fights’ tenant the deterrence space that keeps militaries armed with the state-of-the-art weapons system. They are the substance of political threats, but their military utility is circumscribed to campaign plans.
The relevance of campaign plans lies mostly in the psychological sphere, where the real battles are mind games among opposing political and military leaderships. Territorial conquests that involved entire states have been in decline since 1945. But conquests in lesser forms have persisted. China, in particular, has been perfecting the art of ‘least war prone’ form of conquest for several decades, and its seizure of several patches of territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) bears testimony to the Chinese designs, some of which have been highlighted recently by former ambassador and foreign policy expert P. Stobdan.
Also read: China believes India wants Aksai Chin back. PLA has likely secured 40-60 sq km in Ladakh
China’s favourite game
History seldom follows a set pattern. China’s history of territorial conquests falls in the ‘fait accompli’ category. Sparsely populated/unpopulated and undefended territories have been the prime targets, and Chinese moves in East Asia, South China Sea and Sino-Indian border provide ample evidence thereof. Grabbing such territories based on claim lines that were historically fluctuating, and often expanding, has been China’s signature mode. Also, the practice has gained momentum with the growth of China’s power and concurrent internalising of a self-image of surging strength.
The current situation in Ladakh and Sikkim seems to suggest that China is playing its favourite game of seizing disputed territory that is not populated and is not permanently occupied by the border guarding forces. The confrontation in Galwan River valley, Pangong Tso, and Naku La in north Sikkim is sought to be justified as a defensive move by China due to India’s alleged aggressive acts. The official statement of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 May read: “The Indian Army has crossed the line across the western section of the Sino-Indian border and the Sikkim section to enter Chinese territory”.
Advertisement: 3:58
The fact is that disputed areas exit and have been patrolled by both sides. This has been recognised and agreements signed to avoid confrontations such as the current one.
The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) states: “When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the (LAC) where they have different views as to its alignment”. However, even 27 years later, China has avoided reconciling the differing perception of the LAC. It only allows China to claim an imagined LAC alignment, which can be exploited to buttress the argument that India is the aggressor.
Also read: Chinese aggression in Ladakh also a message for domestic and external audience: Experts
The victory at Doklam that wasn’t
Over several decades, China’s success in limited territorial grabs has been papered over by several Indian governments, often apparently in the interests of peace and tranquility. The 2017 Doklam stand-off is revealing, even though the territory in question was a matter of dispute between China and Bhutan. India, however, was a party to the dispute because it involved the tri-junction.
The dispute resolution through an agreement that was restricted only to the stand-off site has emboldened China to occupy the rest of the disputed Doklam plateau with military assets, including the creation of permanent roads and military structures. China has, in reality, carried out a blatant aggression of a manifestly disputed territory. But the Narendra Modi government has so far brushed it under the carpet; instead, for the domestic audience, it has managed to sustain the fiction of ‘victory’ at Doklam. The constructions in the area of the Doklam plateau before the confrontation in 2017 and now are revealing.
Roads near Doka La, 2014-2017
Chinese buildings and trenches have been added over this period, and the road has been widened. Image credit: Google Earth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Roads near Doka La, 2017-2018
Roads have been widened and toppedwith asphalt, and solar panels have been added. Image credit: GoogleEarth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Roads towards Torsa Nalla, 2014-2019
In 2014, only defensive trenches and foot tracks are visible. By 2018, a dirt road was added. By 2019, the road was substantially widened and new buildings were added. Image credit: Google Earth | Anirudh Kanisetti
Through its silence, India has acquiesced to China’s military occupation of the Doklam plateau, except of course at the face-off site where the status quo has been maintained. The Indian public has been misled and the media and political opposition have failed to bring out the truth. Like the current stand-off in Ladakh, both sides did not want to escalate the matter in 2017.
But unlike Doklam, where India agreed to withdraw, as long as China did not make the road just below our post at Doka La, the situation is now reversed. China has prevented the movement of our patrols and is concomitantly creating military fortifications where none existed before. It is apparent that China has taken territorial bites in Ladakh, and did so with the claim that it was necessary because India was the aggressor here. Their modus operandi is now familiar. Territorial conquest short of war is evident.
India has moved troops to contain the aggression. Eviction can happen through agreement or force. Use of force is ruled out as an option because India would not like to escalate matters. Instead, it would use the military, diplomatic and political mechanisms at different levels to restore the status quo. But all that depends on China’s objectives and actions.
Also read: Despite Covid, China will spend more on defence in 2020 than it did last year
China has gained
Speculations on China’s intentions and motivations are rife in the Indian media. Notably, unlike the Indian press, apart from some limited coverage by the Global Times, there is no indication of raising the flag of nationalism in China. There is not even a passing mention of it from the political leadership. In the prevailing global and regional strategic context, the current moves on the boundary dispute may not be about the dispute per se but leveraging it to send a message to India about who is the boss. Therefore, any moves to gang up with the West against China should be eschewed. An indication about this is evident in this Global Times article.
India’s deal on Doklam was accompanied by two placatory moves; a change of stance on Tibetans organising a thanksgiving event commemorating the Dalai Lama’s 60 years of exile, and the cancellation of a seminar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). It was followed by an attempted reset of relations signified by the Wuhan and Mamallapuram spirit. Overall, India’s approach failed the smell test of appeasement and China probably took note of it.
This time, small military bites in two places also give China more bargaining power and Beijing could be hoping that at the end of the current confrontation, which will not result in a war, the status quo could be changed in at least one place and restored in the other. China then gets to send the message across and gains marginally in territory. It is to this game plan that India must play.
Also read: India to seek ‘amicable solution’ with China amid military build-up on LAC
Choices for Indian military and political leadership
The role of India’s military forces is confined to containing the expansion of China’s territorial control in the confrontation areas. That role is relatively easy to undertake because China does not intend to expand. But it will want to keep what it has already bitten off, and use the time to build military fortifications, including roads a la Doklam. The intensity of this could vary in confrontation areas and Galwan might be what China wants to keep because of its proximity to the Darbok-Shyok-DBO road.
The political question is whether China has crossed India’s Lakshman rekha and whether certain steps to increase India’s bargaining power should be taken before serious diplomatic and political talks are undertaken. In my view, it certainly has, because China’s moves are synonymous to military occupation, though its scale is limited. No vital interest of India is directly threatened but its vital interest of strategic autonomy could be under indirect threat. China is trying to influence India’s decision-making in the context of the US-China geopolitical competition. It’s assumption springs from its experience in Doklam that India can be pressured.
The test for the Modi government is: what measures must it take to increase India’s bargaining power with China? These can be both nuanced and explicit, and range from a military quid pro quo that involves small bites to signalling change of stance in our relations with other powers that could include Tibet, Taiwan, Quad Plus, the US and so on.
Amid an expanding pandemic and a devastated economy, India must treat the situation as a Lakshman rekha having been crossed but do so quietly and not beat the nationalist drums, which is the natural proclivity of the media. More importantly, it must not be self-deluded that diplomatic virtuosity can alone handle the situation. Political sagacity and boldness are the need of the hour.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru; and former military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat. He is the author of Strategy Trap: India & Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow. Views are personal.
ThePrint is now on Telegram. For the best reports & opinion on politics, governance and more, subscribe to ThePrint on Telegram.
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Anandhu Krishna
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Chinese left behind those 3 military vehicles a duplicate copy of Hummers as Trophy...
View attachment 48972View attachment 48973View attachment 48974
They took it back
Don't underestimate the Chinese. They will occupy the forward positions in our land even in winter due to ego or wanting to teach us a lesson. Would the Pakistanis have vacated the heights in Kargil that they annexed because of winter. No. We drove them out.
Regaining our positions now from the Chinese would be an expensive proposition in terms of manpower needed and effort. They are already well entrenched. The obvious option is to open alternative pressure points for the PLA and negotiate a mutual withdrawal from current positions.
There is a risk of escalation and war but what options do we have?. If we allow the Chinese to alter the status quo what example are we setting. Is it OK for any neighbour to usurp our land?. We will be demoralising our army also.
If diplomacy can resolve the matter and the PLA goes back, very good.
But what are the chances of success in the diplomacy. Will it work at all?.
Hard decisions will have to be made sooner or later. The Corona Virus bogey cannot freeze us into fear and inaction. Russia lost a quarter of it's population in the war against the Nazis. We should be ready for sacrifices if needed.
How do we pressure China to restore status quo ante?. I doubt if even the US has leverage over China.
Gtmbisht82
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Major Sahab RR
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Can anyone educate me where does the LAC actually pass from? Finger 4 or 8. To my knowledge its 4, IB east of 8. Vacuous question but I'm fed up of Panag vs Iyer debate over it.
Major Sahab RR
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IA response to the video making rounds.
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