India China LAC & International Border Discussions

[ninja hattori]

The biggest defeat to CHINA is LOSS OF FACE.

If u make them LOSE THERE FACE you win it,

 

[IndianHawk]

सच पूछो, तो शर में ही
बसती है दीप्ति विनय की
सन्धि-वचन संपूज्य उसी का
जिसमें शक्ति विजय की।

सहनशीलता, क्षमा, दया को
तभी पूजता जग है
बल का दर्प चमकता उसके
पीछे जब जगमग है।

Ok we need a poetry thread.

 

[IndianHawk]

seems


Seems Idea has already resonated with RK Dhowan who was navy chief,
in his paper wrt maritime scenario in two front war,

In case of China, the maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the domain of the air and that of the sea in the Indian Ocean Region. Insofar as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximise its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and in geographical areas where China is strong.

In the maritime domain, this would imply abjuring conflict in the South China Sea or in areas where China can support its surface combatants by its shore-based aircraft. On the contrary, the Indian Navy and Air Force could aim to draw Chinese maritime forces into areas where Chinese shore-based air power cannot be brought to bear and where the Chinese logistics lines would be severely extended. The Indian military could then exploit its ability vis-à-vis integral air power (Carrier-based air power) to advantageously deal with the Chinese surface combatants.

and on the top of this is just a aug 2018 year old paper in series of two front war colloquium for Vivekananda foundation,

and who is the founder of that foundation none other than AJIT DOVAL.

Every idea that till now we have been discussing in forum is already part of our defence strategy.

Let me know if I should post it here.

Do post it. It will be a good read.

 

[ninja hattori]

*R K Dhowan, Chairman, National Maritime Foundation and the Former Chief of the Naval Staff. ​

In an armed conflict against India, China and Pakistan could choose either a collaborative or a collusive approach. The former involves one country openly aiding its partner/ ally, whereas the latter involves more covert
cooperation between the two. These approaches could lead to the following scenarios, among others:

(a) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan, and China intervenes with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favourable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low.

(b) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China.

(c) India and China are engaged in armed conflict and Pakistan supports China by activating India’s western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such support being extended by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is, therefore, high. (THIS IS WHAT IS HAPPENING RIGHT NOW)

It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with China is quite likely to lead to India facing a two-front war scenario, involving China and Pakistan.

 

[Bhadra]

The biggest defeat to CHINA is LOSS OF FACE.

If u make them LOSE THERE FACE you win it,

Spell that down into actions ... then compare options and suggest best option

 

[IndianHawk]

*R K Dhowan, Chairman, National Maritime Foundation and the Former Chief of the Naval Staff.


In an armed conflict against India, China and Pakistan could choose either a collaborative or a collusive approach. The former involves one country openly aiding its partner/ ally, whereas the latter involves more covert
cooperation between the two. These approaches could lead to the following scenarios, among others:

(a) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan, and China intervenes with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favourable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low.

(b) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China.

(c) India and China are engaged in armed conflict and Pakistan supports China by activating India’s western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such support being extended by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is, therefore, high. (THIS IS WHAT IS HAPPENING RIGHT NOW)

It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with China is quite likely to lead to India facing a two-front war scenario, involving China and Pakistan.

Good summary.
The problem with pakistan is that it has no money to sustain conflict even for few days. These scenario only work when pakistan is in robust financial situation. Which is almost a fantasy now.

 

[ninja hattori]

What is to be done?

There is no gainsaying that two Armies do not, by themselves, go to war. Nor do two Navies, or two Air Forces. Two nations go to war. In recognition of this truism, a two-front war ought not to be planned-for (and certainly not executed) at the level of individual armed forces. On the contrary, all three Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards the political and military aims of such an armed conflict. India’s joint approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre — not at the Corps level, but at the ‘Theatre’ one. Basically, rather than confronting the adversary solely at his chosen point -of-attack (just as what everyone at DFI is shouting and it seems we might not be able to comprehend but things are going in same direction), India should be in a position to stem or contain such an attack.

Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a geographical area or a domain of our choosing, where India is strong, and the adversary is weak or vulnerable.

In case of China, the maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the domain of the air and that of the sea in the Indian Ocean Region. Insofar as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximise its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and in geographical areas where China is strong.

In the maritime domain, this would imply abjuring conflict in the South China Sea or in areas where China can support its surface combatants by its shore-based aircraft. On the contrary, the Indian Navy and Air Force could aim to draw Chinese maritime forces into areas where Chinese shore-based air power cannot be brought to bear and where the Chinese logistics lines would be severely extended. The Indian military could then exploit its ability vis-à-vis integral air power (Carrier-based air power) to advantageously deal with the Chinese surface combatants.

Further, India could aim to optimally exploit Chinese ‘sensitivity’ that is centred upon the concept of ‘loss-of-face’. For instance, if we were to utilise trade warfare — not so as to disrupt China’s economic lines of communication, but to cause a visible ‘loss of face,’ as might occur if we were to successfully commandeer a Chinese-flagged oil tanker and overtly take it to an Indian port.(I dnt know if u people can resonate the capturing of porbandar ship with this ) This would have negligible economic impact upon China, but the perceived loss of face would be enormous. This would, then, force the Chinese to dispatch surface units to ‘visibly’ protect its merchantmen. However, such surface combatants would be extremely vulnerable to Indian carrier-based attrition. This is a relatively simplistic example showing how India might bring asymmetries in maritime power (that are favourable to it) to bear in a geographical area of its choosing so as to be able to draw China into outcomes that are so unfavourable to it, as to negate any gains that might accrue to China against India on land. Similarly, other avenues favourable to India in the domain of the air should be explored and exploited by the Indian Air Force.

Overall, every effort should be made to exploit India’s comparative advantages in maritime and airborne combat by forcing China to deploy its naval sea-power and its military air power along extended logistics lines, while keeping its own logistics lines as short as is feasible. The strategy for conflict should be to employ several operational enablers, including Maritime Domain

The first step in conflict preparation is to deter it. Effective deterrence is a qualitative aspect measured in terms of deterrent value, which, in India’s case, has been covered in detail in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) 2015, “Strategy for Deterrence” (Indian Navy, 2015, pp 46-59). Further, “the core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, will remain centred on conventional deterrence and conventional military forces” (Ibid, pp. 50) . Therefore, to maintain a high deterrent value, there is a need to maintain capabilities and numbers. Of course, it is these very same capabilities, and numbers that would be used should the adversary ignore the deterrent value and actively seek conflict instead. The Indian Navy is the principal instrument and manifestation of India’s maritime military power. Therefore, there is a need to continuously exercise at sea and hone professional skills and ability to maximise the Navy’s combat potential through operational enablers and actions that have been outlined in the IMSS 2015 ‘Strategy for Conflict’ (Ibid, pp. 60-77). As a part of contingency-planning, there would be a need to match missions with capabilities, identify weak areas and gaps, and factor-in methods of addressing them. The aim would be to attain the country’s political objectives of war and bring the conflict to an early and favourable conclusion by influencing decisions on land. To do so, maritime operations would focus on the adversary’s political, military, economic, informational and psychological paradigms. These issues are relatively easier to achieve than are the larger issues of resources, budgetary allocations, and a unified and integrated approach.

Capabilities and numbers come at a high cost to the Exchequer. However, to maintain a high two-front war deterrence-value and better combatpotential, there is a need to reprioritise the defence budget. The present and future capabilities, and numbers required have been mentioned in the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. This plan, which is capability based and mission dominated, outlines the requirement for developing the Indian Navy as a balanced, multi-dimensional, networked force, with multi-mission, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the full spectrum of combat power. There is a clear need to continuously re-evaluate requirements, based upon the adversary’s capabilities and the Navy’s own operational philosophy. It is important to reiterate that it is the nation as a whole that goes to war and not just a single Service or part thereof. Integration — across the board — both military and civilian, would be an essential component of planning for and addressing the challenges and threats of a two-front war. The cost of preparation may well be high, but the price of failure is utterly unaffordable. The recently constituted Defence Planning Committee, while assessing the arithmetic of a two-front war, should factor these considerations while evaluating the optimal Indian response to a “worst case scenario” of a ‘two-front war’ involving Pakistan and China acting in concert against India.

The Indo-Pacific Region has emerged as the world’s centre of gravity in the maritime domain and there is no doubt that the current century is the century of the seas. As India emerges as a resurgent maritime nation, the importance of the seas to its national interests will continue to increase. The threats to these interests and national security in the maritime domain will need a constant appraisal and joint preparedness to counter their rise.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Post #4089 refers again...

Chinese rotten tea stinks.....

I went to China for work and they offered me tea.

I was happy thinking it will be good.

Tasted like someone took his socks after a days work and boiled it with water.

 

[ninja hattori]

*K K Nohwar, Director General of Center for Air Power Studies and the Former Vice Chief of Indian Air Force

The View from the Air


K K Nohwar*

G eography poses a security dilemma for every nation, and needs to be addressed for the preservation of national integrity. While India’s neighbour to the West is as concerned about the security situation on its western/ north-western border areas as it is on its eastern border with India – a twofront dilemma for India would also have to take into account the possibility of a ‘two-front war’. If China were to get into a skirmish with India, would Pakistan seize the opportunity to create trouble on the Western front? This ‘two-front challenge’ is therefore a concern for the armed forces. While Pakistan might actually take advantage of such an opportunity, the pronouncements by the Chinese of not being opportunistic by opening a second front against India in case of a war/skirmish between India and Pakistan is borne out by their restraint during all India-Pak conflicts in the past -- 1965, 1971 and also the Kargil conflict (1999).

While the Chinese stance of the past might sound propitious for the policy-makers, the defence planners would rather err on the side of caution. National security should never be taken lightly, especially when one is faced with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Moreover, a collusive intent between these two nations – whose friendship has been noted for its rhetoric as being “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans and sweeter than honey” – cannot be ignored.

The possibility of India facing a ‘two-front war’ was articulated at the highest levels in the Indian Government as early as November 2014 when the National Security Advisor, during his address at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, said, “India has two neighbours, both nuclear powers (which) share a strategic relationship and a shared adversarial view of India.” While the
national leadership would engage its known adversaries on all fronts – economic, political, diplomatic and military (through joint military exercises to build confidence) – a pragmatic view would be not to let one’s guard down. To ‘speak softly and carry a big stick’ demands that the ‘stick’ has to be seen as a deterrent – sufficiently lethal to spread fear in the minds of any adversary who steps out of line in its attitude and actions. This would come at a great cost. However, once the Chanakyan missive of resolving conflicts through the adoption of the Dandniti – Sama, Daama, Bheda, Dand – is understood, no leadership would hesitate to ensure that its armed forces are adequately armed to carry out the necessary coercion, without ever being at the receiving end.

The reach of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has improved substantially over the years, and as demonstrated during the recently concluded IAF Exercise Gagan Shakti (08-22 April 2018). The Su-30 MKI, flying from the Eastern airbases, was able to fly across the country and ‘attack’ targets in the Arabian Sea more than 2500 km away and recover at a base in Southern India, covering a total distance of more than 4000 km. This capability of the IAF to undertake offensive action to deter/punish an adversary makes it the natural first instrument of choice – the first responder – in any conflict situation. Also, in case required to defend against a pre-emptive attack by an enemy, while the Army holds on to the nation’s territory resolutely on the ground, and the Navy ensures freedom of Sea Lines of Communication while simultaneously enforcing a blockade in respect of the Western adversary, it is the Air Force that would prevent interference by enemy air to India’s surface forces.

It is, therefore, necessary that while considering the defence preparedness of the armed forces, adequate consideration be given to ensure that the Air Force remains a potent force, not only as a strong deterrent able to effect punishment on a wayward enemy, but also maintain the required ‘dissuasive’ posture against an adversary that is modernising its Air Force at a galloping pace. The present manning level of the IAF is a cause for concern. With only 31 squadrons at present, and the likelihood of winding down of all MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons by 2024, the IAF would be in a precarious position unless accretions – whether of single-engine fighters (Light Combat Aircraft) or the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (for which a Request For Information has been floated in April 2018) – take place by then (2024). The slow pace of production of the LCA does not give reassurance to an IAF that stares at depletion to its fighter fleet in the next six to eight years. And numbers are important .

During Ex Gagan Shakti – where more than 9000 sorties were flown by fighters alone (of the total 11,000 plus sorties flown during the Exercise) – the ‘surge ops’ demonstrated by the IAF during the first phase of the Exercise saw more than 5000 sorties being flown in just 3-4 days. This effort by the IAF was not lost on our adversaries who had been watching the progress keenly, and prompted the Chinese media to praise India’s effort, albeit ‘grudgingly.’

To ensure that the IAF – as the primary instrument of military diplomacy/military coercion – remains adequately potent, urgent steps are needed for preventing a slide in the number of squadrons from the existing 31 squadrons, and after that a gradual build-up to 42 squadrons by 2032. Meanwhile, as has been demonstrated by the IAF during Ex Gagan Shakti, the IAF would remain prepared to fight with what is at its disposal in the highest traditions of the Military – although this may amount to entering the boxing ring with one hand tied behind its back!

Joint planning and joint training would always remain the cornerstones of an effective and efficient armed force that would be able to meet the demands placed on it by the nation’s polity in times of crises.

 

[IndianHawk]

What is to be done?

There is no gainsaying that two Armies do not, by themselves, go to war. Nor do two Navies, or two Air Forces. Two nations go to war. In recognition of this truism, a two-front war ought not to be planned-for (and certainly not executed) at the level of individual armed forces. On the contrary, all three Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards the political and military aims of such an armed conflict. India’s joint approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre — not at the Corps level, but at the ‘Theatre’ one. Basically, rather than confronting the adversary solely at his chosen point -of-attack (just as what everyone at DFI is shouting and it seems we might not be able to comprehend but things are going in same direction), India should be in a position to stem or contain such an attack.

Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a geographical area or a domain of our choosing, where India is strong, and the adversary is weak or vulnerable.

In case of China, the maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the domain of the air and that of the sea in the Indian Ocean Region. Insofar as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximise its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and in geographical areas where China is strong.

In the maritime domain, this would imply abjuring conflict in the South China Sea or in areas where China can support its surface combatants by its shore-based aircraft. On the contrary, the Indian Navy and Air Force could aim to draw Chinese maritime forces into areas where Chinese shore-based air power cannot be brought to bear and where the Chinese logistics lines would be severely extended. The Indian military could then exploit its ability vis-à-vis integral air power (Carrier-based air power) to advantageously deal with the Chinese surface combatants.

Further, India could aim to optimally exploit Chinese ‘sensitivity’ that is centred upon the concept of ‘loss-of-face’. For instance, if we were to utilise trade warfare — not so as to disrupt China’s economic lines of communication, but to cause a visible ‘loss of face,’ as might occur if we were to successfully commandeer a Chinese-flagged oil tanker and overtly take it to an Indian port.(I dnt know if u people can resonate the capturing of porbandar ship with this ) This would have negligible economic impact upon China, but the perceived loss of face would be enormous. This would, then, force the Chinese to dispatch surface units to ‘visibly’ protect its merchantmen. However, such surface combatants would be extremely vulnerable to Indian carrier-based attrition. This is a relatively simplistic example showing how India might bring asymmetries in maritime power (that are favourable to it) to bear in a geographical area of its choosing so as to be able to draw China into outcomes that are so unfavourable to it, as to negate any gains that might accrue to China against India on land. Similarly, other avenues favourable to India in the domain of the air should be explored and exploited by the Indian Air Force.

Overall, every effort should be made to exploit India’s comparative advantages in maritime and airborne combat by forcing China to deploy its naval sea-power and its military air power along extended logistics lines, while keeping its own logistics lines as short as is feasible. The strategy for conflict should be to employ several operational enablers, including Maritime Domain

The first step in conflict preparation is to deter it. Effective deterrence is a qualitative aspect measured in terms of deterrent value, which, in India’s case, has been covered in detail in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) 2015, “Strategy for Deterrence” (Indian Navy, 2015, pp 46-59). Further, “the core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, will remain centred on conventional deterrence and conventional military forces” (Ibid, pp. 50) . Therefore, to maintain a high deterrent value, there is a need to maintain capabilities and numbers. Of course, it is these very same capabilities, and numbers that would be used should the adversary ignore the deterrent value and actively seek conflict instead. The Indian Navy is the principal instrument and manifestation of India’s maritime military power. Therefore, there is a need to continuously exercise at sea and hone professional skills and ability to maximise the Navy’s combat potential through operational enablers and actions that have been outlined in the IMSS 2015 ‘Strategy for Conflict’ (Ibid, pp. 60-77). As a part of contingency-planning, there would be a need to match missions with capabilities, identify weak areas and gaps, and factor-in methods of addressing them. The aim would be to attain the country’s political objectives of war and bring the conflict to an early and favourable conclusion by influencing decisions on land. To do so, maritime operations would focus on the adversary’s political, military, economic, informational and psychological paradigms. These issues are relatively easier to achieve than are the larger issues of resources, budgetary allocations, and a unified and integrated approach.

Capabilities and numbers come at a high cost to the Exchequer. However, to maintain a high two-front war deterrence-value and better combatpotential, there is a need to reprioritise the defence budget. The present and future capabilities, and numbers required have been mentioned in the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. This plan, which is capability based and mission dominated, outlines the requirement for developing the Indian Navy as a balanced, multi-dimensional, networked force, with multi-mission, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the full spectrum of combat power. There is a clear need to continuously re-evaluate requirements, based upon the adversary’s capabilities and the Navy’s own operational philosophy. It is important to reiterate that it is the nation as a whole that goes to war and not just a single Service or part thereof. Integration — across the board — both military and civilian, would be an essential component of planning for and addressing the challenges and threats of a two-front war. The cost of preparation may well be high, but the price of failure is utterly unaffordable. The recently constituted Defence Planning Committee, while assessing the arithmetic of a two-front war, should factor these considerations while evaluating the optimal Indian response to a “worst case scenario” of a ‘two-front war’ involving Pakistan and China acting in concert against India.

The Indo-Pacific Region has emerged as the world’s centre of gravity in the maritime domain and there is no doubt that the current century is the century of the seas. As India emerges as a resurgent maritime nation, the importance of the seas to its national interests will continue to increase. The threats to these interests and national security in the maritime domain will need a constant appraisal and joint preparedness to counter their rise.

This is good. We have been talking about these points.

Porbandar ship seizure was indeed humiliating for china. Infact even doklam was as india exploited Chinese weakness in the tri- junction area.

This is template for future conflict management with china. They will happen over multiple fronts and domains and will run parallely.

Australia logistics agreement and quad revival is also part of this strategy.

 

[Brood Father]

Talks will surely fail.. Why china will talk to a nation which cannot defend it's boundary..
China will only urge for talks when PLA will be sent in body bags.
We should now escalate. Enough of china bullshit

 

[IndianHawk]

Talks will surely fail.. Why china will talk to a nation which cannot defend it's boundary..
China will only urge for talks when PLA will be sent in body bags.
We should now escalate. Enough of china bullshit

What boundary?? Conflict now is about patrolling beyond lac which china is blocking .we are similarly blocking Chinese patrol to our side of lac.

But we are not tolerating Chinese temporary camps in the grey area.

 

[ashdoc]

Psy Ops: In Ladakh standoff with India, China’s PLA replays Doklam tactics

China People’s Liberation Army is up to its old tactics to weaken the Indian resolve in the on-going stand-off at Pangong Tso and Galwan River in Eastern Ladakh.

m-hindustantimes-com.cdn.ampproject.org

China plays psy ops in engagement with India .

 

[Coalmine]

 

[ezsasa]

No news as of now. But as you can see we are also threatening china with more standoffs.

it should also be considered that there is a chance that, the longer these talks are delayed, the longer IA might have to postpone arty strikes for this summer.

Two weeks back, there was news that grass was accumulating to infiltrate on the other side and we are yet to hear about any Major arty strikes.

 

[Bhadra]

TV - Sources say Border Personnel Meeting Ends Inconclusively....
Five hours talks - Chinese love to talk....
Post # 4089

 

[Brood Father]

What boundary?? Conflict now is about patrolling beyond lac which china is blocking .we are similarly blocking Chinese patrol to our side of lac.

But we are not tolerating Chinese temporary camps in the grey area.

Sorry too many posters are now confirming that china has occupied strategic points either in gray area or inside our claim area. Army and government silence is not helping either.
China is getting emboldened everyday with our silence

 

[Tridev123]

BM-21 grad set chinese ass on fire.

It was called the Katyusha rocket?. Right?. The Russians don't tolerate nonsense.

 

[ezsasa]

TV - Sources say Border Personnel Meeting Ends Inconclusively....
Five hours talks - Chinese love to talk....
Post # 4089

Chinese love to stall, if things are not going their way...

 

[Bhadra]

Sorry too many posters are now confirming that china has occupied strategic points either in gray area or inside our claim area. Army and government silence is not helping either.
China is getting emboldened everyday with our silence

I slap you hard... to convey a massage..
If you acknowledge that and go crying in the town. I have achieved my aim..