India China LAC & International Border Discussions

[IndianHawk]

The problem of a dispute between any two countries can only be solved by mutual agreements or treaties. The application of military power is also resorted for obtaining a favorable agreement/treaty at the end of it. A counter to military power, say PLA, is thus either the application of military power or a favourable treaty.

In our position Vis a Vis China (PLA), the Chinese have already attained their desired objectives of the annexation of Tibet and capture of territory that gives them a secure road to Xinjiang (both given to them on Leftist Love Plate by Nehru). They are in possession of areas and are the victors of the war. However, the Chinese having stopped or made to stop at a particular line, still have contrary claims to territories and borders between the two countries. For them it is now - "Ye Dil Mange More".

For Indians, it is a loss of claimed territory but a military gain of territories where even the British Empire had not reached physically. India is almost firmly on McMahon Line in East and a fairly good defense line in Ladakh.

The Options with India are but a few only:

* Capture territory that is considered Indian but India does not have sufficient military power for it. So wait for India to become a powerhouse.

* Negotiate a favorable agreement - Chinese are not ready for it as they wish to use the dispute along with military coercion as an instrument of diplomacy against India.

* China also awaits for that historical period when China is a superpower and captures desired Indian territory in the guise of dispute in the future or negotiate from a position of strength.

* India for the time has no option but to manage the border in a peaceful manner and ensure no more territory is lost, gain comprehensive national strength and negotiate a favorable border agreement or use comprehensive military power to settle borders at an opportune historical time.

At present, the Chinese feel that they can bully India due to their superior national/military power. multiple external threats to India forcing India to divide military strength. force excessive defense expenditure on India to retard economic growth and finally force India to divert resources from Indian Oceans to the Himalayas.

Therefore India has to manage Himalayan borders very cleverly and judicially.

Chinese control of tibet is never secure. British empire didn't annex tibet because it was too difficult to maintain control in that climate and returns were minimal. However British kept a resident commissioner in Lhasa which exerted influence on behalf of empire.

Coming to present Chinese know that as India gets stronger tibet becomes more vulnerable as Chinese mass are still 1500km away from tibet. And tibetian climate is not suitable for major deployment. Indian threat to tibet is perennial. That's why Chinese claim even more so that India remains on defensive about tibet because once India adopts aggressive posture toward tibet then china will have to put massive resources to secure tibet and supply them from 1500km to 2000km away while Indian Land mass is just south of Himalayas already ready to supply man and machines.

That is why china howled at bramhos deployment and raising of Mountain strike corps.
In fact tibet could become Kashmir of china . It will never be truly secure from India no matter how many resources china puts there . Chinese jets can't fly properly in rare air of tibet . Supply lines overstretched and can be taken out with precision weapon. Local population hostile to china.

In this context see all the Chinese action. And you will understand what is actually happening.

 

[Bhadra]

I think that CAPFs already have a training at par with army's light infantry.

No sir. They are rarely employed as a unit or subunit together except maybe in Naxal areas. There is nothing known as light Infantry - yes they can perform limited infantry roles if trained well.

Military training means - a CAPF unit/subunit should be able to mesh in with military formations or with army units for holding ground as also for offensive actions along with them or independently. That necessitates similarity of drills, procedures, weapons, ammunition, communication, and logistics and entire supply chain. This also means meshing up the command and control elements which is a far cry and dark area when it comes to police forces. Military operations demand unity of command and not a multiplicity.

There is no joint exercises or operational oriented training, no military training imparted to CAPF which is required to be undergone on a regular basis. Unoriented troops in the battlefield are a liability rather than an asset.

CAPF must be made to undergo minimum of two to three months of military training for their assigned military roles in operational areas where they would be employed for military roles.

Their officer cadre should be made to go through military courses and training as a mandatory requirement. All CAPF officers must undergo Commando Course, Weapon training and JC courses as a bare minimum requirement.

All IPS officers must be made to undergo minimum JC and DSSC courses of IA before being eligible to touch CAPF in any manner. No IPS should be posted to any position in CAPF unless he has commanded a CAPF unit.

There are bare minimum.

 

[cereal killer]

Chinese control of tibet is never secure. British empire didn't annex tibet because it was too difficult to maintain control in that climate and returns were minimal. However British kept a resident commissioner in Lhasa which exerted influence on behalf of empire.

Coming to present Chinese know that as India gets stronger tibet becomes more vulnerable as Chinese mass are still 1500km away from tibet. And tibetian climate is not suitable for major deployment. Indian threat to tibet is perennial. That's why Chinese claim even more so that India remains on defensive about tibet because once India adopts aggressive posture toward tibet then china will have to put massive resources to secure tibet and supply them from 1500km to 2000km away while Indian Land mass is just south of Himalayas already ready to supply man and machines.

That is why china howled at bramhos deployment and raising of Mountain strike corps.
In fact tibet could become Kashmir of china . It will never be truly secure from India no matter how many resources china puts there . Chinese jets can't fly properly in rare air of tibet . Supply lines overstretched and can be taken out with precision weapon. Local population hostile to china.

In this context see all the Chinese action. And you will understand what is actually happening.

You mentioned that Tibet can become Kashmir of China which is hypothetically correct but have Chinese tried to integrate Tibetans into the mainland China? Is there any anti Chinese Element in Tibet? Of course Tibetans living in exile in India hate Chinese to the core but Is the situation same in Chinese controlled Tibet? That is the main question.

 

[Bhadra]

Chinese control of tibet is never secure. British empire didn't annex tibet because it was too difficult to maintain control in that climate and returns were minimal. However British kept a resident commissioner in Lhasa which exerted influence on behalf of empire.

Coming to present Chinese know that as India gets stronger tibet becomes more vulnerable as Chinese mass are still 1500km away from tibet. And tibetian climate is not suitable for major deployment. Indian threat to tibet is perennial. That's why Chinese claim even more so that India remains on defensive about tibet because once India adopts aggressive posture toward tibet then china will have to put massive resources to secure tibet and supply them from 1500km to 2000km away while Indian Land mass is just south of Himalayas already ready to supply man and machines.

That is why china howled at bramhos deployment and raising of Mountain strike corps.
In fact tibet could become Kashmir of china . It will never be truly secure from India no matter how many resources china puts there . Chinese jets can't fly properly in rare air of tibet . Supply lines overstretched and can be taken out with precision weapon. Local population hostile to china.

In this context see all the Chinese action. And you will understand what is actually happening.

Many of your assumptions and facts are debatable.

China has had mush more closer links with Tibet than India had with Tibet. Tibet is not only the roof of the world but a roof of China. It is major source of water for China. Tibet is suitable to pose a direct land threat to mainland China and Tibetans have carried out military expeditions into China in the past and ruled many parts of it. Similarly Tibet has been under Chinese control even in the past.

Tibet as of today is well integrated with mainland with multiple lines of all-weather secure communication lines by roads, rail, and air. Population and religious institutions are well under control.

Ratified air is applicable to both the airforces. It is the bases (take off load) that make the difference if any.

It is only the Tibetan govt in exile and control over religion by Dalai Lama coupled with a large Tibetan population in India that rattles China. Imagine that force being supported by India being launched into Tibet. The hell will break loose. It is much more than Sayid Sallahauddin being in Muzzarabad with an Army called Hizbul, LET and JeM.

 

[Suryavanshi]

Should consider light tanks for LAC now.

Judging by the landscape, Aksai Chin can become a place of major tank skirmish.

Which places at LAC can see possible armoured corps action in case of a war?

 

[mist_consecutive]

Are you sure those are air refuellers?
Do not forget many posts there are air maintained which includes drops from transport aircraft...

I first assumed that it's actually IL-76 going for a routine cargo drop at border. But then I found out the registration/tail number of the plane, which is RK-3452.

I searched it up and to my amazement, it is indeed IL-78MKI of IAF.

The fun thing is, IL-78MKI does not have a functioning cargo door, hence it cannot be used for cargo operations. It is only capable of A2A refueling.

Which means it was definitely air-refueling our jets on Sikkim skies

 

[HariPrasad-1]

China specific pralay testing delay is cause of concern. It has not been tested even after many announcements.

 

[Suryavanshi]

I first assumed that it's actually IL-76 going for a routine cargo drop at border. But then I found out the registration/tail number of the plane, which is RK-3452.

I searched it up and to my amazement, it is indeed IL-78MKI of IAF.

The fun thing is, IL-78MKI does not have a functioning cargo door, hence it cannot be used for cargo operations. It is only capable of A2A refueling.

Which means it was definitely air-refueling our jets on Sikkim skies

Looks like going to kailash Mansarovar won't be a hassle anymore.

 

[Bhadra]

Should consider light tanks for LAC now.

Judging by the landscape, Aksai Chin can become a place of major tank skirmish.

Which places at LAC can see possible armoured corps action in case of a war?

Yes ... the subject might have been adequately considered by the Indian Army.

When one speaks of tanks or mechanized forces, their utility lies in using those as maneuver force to conduct mobile warfare. That means sufficient avenues of egress must exist so that mechanized forces are able to project themselves in a favorable position to threaten enemy flanks or turn the defenses or draw the enemy in to destroy them on the chosen ground. That means suitable stretchs of sufficient depth and width, say minimum 15-20 km, should exist astride the LAC. Those are very few in East or in Ladakhs because there are either funnel traps or a line of ridges one after the other.

Another area where mechanized forces can be profitably used is to support Infantry attacks, shoot them in or carry infantry to the objective particularly on negotiable hill features and undulating plateaus. Such employment can be profitable and prove to be force multipliers.

How much light should the light tanks be is a function of terrain, ATK density of defenses and doctrine? That is but debatable.

 

[aarav]

Surprisingly Chink media is very quiet regarding recent border brawls as one may call it in normal times they might breathing fire questioning India & it's democracy and would have called UNSC meeting on kashmir ,if you read their own media & analysts regarding these flare ups ,acc to them indian have way higher presence now than ever before ,IAF & IA helicopters have contributed to that, Recently concluded exercises Him Vijay in AP & changtham prahar in Ladakh have proved indian army's rapid deployment for strike roles in LAC ,I don't see them doing any flare ups in near future.In Pic T-72 Ajeya in Valleys of Ladakh

 

[Bhadra]

India getting Important position in WHO, Trump wanting India to finger China on Corona Vius issue, India building a road up to Lipulekh, border skirmishes in North Sikkim and Ladakh, Nepal raising the border dispute with India = all of these are required to be viewed as one issue - composite Chinese signaling of a hostile attitude towards India. Though the COAS says the incident are not related but their timings and sequences point towards something else.

For me. the main issue appears to be Road to Lipulekh. This the closest India has reached near the LAC in Uttarkhand border by road. Chinese military garrison of Taklakot / is barely 15 km from Lipulekh and their highway connecting Tibet with Western areas (LAC) and Jinjiang is under interdiction range. If one is able to cut off this road entire Chinese Ladakh LAC is compromised with only alternatives to support that from Jinjiang.

Well done Shri Narendra Modi and well done General Rawat. Gen Rawat should not forget how Garhwali and Kumaoni generals like Barthwal have captured Taklakot many times in the past.

Uttarakhand CM has a proposal to take tourists and pilgrims up to Lipulekh for Kailash darshan... That is the second stage which must be followed through.

I can foresee another MSC for Uttarakhand in next twenty years.

Soon India will be able to connect Barahoti by road.... well done all.

 

[Bhadra]

Military Significance of Lipulekh

 

[Bhadra]

Military Significance of Lipulekh

 

[BangaliBabu]

China specific pralay testing delay is cause of concern. It has not been tested even after many announcements.

most of us are not taking this very issue seriously indeed.

 

[Absolut_Vodka]

If our govt and babus were able to play on front foot, we should have facilitated a mini war on our LAC with narrative of China being imperialist commie aggressor against Indian democracy, a wannabe nazi against a liberal pluralistic regime. We could have browbeaten China in Info-warfare, especially since Covid-19 hit home in every nation making it personal to every Tom, Dick and Harry in west, thereby negotiate Askai Chin from higher moral ground. This was once in a lifetime opportunity to neutralize China and PLA whilst gaining back territory/ies.

But our dhoti shivering setup rather play stone pelting with PLA than trapping Chinese into being aggressive, supremacist bully against weaker, docile India in times of Covid-19.

Just imagine China raging a war at this moment, how would have narrative built against them giving India a freepass. Already China is bullying weaker economies and trying for hostile takeovers of their businesses. But we allow them to needle us while try to downplay their incursions.

A wasted opportunity when whole world is fuming at China and CCP.

 

[Skyh3ck]

Aksai chin never coming back with current attitude of Indians..nobody cares about anything.. people are busy in their whatsapp and tick tok.. media is busy earning more... There is no narrative about aksai chin or China..

World is looking at USA to teach China.. nobody wants to get dirty..

Our Babu's does not care

 

[Skyh3ck]

Even if india would have shot those chinese helicopter.. india would be seen as hero and the news may have hit on front page of newspaper of entire world.. not a full war.. but just let China bleed litle bit..

It's like everyone is fed.. but nobody wants to starts first

 

[HariPrasad-1]

most of us are not taking this very issue seriously indeed.

To win a battle against china, we need china specific weapons like Brahmos, pralay etc. Which can steep dive on other side of mountain on target. China has S400 so as India will have. Air attack will be suicidal for both the countries. It will be very difficult for china to maintain supply line on north east and in laddakh. We need to build infrastructure and adopt offense posture such as more encroachment in chinese occupied territory, hard dealing with chinese troops like we are doing in recent time. One of our junior officer knocked down chinese senior army officers with a punch recently. We need more and more such incidents.

 

[AMCA]

For Operation Falcon, Maj Gen Jimmy asked for mules but Army chief Sundarji gave helicopters
Major General J. M. Singh suggested a forward posture in the Zimithang sector and requested for 1,200 mules but Army chief Sundarji gave him helicopters.
AVM ARJUN SUBRAMANIAM (RETD)15 May, 2020

Major General J.M. 'Jimmy' Singh (left) with Lieutenant General N.S. Narahari | Photo: Special arrangement/Lt Gen J.M. Singh (Retd)

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It was the summer of 1986 and Major General J.M. ‘Jimmy’ Singh, the divisional commander of the Indian Army’s 5th Mountain Division, was alerted to the setting-up of a Chinese camp in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh.
Located in an area that was north of the ‘Limits of Patrolling’ — LOP — as laid down for Indian troops, but was considered ‘disputed’ by the Chinese, the Wangdung grazing ground emerged as a bone of contention between India and China over the next ten months. Interestingly, it was also close to the Namka Chu Valley where the Indian troops had been overwhelmed by the People’s Liberation Army — PLA — in 1962.
This is the story of Indian armed forces’ Operation Falcon.

The trio’s strategy
Jimmy moved swiftly, dispatching a protective patrol to Lungro La, a pass overlooking the Sumdorong Chu Valley, which if occupied, would offer easy access to the Tawang defences. He simultaneously deployed 81mm infantry mortars to support Lungro La and gave the patrol commander discretion to open fire with small arms if the Chinese approached the pass. Even as Jimmy readied an infantry battalion to move to Lungro La, he realised that it was 15 kilometres from the nearest road-head, much like in 1962. There was much to be done in terms of laying a 13-kilometre track to facilitate the deployment of field artillery, an essential task if the battalion was to beat off a likely assault.

Jimmy was fortunate to have a supportive corps commander in Lieutenant General N.S. Narahari, who was commanding the Tezpur-based 4 Corps. Despite the cautious advice from Eastern Army Command and New Delhi not to provoke the Chinese, the duo went about their immediate task of deterring the Chinese with speedy outflanking deployments. This was when General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, the Chief of Army Staff, responded to a personal outreach from Narahari, where the latter urged him to visit the area and gauge the gravity of the situation.

Maj. Gen. J.M. Singh with his corps commander, Lt Gen. Narahari and other officers, surveying the area | Photo: Special arrangement/Lt Gen J.M. Singh (Retd)
Sundarji’s visit to Tawang laid the foundation for what has since emerged as among the best-executed deployments in the mountains that combined both defensive and offensive posturing. Recollecting vignettes from that briefing, Jimmy recalls telling Sundarji bluntly that he could not defend Tawang with his existing posture. Sundarji responded by saying, ‘Then I will sack you.’ Narahari then jumped in and requested Sundarji to hear Jimmy out. When Jimmy suggested a forward posture in the Zimithang sector, Sundarji responded, ‘Who is stopping you? Why don’t you go forward’? When Jimmy suggested that he needed 1,200 mules to maintain his troops and that it would take several months to build-up positions, Sundarji interjected, ‘Why are we talking mules in this era? Let’s talk about helicopters.’


Support for Operation Falcon
Soon, Air Chief Marshal Denis La Fontaine arrived on the scene and promised to send in the newly inducted Mi-17 medium-lift helicopters to supplement the older Mi-8s, which were already in action. Swiftly moving a brigade to the Zimithang sector and speedily constructing helipads and dropping zones to sustain the troops and fly-in field artillery guns, mortars and ammunition stocks, Jimmy soon had the first Bofors regiment to support him. While the Mi-8s operated from Guwahati and Tezpur, Mi-17s operated a detachment from Tawang.

Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major, the only helicopter pilot to become Chief of Air Staff, had just raised 127 Helicopter Unit with Mi-17s. He recollects that he maintained two detachments, one at Thoise to support operations in Siachen, and the second at Tawang to support Operation Falcon. “Each pilot in the unit used to average 100 hours a month during the initial months. The good part was that my pilots were battle inoculated in almost war-like operations on a new type immediately after induction,” he added. Flying from dawn to dusk, the helicopters from five units crisscrossed across the sector with one aim – Loads must Go (LMG).

Major General J.M. Singh enjoying a hot cuppa with troops from 5 Mountain Division | Photo: Special arrangement/Lt Gen J.M. Singh (Retd)

From a woefully defensive posture in the summer of 1986, by Spring 1987, Jimmy had the contours of a neo-forward posture that was assisted by tracks and had engineer-support, adequate logistics stocking and a well-oiled air maintenance network.

Building on the success of the proactive defensive posture, Narahari and Jimmy also thought about the unthinkable as the winter crept along — a limited offensive to evict the Chinese from Wangdung and secure the Thagla ridge and the PLA base across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Le. In sync with this idea, Sundarji moved one brigade from Shillong and placed it under Jimmy’s command for counter-attack and counter-offensive tasks, and practiced it in this role in tough winter conditions. Jimmy recollects that he “had 100 guns ready to boom in support of his initial offensive with a total of 37 fire units (222 guns) and 1,200 tons of gun ammunition available to him for a sustained operation.”

While the operation was shelved as the Chinese did not continue with any provocative moves, Sunderji firmly stood by Narhari and Jimmy as he injected the idea of sustained helicopter-based maintenance in the mountains and provided resources to test this concept successfully.

Operation Falcon was followed up with Exercise Chequer Board, a table-top exercise that introduced the concept of a Reorganised Army Mountain Division (RAMID) and laid the foundations for offensive joint operations in mountainous terrain. Operation Falcon was undoubtedly one of Sunderji’s successes as Army chief. Jimmy is certain that had it flared-up into a localised conflict, the PLA would have got a bloody nose, if not across the LAC, but certainly in the Tawang sector.

The author is a retired Air Vice Marshal of the IAF and a military historian. These are vignettes from a forthcoming book soon to be published by Harper Collins India. Views are personal.

 

[Bhadra]

Aksai chin never coming back with current attitude of Indians..nobody cares about anything.. people are busy in their whatsapp and tick tok.. media is busy earning more... There is no narrative about aksai chin or China..

World is looking at USA to teach China.. nobody wants to get dirty..

Our Babu's does not care

China is a big "Hawa" for the Indian establishment as nothing worst has ever shaken the new "India Elites", the modern "Bharat Bhagya Vidhata" as badly as 1962 fiasco. They could literally feel that their newly acquired by transfer empire called India could slip out of their hands. It was almost an existentialist crisis,,,,

It did upturn many things in the Indian establishment. MEA became the boss of all China affairs even to the extent of bringing NEFA (North East Frontiers Agency - Today's Arunachal Pradesh) under their administrative control. The MEA babus were appointed as administrators (equivalent to today's DC or DM) inside India. Indian babus shivered so badly that Army was kept 200 km away from the McMahon Line. The IB, main culprits of 1942 (a la Malik and Bhatia) and subsequently RAW got paranoid and started devoting efforts towards LAC and Tibet. The army started asserting its independence in the execution of plans as per military requirements rather than politicians and bureaucrats whims and fancies.

The good thing that emerged was that all vital agencies and stakeholders- MEA. MoD, IB, RAW, Survey, State administration, think tanks and institutions were brought on board at some single platforms to considers China issues which gave rise to many groups such as CSG (China Study Group).

What is intended to convey is that China occupies a considerable space at least in top ruling establishment of India. China continues to dominate the strategic space and is not a matter that is ignored for the male/ female conversion dramas of TikTok.

Just look at the list of our Foreign Secretaries as also a list of our COAS and see how many of those have been China experts or Eastern Army Commanders. That does reflect on the space China commands in their minds.

In our national consolidation efforts great strides have been made restoring Indian frontiers bases on the Himalayas and beyond as exists in our mythical, cultural and historical mindset. It is a great mission in restoring our historical legacy. Everyone especially the Armed Forces have played a great role in that nobal mission.

It was our great Army that had to inch and crawl forward into NEFA to throw MEA babus out of it and make it possible for Arunachal Pradesh to be the 22nd state of India. They won a state for the IAS babus.