India China LAC & International Border Discussions

[tsunami]

Damn ! Say whatever you want, but Modi acts like a true leader. His one speech can motivate the whole country.

Off Topic :- That beard is so badass it can break necks of two Chinese alone !

Off topic but OMG...

 

[ezsasa]

Lessons from Somdurong Chu Incident






April 26, 2013

The 4057 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the largest undemarcated and disputed land border in the world. It has the unique distinction of being the most 'peaceful' border with not a shot being fired over the last 46 years, save a standoff at Nathu La in 1967, when a display of resolve by the Indian Army prevented further escalation. However, there have been some serious incidents of escalation of tension between the two nuclear powered neighbours which were successfully diffused by a combination of adroit diplomacy, ‘show of force’ and political statesmanship. The most notable among these was the Somdurong Chu incident, sometimes called the Wangdung incident, in 1986-87 in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the LAC.​

On 26 June, 1986, the Government of India (GOI) lodged a formal protest with the Chinese government that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had intruded in the Thandrong pasture on the banks of the Somdurong Chu (river) under the Zimithang circle of Tawang district. This was days before the seventh round of border talks which was due between the two countries. The area of intrusion, in the vicinity of the Thag La ridge, had seen bloody conflict in 1962. Considered neutral since 1962-63, it was not monitored till 1980. Patrolling resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984, India established a post in the area manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), a para-military force , which was vacated in winters. On 16 June 1986, a patrol of 12 ASSAM regiment of the Indian Army noticed Chinese presence in the area and construction of a few permanent structures. The Chinese soldiers were initially identified to be 40 and were soon reinforced by 200 more troops. They were being maintained by mules along a seven km mule track. By August, they had constructed a helipad and were being air supplied.1​

The GOI, made an offer to China to withdraw from the area with an understanding that India would not reoccupy the vacated area, the following summer. This was rejected by the Chinese. At the Seventh round of border talks that were held from 21-23 July 1986, despite the standoff, the issue was discussed “intensively” with no solution, resulting in acrimony and tension.2 Meanwhile, the Chinese 'dug in' to prepare to stay through the winter of 1986. The Indian Army then air lifted a Brigade from 5 Mountain Division to Zimithang and occupied the ridges dominating the Somdurong Chu. Deng Xiaoping took a tough stand and said that it was time to "teach India a lesson”, a message conveyed through the visiting US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger during a stopover at New Delhi from Beijing. Simultaneously, the PLA moved 20,000 troops of the 53 Group Army and 13 Group Army along with guns and helicopters. There were reports that unemployed Tibetan youth were recruited at RMB 300 per month, essentially for administrative duties.3 Tibetans also reported movement and mobilisation of PLA in the areas around Lhasa and parts of the Tibetan plateau. The Indian Army moved up to three divisions into the positions around Wangdung, maintaining them by air. In addition as many as ten divisions were mobilised to the Eastern sector with almost 50,000 troops in Arunachal Pradesh alone with substantial assets from the Indian Air Force. Simultaneously, the Indian Army conducted a massive air- land exercise called 'Chequerboard ' which commenced in October, 1986 and continued till March 1987.4 This was in conjunction with another major military exercise called ‘Brasstacks’ on the western borders. These exercises demonstrated the will and capability of the Indian armed forces to fight a war on both fronts. ​

Soon after, hectic diplomatic parleys between the two countries worked towards defusing the situation. In April 1987, defence minister K.C Pant made a scheduled transit halt at Beijing and delivered a message of peace. In May 1987 the external affairs minister N.D Tiwari visited China reaffirming the desire of the GOI to continue border talks and lower tensions. In August, the field commanders met on the ground and agreed to move their posts apart. By November, the eighth round of border talks were held which called for an end to ‘military confrontation’ and laid the ground work for the pull back of the militaries. Subsequently, China extended an invitation to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in 1988. ​

What were the lessons learnt?

For China, it appears the standoff diverted the focus of attention from Aksai-chin to the Eastern sector, linking the two to any future solution of the border dispute. China also realized the futility of conflict with a determined, well prepared and well-equipped Indian Army. According to Keshav Mishra, "Overt display of military power had effectively neutralised any adventurist step" by China.5 Moreover, it was China that extended the ‘olive branch’ inviting Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in a bid to normalise the relations. In retrospect, the firm will of the GOI may have been instrumental in shaping China’s strategy of ‘a face saving pull out’ from Somdurong Chu.​

For India, it was a wakeup call. The GOI immediately shifted focus on infrastructure development, logistic management, redeployment of additional resources and construction of airfields and advanced landing grounds in the North East, changing its policy of years of neglect of the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).6 As a beginning, India voted for statehood for NEFA and the new state of Arunachal Pradesh was created in December 1986. It would be pertinent to quote Rajiv Gandhi in his speech to Parliament on 3rd March 1987. ​

He said:​

"There has been tension on our border with China. We want a peaceful settlement of the border issue. It will need wisdom and statesmanship. It will need vision and firmness. Firmness is included in wisdom….. It is this perspective that should guide our countries in seeking a solution to the problem".7 ​

The recent Chinese intrusion at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) on 15 April this year and the ongoing standoff with the PLA is in many ways similar to the Somdorung-Chu incident. India could do well to learn from the past while chalking out strategies for an amicable solution to the present.​

So as expected, it's going to be a prolonged affair this time too.

 

[Willy3]

China now claims Vladivostok as it's territory......

They had those claims from sino -soviet split era, they claim everything south of amur river

 

[Bhadra]

Arriving at a new normal in India-China relations: An Opinion
The ongoing stand-off between the Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh is a fork in the road, fundamentally reshaping the direction of the bilateral relationship. Over the last few years, the architects of the gradual thaw and developing partnership between the two sides, which began in 1988, had been warning about the withering of old mechanisms that had kept the peace on the disputed boundary.

There is nothing new for the better. From Chinese perspective. the new normal is India accepting a subjugated or a second rung status like a vessel of China at par with Pakistan. If the equal and fair status was never accepted by China any time before as reflected in the five agreements relating the border management being heavily loaded in favor of China.

Since that regime has been put by the Chinese in the dustbin and a favorable regime of advantage to India is not acceptable to them . a new normal can not be reached unless the two side have a common ground to stand on.

 

[ninja hattori]

Rajiv Gandhi’s policies towards Pakistan yielded mixed outcomes as well. New Delhi’s principal concerns were Pakistan’s nuclear programme, its support for rebels in Punjab, and the ongoing military engage

ments over the Siachen glacier. Gandhi was willing to work with President Zia ul Haq on nuclear confidence-building measures and on the Siachen glacier. A crisis, however, was triggered by India’s decision ​

to conduct a massive military exercise in Rajasthan named Brasstacks. The idea of a large-scale exercise was apparently mooted by the Prime Minister (who also held the defence portfolio) at the end of 1985. The

army chief, General Sundarji, embraced it as an opportunity to test new doctrines and systems recently inducted into the armed forces. Accounts differ as to whether there was any larger political-military objective vis-à-vis Pakistan (​

Bajpai et al. 1995​

; ​

Chari et al. 2007​

). In any event, Pakistan was rattled by the scale and scope of the exercise being conducted very close to its border.

Prime Minister Junejo of Pakistan met Gandhi on the margins of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in November 1986 and expressed his concerns. Gandhi assured him that this was merely a training exercise and that it would be scaled down. However, this assurance was not conveyed to the military, which continued with the exercise as originally envisaged. Meanwhile, Pakistan

moved its main offensive formations closer to the border. This led to some counter-deployment by the Indian army. Gandhi later told Gorbachev that ‘t is quite possible that if we did not deploy our forces, the Pakistanis would be able to quickly grab a piece of our territory, proclaim “Khalistan” there, and hand it over to the Sikhs.’ The Indian army, he added, was also ‘itching’ to have a go at Pakistan.​

[SUP]12[/SUP]​

By January 1987, a major

crisis was on hand and the superpowers urged India and Pakistan to back off from the brink of war. On 24 January 1987, Gandhi told the Pakistani envoy in New Delhi that the border situation needed to be rapidly defused. Official talks were announced soon after. Gandhi also invited President Zia to watch an India–Pakistan cricket match the following month.​

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In response to the Chinese troop presence in this area in the summer of 1986, the Indian army chief, General K. S. Sundarji, moved some Indian forces right athwart the Chinese built-up position. When an Indian

demarche failed to elicit any response from Beijing, an entire brigade of the Indian army was airlifted close to Sumdorong Chu. The Chinese responded with a build-up of their forces. In December 1986, New Delhi granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, so emphasizing its hold over the region. The Chinese response was predictably strong and soon a serious crisis seemed to loom. In May 1987, Prime Minister

Gandhi sent the Foreign Minister to Beijing—a move that paved the way for a resolution of the stand-off.​

​

The Sumdorong Chu episode drove home the importance of ensuring a stable border with China and, more importantly, of seeking a new and broader basis for the relationship with China—one that would not be focused solely on boundary questions. Gandhi and his advisers felt that China too might be open to a rap

prochement owing to similar considerations. From mid-1987, New Delhi opened several lines of back-channel communication with Beijing to probe the latter’s mind about a possible visit to China by the Prime Minister. However, attempting such a dramatic move—the first prime ministerial visit to Beijing in 34 years—required overcoming strong opposition both within and outside the Congress Party. The sources of

this opposition were many and various: memory of the humiliating defeat of 1962; the experience of Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee’s abortive visit in 1979; and pro-Tibetan lobbies that hinted at appeasement. Gandhi had the numerical majority, but his own position was under siege following allegations of kick-backs in the Bofors weapons procurement deal. Once China extended the invitation, the Prime Minister reached

out to all significant political leaders across the spectrum, but he was determined to proceed in any case. Extensive preparations were undertaken to ensure that the visit did not undermine the Prime Minister’s position. For instance, the joint statement to be issued during the visit was negotiated with the Chinese six weeks before Gandhi reached Beijing.​

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[ninja hattori]

So as expected, it's going to be a prolonged affair this time too.

some more similarities ,

1986

1. operation brasstacks was ongoing and it was a huge exercise which build apprehensions even in USSR, pakis were scared, Rajiv told ussr that its just an exercise it will end soon but the military wasn't conveyed the same. Which points to the direction of some ulterior motive of army.

and then the Chinese showed up.

2020

2. again now we had our cards for GB ready,

and now again the Chinese showed up.

 

[cereal killer]

some more similarities ,

1986

1. operation brasstacks was ongoing and it was a huge exercise which build apprehensions even in USSR, pakis were scared, Rajiv told ussr that its just an exercise it will end soon but the military wasn't conveyed the same. Which points to the direction of some ulterior motive of army.

and then the Chinese showed up.

2020

2. again now we had our cards for GB ready,

and now again the Chinese showed up.

Just a normal query What makes you think that India was ready to make a move over GB this year? Apart from usual rhetoric nothing quite was being done on that front. Unless Chinese may have pre empted that Modi might make a move closer to 2024 after India gets Rafale & S400.

 

[ezsasa]

some more similarities ,

1986

1. operation brasstacks was ongoing and it was a huge exercise which build apprehensions even in USSR, pakis were scared, Rajiv told ussr that its just an exercise it will end soon but the military wasn't conveyed the same. Which points to the direction of some ulterior motive of army.

and then the Chinese showed up.

2020

2. again now we had our cards for GB ready,

and now again the Chinese showed up.

Yup, and it does look like CCP has been an insecure regime for a long time. they get spooked easy, just that people haven't focussed on this aspect much, and allowed the CCP to get on with their propaganda & military buildup for three decades without interruption.

 

[HindaviSwarajya]

That within 48 hrs there will be a news of de-escalation. GoI would capitulate and retract their demands that Chinese must go back to their positions prior to April. The de escalation will be on Chinese terms and status quo as of current will be accepted and Chinese will remain where they are.

Hellfire has confirmed that's what happening as well. Read the thread.

Stop this negetivity. If that was the case why r we acquiring wepons on emergency basis. Why modi went there. Why are we increasing troop deployment. Its insult to 20 brave soldiers who gave their all. I dont like to rant but few kids crying surrender forced me to reply. This is defence forum and such comments are surprising. Cry at the end and end is not now or even winter. This is long game.

 

[ninja hattori]

Just a normal query What makes you think that India was ready to make a move over GB this year? Apart from usual rhetoric nothing quite was being done on that front. Unless Chinese may have pre empted that Modi might make a move closer to 2024 after India gets Rafale & S400.

art 370 scrap doesn't qualifies for it?

and gaganshakti exercise in 2018.

and many more.

CDS post created specifically to retain Bipin raut,

gen vk singh as minister,

general dalbir singh Suhag as envoy to Seychelles.

its like u have 4 COAS in one govt. what for?

Doval still remains NSA

Jaishankar called in.

In pak bajwa gets extension,

we will have rafale from next year which makes the move to be timed now,

also s400 and many other planned acquisitions,


I know this are things that one may overlook, but dnt u think in geopolitics coincidence have no room.
Similar thing happened when operation brasstacks happened. when zia explicitly told ambassador that they will nuke Mumbai if paks physical existence is threatened.

also jaishankars reiterance on every intl forum and policy think tanks that India can only move forward by solving its LEGACY issues and we will do that.

 

[Sanglamorre]

Stop this negetivity. If that was the case why r we acquiring wepons on emergency basis. Why modi went there. Why are we increasing troop deployment. Its insult to 20 brave soldiers who gave their all. I dont like to rant but few kids crying surrender forced me to reply. This is defence forum and such comments are surprising. Cry at the end and end is not now or even winter. This is long game.

Why don't you take it up with the defence professional whose words I've quoted here?

Ask him those questions. I'll wait to see the interaction on that Twitter thread.

 

[ninja hattori]

old one yet relevant

this gives an insight in the strategic thinking that we will not let this problem just pass but SOLVE it for once and for all

China prepared for what they wanted to become, India should start: Jaishankar

The major problem between the Indians and the Chinese is when the latter looks at a problem they start thinking 'how do I solve the problem', says Jaishankar.Citizenship issue or Article 370 or Ayodhya — we have let problems accumulate over a period of time, says the Foreign Minister

www.livemint.com

 

[Absolut_Vodka]

Off topic but OMG...

View attachment 51908

It's indian armed forces that's keeping mustache up, let's not overglorify modi. He can make tough and unpredictable decisions but he has got back of braves on the ground

But I will concede, China made a massive mistake messing up with modi. Modi looks like a lion because we were ruled by timid, compromising leadership for past two elections

China, a closed echo chamber like that gutter Abdul forum, took him lightly and tried to pull an adventure, shown their place by battle hardened army breaking necks of baby faced hans.

This clash will end with Xi losing power and possibly going to gallows.

 

[ARVION]

The chini are war gaming today at UAR with the Artillery's

 

[captscooby81]

Russian Embassy in india trolled back chinese

China now claims Vladivostok as it's territory......

 

[tigerhill]

A countdown has begun today
India will awake to life and freedom of a different kind
Beat the drums
The men will cheer, the boys will shout and the ladies they will all turn around
and we will all feel gay when johnny comes marching home again!!

 

[ninja hattori]

It's indian armed forces that's keeping mustache up, let's not overglorify modi. He can make tough and unpredictable decisions but he has got back of braves on the ground

But I will concede, China made a massive mistake messing up with modi. Modi looks like a lion because we were ruled by timid, compromising leadership for past two elections

China, a closed echo chamber like that gutter Abdul forum, took him lightly and tried to pull an adventure, shown their place by battle hardened army breaking necks of baby faced hans.

This clash will end with Xi losing power and possibly going to gallows.

may be I m wrong ,

but I have a feeling that CHINESE got themselves trapped in coming to help there slave pak.

Now MODI is finding an opportunity to get both things done at same time.

He makes u see somewhere else and acts somewhere else.

 

[HariPrasad-1]

Mr Parathsarthy says in 1986. India dropped the Para Brigade behind the Chinese and surrounded them in Sumdorong Chu ??
Is it so ... my God how come I do not know it... ... does any one know this ..
This is 2020 ... and it should not be a secret anymore...
Did Sunderjee really do it ?????

This is a well known incident. China was very much impressed by sunder ji's move and invited him to china after his retirement.

 

[ezsasa]

Two of the lessons to be learnt from this episode with CCP, so far.
1) Is that we are in dark as to views inside of china among general population.
2) we need a lot more indian satellite imagery experts in public domain.

 

[Bhadra]

But the L & T and the DRDO's proposal to get a tank would not be possible until 2022 due to the DRDO'S funding only started in late 2019's and the proposal is still only in a initial stage of prototype's stage

The hull's would be raised and the turret would be auto turret with better armor ror the hull and with an a targeted weight of 42 tonne's with much better speed and endurance and range's

Firstly. one needs to carry out an environmental scan to see what kind of Tank forces exist in the areas where this so called light tank is proposed to be deployed. Is this tank going to face enemy MBT or only some assorted armored vehicle platforms. The answer is that we are likely to encounter something like Chinese 36 ton T-15 type of tanks. So the answer is that we should ideally go in for a Meduim tank (45 -50 tons) failing which a light tank (32 -38 tons) to meet our requirements.

China is likely to always use light tanks due to distances, logistics and incapability of Medium or heavy tank being brought to our borders over land or by air. To counter that we can easily build up a force of medium tanks at desired locations.

Secondly. we need to determine what areas and how much are suitable for employment of such machines. We can say four to six Regiments for Ladakh. One regiment for North Sikkim and two for Silurian Corridor. That makes it to about 450 to 500 tanks.

105mm gunned BMP has been tried and rejected. Now the general is proposing that a gun be mounted on L&T Vajra hull making that to be around 42 ton tank. If so that really does not make much of a difference from T-72 and T-90 tanks which are better platform as a tank.

If numbers and cost is the problem, I suggest we mount a 1200 -1400HP engine on Vijayanta and that would make it a 39 -40 ton tank with a proven and accurate 105mm gun. India has enough experience and expertise on that tank. With a holding of about 2000 Vijayant tanks converting about 500 tanks with new engines. Why do not we try Vajra engines on Vijayanta ? Moreover, enough spares are available in the form cannibalized parts from 2200 Vijayants... this is the easiest and most practical way to jump in the fray.

Why have we just junked Vijayant into derelicts... it was our MBT till yesterday. Not only upgraded in engines but Vijyant can also have add on Armour protection of up to 4 -5 tons weight and be a runner. Only Mud Corps have to shed their prejudices about Vijayant.. it can be a useful runner for Ladakh..