India-China Border conflict

[rvats]

Thank you, that's very insightful. About point 46, why didn't you account for Pakistan? Especially cuz there have been considerable degree of cooperation between the two countries and if we are going by the timeline of 5-7 years to conflict that means what if China-Pakistan all these exercises will finally culminate to that and we will see attack from Pakistan too?

There are two scenarios of 2-front war -

(1) India-Pakistan shooting match and the Chinese intervene on side of Pakistan.
(2) India-China shooting match and Pakistan front gets activated.

In case of (2), China does not need Pakistan to physically intervene to achieve its objectives against India. Yes, what can happen is that the Pakistanis can create tension on international border or LOC, and this restricts India's ability to move formations from west to east. An open intervention by Pakistanis will lead to immediate pressure from the world community. And India can always threaten conflict going nuclear because of pressure on two-fronts.

In first case, China can do something similar. As in, they can put pressure on eastern border and prevent us from moving formations to west. But yes, in case China feels that India is likely to achieve major breakthrough against Pakistan, you never know, they might intervene physically as well.

For example, if India makes major gains in Gilgit-Baltistan area, then it will seriously compromise Chinese CPEC project in Pakistan. China might intervene to safeguard its investments.

One thing you need to consider is that India-Pakistan shooting match can happen in two windows - prior to Monsoon, and in winters. Both these periods allow for use of armor in plains as plains don't have standing crops. Of course, pressure can be put in winters as well.

Similarly, in case of India and China, shooting window is summers, before monsoon. And before onset of winters. In 1962, the war took place in October-November window.

 

[hit&run]

There are two scenarios of 2-front war -

(1) India-Pakistan shooting match and the Chinese intervene on side of Pakistan.
(2) India-China shooting match and Pakistan front gets activated.

In case of (2), China does not need Pakistan to physically intervene to achieve its objectives against India. Yes, what can happen is that the Pakistanis can create tension on international border or LOC, and this restricts India's ability to move formations from west to east. An open intervention by Pakistanis will lead to immediate pressure from the world community. And India can always threaten conflict going nuclear because of pressure on two-fronts.

In first case, China can do something similar. As in, they can put pressure on eastern border and prevent us from moving formations to west. But yes, in case China feels that India is likely to achieve major breakthrough against Pakistan, you never know, they might intervene physically as well.

For example, if India makes major gains in Gilgit-Baltistan area, then it will seriously compromise Chinese CPEC project in Pakistan. China might intervene to safeguard its investments.

One thing you need to consider is that India-Pakistan shooting match can happen in two windows - prior to Monsoon, and in winters. Both these periods allow for use of armor in plains as plains don't have standing crops. Of course, pressure can be put in winters as well.

Similarly, in case of India and China, shooting window is summers, before monsoon. And before onset of winters. In 1962, the war took place in October-November window.

The objective is to kill as many Chinese on the border we can.

Many frontiers will be lost in either scenario and many will be won.

The confrontation with Pakistan will be quite straightforward and will be weighed in attrition and land grab before negotiations revert everything back to status quo. Propaganda notwithstanding.

With China the war will be fought first to change the old inertia and perception of the peaceful border to start new hostility with clear objectives of denying them any easy access to disputed border and beyond like they enjoy now.

Both jumping in to start this two front war will make sure Pakistan loses all its steam before exhausting itself defending Punjab and central Sindh and then staying quite for a decade or so.

China on the other hand will be engaged with similar contempt like we rage it on LOC.

 

[rvats]

Excellent analysis !

Few questions, if I may -

• If we factor in that Chinese were unprepared to fight or escalate, how do you see the carefully-planned Galwan ambush fitting into their strategy ? I say ambush because they were carefully prepared to fight that day, from bringing special forces, arming troops with riot-gear and medieval weapons, and going straight to our officer (Col. Santosh Babu) ?

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.
- The only people who actually spoke truth about the whole incident were the Chinese!
- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.
- But what this conflict did do was put the fear of God into the Chinese. And told them that Indians will not simply roll-over and die.
- Their game plan in Galwan was to gain access as far as possible towards Shyok so that they could keep DSDBO under observation.
- Now, post disengagement, they've gone deep back inside the Galwan river valley.

China reinforcing Tibet-PoK makes sense because India may become adventurous as we grow as an economy and a military power. However, China attacking us (instead of holding a defensive posture like the current situation) makes little sense. What does China possibly suppose to gain from that ? They cannot steamroll us, both sides will take massive losses, possibly NATO jumping in, or at least a naval blockade. All this for a few kilometers of land ?
Thanks !

- As I've explained before, this particular instance of stand-off has happened because the Chinese miscalculated. This is my reading of the situation.
- However, what this stand-off revealed to the Chinese is how much they were lacking in terms of infrastructure to position, and sustain troops in this sector.
- It is one thing to have troops for a few months but quite different to sustain them over a longer period.
- And that too, in a area which grows nothing. Which cannot provide food, electricity, and other resources to sustain the troops.
- The Chinese have to bring everything from their rear bases in Xinjiang which is 1,000+ kilometers away.
- Like how we do Winter Stocking for entire northern sector to sustain our troops over 6-8 months, the Chinese also have had to now do that.
- Plus, under Modi, they also have to factor that should India change its political stand and go on offensive in eastern Ladakh, Chinese would not have sufficient troops to stop the Indians (as I mentioned earlier, they used to have only 2-3 Border Defense Regiments in entire Eastern Ladakh).
- So, now they have to maintain and sustain a much larger body of troops here.
- And this enhanced infrastructure will form base for any future hanky-panky they might try in eastern Ladakh, as well as opposite Himachal and Uttarakhand.
- As for steamrolling part - well, they don't need to launch a massive ops across entire sector. They will aim to launch an assault in one or two sub-sectors where they can be visibly seen to have achieved victory over us.
- For example, they might launch an operation to interdict DSDBO road as it enters the Murgo gorge and isolate entire Depsang Plains and DBO sector.
- This is a high optics, high impact operation and then, they'll wait and see if India escalates. But will be prepared if it does.
- Think of slapping someone in front of a large crowd and he cannot retaliate because you've a strong group behind you - that hurts a person's ego and self respect much more than proper beating!

 

[ezsasa]

What most Chinese will be reading from the alleged IW masterstroke.

India will have to come up with some sort of name/term for the disparity in "narrative setting" ability between us and our adversaries. when our side tries to create a narrative, it always have to overcome more obstacles ( foreign and domestic ), than the other side. by the time the confusion is cleared, the narrative itself is muddled with doubts. this applies to domestic politics as well.

 

[Compersion]

all talk of the similarity by and between 1962 and 2022 and how it will be better and different this time for Bharat.

During 17-19 December 1961 : there was Incorporation of the Portuguese colonial territories of Goa, Daman and Diu into the Republic of India

Do we replace the above with certain (current) Pakistan Areas as a prelude ...

 

[rvats]

Any thoughts on how long will it take for PLA to learn the skill set manage the climatic conditions in that region? have they already mastered dealing with High altitude warfare, or is it in progress?

say they have 50,000 troops on that given day, within those 50,000 not every infantry man will be fighting fit. the longer they are deployed in the region, higher the chances for them to develop/refine SOP’s to manage high altitude medical issues.

There are two aspects to this high-altitude warfare question.

First, logistics.

Everything said and done, the Chinese are good at creating and managing logistics. So, they'll work out and establish lines of communication and SOPs to sustain troops in the region. And ways to handle weather, altitude and temperature related issues effecting equipment. From weapons to vehicles to tanks to radars to communication equipment, food and POL storage, etc.

I think they'll sort out this part over a 2-3 winter cycles.

Next comes the more difficult part - human resource.

As I said earlier, the Chinese have been manning their side with minimum number of troops of Border Defense Regiments. As you might have seen in the Chinese propaganda pics and videos, these soldiers have good infrastructure, and generally go about their patrolling business in 4 x 4 vehicles.

They aren't exposed to elements like our troops who see 24x7 deployment in very tough environment.

So, the real issue is with respect to both physical and mental health of the Chinese troops. Being positioned in a harsh environment like eastern Ladakh for prolonged period has serious repercussions on mental and physical health, not to mention reduced physical performance.

Other important thing to remember is that 70%-80% of the Chinese soldiers are draftees - i.e. they serve in the army for only 2-years. Most of them are in the army not out of choice but compulsion. The one-child policy of China is coming to bite them bad. Not many families want to send their only child to army for 2-years.

You can imagine the motivation level of these soldiers in a harsh, and tough terrain like Ladakh.

If the news reports about the Chinese having to rotate a large body of troops back to plains, and more focus on recruiting Tibetan soldiers, are true, then the Chinese already have a problem at their hand.

 

[prasadr14]

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.
- The only people who actually spoke truth about the whole incident were the Chinese!
- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.
- But what this conflict did do was put the fear of God into the Chinese. And told them that Indians will not simply roll-over and die.
- Their game plan in Galwan was to gain access as far as possible towards Shyok so that they could keep DSDBO under observation.
- Now, post disengagement, they've gone deep back inside the Galwan river valley.



- As I've explained before, this particular instance of stand-off has happened because the Chinese miscalculated. This is my reading of the situation.
- However, what this stand-off revealed to the Chinese is how much they were lacking in terms of infrastructure to position, and sustain troops in this sector.
- It is one thing to have troops for a few months but quite different to sustain them over a longer period.
- And that too, in a area which grows nothing. Which cannot provide food, electricity, and other resources to sustain the troops.
- The Chinese have to bring everything from their rear bases in Xinjiang which is 1,000+ kilometers away.
- Like how we do Winter Stocking for entire northern sector to sustain our troops over 6-8 months, the Chinese also have had to now do that.
- Plus, under Modi, they also have to factor that should India change its political stand and go on offensive in eastern Ladakh, Chinese would not have sufficient troops to stop the Indians (as I mentioned earlier, they used to have only 2-3 Border Defense Regiments in entire Eastern Ladakh).
- So, now they have to maintain and sustain a much larger body of troops here.
- And this enhanced infrastructure will form base for any future hanky-panky they might try in eastern Ladakh, as well as opposite Himachal and Uttarakhand.
- As for steamrolling part - well, they don't need to launch a massive ops across entire sector. They will aim to launch an assault in one or two sub-sectors where they can be visibly seen to have achieved victory over us.
- For example, they might launch an operation to interdict DSDBO road as it enters the Murgo gorge and isolate entire Depsang Plains and DBO sector.
- This is a high optics, high impact operation and then, they'll wait and see if India escalates. But will be prepared if it does.
- Think of slapping someone in front of a large crowd and he cannot retaliate because you've a strong group behind you - that hurts a person's ego and self respect much more than proper beating!

And if India decides to blockade Chinese vessels in Indian ocean and especially in straits, China will be squirming.

The reason China desperately need ports in Indian Ocean is to get around this nasty equation in their plans for India.

Any blockade in straits would have cascading effects on any plan Chinese have in Himalayan Range.

 

[ezsasa]

There are two aspects to this high-altitude warfare question.

First, logistics.

Everything said and done, the Chinese are good at creating and managing logistics. So, they'll work out and establish lines of communication and SOPs to sustain troops in the region. And ways to handle weather, altitude and temperature related issues effecting equipment. From weapons to vehicles to tanks to radars to communication equipment, food and POL storage, etc.

I think they'll sort out this part over a 2-3 winter cycles.

Next comes the more difficult part - human resource.

As I said earlier, the Chinese have been manning their side with minimum number of troops of Border Defense Regiments. As you might have seen in the Chinese propaganda pics and videos, these soldiers have good infrastructure, and generally go about their patrolling business in 4 x 4 vehicles.

They aren't exposed to elements like our troops who see 24x7 deployment in very tough environment.

So, the real issue is with respect to both physical and mental health of the Chinese troops. Being positioned in a harsh environment like eastern Ladakh for prolonged period has serious repercussions on mental and physical health, not to mention reduced physical performance.

Other important thing to remember is that 70%-80% of the Chinese soldiers are draftees - i.e. they serve in the army for only 2-years. Most of them are in the army not out of choice but compulsion. The one-child policy of China is coming to bite them bad. Not many families want to send their only child to army for 2-years.

You can imagine the motivation level of these soldiers in a harsh, and tough terrain like Ladakh.

If the news reports about the Chinese having to rotate a large body of troops back to plains, and more focus on recruiting Tibetan soldiers, are true, then the Chinese already have a problem at their hand.

yes and on a side note, if there indeed is a periodic schedule from PLA, then LAC will probably be in limelight again in 2023.

There must be an expert debate on whether PLA can acquire high altitude mountain warfare skills three or more years from now, ultimately mountain warfare is a skillset, you try enough number of times you are bound to get it right eventually.
I say three years because that seems to be their cycle, 2014 2017 2020.

 

[sachincba]

@ezsasa Please consider moving this article on homepage. Thanks!


No 1962 again, a horror story awaits the Chinese in mighty Himalayas

The second world war resulted in two superpowers— the US and the USSR. The USSR broke up due to flawed socialist model, leaving only one superpower for the last thirty years— the US. But in recent years, the narrative of US decline and China’s rise as the next superpower has been gaining pace. Hurried US withdrawal from Afghanistan amplified the narrative of US decline on world stage. This narrative of decline of the US and rise of China has massive implications for India.

Some early Indian leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru were empathetic to China. They thought that China and India had a lot of similarities. Both ancient civilizations, pauperized by colonialism, were trying to rise on the world stage. But the 1962 Sino-Indian war came as a rude shock: China and India had different fundamental world views. India had the vision of universal brotherhood “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” while the Chinese had a dormant ego of world domination.

The relative quiet on Indo-China border for the last fifty years had been that of an “Unstable Peace”. The border dispute between the two countries remained unresolved. Tension levels kept on varying, but it came to an inflexion point in 2017. India decided to stand up to the Chinese in Doklam— no more salami slicing was India’s message. It triggered a panic in the Chinese. China launched a propaganda war. It threatened India of all kinds of consequences. Although India was restrained in response to propaganda but remained firm on the ground. Chinese had never imagined, in the superior ego they had drowned themselves in, that India can stand up to them.

In 2020, China brought massive forces to change the status quo on the LAC. India stood up to this blatant aggression, mobilizing its own forces in equal strength. Although no shots were exchanged, but the clash in Galwan valley and accompanying Chinese propaganda made one thing loud and clear: peaceful rise of both India and China is a pipe dream. An innovative response of India — banning Chinese applications— had a global implication: Chinese businesses, unless they disassociate themselves from PRC, face the threat of ban all around the globe.

The next ten years will be crucial for India-China relations. In near to short term, China is expected to test its military power on two fronts — on eastern front to integrate Taiwan and on western front to contain India. Although Chinese success in these two initiatives will be a major blow to the Americans, they have only recently started focusing on China.

It is beyond India’s current abilities to determine the fate of Taiwan. The US too is afraid to take big risks with China. Gone are the days when one US career fleet in South China sea would see the Chinese trembling. Chinese have possibly developed missiles that can hit moving US aircraft careers from thousands of kilometers away. Chinese are waiting for the right time. They will attack Taiwan the moment they feel the risk from US is manageable.

On Himalayan borders, Chinese may use the tactics of tiring Indian defenses. Having comfort in knowing that India would never hurt them, they can mobilize every year on the LAC. The advantage of gaining territory will remain with the Chinese, unless India breaks out of its monotonous response and starts hurting the Chinese. All Chinese propaganda is aimed towards stopping India from taking any action that results in Chinese loss of face. If only India let China understand that India will do something that will result in Chinese loss of face, the Chinese will probably stop mobilizing.

Apart from finding a response for the yearly Chinese mobilization, India also needs to prepare for the day the Chinese try to repeat 1962. Chinese are likely to surprise India with overwhelming firepower at a time and place of their favor. Chinese, after making quick gains, can offer ceasefire and return to status quo. On Indian side, there is likely to be an overwhelming sense of defeatism at that time to accept ceasefire as the Chinese propaganda will be on full volume — threatening India with dire consequences if India chooses to fight. India needs a firm resolution: when the Chinese come, India will fight well with everything India has and not let the war finish on Chinese terms.

A bloody nose in 1967 is what kept the Chinese silent for so long. This time again, India will not miss the opportunity. India is prepared for the predictable misadventure for China. China will remember the horrors of war for a long time, if they choose to enter the Himalayas again.

 

[ezsasa]

@ezsasa Please consider moving this article on homepage. Thanks!


No 1962 again, a horror story awaits the Chinese in mighty Himalayas

The second world war resulted in two superpowers— the US and the USSR. The USSR broke up due to flawed socialist model, leaving only one superpower for the last thirty years— the US. But in recent years, the narrative of US decline and China’s rise as the next superpower has been gaining pace. Hurried US withdrawal from Afghanistan amplified the narrative of US decline on world stage. This narrative of decline of the US and rise of China has massive implications for India.

Some early Indian leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru were empathetic to China. They thought that China and India had a lot of similarities. Both ancient civilizations, pauperized by colonialism, were trying to rise on the world stage. But the 1962 Sino-Indian war came as a rude shock: China and India had different fundamental world views. India had the vision of universal brotherhood “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” while the Chinese had a dormant ego of world domination.

The relative quiet on Indo-China border for the last fifty years had been that of an “Unstable Peace”. The border dispute between the two countries remained unresolved. Tension levels kept on varying, but it came to an inflexion point in 2017. India decided to stand up to the Chinese in Doklam— no more salami slicing was India’s message. It triggered a panic in the Chinese. China launched a propaganda war. It threatened India of all kinds of consequences. Although India was restrained in response to propaganda but remained firm on the ground. Chinese had never imagined, in the superior ego they had drowned themselves in, that India can stand up to them.

In 2020, China brought massive forces to change the status quo on the LAC. India stood up to this blatant aggression, mobilizing its own forces in equal strength. Although no shots were exchanged, but the clash in Galwan valley and accompanying Chinese propaganda made one thing loud and clear: peaceful rise of both India and China is a pipe dream. An innovative response of India — banning Chinese applications— had a global implication: Chinese businesses, unless they disassociate themselves from PRC, face the threat of ban all around the globe.

The next ten years will be crucial for India-China relations. In near to short term, China is expected to test its military power on two fronts — on eastern front to integrate Taiwan and on western front to contain India. Although Chinese success in these two initiatives will be a major blow to the Americans, they have only recently started focusing on China.

It is beyond India’s current abilities to determine the fate of Taiwan. The US too is afraid to take big risks with China. Gone are the days when one US career fleet in South China sea would see the Chinese trembling. Chinese have possibly developed missiles that can hit moving US aircraft careers from thousands of kilometers away. Chinese are waiting for the right time. They will attack Taiwan the moment they feel the risk from US is manageable.

On Himalayan borders, Chinese may use the tactics of tiring Indian defenses. Having comfort in knowing that India would never hurt them, they can mobilize every year on the LAC. The advantage of gaining territory will remain with the Chinese, unless India breaks out of its monotonous response and starts hurting the Chinese. All Chinese propaganda is aimed towards stopping India from taking any action that results in Chinese loss of face. If only India let China understand that India will do something that will result in Chinese loss of face, the Chinese will probably stop mobilizing.

Apart from finding a response for the yearly Chinese mobilization, India also needs to prepare for the day the Chinese try to repeat 1962. Chinese are likely to surprise India with overwhelming firepower at a time and place of their favor. Chinese, after making quick gains, can offer ceasefire and return to status quo. On Indian side, there is likely to be an overwhelming sense of defeatism at that time to accept ceasefire as the Chinese propaganda will be on full volume — threatening India with dire consequences if India chooses to fight. India needs a firm resolution: when the Chinese come, India will fight well with everything India has and not let the war finish on Chinese terms.

A bloody nose in 1967 is what kept the Chinese silent for so long. This time again, India will not miss the opportunity. India is prepared for the predictable misadventure for China. China will remember the horrors of war for a long time, if they choose to enter the Himalayas again.

looping in @LurkerBaba .

 

[mist_consecutive]

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.
- The only people who actually spoke truth about the whole incident were the Chinese!
- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.
- But what this conflict did do was put the fear of God into the Chinese. And told them that Indians will not simply roll-over and die.
- Their game plan in Galwan was to gain access as far as possible towards Shyok so that they could keep DSDBO under observation.
- Now, post disengagement, they've gone deep back inside the Galwan river valley.



- As I've explained before, this particular instance of stand-off has happened because the Chinese miscalculated. This is my reading of the situation.
- However, what this stand-off revealed to the Chinese is how much they were lacking in terms of infrastructure to position, and sustain troops in this sector.
- It is one thing to have troops for a few months but quite different to sustain them over a longer period.
- And that too, in a area which grows nothing. Which cannot provide food, electricity, and other resources to sustain the troops.
- The Chinese have to bring everything from their rear bases in Xinjiang which is 1,000+ kilometers away.
- Like how we do Winter Stocking for entire northern sector to sustain our troops over 6-8 months, the Chinese also have had to now do that.
- Plus, under Modi, they also have to factor that should India change its political stand and go on offensive in eastern Ladakh, Chinese would not have sufficient troops to stop the Indians (as I mentioned earlier, they used to have only 2-3 Border Defense Regiments in entire Eastern Ladakh).
- So, now they have to maintain and sustain a much larger body of troops here.
- And this enhanced infrastructure will form base for any future hanky-panky they might try in eastern Ladakh, as well as opposite Himachal and Uttarakhand.
- As for steamrolling part - well, they don't need to launch a massive ops across entire sector. They will aim to launch an assault in one or two sub-sectors where they can be visibly seen to have achieved victory over us.
- For example, they might launch an operation to interdict DSDBO road as it enters the Murgo gorge and isolate entire Depsang Plains and DBO sector.
- This is a high optics, high impact operation and then, they'll wait and see if India escalates. But will be prepared if it does.
- Think of slapping someone in front of a large crowd and he cannot retaliate because you've a strong group behind you - that hurts a person's ego and self respect much more than proper beating!

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.

Explain how coincidentally -

• PLA Airborne troops were present from the zero'th minute of the clash. Pushing Special Forces on the frontline only means you want action.
• PLAGF troops were armed till teeth with riot-gear and medieval weapons. Before that, we do not see PLAGF troops in either riot armor or swords/bats in pre-Galwan videos.
• Use of flashing strobe lights to disorient the Indian side. Who carries such a random object on the frontline unless specifically intended to ?
• PLAGF troops perched upon cliffs with rocks, throwing them down on our troops ?

In case you want source/pictures for any of the above, I will be happy to provide with some delay, however I think anyone who has seen Galwan videos released by Chinese sides has noticed these things.

- As for steamrolling part - well, they don't need to launch a massive ops across entire sector. They will aim to launch an assault in one or two sub-sectors where they can be visibly seen to have achieved victory over us.
- For example, they might launch an operation to interdict DSDBO road as it enters the Murgo gorge and isolate entire Depsang Plains and DBO sector.

Agree on this, DSDBO road and whole area above Galwan (Murgo, Depsang, DBO) is vulnerable and will probably fall in an intense Chinese offensive.
However, what is your opinion on India mounting a similar offensive on Chinese weaknesses & bottlenecks, especially in Central, Sikkim, and Tawang sectors where the Indian side enjoys equal or better border infrastructure for a tit-for-tat measure ?

For example, in this area opposite Sumdo (H.P) we enjoy relative superiority vis-a-vis border infrastructure.

Around 3 brigade-level strength (maybe even less than that) combined with some para-dropped elements will be able to completely secure this peninsula.

 

[mist_consecutive]

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.
- The only people who actually spoke truth about the whole incident were the Chinese!
- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.

he is right about all the above. except maybe (2)

chinese were carrying riot shields before june 15 clash , there are pictures .

we crossed PP14 several times. actual clash site is at or near end of buffer zone. same location they did their flag raising ceremony.

chinese broke the agreement , kicked us out of PP14 , then we went forward and thrashed them ,
once we pushed forward they brought in HEAVY reinforcement on june 15 , via helicopters and APCs and trucks , there about 10-15 vehicles visible on galwan on june 16 .

a current indian army soldier who was posted at mouth of galwan made a thread claiming local commander fucked up , hid details from superiors , then send in our guys as last resort. entire thing was a shit show.

dude was legit then deleted the thread. even a usual modi-hater liberandu was defending him.

- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.

These and the fact that Chinese were prepared for an offensive can be valid at the same time.

chinese were carrying riot shields before june 15 clash , there are pictures

Riot shield =/= Fully-armed head-to-toe riot armour. Even we carried basic fiberglass riot shield and stick, visible in Galwan and Pangong Tso videos.

chinese broke the agreement , kicked us out of PP14 , then we went forward and thrashed them ,
once we pushed forward they brought in HEAVY reinforcement on june 15 , via helicopters and APCs and trucks , there about 10-15 vehicles visible on galwan on june 16 .

a current indian army soldier who was posted at mouth of galwan made a thread claiming local commander fucked up , hid details from superiors , then send in our guys as last resort. entire thing was a shit show.

dude was legit then deleted the thread. even a usual modi-hater liberandu was defending him.

All this is okay, but still my argument about ambush remains valid.

Spoiler: Argument

Explain how coincidentally -

• PLA Airborne troops were present from the zero'th minute of the clash. Pushing Special Forces on the frontline only means you want action.
• PLAGF troops were armed till teeth with riot-gear and medieval weapons. Before that, we do not see PLAGF troops in either riot armor or swords/bats in pre-Galwan videos.
• Use of flashing strobe lights to disorient the Indian side. Who carries such a random object on the frontline unless specifically intended to ?
• PLAGF troops perched upon cliffs with rocks, throwing them down on our troops ?

 

[mokoman]

These and the fact that Chinese were prepared for an offensive can be valid at the same time.

.

Riot shield =/= Fully-armed head-to-toe riot armour. Even we carried basic fiberglass riot shield and stick, visible in Galwan and Pangong Tso videos.



All this is okay, but still my claims about ambush remains valid.

simple question invalidating 'ambush' argument

why are there pictures/vids of indian soldiers across the so called LAC aka PP14 ??

where is the LAC actually ?? , at PP14 or 1.4km east of it ?

if the LAC is at PP14 why did we cross it ??

chinese are obviously lying , they will only release pictures that suit them , but what the gov says is also half truth.

 

[mist_consecutive]

simple question invalidating 'ambush' argument

why are there pictures/vids of indian soldiers across the so called LAC aka PP14 ??

where is the LAC actually ?? , at PP14 or 1.4km east of it ?

if the LAC is at PP14 why did we cross it ??

chinese are obviously lying , they will only release pictures that suit them , but what the gov says is also half truth.

why are there pictures/vids of indian soldiers across the so called LAC aka PP14 ??

There isn't any (unless captured), show me otherwise.

where is the LAC actually ?? , at PP14 or 1.4km east of it ?

Jiski laathi uski bhais. LAC is originally at PP14 (100-200m South-East) does not matter, it is open to interpretations. Why it is LAC? Because during the 1962 war, the Chinese army pushed us to that location in Galwan valley.

if the LAC is at PP14 why did we cross it ??

Initial satellite pictures (by you !) only show we crossed it ~500m South-East, not all the way where Chinese were hoisting flag. Why, because Army is giga chad and does not care about hurting the feelings of either China or MEA.
We also crossed LAC at Rezang-La/Mukhapari by good 1.2 km and average 500m.

chinese are obviously lying , they will only release pictures that suit them , but what the gov says is also half truth.

Not denying that.

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What I am trying to say, is Chinese army came fully-prepared to escalate and kill/severly injure Indian Army. The simple fact that a Colonel-level officer who is never at the frontline was among the first casaulties prove it. They intentionally went straight to our colonel to spark the gunpoweder.

What happened later, i.e., 100% of the Indian Army soldiers swarming and going on a bloody rampage, that did happen, and was out of calculation for the Chinese.

 

[mokoman]

There isn't any (unless captured), show me otherwise.

there is also a vid , from early April .

View attachment 130388

 

[Automatic Kalashnikov]

- It was no ambush. Please don't fall for the propaganda by the usual sources.
- The only people who actually spoke truth about the whole incident were the Chinese!
- As in, that Indians went deep on the Chinese side and thrashed them. And thrashed them very badly.
- This is also the reason why some Indian soldiers were taken as prisoner; some went so deep inside that they got separated from the main body of own troops, were isolated, and overpowered by the Chinese.

he is right about all the above. except maybe (2)

chinese were carrying riot shields before june 15 clash , there are pictures .

we crossed PP14 several times. actual clash site is at or near end of buffer zone. same location they did their flag raising ceremony.

IMHO chinese broke the agreement , kicked us out of PP14 , then we went forward and thrashed them ,
once we pushed forward they brought in HEAVY reinforcement on june 15 , via helicopters and APCs and trucks , there about 10-15 vehicles visible on galwan on june 16 morning.

a current indian army soldier who was posted at mouth of galwan made a thread on twitter claiming local commander fucked up , hid details from superiors , then send in our guys as last resort. entire thing was a shit show.

dude was legit then deleted the thread. even a usual modi-hater liberandu was defending him.

Is the soldier who made the thread still active on twitter?

 

[vidhwanshak]

a current indian army soldier who was posted at mouth of galwan made a thread on twitter claiming local commander fucked up, hid details from superiors, then send in our guys as last resort. entire thing was a shit show.
dude was legit then deleted the thread. even a usual modi-hater liberandu was defending him.

local commander == santosh babu?

 

[Jimih]

@mist_consecutive theory seems to be right about the ambush.

Some overambitious Political Commissar of PLA wanted to sync the Galwan ambush with Xi Jinping's birthday in order to impress him.

My own understanding is that Col. Babu and his men went crossing LAC in order to protest against the water bund or some sort of construction that the PLA was building at that time and PLA ambushed our men, they were waiting.

 

[mokoman]

local commander == santosh babu?

nope not him , higher up . dont know who he was referring to but not Col Santosh.

 

[hit&run]

Is the soldier who made the thread still active on twitter?

There are good story teller everywhere. Blame the local officer and unpreparedness is usual propaganda lines.