ARVION MK 1A
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And The Truma material can be outsourced from various domestic items.
very well thought-out idea, hence will never happen in india.Could probably get away with just replacing the upper with this:
M4A1 Upper Receiver Group
The M4A1 AR15 style Upper Receiver Group features the RIS II picatinny quad rail, which has been in use by US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for the SOPMOD Block II program since 2005. The M4A1 is built around a 14.5 inch Cold Hammer Forged M4 Profile barrel with a permanently attached...danieldefense.com
Most of the wear & tear on Paras' old M4s would be in the Barrel & BCG. Getting a new upper from DD (includes barrel & BCG, all M4 Mil-spec grade) should refresh the existing M4s, enhance their utility for possible future upgrades, and extend their life. The mil-spec Colt stock is just fine, length-adjustability is already there. We already got basic foregrips from KAC, as of optics EOTechs and Aimpoint Comps are good enough for assaulters.
Note that I'm not saying this is what we ought to be having, I'd ofcourse prefer a full refresh of the platform with best of the best kit to include stubby grips, XPS holos, Magpul stocks etc. but I'm saying what could be the bare minimum upgrade we could do on our existing M4s with minimal cost.
You said it. We're looking at overpriced junk instead of improving and customizing what we already have. And the requirements aren't clear either. Just buying whatever's on the market.very well thought-out idea, hence will never happen in india.
That's what DMR is supposed to be Same rifle as used by the team but with scope and used by a trained marksman .Ghatak platoon - Dragunov svd PSO-1 telescopic sight.
General issued marksman for 15 to 20 men team
Svd Dragnov
View attachment 72787
Range- 800m to 1000m
Capacity- 10 rounds
Caliber-7.62x54mm
Cobra- newly inducted PSG (MSG90 varient)
replacing old SLR
General issued marksman for 15 to 20 men team
PSG(MSG90 variant)
View attachment 72790
Range- 800m to 1000m
Capacity- 20 rounds
Caliber-7.62x51mm
Rashtriya Rifle-various AK varient with Alpha
Design Technologies Telescopic Sight or Svd Dragnov
15 to 20 men are generally equipped with AK varient with Alpha Design Technologies Telescopic Sight for marksman role.
Dragnov are rarely used in marksman role for RR
Pm md 90
View attachment 72791
Range- 400m to 600m
Capacity- 30 rounds
Caliber-7.62x39mm
Depends on what you define as standards. The plate carrier designs which are procured through open tenders are based on Army's own GSQR's, with the HAP and SAP plates tested against various ammunitions. Now, these GSQR's are formulated according to army's own operational experiences in J&K and NE.Please any senior member tell me whether these vests are at par with western standards or the one below are needed.
Like I said, I'm talking about what's the least-expensive way to enhance utility (and to lay a sound foundation for future upgrades, like a contiguous 12'o clock rail), not talking about what a whole upgrade could entail.I'm more interested in the trigger group, optics choices (preferably a 1-6x/1-8x LPVO), maybe a better stock and handguard (grip angle on the A2 sucks imo.).. But mostly the heavy SOCOM profile barrel and trigger. And ofc BCG.
For a clean sheet upgrade its great but it would also mean all of our existing peripheral kit (KAC grips, flashlights, PEQs etc.) would become useless as they all interface with 1913 rails. Meaning at the very least we need to buy MLOK-to-Picatinny adapters for each & every attachment that's meant to go on 3, 6 or 9'o clock positions. That, or buy entirely new peripheral kit.Nah, I'd prefer the Giessle URG-I upper. Or just an M-LOK handguard to the existing upper. Of course, a SOCOM profile barrel would also be welcome. Gence the URGI.
I think I was not able to convey my questions properly.... I just wanted to know... Are we on a path to compete with western SFs in the coming 5 years... The upgrade in plate carriers, the vests, the tactical SDRs being brought from Israel, the deals of NVGs Scars and LMGs with USA, the hight cut helmets and the new uniform with new camo and some of them with integrated knee pads... are these upgrades on line or are we still far behind even Nigerian, paki, Iraqi and Somalian SFs as per some of the people of this reputed forum in the previous thread.. Israel Russia Usa and Nato are decades away from us....Depends on what you define as standards. The plate carrier designs which are procured through open tenders are based on Army's own GSQR's, with the HAP and SAP plates tested against various ammunitions. Now, these GSQR's are formulated according to army's own operational experiences in J&K and NE.
Coming to western SFs, they have inducted plate carriers according to their own experiences and requirements. For example, NATO SF's earlier used to have more heavy BPJs which restricted body movement. Based on soldiers feedback they are moving towards modular vests. Currently, their Special forces vests have comprovised neck, groin, side protection in favour of ease of movement, more number of ammo pounches, medical kit among others.
Whether, such designs are also acceptable to Indian army is to be seen.
By the way, the LAM here seems to be a Steiner DBAL-A2
Ques- Do you know what do these soldiers talk about these plates?
First of all, I would start with infiltration and exfiltration aircraft... Every country is not the united states. The US has made those aircraft and uses them. What about countries like Russia... which still uses mi17.... or the Israelis who only have Blackhawk helos in the medium weight lift category... And when you talk about special operations... You have to talk about various aspects.... Mainly the terrain.... And in higher terrain, BLACKHAWK IS NOTHING BEFORE MI17.... and that's not my version... CIA in its report said that in the case of mi17s used by afghan SFs... Also CIA brought 30 mi17s for ops at a high terrain.. Keeping this in mind along with the terrain along LOC, you should be satisfied with was India has in helo category... Also, India was mulling over an option to buy 6 V22 osprey for rapid force insertion along borders and other areas... Because during the congress era when SF asked for planes for surgical strike type ops... The government brought them C130.... WHICH IS NOT AT ALL SUITABLE FOR OPS LIKE SURGICAL STRIKE.... Meanwhile, Israelis rejected to buy tilt rotorcraft because its sirosky ch35k performed better than it.... And also we should go for an indigenous platform like Dhruv and LUH.... Also, India should proactively on medium-lift helo program... This would increase our numbers... but in the current scenario, we have sufficient aircraft for doing spec ops.... And if these deals and programs go on as planned India will have a better spec ops fleet than even better Chinese because our helos would be made on lines of Russian tough helos and planes would be of US... they won't be copycat stuff.. Also, we have a small but decent fleets of chinooks which can also be called upon.... Israel for example has balck hawks and other helos under its Air force.... It has unit 669 which has access to any plane it wants for spec ops and sear h and rescue.... Every country doesn't openly have dedicated plane units but at backstage they posses them... Same is the case of India...Equipment alone isn't what makes any SF including western ones effective, you also need an effective structure and support (intel, R&D, logistics etc). Not to mention when it comes to equipment: insertion and exfiltration technology is far more important than body armor and individual kits, followed very closely by specialized technology and training. When it comes to all of these we are significantly lacking.
Our insertion and extraction options are limited (example: The US's modified UH-60 helos allowed them to sneak into Pakistan, execute a DA in Abbottabad and pull out before Pakistan could effectively respond or even realize what was happening, there's also the V22 osprey that can take off and land vertically but fly as fast as an aircraft allowing for speedy deployment and great coverage as well as extraction, albeit an expensive one.) On the other hand we have no specialized insertion tech for our guys, just limited numbers of regular helos and even fewer C130s and C-17s which are also not dedicated assets for the special forces. The greater your reach, the greater your operational profile and influence on the battlefield.
In terms of organization, all the Indian SOF are isolated bubbles trained, equipped and operating in their own accord even after the advent of AF-SOD since we still don't have a centralized SOC to set the standard and centralize command for all SOF. This also creates problems in training and doctrine, where different forces have different standards, equipment and tactics for it's forces which could affect future synergy greatly. This has also lead to misuse of the special forces as simply elite infantry and not assets for special operations, especially in the Parachute regiment which is saddled under the command and structure of the Parachute regiment rather than being it's own structure. Also intelligence gathering is weak, RAW is almost entirely reliant on SIGINT, OSINT and TECHINT and operates separated from the special forces. This is very important because intelligence is pretty much the lifeline of special operations and as such is perhaps the most important aspect of special operations support. The importance and potential for intelligence can be further verified by the very existence of the US military's very little known Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) special operations unit composed of highly intelligent special forces members trained in all aspects of HUMINT and SIGINT specifically for special operations. They essentially set the stage by gathering information on the field, sometimes by even attaching themselves with other SOF units conducting SR for special operations or sometimes conduct SO themselves. We have no such structure or even the importance given to seamless integration of the SOF community with RAW and IB for maximum intelligence exploitation.
All of this greatly limits the operational profile of the Indian SOF for wartime activities. You could have the best trained special forces unit in the world and it still won't matter if you don't have the requisite intelligence, ability to get there in the first place, complete synergy and efficiency as well as equipment to tackle various operational activities entirely dependent on your tech. For example: the Garud SF being stationed along the Chinese border with SAMs to provide AA/AD instead of having a conventional unit for this purpose, the fact that the MARCOS are stationed to guard the Wular lake like elite marine infantry instead of another conventional force, Paras being used for domestic terror incidents in the first place when there are THREE (RR, CRPF, JK SOG) units doing the same job anyway and a fourth (NSG) entirely dedicated in this field etc.
Not only are their skills being underused, them being used for conventional activities keeps them from preparing and training for their actual roles or even training in general. It also portrays another aspect of the military no one talks about: The lack of any actual specialization of military personnel. The fact that we don't have a conventional unit capable of AA/AD stationed for china, the fact that we don't have a conventional unit capable of guarding the Wular lake doing so, The fact that the Para SF's ties to conventional structures pushes it into doing infantry tasks when their is already a melting pot of units specializing in all aspects of that job, or even the fact that we have no actual training institution dedicated for basic infantry specializations like Snipers.
This is why we have a L O N G way to go before we can reach the zenith of special operations.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is a 5 ton class chopper. It is about half the size of the 10 ton Mi-17. Mi-17's performance is obviously going to be higher than the Blackhawks. And UH-60 platform does its job well enough. And has specialised variants for special operations on land and sea. It is one of the most versatile and modular platforms out there.I think there's a couple of things wrong with your argument:
1. The UH-60s that I'm talking about were the ones modified with LO features meant for stealthy insertion and exfiltration of troops. Granted those are too specific and intensive for anyone other than the US military to operate but that fact still stands that without those helos any such operation was absolutely impossible. The point here was how insertion technology can make a huge difference in your operational capabilities, even extending to operations that would otherwise be considered unthinkable should you acquire such a capability.
2. I wasn't just talking of the paras operating deep in Pakistan. I was talking about the Indian SOF community as a whole. Other than the SG, which itself answers not to the military but RAW, what other SOF in India is capable of deep insertion based operations? The USSOCCOM has units operate and trained on a tier based structure for this very reason. It allows them to pick units depending on their operational roles, capabilities and their deployment which in turn maximizes their operational efficiency and effectiveness regardless of the mission profile. But unlike the US we have no such middle ground between the SG and the Para SF/Marcos Garud at all. The military is essentially left without it's own third option for a higher degree of operations, being forced to depend on RAW to do that job who might not see things their way or believe in it being worthwhile or something else. I think it's important to reiterate that SG answers only to RAW and it's requirements, not the military's. The dedication of assets is also important in our case. Very few countries face the prospect of a possible conflict of such high intesity
3. The idea that they do an entire range of operations is incorrect, and it also flies in the face of what you said previously regarding the Paras/Indian SOF being used to a limited role with the SG doing the wet-work. The Paras for the past three decades have rarely conducted an offensive operation that wasn't against non-state actors, with only ONE somewhat verifiable operation that we know of being conducted against the Pakistani military itself. That operation being Operation apache, and the only reason that it's believable is because of that one picture of 4 Pakistani personnel heads being carried under the credit of said operation.
Also, this belief that because we're safe that the SF or the military is doing it's job optimally is incorrect. In order for the SF or the military to fail at it's most basic job would require catastrophic incompetence. And the Paras haven't always succeeded either. The Jaffna operation is a stark reminder ,and it's failure lay in the lack of accurate intelligence and proper sharing of intel between RAW and the units. It's not about just about the overall picture, it's about maximizing effectiveness and minimizing risk/losses of extremely valuable assets. How many losses could we have avoided in the past to opportunity ambushes that have happened if the Paras had the adequate support like a higher resolution of intel support being provided?
4. Also Balakot (Which wasn't a special op) is not a good example of success. Here's an unpopular opinion which most would call heresey: The IAF portrayed multiple avoidable mistakes of the entire ordeal. Starting with intelligence, there's little suggesting that the IAF actually hit it's targets at all. the bombs and the kit used (SPICE-2000) simply doesn't add up to the post strike analysis of the structure, which is that instead of the structures being completely leveled to the ground all of them are standing. What's more, the evidence actually provides credence to the theory that the sat-coordinates given to the bombs were lining up exactly with the structures, but were incorrect by a certain set coordinate that pushed the bombs beyond the targets leading to the bombs lining up with the structures but missing their targets. (The failure of the bomb doesn't mean that the whole operation was a failure itself as the more important fact was that the IAF was able to ingress inside Pakistan 80km deep in the first place, but we still didn't manage to achieve complete success and succumbed to an avoidable mistake)
Then there's the fact that whether we shot down an F-16 or not ,the PAF still managed to launch an attack in broad daylight without encountering any AA/AD resistance from our SAMs and were able to shoot down a Mig-21 in the first place, instead of getting wacked out of the Sky considering what should have been the defenders advantage. Instead the IAF could only muster a defense of 8 aircraft against a package of 24 without any real ground support structure when things really came to a head. Instead the SAMs we did have ended up shooting a friendly Mi-17 in a blue on blue incident on the very same day in Kashmir adding insult to injury.
The idea behind the answer wasn't whether the SF can do it's job effectively, it was whether the SF had maximized it's potential enough to compete with the western SF, which it simply hasn't. We can talk about the greatness/superiority of the Indian SOF all we want, but it was still the US that launched the Abbottobad raid, not us. And the raid was done by elements of the USSOCCOM. What's more the raid shows everything that puts them at the top. They have complete synergy between their SOF and their intelligence agencies. They have dedicated support structures not just for intelligence but even insertion. Not just in assets available but entire units raised for the sole purpose of inserting SOF troops for special operations (160th SOAR) and so on.
What I just saw was a comparision of India SF , who were neglected for 70+ years and Elite USSOCOM who is called the back bone of US special ops... US, a country with a long list of wars.... Now let me post answers to your points from start :-I think there's a couple of things wrong with your argument:
1. The UH-60s that I'm talking about were the ones modified with LO features meant for stealthy insertion and exfiltration of troops. Granted those are too specific and intensive for anyone other than the US military to operate but that fact still stands that without those helos any such operation was absolutely impossible. The point here was how insertion technology can make a huge difference in your operational capabilities, even extending to operations that would otherwise be considered unthinkable should you acquire such a capability.
2. I wasn't just talking of the paras operating deep in Pakistan. I was talking about the Indian SOF community as a whole. Other than the SG, which itself answers not to the military but RAW, what other SOF in India is capable of deep insertion based operations? The USSOCCOM has units operate and trained on a tier based structure for this very reason. It allows them to pick units depending on their operational roles, capabilities and their deployment which in turn maximizes their operational efficiency and effectiveness regardless of the mission profile. But unlike the US we have no such middle ground between the SG and the Para SF/Marcos Garud at all. The military is essentially left without it's own third option for a higher degree of operations, being forced to depend on RAW to do that job who might not see things their way or believe in it being worthwhile or something else. I think it's important to reiterate that SG answers only to RAW and it's requirements, not the military's. The dedication of assets is also important in our case. Very few countries face the prospect of a possible conflict of such high intesity
3. The idea that they do an entire range of operations is incorrect, and it also flies in the face of what you said previously regarding the Paras/Indian SOF being used to a limited role with the SG doing the wet-work. The Paras for the past three decades have rarely conducted an offensive operation that wasn't against non-state actors, with only ONE somewhat verifiable operation that we know of being conducted against the Pakistani military itself. That operation being Operation apache, and the only reason that it's believable is because of that one picture of 4 Pakistani personnel heads being carried under the credit of said operation.
Also, this belief that because we're safe that the SF or the military is doing it's job optimally is incorrect. In order for the SF or the military to fail at it's most basic job would require catastrophic incompetence. And the Paras haven't always succeeded either. The Jaffna operation is a stark reminder ,and it's failure lay in the lack of accurate intelligence and proper sharing of intel between RAW and the units. It's not about just about the overall picture, it's about maximizing effectiveness and minimizing risk/losses of extremely valuable assets. How many losses could we have avoided in the past to opportunity ambushes that have happened if the Paras had the adequate support like a higher resolution of intel support being provided?
4. Also Balakot (Which wasn't a special op) is not a good example of success. Here's an unpopular opinion which most would call heresey: The IAF portrayed multiple avoidable mistakes of the entire ordeal. Starting with intelligence, there's little suggesting that the IAF actually hit it's targets at all. the bombs and the kit used (SPICE-2000) simply doesn't add up to the post strike analysis of the structure, which is that instead of the structures being completely leveled to the ground all of them are standing. What's more, the evidence actually provides credence to the theory that the sat-coordinates given to the bombs were lining up exactly with the structures, but were incorrect by a certain set coordinate that pushed the bombs beyond the targets leading to the bombs lining up with the structures but missing their targets. (The failure of the bomb doesn't mean that the whole operation was a failure itself as the more important fact was that the IAF was able to ingress inside Pakistan 80km deep in the first place, but we still didn't manage to achieve complete success and succumbed to an avoidable mistake)
Then there's the fact that whether we shot down an F-16 or not ,the PAF still managed to launch an attack in broad daylight without encountering any AA/AD resistance from our SAMs and were able to shoot down a Mig-21 in the first place, instead of getting wacked out of the Sky considering what should have been the defenders advantage. Instead the IAF could only muster a defense of 8 aircraft against a package of 24 without any real ground support structure when things really came to a head. Instead the SAMs we did have ended up shooting a friendly Mi-17 in a blue on blue incident on the very same day in Kashmir adding insult to injury.
The idea behind the answer wasn't whether the SF can do it's job effectively, it was whether the SF had maximized it's potential enough to compete with the western SF, which it simply hasn't. We can talk about the greatness/superiority of the Indian SOF all we want, but it was still the US that launched the Abbottobad raid, not us. And the raid was done by elements of the USSOCCOM. What's more the raid shows everything that puts them at the top. They have complete synergy between their SOF and their intelligence agencies. They have dedicated support structures not just for intelligence but even insertion. Not just in assets available but entire units raised for the sole purpose of inserting SOF troops for special operations (160th SOAR) and so on.
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