Going to do an analysis of capabilities of each special forces since 1990:
1. MARCOS. While not used in strategic missions like they should be, in every “mission” they have been on they have always delivered decisive results, if tactical. The tactics they use ensure minimal casualties. Sure para does less ops, but as highlighted by previous members the tactics MARCOS use (in recent times, not sure ab the 90s) are far more sophisticated. Time for me to get overwhelmed by pwordjeets, but MARCOS has improved its capabilities, and modernized to be on par with contemporary SOFs, as highlighted by Vijaypal Rawat sir, and as also highlighted by him, we must be strategic in our use with MARCOS, and have a grand vision and ethos. This is what MARCOS lacks, we need to treat them like proper SOF. But overall, MARCOS shows us who the real SF in India is. Now, we need to make sure they are used as proper SOF, not super marines.
2. GARUDS. Not really an SOF, but largely untested and very very conflicted on wether this is an SOF or DSC with proper gear. Their jobs seems to be to gaurd based, and hunt down militants. GARUDS are attached with the oldest and most experienced RR battalions, and do joint ops with them, whcih further makes their actual role confusing. Nirala sir made the supreme sacrifice in one such operation. I no doubt am sure that GARUDS are consisting of very capable men, who can do things infantrymen of contemporaries can do, but their actual SOF capability is very questionable. No, Pathankot is not an “SOF” op. While the GARUDS did chase down well trained and highly motivated Fidayeens, the actual result of said op was not strategic in nature. It was a tactical victory that All attackers were eliminated. Bottom line- GARUDS don’t seem to be a proper SOF in any manner. Their equipment profiles are also rather weak.
3. Para SF. Where do I begin? What was once a lethal super infantry and even a top level SOF for a time, has now pratically destroyed both its super infantry and SOF capabilities, as highlighted by the operations paras have been doing for the last 2-3 years. Para commandos, were quite lethal in 1971. Their airborne counterparts (if that’s the right word) also did wonders. They would continue to do wonders and lots of oprrations in Lanka, NE, and 90s J&K. Sometimes, doing up to 8 operations a day, they were a very well disciplined force. However, the mixing of the three existing para special forces battalions (1,9,10) with regular airborne, in the late 90s, effectively ended the 50th brigade and making the “para regiment” as we know it today. The man, the criminal behind this, was General Shankar Rowchoudhary. Not only did he undo all the hard work by his predecessor, General BC joshi, he effectively set back the IAs SF by several decades. This, coupled with the mass expansion of Para Sf in the 2000s has effectively made confusing the exact role of Para SF. Usually, an SOF is supposed to do operations that are strategic in nature. The operations paras (both SF and regular) did in the 90s, were basically super infantry raids on militant hideouts, cordons, etc etc. the existing SF battalions did have an excellent stalking capability, but that seems to have dwindled down. To this day, it is unclear what the role of PARA SF is. They don’t even do super infantry operations anymore. They are doing security jobs for pilgrims. Barring several raids in the 2010s, it is unclear what their current stalking capability is. They still operate the same way they did in the 90s. They still wait till early morning, they still charge in frontal positions, but nowadays they seem to have forgot to learn about the element of surprise. Their attacks are predictable, as highlgihted in the recent Rajouri ambush. Their gear is horseshit, with several IA infantry units having more sophisticated gear (that are indep. procured).
In summary, a top tier SOF in the 70s became a top tier Super infantry in the 90s, and has now become a glorified security force with an unclear role in 2023. Coupled with the criminal lack of gear. We can say that the Paras have gone in the opposite direction that their MARCOS counterparts went into. Their training, tactics, and gear need a whole revamp to 2023. That they fought in the literal exact same way as they did back in 1998 is criminal.
