the 1960s.
During the Cold War, the CIA trained Tibetan freedom fighters at Camp Hale, Colorado. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
Establishment 22
In 1962, the CIA’s Tibet operation was in limbo. The Kennedy administration questioned the utility of the mission due to the botched Bay of Pigs invasion and a budding rapprochement with a skittish India, already navigating tricky times with China.
The Dalai Lama’s presence in India in exile and the CIA’s recruitment of Tibetan fighters from India-based refugee communities made the CIA’s mission in Tibet a political liability for New Delhi’s fragile relations with Beijing. Thus, backing a secret CIA war in Chinese-occupied Tibet was decidedly not in India’s interest at the time.
The Tibetan resistance also created an awkward situation for the Dalai Lama. The exiled Tibetan leader owed his life to the Chushi Gangdruk warriors, but he was also trying to court the favor of the Indian government to secure a home for his exiled nation. For his part, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was reluctant to support Tibet in a way that might further antagonize China.
But the political calculus for both the U.S. and India changed on Oct. 22, 1962, when China attacked India along the Himalayan frontier. India scrambled to mount a military response as 25,000 PLA troops invaded over the Thang La Ridge. Nehru’s longstanding efforts to downplay the Tibetan situation to appease Beijing were exposed as misleading, and he faced scathing criticism at home.
Tsering Tunduk, an Establishment 22 veteran, at his home on Pangong Lake. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
Humiliated, Nehru asked U.S. President John F. Kennedy for help in standing up an all-Tibetan mountain warfare unit.
Named Establishment 22, this crack outfit tapped into the CIA’s existing recruiting and training networks for the Chushi Gangdruk. The original purpose of Establishment 22 was to use the Tibetans’ fighting prowess, which they’d proved against Chinese occupiers in Tibet, as well as their genetic ability to physically perform at high altitude to wage a guerrilla war against China in the Himalayas.
Initially, the CIA provided much of Establishment 22’s weapons and training. But the 1962 Sino-Indian War cooled before the secret unit could be trained and fielded. India, however, recognized the combat potential of Establishment 22 and kept it active.
The unit deployed to combat for the first time in East Pakistan — in hot and humid lowland conditions — in 1971 as part of Operation Mountain Eagle, and later fought Pakistani troops in the Himalayas, including the 1986 battle on Siachen Glacier, in which 17 Tibetans died. Establishment 22, however, never officially faced Chinese soldiers in combat.
Many Tibetan refugees escaped from China across the Himalayas. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
The U.S. opposed Establishment 22’s operations against Pakistan. But in 1975, the CIA rekindled its support for the all-Tibetan unit, sending two airborne advisers to train the Tibetans in high-altitude parachute jumps, using drop zones in Ladakh.
The use of Tibetans in operations against Pakistan was also controversial among the Tibetan exile community living in India. But the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala, India — home of the Dalai Lama — ultimately supported the move out of deference to their Indian hosts. India later tagged Establishment 22 for counterterrorism operations.
Based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand, the unit continues to serve along India’s Himalayan border and draws recruits from Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal.
India’s Ladakh region, the scene of a recent clash between Indian and Chinese border forces. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
Bad Blood
The CIA continued training Tibetan freedom fighters in Colorado until 1964 — and support for Tibetan guerrillas based in the Mustang region of Nepal continued until President Richard Nixon’s normalization of relations with China in 1972. Yet even after CIA support dried up for the Chushi Gangdruk, approximately 10,000 Tibetan soldiers continued serving in India’s Establishment 22, now known as the Special Frontier Force.
In 1974, after bowing to Chinese pressure, the Nepalese military rooted the Chushi Gangdruk out of their mountain hideouts in Mustang, killing many fighters who had been trained by the CIA at Camp Hale. The Dalai Lama sent a taped message imploring the Mustang resistance to lay down their arms, spurring several fighters to commit suicide.
Despite the overwhelming odds against them, Tibet’s guerrilla fighters fought fiercely, suffering heavy casualties as they faced China’s modern military. The CIA’s Tibetan operation ultimately failed to make a large-scale impact on the Chinese occupation, and many of the CIA-trained Tibetan fighters were killed in combat or captured.
Buddhist monks in McLeod Ganj, India — the Dalai Lama’s home in exile. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
But the intelligence the Tibetan fighters gathered was sometimes of great value to the United States. A raid on a Chinese convoy in 1961, for example, killed a Chinese regimental commander and provided the CIA with what it later referred to as the “bible” on Chinese military intelligence.
After years of relative calm, tensions between China and India over their Himalayan frontier began to mount again in 2013, spiking near their shared Himalayan border with Bhutan in 2017. Those persistent hostilities inflamed again in May after reports of fistfights between Chinese and Indian border patrols at two different sites along the so-called Line of Actual Control, or LAC, which marks the two countries’ Himalayan frontier in a remote Indian region called Ladakh. Both sides have since massed military forces in the region, including artillery and troops, according to news reports.
Chinese news reports have said that India has been building up its infrastructure in the disputed Himalayan region, sparking Beijing’s legitimate reprisal. According to New Delhi, on the other hand, Beijing has been building up its troops in the Galwan River area in the Ladakh region in a bid to redraw the border map — thereby upheaving a de facto military stalemate that has held, more or less, since the two countries fought their brief Himalayan war in 1962.
Chinese units have also claimed territory near Pangong Tso, a high-altitude lake that marks part of the Himalayan frontier between India and China. Both sides have overlapping claims on the lake. According to Indian government figures, Pangong Lake saw more Chinese transgressions between 2015 and 2019 than any other point along the border.
Indian and Chinese forces have competing claims over Pangong Lake. Photo by Nolan Peterson/Coffee or Die.
“The good news is, the current crisis in Ladakh bears some resemblance to these prior standoffs, all of which were peacefully resolved. The bad news is, they also differ in some important and concerning ways, with mounting evidence to suggest the [line of actual control] is entering a new, more volatile chapter,” said Jeff Smith, a research fellow at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
However, Smith added that Chinese incursions into India’s Himalayan Ladakh region have become more frequent and now comprise areas that weren’t previously contested.
“In aggregate, these trends suggest LAC standoffs are growing more hostile, more frequent, longer in duration, and are receiving more media coverage and international attention, potentially restricting both sides’ room for maneuver,” Smith said.
According to some, last week’s deadly clash between Indian and Chinese forces underscored that, once again, the U.S. has the chance to act as a peripheral power broker on India’s behalf.
“The first deadly border clash since the mid-1970s shows just how fraught relations between the world’s two most populous countries are becoming,” Stavridis, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, wrote in last week’s editorial for Bloomberg. “And while the geopolitical dangers are obvious and severe, the crisis also presents the U.S. with an opportunity to forge the strong relationship with India it has desired for more than two decades.”