India-China Border conflict

[Joe Shearer]

GOOD thinking!

We need to work on this. You will be surprised, but think of it this way.

The PLA is a long needle thrusting out of....Chengdu!
The Indian Army is a tank bund holding in the entire resources of the combatant country, nowhere more than 400 kms from their vital communications anywhere.
400 kms is not small; the logistics involved is not to be trivialised. If we look at the nature of the two armed contingents physical disposition, other dimensions come to mind.

....at one point, parallel to the western edge of the Nepal-India boundary, it is 500 kms.

 

[Joe Shearer]

its a gap , but thats why they are building g216 , from what i heard , they are on track to complete it asap .

better come up with a new battle plan now

I would like you to do something, when you have a little time.

 

[karn]

One variable that would be useful here ... is how deadly short range anti air missiles would be in any conflict with China. There is an average altitude of 5 kms .. Now very few aircraft can fly at any appreciable height above this floor.
Imo parking masses of semi autonomous anti air batteries on the reverse slopes of mountains and triple A at the entrance of valleys. would make air raids from their side almost a suicide mission.

 

[Joe Shearer]

One variable that would be useful here ... is how deadly short range anti air missiles would be in any conflict with China. There is an average altitude of 5 kms .. Now very few aircraft can fly at any appreciable height above this floor.
Imo parking masses of semi autonomous anti air batteries on the reverse slopes of mountains and triple A at the entrance of valleys. would make air raids from their side almost a suicide mission.

I need to write a document and file it with the admin here so that I won't be accused of stealing copyright.
Another reverse slope useful tactic would be 80 mm mortars with spotters on the forward slopes or the crestline.

But the basic issues are entirely logistical.

On the plains, 1000 MT a day for armoured divisions, 500 for infantry divisions. Now that ought to increase for mountain divisions, as some considerable effort will be wasted in the transit operations themselves.

Again, the light tank/tank destroyer/infantry fire support vehicle kind of campaigning on the plateau should approach, if not actually exceed, plains armour consumption rates.

So we are looking at number of divisions x consumption rate x days, and creating surpluses, PROTECTING surpluses, and shipping surpluses to the battle-field rear echelons.

 

[karn]

I need to write a document and file it with the admin here so that I won't be accused of stealing copyright.
Another reverse slope useful tactic would be 80 mm mortars with spotters on the forward slopes or the crestline.

But the basic issues are entirely logistical.

On the plains, 1000 MT a day for armoured divisions, 500 for infantry divisions. Now that ought to increase for mountain divisions, as some considerable effort will be wasted in the transit operations themselves.

Again, the light tank/tank destroyer/infantry fire support vehicle kind of campaigning on the plateau should approach, if not actually exceed, plains armour consumption rates.

So we are looking at number of divisions x consumption rate x days, and creating surpluses, PROTECTING surpluses, and shipping surpluses to the battle-field rear echelons.

Thats why I said semi autonomous . Have you retractable radars and optronic sensors peak over the hill .. With a few operators manning them .. while the missiles are canisterised and buried on the slope. Airdrop diesel an food for the post .. Imo this could be a cheap permanent deployment. I mean the IA digs so many bunkers in anycase.

 

[Jimih]

If you consider than the PA is only 25 or so strong, if you consider that only 1/3 that number is needed to defend against them, if you consider that we already have 39 divisions, if those facing the PA are 8 divisions, if there are 39 - 8 = 31 divisions at our disposal, would that be such a difference? Would it be insufficient?

Before commiting the said Divs, we have to first fortify the vulnerable DBO, Galwan sector, Hot Springs, Gogra, Kongka La, Tsogtsalu sector, Marsimik La, Phobrang la and also Fingers 1 to 3 with overwhelming resources.

Because a pre-emptive intrusion and concentration of PLA troops at Depsang, Galwan valley, Hot Springs, Gogra-Kongka La and north of Pangong Tso will place India at a disadvantage during a war.

IMO the goal should be a move northwards from DBO, across the Karakoram pass that will cut the G219 highway hence blocking it at that sector. But Pakistan factor will come at this sector, and have to prepare for it.

 

[cereal killer]

Before commiting the said Divs, we have to first fortify the vulnerable DBO, Galwan sector, Hot Springs, Gogra, Kongka La, Tsogtsalu sector, Marsimik La, Phobrang la and also Fingers 1 to 3 with overwhelming resources.

Because a pre-emptive intrusion and concentration of PLA troops at Depsang, Galwan valley, Hot Springs, Gogra-Kongka La and north of Pangong Tso will place India at a disadvantage during a war.

IMO the goal should be a move northwards from DBO, across the Karakoram pass that will cut the G219 highway hence blocking it at that sector. But Pakistan factor will come at this sector, and have to prepare for it.

Any sort of Indian offensive has to be beyond Karakoram or we will be left fighting a defensive battle. In my view we have to quickly take out Shenxiawan post to the north of Karakoram when sh*** hits the fan. Entire SSN will be bloody intense. Limited mechanized warfare can also happen.

 

[Love Charger]

I need to write a document and file it with the admin here so that I won't be accused of stealing copyright.
Another reverse slope useful tactic would be 80 mm mortars with spotters on the forward slopes or the crestline.

But the basic issues are entirely logistical.

On the plains, 1000 MT a day for armoured divisions, 500 for infantry divisions. Now that ought to increase for mountain divisions, as some considerable effort will be wasted in the transit operations themselves.

Again, the light tank/tank destroyer/infantry fire support vehicle kind of campaigning on the plateau should approach, if not actually exceed, plains armour consumption rates.

So we are looking at number of divisions x consumption rate x days, and creating surpluses, PROTECTING surpluses, and shipping surpluses to the battle-field rear echelons.

In an event of War, can india move into Bhutan?
If it serves some Tactical advantage for us?
And its 81 mm mortar sir also tanks require special fuel to fight in mountains

 

[Love Charger]

Thats why I said semi autonomous . Have you retractable radars and optronic sensors peak over the hill .. With a few operators manning them .. while the missiles are canisterised and buried on the slope. Airdrop diesel an food for the post .. Imo this could be a cheap permanent deployment. I mean the IA digs so many bunkers in anycase.

Sir ,i understand that we tried something similar in 1962 with our forward policy .
We could not supply them well, results were disastrous for all to see.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thats why I said semi autonomous . Have you retractable radars and optronic sensors peak over the hill .. With a few operators manning them .. while the missiles are canisterised and buried on the slope. Airdrop diesel an food for the post .. Imo this could be a cheap permanent deployment. I mean the IA digs so many bunkers in anycase.

Actually solvable by putting them on different hills. That will achieve some degree of obfuscation, nobody thinks of scanning surrounding peaks for sensors when there is one clearly identifiable, but unreachable, fire station known.
Airdropping is, IMHO, not a good option, the numbers involved are massive, and it will expose transport aircraft to hideous risks, as well as being unreliable, Indian Army experience with paradropping in high wind conditions has not been happy.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In an event of War, can india move into Bhutan?
If it serves some Tactical advantage for us?

Can, but will permanently wreck the relationship.
The Bhutanese, after the incident at their borders, have moved swiftly to put daylight between themselves and India.

 

[Love Charger]

Can, but will permanently wreck the relationship.
The Bhutanese, after the incident at their borders, have moved swiftly to put daylight between themselves and India.

I

 

[Joe Shearer]

In an event of War, can india move into Bhutan?
If it serves some Tactical advantage for us?
And its 81 mm mortar sir also tanks require special fuel to fight in mountains

You mean I'm not allowed to build 80 mm, because it has to be consistent with inch dimensions? Thank you for the correction, btw; what would I do without your watchful eye?
Tanks require high-octane fuel for petrol, for diesel and petrol both, they require engines designed for high-altitude low-oxygen conditions.

 

[karn]

Actually solvable by putting them on different hills. That will achieve some degree of obfuscation, nobody thinks of scanning surrounding peaks for sensors when there is one clearly identifiable, but unreachable, fire station known.
Airdropping is, IMHO, not a good option, the numbers involved are massive, and it will expose transport aircraft to hideous risks, as well as being unreliable, Indian Army experience with paradropping in high wind conditions has not been happy.

I know.. Whatever is the better vantage point .. the place where the missiles are actually kept can be unmanned. Perhaps the airdropping part is just an add on .

 

[Joe Shearer]

Before commiting the said Divs, we have to first fortify the vulnerable DBO, Galwan sector, Hot Springs, Gogra, Kongka La, Tsogtsalu sector, Marsimik La, Phobrang la and also Fingers 1 to 3 with overwhelming resources.

Because a pre-emptive intrusion and concentration of PLA troops at Depsang, Galwan valley, Hot Springs, Gogra-Kongka La and north of Pangong Tso will place India at a disadvantage during a war.

IMO the goal should be a move northwards from DBO, across the Karakoram pass that will cut the G219 highway hence blocking it at that sector. But Pakistan factor will come at this sector, and have to prepare for it.

Any sort of Indian offensive has to be beyond Karakoram or we will be left fighting a defensive battle. In my view we have to quickly take out Shenxiawan post to the north of Karakoram when sh*** hits the fan. Entire SSN will be bloody intense. Limited mechanized warfare can also happen.

You may be right.
You must be right.
Every single kilometre away from the supply base is a penalty.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I know.. Whatever is the better vantage point .. the place where the missiles are actually kept can be unmanned. Perhaps the airdropping part is just an add on .

Agree in full.

 

[karn]

Sir ,i understand that we tried something similar in 1962 with our forward policy .
We could not supply them well, results were disastrous for all to see.

1962 was a different time. Im not proposing having random isolated posts out there . More like a network .. Where all the points of ingress are covered and the air defense hardware is not easily destroyed from the air.
Please don't call me sir.

 

[Joe Shearer]

1962 was a different time. Im not proposing having random isolated posts out there . More like a network .. Where all the points of ingress are covered and the air defense hardware is not easily destroyed from the air.
Please don't call me sir.

Maybe we can discuss this before finalising, Sir.

 

[Love Charger]

1962 was a different time. Im not proposing having random isolated posts out there . More like a network .. Where all the points are covered and the air defense hardware is not easily destroyed from the air.
Please don't call me sir.

That part is already being done, mokoman posted many maps here where different positions have pathways connecting them.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Maybe we can discuss this before finalising, Sir.