Someone actually read my post.
First, let me welcome you to this forum. I have seen you posting on the Pakistani forum a lot, as I have been a long-time lurker there. Times when saner minds prevailed there.
I will suggest you stick around, this forum actually has quality material and fruitful discussions, if you engage correct members, and ignore trolls.
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Back to the discussion....
We can dance around this 'How big is big?' till the cows come home, but when it comes to actual down to earth planning, my own outlook is that we don't need 28 divisions for Pakistan if we are being defensive, and we need more than 69 if we are to attack (these are raw numbers; the Lanchester numbers/ratios are admittedly different).
So, yes, we need manpower; the question is, how many? Until we put a figure to it, and justify it, saying that we NEED to maintain numbers is something like saying we need petrol or diesel to move our cars. Sure we do, but what's the issue? The issue is how many. By saying drastically reduce head-count, surely there was something in mind.
What I have been observing, is now China is completely into the anti-India game (it always was, but we realized it in 2020), and our offensive plans on Pakistan (read cold-start) are on halt, at least till China stops squatting on our borders. But yes, overall, there is no well-defined number for headcount.
If you are suggesting we maintain headcount, since we can't beat the PLA in equipment, we might as well give up before we start.
Can we beat PLA in equipment ? I don't think we can in the next 20 years at least. What remains, if we discount geopolitics ? Manpower, tactics and geography.
Mountains are anything but perfect defences. If we do not know what we are doing, they become death-traps where troops isolated on the heights watch helplessly as the enemy sweeps around them and cuts off their retreat, and their logistics back-up.
Well, good thing is our army is pretty well-versed in mountains and we know exactly what we are doing, at least better than Chinese. Logistics chokepoints are death-sentence for any army, anywhere, not only mountains. We have maintained one of the toughest supply lines in the world on Himalayas in Dras-Kargil sector using porters and mules.
What do you think happened in 62? We lost to mass attacks? If that is what you think happened, let me surrender straight away, and acknowledge that you are the strategic supremo.
We lost due to under-equipped, ill-supplied army lead by ineffective leaders. But it is also to be noted, we ran out of bullets to fire at the human-waves of PLA.
Apart from that, if you have anything to add, please do.
Just a sly hint.
Remind me about the Bailley Trail, and Thorat vs. Kumaramangalam war-gaming it, Thorat as China, K as India.
I am not aware, I have to read about it first.