Employment of Mechanised Forces In Himalayan Terrain by Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj
Author: Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj, PVSM, VSM (Retd)
In August 2010 the PLA conducted a logistic exercise on mobilisation and movement of large formations on the Qinghai-Tibet railway line. In October 2010 the PLA conducted its first Group Army level joint air-land exercise (Shimingxindong) by both Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions to practice manoeuvres and ground-air coordination. In November 2011 the PLA practised capture of military passes in HAA beyond 5,000m by employing armoured vehicles and airborne troops.
As per media reports the Army is planning to raise two armoured brigades. (six armoured regiments and two mechanised infantry battalions) especially for the Northern borders to be employed along with the Mountain Strike Corps planned to be raised. This no doubt will give a boost to our defensive and offensive capabilities, but what needs to be analysed is its equipment profile of the mechanised forces and their employment in these areas.
The most dangerous threat to our security would be a simultaneous conventionalattack on both our Northern and Western fronts supported by internal disturbances. Hence the armed forces must be prepared to dissuade, deter and if necessary take punitive action. As all future wars will be joint operations the synergy and capabilities of the services need to be enhanced. The Army in particular would need to upgrade its fire power and manoeuvre capabilities to operate in High Altitude Areas (HAA)
China over the past two decades has made phenomenal advances in their capabilities to operate along our Northern borders. They first enhanced their development of their infrastructure and have now provided all weather metalled roads leading to the Tibetan plateau right up to their border posts. Apart from this their railway lines connecting their hinterland to the plateau have greatly enhanced their mobilisation capability. The POL pipelines provide adequate logistic support to the deployed troops
India has approx 3,380 km long border in the North with China which has not yet been demarcated. The dispute over demarcation has flared up on more than one occasion resulting in a war in 1962 and subsequently remained tense on more than one occasion. Despite signing the Treaty of Peace and Tranquillity and holding 16 rounds of talks to resolve the contentious issue, not much headway has been made. After 50 years of the 1962 war, the Army needs to re-analyse the concept of defending our Northern borders against China in the present scenario.
The most dangerous threat to our security would be a simultaneous conventional attack on both our Northern and Western fronts supported by internal disturbances. Hence the armed forces must be prepared to dissuade, deter and if necessary take punitive action. As all future wars will be joint operations the synergy and capabilities of the services need to be enhanced. The Army in particular would need to upgrade its firepower and manoeuvre capabilities to operate in High Altitude Areas (HAA). With the induction of the 155 mm Light Howitzer Gun
M777, the fire support would be enhanced to a large extent. As per media reports the Army is planning to raise two armoured brigades (six armoured regiments and two mechanised infantry battalions) especially for the Northern borders to be employed along with the Mountain Strike Corps planned to be raised. This no doubt will give a boost to our defensive and offensive capabilities, but what needs to be analysed is its equipment profile of the mechanised forces and their employment in these areas.
Aim: The aim of this article is to analyse the employment of Mechanised Forces along our Northern borders.
Historical perspective
On 27 October 1947 the first
Indian Army troops landed in Srinagar to implement the Instrument of Accession whereby the state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India. The attention of the Army was diverted towards the West. In June 1948 Pakistan attempted to sever Ladakh and occupied the heights dominating the only road axis between Srinagar and Leh at Kargil, Dras and Zoji La and thereby isolating the garrison at Leh. The operations launched to clear the road axis could not make much progress as the enemy was well entrenched on dominating heights at 16,000 ft. The crux of the problem was to clear the Zoji La Pass (11,575 ft) and hence Maj Gen K S Thimayya, then GOC Srinagar Division conceived the idea of employing tanks to clear the pass and road axis. Tanks had never been employed at such heights and the problem was compounded by logistical difficulties of moving tanks from the plains of Jammu to the operational area.
On 23 September, orders were issued to Lt Col Rajinder Singh (CO 7 Cav) to move his tank squadron (
Stuart tanks) from Akhnoor to Baltal and along with 77 Para Brigade clear the Zoji La Pass by 31 October 1948 (Snow would have made Zoji La Pass impassable thereafter). Due to lack of adequate infrastructure, the tanks had to be dismantled and the turret, chassis and ammunition moved separately. As the bridges could not take the combined weight of the tank and transporters, the chassis had to be frequently dismounted and cross the bridges on tracks. The move commenced on 05 October and was completed on 15 October. The tanks were thereafter reassembled and readied for battle at Baltal (base of Zoji La Pass). To ensure surprise the convoy moved only at night. Simultaneously the Engineer task force was converting the existing track of 7.5 km length to a road wide enough for tanks. In addition caves were made at the head of the pass to hide the tanks. This herculean task was successfully completed and the attack was launched on 01 November.
Tanks led the assault and the enemy was totally surprised with the appearance of the tanks with their deafening roar and spitting fire on the well entrenched enemy that within the next 8 hrs Zoji La Pass and the adjoining Gumri Basin fell to 77 Para Brigade. Thereafter tanks were employed upto Dras and on 14 November they were de-inducted before the pass closed for the winter season. Strategic, operational and tactical surprise was achieved with the appearance and employment of tanks at that altitude, a first in the history of tank warfare. It was truly a game changer as subsequently the link up with Leh garrison was facilitated which ensured the liberation of Ladakh.
During the 1962 war against China
the Indian Air Force was not employed, nor were the tanks employed. The lessons learnt have oft been repeated, however, time has now come to ensure that when the bugle calls the mechanised forces are appropriately equipped, organised and trained to secure our Northern borders
During the 1962 operations with China, two Armoured Regiments were moved, however they saw little or no action. It was only in the late 1980s that tanks and ICVs were deployed in HAA. The move of tanks to Leh was again a mammoth logistic exercise. The
T-72 tanks had to be dismantled and flown to Leh where a major exercise followed to re-assemble the tanks, conduct zeroing of their guns and preparing them operationally.
Tanks and IFVs are being employed by ISAF in Afghanistan achieving phenomenal success, dominating their area of responsibility. No operation is being conducted in the hinterland without the support of tanks. It is the intimidating effect of the tank with its accurate fire power, mobility and inherent protection which has an awesome effect on the enemy and belligerent local population. AFVs are being employed for multifarious tasks such as road clearance, convoy protection, direct fire support to the assaulting infantry and occupying pivots of manoeuvre.
Peculiarities of operating in high altitude areas
The challenges to man and machine operating in HAA are many. Half the battle is won if both the soldier and his weapon platform are fighting fit. The altitudes of the border areas vary from 11,000 to 18,000 ft where the oxygen content being low, the performance of both deteriorates sharply. If proper acclimatisation is done the soldiers overcome many hazards, however it is the equipment that has to be specifically designed to operate in these adverse conditions.
Terrain: The borders to the North can be further divided into three distinct sectors, the Western, Central and Eastern sectors. All three sectors have their own peculiarities. The Western sector (Ladakh) is more akin to the deserts with wide valleys and flat open terrain giving a frontage for upto two troops of tanks to operate. The hill features on either side are dominating and would require high angle direct fire weapons to provide intimate fire support. In the Eastern sector the valleys are narrower till the start of the Tibet plateau. The problem is that lateral movement between valleys is non-existent hence the greater challenge of inducting troops and subsequent reinforcements to the desired area.
The future ICV being indigenously developed has been conceived keeping our requirements for both the Northern and Western theatres. Hence a tracked and wheeled version of the ICV is likely to be inducted by 2017
Infrastructure: A concerted effort is being made to develop and upgrade the infrastructure as regards roads, bridges and air-strips. However greater urgency is required to ensure the desired level of operational and tactical mobility is achieved. Simultaneously, construction of insulated garages for the AFVs and appropriate ammunition dumps especially for the anti-tank missiles need priority. As deployment areas are restricted, construction of large tunnels and caves in the hillsides are ideal for AFVs as they provide additional protection and security.
If soldiers had'nt died at the border , they would have pulled out and tried to push us to be neutral.
