Bhadra
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- Jul 11, 2011
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Indian Army operations in Ladakh this season has proved certain things;
* That Indian Army is capable of controlling information flow from the battleground. It is no more Bombay attack scene or Kargil Fiascos. Many journalists are not able to pass information or rather sell information to the other side.
* It has very badly exposed the ability of OSINT to manipulate and control information of the battle area. It has exposed chinks in satellite imagery technology as available in the public domain. PP14 and Galwan proved that beyond doubt and now Black Top is troubling the OSINT horribly. This aspect has burnt holes in the credibility of many jumpstarts like Shukla and Mitra Ayyars etc.
* That Infantry remains the arm of decision and no amount of mechanization, light tanks, motorized forces can substitute it, especially in mountains.
* If it was a testbed for testing Chinese Mechanised and Motorised Infantry Divisions, it can be considered as a failure so far.
* That in spite of all modernization, mechanization and restructuring leadership training is a battle-winning factor. The Chinese leadership tendency to fall back to mass waves and faith in share numbers continues to be their dominant military culture. They have not overcome the Chinese PLA guerrilla mindset and the culture of crows carrying political commissars.
* That Chinese are most untrustworthy and treacherous people not cable of keeping agreements or treaties.
* That the shots in the Chinese power structure are called by PLA rather than any diplomat or political leader and PLA has a much stronger hold over the Chinese power system than one would like to believe.
* That PLA is indeed facing difficulties in remaining and operating in High Altitude areas of Tibet, especially in difficult mountains. So far Indian MEA had been saving them by entering into unfavorable agreements even against professional advice.
* That Indian Army is capable of controlling information flow from the battleground. It is no more Bombay attack scene or Kargil Fiascos. Many journalists are not able to pass information or rather sell information to the other side.
* It has very badly exposed the ability of OSINT to manipulate and control information of the battle area. It has exposed chinks in satellite imagery technology as available in the public domain. PP14 and Galwan proved that beyond doubt and now Black Top is troubling the OSINT horribly. This aspect has burnt holes in the credibility of many jumpstarts like Shukla and Mitra Ayyars etc.
* That Infantry remains the arm of decision and no amount of mechanization, light tanks, motorized forces can substitute it, especially in mountains.
* If it was a testbed for testing Chinese Mechanised and Motorised Infantry Divisions, it can be considered as a failure so far.
* That in spite of all modernization, mechanization and restructuring leadership training is a battle-winning factor. The Chinese leadership tendency to fall back to mass waves and faith in share numbers continues to be their dominant military culture. They have not overcome the Chinese PLA guerrilla mindset and the culture of crows carrying political commissars.
* That Chinese are most untrustworthy and treacherous people not cable of keeping agreements or treaties.
* That the shots in the Chinese power structure are called by PLA rather than any diplomat or political leader and PLA has a much stronger hold over the Chinese power system than one would like to believe.
* That PLA is indeed facing difficulties in remaining and operating in High Altitude areas of Tibet, especially in difficult mountains. So far Indian MEA had been saving them by entering into unfavorable agreements even against professional advice.