IAF MiG-21 shoots down Pakistani F-16

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Hellfire

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Active-Radar BVR Missiles (Like AMRAAMs & R77), have their own radar turned-on on the final phase of chase (<30km), before that, they are guided by datalink to the launching aircraft. If somehow (or defending themselves), launching F-16s maneuver out and lose their radar lock on targetted IAF aircraft, the missile will turn on its radar early, potentially locking up on civilian jets (which has bigger RCS), if IAF jets are close.
Okay. Working on the hypothetical consideration that there was indeed a civil aircraft at and north of Bannihal. I do hope you recollect that the AIM-120C AMRAAM can have mid course correction input from the controlling AEW&C via Link 16, incidentally operational on both the SAAB 2000 AEW&C and F-16s?


bold part,
sorry but I have no reason to believe your claim (or if you have a source, show me!). Anyone can also lookup Indian Airforce squadrons and cite that.
Then maybe you can contact Gp Capt NKS who was the CO and ask him yourself? From the proverbial horse's mouth ....

I am pretty sure that the initials of the officer can not be looked up and cited, with certainty of his being the CO at the time. Obviously they will remain initials as am not going to put his name up here although he has retired and has joined the private sector, based out of capital now. So you can undertake the due diligence ...

Early-morning 10 AM is the time for many Srinagar inbound-outbound flights.
As told.

At about 0855 am Phalcon noticed few bogies begin slowly taking to air randomly deep in enemy airspace, analysis of the movement was suspicious enough that shortly Srinagar ATC started clearing own airspace. By 0925-0928 am (exact time I do not recollect) it was very clear that the enemy was about to do something - either actually or send in a feint. That is when ORPs were launched off Srinagar AFB and subsequently off Awantipore.

Said IL-76 was on finals to land at AFB Srinagar with 'critical' equipment. As situation was of being at high alert, the said CO himself was flying.
 

mist_consecutive

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Okay. Working on the hypothetical consideration that there was indeed a civil aircraft at and north of Bannihal. I do hope you recollect that the AIM-120C AMRAAM can have mid course correction input from the controlling AEW&C via Link 16, incidentally operational on both the SAAB 2000 AEW&C and F-16s?


Hmm, you are correct, I did miss that. Didn't knew PAF had the ability to slave their AMRAAMs to AEW&Cs. That actually is quite a threat TBH.





Then maybe you can contact Gp Capt NKS who was the CO and ask him yourself? From the proverbial horse's mouth ....



I am pretty sure that the initials of the officer can not be looked up and cited, with certainty of his being the CO at the time. Obviously they will remain initials as am not going to put his name up here although he has retired and has joined the private sector, based out of capital now. So you can undertake the due diligence ...




Ah, my bad, I am just a puny civilian (or am I, -- Vsauce theme in background --) I have no means to even get his original name or contact him 😞



As told.



At about 0855 am Phalcon noticed few bogies begin slowly taking to air randomly deep in enemy airspace, analysis of the movement was suspicious enough that shortly Srinagar ATC started clearing own airspace. By 0925-0928 am (exact time I do not recollect) it was very clear that the enemy was about to do something - either actually or send in a feint. That is when ORPs were launched off Srinagar AFB and subsequently off Awantipore.



Said IL-76 was on finals to land at AFB Srinagar with 'critical' equipment. As situation was of being at high alert, the said CO himself was flying.


ORPs (especially Mig-21s) takes 3 minutes for takeoff. They will reach the border within the next 4-5 minutes (actually even lesser), given they achieve Mach 1.5 ~ 40 seconds after takeoff.



If the reinforcements arrived even by 0945 (let's take 15 mins for safety), we pretty much had 2x Mig-21 from Srinagar, 2x Mig-21 from Awantipore, and 2x MKIs already on patrol.



We know our MKIs were ambushed by F-16s with multiple barrages of AMRAAM by around 0955 hours when PAF egressed and launched their munition. Mig-21s came later.



Sorry, but the timings and numbers don't match up with the attack timeline.
 

scatterStorm

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Just dropping here to Why the SU30MKI defeated those Aim120C's, and why we didn't lost a single MKI there. I think its pivotal technical explanation for the uninitiated. Watch from 13:03 or watch the full video, if you like to know why our defense tactics, "maybe" was to fly at low altitude at first place. 😎


 

Hellfire

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Hmm, you are correct, I did miss that. Didn't knew PAF had the ability to slave their AMRAAMs to AEW&Cs. That actually is quite a threat TBH.
Not that much of a threat either. There was speculation and downright interesting (for the lack of a correct word) posts over EL-8222 interfering with the Su-30MKI Radars. If that was the case, we might not have seen F-16s operating within 20 kms of their own airspace to launch a BVR.


Ah, my bad, I am just a puny civilian (or am I, -- Vsauce theme in background --) I have no means to even get his original name or contact him 😞
:)



ORPs (especially Mig-21s) takes 3 minutes for takeoff. They will reach the border within the next 4-5 minutes (actually even lesser), given they achieve Mach 1.5 ~ 40 seconds after takeoff.



If the reinforcements arrived even by 0945 (let's take 15 mins for safety), we pretty much had 2x Mig-21 from Srinagar, 2x Mig-21 from Awantipore, and 2x MKIs already on patrol.



We know our MKIs were ambushed by F-16s with multiple barrages of AMRAAM by around 0955 hours when PAF egressed and launched their munition. Mig-21s came later.



Sorry, but the timings and numbers don't match up with the attack timeline.

Timings are based on AWACS crew input. where the exact time is not known, have said I do not recollect and have mentioned the time in approx. Take that as +/- 2 mins for actions to be taken.

Yes 3 minutes, but that would be from the moment a go is given. Won't delve on it more.

This article may point to why the timelines are the way they are:


And, PAF did not cross the LC itself at any point. They made a technical violation. As such, ROE calls for warning. It was only when they deployed their A2G munitions that India had a cause to act definitively.

In this regards, I shall still go with ACM Tipnis' initial statement on news channel ... that PAF may have tried to target the AFBs at Awantipore and Srinagar but failed.

Was it due to active jamming and sectorial jamming? Won't speculate. So they went for secondary targets. Military installations in near proximity to LC. And we know how that played out.

By the time the things started, the Indian side of airspace was clear of civil traffic which was either diverted or in hold over HP (as Northern Punjab bases got activated and ORPs began to take to air)
 

mist_consecutive

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Not that much of a threat either. There was speculation and downright interesting (for the lack of a correct word) posts over EL-8222 interfering with the Su-30MKI Radars. If that was the case, we might not have seen F-16s operating within 20 kms of their own airspace to launch a BVR.




:)






Timings are based on AWACS crew input. where the exact time is not known, have said I do not recollect and have mentioned the time in approx. Take that as +/- 2 mins for actions to be taken.

Yes 3 minutes, but that would be from the moment a go is given. Won't delve on it more.

This article may point to why the timelines are the way they are:


And, PAF did not cross the LC itself at any point. They made a technical violation. As such, ROE calls for warning. It was only when they deployed their A2G munitions that India had a cause to act definitively.

In this regards, I shall still go with ACM Tipnis' initial statement on news channel ... that PAF may have tried to target the AFBs at Awantipore and Srinagar but failed.

Was it due to active jamming and sectorial jamming? Won't speculate. So they went for secondary targets. Military installations in near proximity to LC. And we know how that played out.

By the time the things started, the Indian side of airspace was clear of civil traffic which was either diverted or in hold over HP (as Northern Punjab bases got activated and ORPs began to take to air)
Actually I will buy your theory, your English & use of technical terms match that of someone knowledgeable, quite probably someone from IAF :india2:

If that might be true, can you please divulge a greater detail of what exactly happened on 27 Feb? I always hated the Indian govt. the lethargic approach towards divulging any information, and whatever we know is a mix of speculations from journos + few credible inputs. Resultingly, we are weak-spined towards info-warfare.
 

Neptune

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Just dropping here to Why the SU30MKI defeated those Aim120C's, and why we didn't lost a single MKI there. I think its pivotal technical explanation for the uninitiated. Watch from 13:03 or watch the full video, if you like to know why our defense tactics, "maybe" was to fly at low altitude at first place. 😎




Notching is probably one of the tactics Avenger1 used, it would explain a few things such Avenger1 being so low, Pakistani pilots being overly enthusiastic and thinking they achieved a kill when in reality Avenger1 just disappeared off the radar momentarily due to flying parallel to F-16s radars and against ground clutter. Although I don’t believe Pakistani pilots are that incompetent, so they probably knew they hit nothing and instead declared a kill solely for propaganda PR.

Some of this is redundant and I already mentioned it but there is one thing I left out. The scenario being played out was Avenger1 being outnumbered 1:8 or 1:12 if you count the 4 JF-17s operating north which resulted in a no win situation. Even if Avenger1 had missiles with the same range as AMRAAMS it would not mean he would or could go on the offensive since Avenger1 would likely easily get flanked with so many enemy aircraft around. Another overlooked aspect is that even if Avenger1 miraculously launched a missile it would have to climbed a considerable altitude thus limiting its range even further. To some up the troubles Avenger1 had: low altitude cut Avenger1’s missile range considerably, enemy aircraft operating at higher altitudes further negated the range from Avenger1’s R-77s since they would further lose kinetic energy while trying to climb, the other problem would be R-77s being in a tail chase trying to catch F-16s. It was an impossible situation, the only thing that the IAF could have done was match or exceed the PAF numerical advantage which would cause the PAF on the defensive.
 

scatterStorm

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Actually, going cold is the most standard and safest method of avoiding BVR missiles.
True, but comms were being jammed, and as I said, when you no there's no advantage in escape left as you are going to blow up into pieces, better put good use to those Fox2's. He had no choice.
 

Hellfire

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always hated the Indian govt. the lethargic approach towards divulging any information, and whatever we know is a mix of speculations from journos + few credible inputs. Resultingly, we are weak-spined towards info-warfare.
The design of the strike was always such that it was deniable for Pakistan. But question arises, why Pakistan had to undertake an action on 27 Feb 2019? Was it because a few crows and trees were felled? Or perhaps, the strike attained objectives that put pressure on Pakistani Govt to give in to the demands of the concerned groups for some kind of action?

My limited information says that we had an ELINT aircraft monitoring the strike and also HUMINT in terms of eyes on ground. Ample evidence and data for a proper BDA exists.

This is a post from 15 Feb 2019 by Hellfire/Falcon on the pakistani forum.

1.JPG


One could not be clearer than this. And this was read by the other side.


So, did the design of the strike and how events played out match above? To a large extent, yes.

It was a deliberate policy to not create a situation wherein the diplomatic fallout from our strike could be termed as war mongering. Diplomacy demands subtle actions. So was undertaken.

The biggest casualty of a well executed plan, including the actions on 27 feb 2019, was that it allowed a space for a certain narrative to gain hold, pushed forward by a certain ex IAF officer, wherein it was shown that AWACS was not in position. A factual lie. This was also repeated by people like Vishnu Som, who, in spite of being pointed out to the inaccuracy of the information, retorted that he had information from people better informed in air force.

No one in IAF not directly linked with the action had any information. And so, the narrative was damaged by these individuals, inadvertently or deliberately, when IAF released AWACS data for F-16 kill.

Do you remember a very popular and oft quoted Indian handle had claimed capture of Akhnoor Dagger? And the same handle recently released a statement on twitter stating that he will return after getting NOC from the departments? Which Govt handle proclaims that? Or which Government handle indicates that?

Absence of a visible effort by GoI to put forth its point is a political decision. But undermining what little information we have, is an action being undertaken in overzealousness, arising out of the information dissemination gap that exists within the govt.

Information Warfare has two aspects - Information gathering, collating and dissemination & Information denial.

Unfortunately, our policy planners fail to realize that information denial is selective to operational matters, not results thereof, in an increasingly connected and aware world.
 

scatterStorm

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The design of the strike was always such that it was deniable for Pakistan. But question arises, why Pakistan had to undertake an action on 27 Feb 2019? Was it because a few crows and trees were felled? Or perhaps, the strike attained objectives that put pressure on Pakistani Govt to give in to the demands of the concerned groups for some kind of action?

My limited information says that we had an ELINT aircraft monitoring the strike and also HUMINT in terms of eyes on ground. Ample evidence and data for a proper BDA exists.

This is a post from 15 Feb 2019 by Hellfire/Falcon on the pakistani forum.

View attachment 46606

One could not be clearer than this. And this was read by the other side.


So, did the design of the strike and how events played out match above? To a large extent, yes.

It was a deliberate policy to not create a situation wherein the diplomatic fallout from our strike could be termed as war mongering. Diplomacy demands subtle actions. So was undertaken.

The biggest casualty of a well executed plan, including the actions on 27 feb 2019, was that it allowed a space for a certain narrative to gain hold, pushed forward by a certain ex IAF officer, wherein it was shown that AWACS was not in position. A factual lie. This was also repeated by people like Vishnu Som, who, in spite of being pointed out to the inaccuracy of the information, retorted that he had information from people better informed in air force.

No one in IAF not directly linked with the action had any information. And so, the narrative was damaged by these individuals, inadvertently or deliberately, when IAF released AWACS data for F-16 kill.

Do you remember a very popular and oft quoted Indian handle had claimed capture of Akhnoor Dagger? And the same handle recently released a statement on twitter stating that he will return after getting NOC from the departments? Which Govt handle proclaims that? Or which Government handle indicates that?

Absence of a visible effort by GoI to put forth its point is a political decision. But undermining what little information we have, is an action being undertaken in overzealousness, arising out of the information dissemination gap that exists within the govt.

Information Warfare has two aspects - Information gathering, collating and dissemination & Information denial.

Unfortunately, our policy planners fail to realize that information denial is selective to operational matters, not results thereof, in an increasingly connected and aware world.
A wise man once said, "the first casualty of war is always truth", unfortunately it did that day.
 

Srinivas_K

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The design of the strike was always such that it was deniable for Pakistan. But question arises, why Pakistan had to undertake an action on 27 Feb 2019? Was it because a few crows and trees were felled? Or perhaps, the strike attained objectives that put pressure on Pakistani Govt to give in to the demands of the concerned groups for some kind of action?

My limited information says that we had an ELINT aircraft monitoring the strike and also HUMINT in terms of eyes on ground. Ample evidence and data for a proper BDA exists.

This is a post from 15 Feb 2019 by Hellfire/Falcon on the pakistani forum.

View attachment 46606

One could not be clearer than this. And this was read by the other side.


So, did the design of the strike and how events played out match above? To a large extent, yes.

It was a deliberate policy to not create a situation wherein the diplomatic fallout from our strike could be termed as war mongering. Diplomacy demands subtle actions. So was undertaken.

The biggest casualty of a well executed plan, including the actions on 27 feb 2019, was that it allowed a space for a certain narrative to gain hold, pushed forward by a certain ex IAF officer, wherein it was shown that AWACS was not in position. A factual lie. This was also repeated by people like Vishnu Som, who, in spite of being pointed out to the inaccuracy of the information, retorted that he had information from people better informed in air force.

No one in IAF not directly linked with the action had any information. And so, the narrative was damaged by these individuals, inadvertently or deliberately, when IAF released AWACS data for F-16 kill.

Do you remember a very popular and oft quoted Indian handle had claimed capture of Akhnoor Dagger? And the same handle recently released a statement on twitter stating that he will return after getting NOC from the departments? Which Govt handle proclaims that? Or which Government handle indicates that?

Absence of a visible effort by GoI to put forth its point is a political decision. But undermining what little information we have, is an action being undertaken in overzealousness, arising out of the information dissemination gap that exists within the govt.

Information Warfare has two aspects - Information gathering, collating and dissemination & Information denial.

Unfortunately, our policy planners fail to realize that information denial is selective to operational matters, not results thereof, in an increasingly connected and aware world.
What details exactly you are expecting from our defense forces can you be more specific ?
 

scatterStorm

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Notching for dummies.

Much easily understandable.
Very nice explanation indeed for the uninitiated. So now where are my Paki Bois, educate these buggers.

Man I need to upgrade my hardware to Ryzen 3700x to play this simulator, its now on my bucket list. :frusty:
 
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Hellfire

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What details exactly you are expecting from our defense forces can you be more specific ?
Please read again. I said information denial should be limited to operational aspects. That includes Bomb Damage Assessment, platforms used and information as to specifics. The best way to fight an asymmetric war remains in denying any information of own action to the enemy.

The statements on the actual strikes should have been limited to a statement by the forces. No one else needed to make a statement on it.
 

fire starter

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South Asia’s first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of February 27 2019, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia. Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW & CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited hostilities in South Asia.

At around 9:30am on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases. These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control (LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara.

Pitted against them were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan Punjab border.

Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top (Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.

However, the moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range, the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak attack’ inside Indian territory.

By most accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan) moved in from behind and fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.

The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.

There are two probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However, since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that can provide assured self-defence.

There are only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of SRAAMs for this aerial engagement:

1) The PAF was unsure whether or not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST) sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect);

2) The PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27 morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination, both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in combat.

3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess till today).

NCTR Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier.

In essence, the NCTR mode enables a combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference (EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod.

On the other hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.

IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings.

Where the IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare development house, for US$4.8 million. And in March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation (GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017 became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and laser warning receivers.

Source :- Prasun K Sengupta
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mist_consecutive

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South Asia’s first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of February 27 2019, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia. Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW & CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited hostilities in South Asia.

At around 9:30am on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases. These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control (LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara.

Pitted against them were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan Punjab border.

Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top (Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.

However, the moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range, the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak attack’ inside Indian territory.

By most accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan) moved in from behind and fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.

The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.

There are two probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However, since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that can provide assured self-defence.

There are only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of SRAAMs for this aerial engagement:

1) The PAF was unsure whether or not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST) sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect);

2) The PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27 morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination, both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in combat.

3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess till today).

NCTR Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier.

In essence, the NCTR mode enables a combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference (EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod.

On the other hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.

IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings.

Where the IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare development house, for US$4.8 million. And in March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation (GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017 became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and laser warning receivers.

Source :- Prasun K Sengupta
View attachment 46757
Well, I just don't get it. Every month some journalist comes and paints a different picture of what happened. This article is way off the mark from that what we know currently (It might as well be the truth, whereas our current knowledge is wrong). But hey, now that more than a year has passed, how about releasing some details what exactly happened ?
 

scatterStorm

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Well, I just don't get it. Every month some journalist comes and paints a different picture of what happened. This article is way off the mark from that what we know currently (It might as well be the truth, whereas our current knowledge is wrong). But hey, now that more than a year has passed, how about releasing some details what exactly happened ?
Its not going to happen, its confidential information. Expect in a book or something after a decade.
 

Karthi

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Well, I just don't get it. Every month some journalist comes and paints a different picture of what happened. This article is way off the mark from that what we know currently (It might as well be the truth, whereas our current knowledge is wrong). But hey, now that more than a year has passed, how about releasing some details what exactly happened ?

It's probably the only aerial war using AWACS, BVR , WVR and EW . Indias 10 fighters fought against 24 Enemy in a defensive situation . It's gave IAF an excellent taste for modern warfare , Sometimes I think this porks are Actually helping buy giving experience of fighting.

No professional military give away th secrets , for cheap publicity except Porkistan
 

Neptune

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It's probably the only aerial war using AWACS, BVR , WVR and EW . Indias 10 fighters fought against 24 Enemy in a defensive situation . It's gave IAF an excellent taste for modern warfare , Sometimes I think this porks are Actually helping buy giving experience of fighting.

No professional military give away th secrets , for cheap publicity except Porkistan

Not even close, the US (and other countries) have been using AWACS, electronic warfare and both long and short range missiles since the Vietnamese War all the way through Operation Eldorado (Libya), Grenada, Falkland War, Gulf War, Yugoslavia, Iraq 2003, Syria, Yemen and even against Pakistan during the Bin Laden raid. Also when I say Syria I mean many countries including the United States, Turkey, Israel and Russia. They all use AWACS, jammers, and have fired missiles on other aircraft or drones.

For historical context AWACS was used during the Vietnamese war which was the EC-211 Warning Star.

Electric warfare was A-6 Prowler, F-105 Thunder chief and F-111

Fighters were many but mostly F-4s and they carried AIm-9s for short range and AIM-7s for long range.
 
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