Why did China withdraw from Arunachal in 1962 skirmish?

[Bhadra]

China withdrew from Arunachal or NEFA because by the end of war Cuban Missile crisis was solved. China attacked India when 2 superpowers were busy at Cuba.

Possible US and Soviet military help to India forced China to withdraw in excuse of goodwill gesture.

You mean to say, China could have held on to Arunanchal had she desired so ??

Tell us how ??

 

[ITBP]

You mean to say, China could have held on to Arunanchal had she desired so ??

Tell us how ??

Yes, China took the advantage of Cuban crisis. When whole worlds's spotlight was in Cuba, then China invaded India as silently as possible. India army was not able to drive back Chinese.

 

[Ray]

China withdrew from Arunachal because it was untenable from the logistic and fire support stand point.

They did not withdraw from Ladakh as they did not face the same problems.

Terrain

Roads as of today

 

[Bhadra]

Yes, China took the advantage of Cuban crisis. When whole worlds's spotlight was in Cuba, then China invaded India as silently as possible. India army was not able to drive back Chinese.

China took advantage to launch the attack. That was neither the reason nor the cause of attack. That was just choosing the time.

China did not attack India to hold territory. They had already gained territory militarily what ever they wanted between 1959 and 1962 prior to attacking India. Attack on India had other politico military purposes. They also achieved those politico military aims.

Before Indian Army could regroup and counter attack , the PLA withdrew ; even in Ladakh beyond their claimed positions or claimed Line.

Your statement that " Indian Army was not able to drive back the Chinese" could have been true if Indian Army was given an opportunity and time to launch a counter offensive or had the Chinese stayed back. How could Indian Army drive the Chinese back when the Chinese drove themselves back ?? It is something like Changes Khan coming to India collecting the booty and going back. Did Indians forces him back.

You mean to suggest that Indian Army should have chased the withdrawing troops to Lhasa ??

Ridiculous man !!

 

[Ray]

I wonder if India could launch any counter attacks.

One should see the situation that was there on the ground and the resources available.

 

[Bhadra]

I wonder if India could launch any counter attacks.

One should see the situation that was there on the ground and the resources available.

India very much could have regrouped and launched a counter attack. It had lots of uncommitted troops. After all how many troops were involved ? One brigade in Ladakh and one division in Kameng ?

But Chinese withdrew and Nehru had no guts to go back to Tawang and occupy it !!

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Kennedy had airlifted weaponry into India during this conflict, maybe
Chinese feared us involvement after they just annexed Tibet?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Sir, Only if IA can cut off all Major supply routes via Cruise and Balletic Missiles and command infrastructure in few early hours of battle ..

Then only can focus on local tactical positions with artillery and airstrikes complemented with Para troopers, Just a theory ..

I wonder if India could launch any counter attacks.

One should see the situation that was there on the ground and the resources available.

 

[Ray]

Sir, Only if IA can cut off all Major supply routes via Cruise and Balletic Missiles and command infrastructure in few early hours of battle ..

Then only can focus on local tactical positions with artillery and airstrikes complemented with Para troopers, Just a theory ..

I was mentioning it in the context of 1962.

Read Capt Amarinder Singh's book LEST WE FORGET.

It gives somewhat of the actual picture of what happened and also the resources.

The nub lay in the artillery resources and the underdeveloped trails.

Today, the situation is different.

 

[Bhadra]

Kennedy had airlifted weaponry into India during this conflict, maybe
Chinese feared us involvement after they just annexed Tibet?

What I said earlier was just a theoretical premise. And Counter offensive or counter attack can manifest even after 50 years or say 100 years. Countries and societies have done that to set aside real or perceived historical wrongs.

Otherwise, the Chinese launched their attack on 20 October. The skirmishes along the borders had started in May- june 62 for example in Chususl in Western Sectors, Chinese intentions of offensive actions became clear in October 1962 when when along with attack onTthagla they occupied Laongju and Asaphila in NEFA (as known then).

Chinese declared ceasefire on 20 Novemebr 1962.

The Campaigning season had come to an end as by then the passes would have started closing.

The Conter attack was thus not possible. But what was possible even after 20 novemeber 1962 was to throw back the PLA from NEFA.

But they withdrew on their own as they had even exhausted the crow population of upper Assam and NEFA.

It was neigh impossible to support three Chinese divisions south of Tawang where even local produce had been exhausted by the PLA within a month.

Had the Chinese stayed on, the Indian Forces would have allowed then to die hungry.

The Chinese could have returned even much earlier had Nehru and his bureaucrats allowed IAF to be used (what to talk of Cruise ballistic or nuclear missiles -a Joke ) .

 

[Ray]

Some Lessons of the 1962 NEFA Debacle
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/SomeLessonso the1962NEFADebacle_AMVohra.pdf

Read it all if you wish or read from Page 5 (Forward Policy)

 

[CCP]

1. South Tibet is hard to defence and it is far from central area of Tibet. Supply lines are only available for two months Oct. and Nov.( yes, we choose the time to attack.)

2. we can turn it into a water pool by build a few damns in the side we are controlling.

3. It is much less important than Aksai Chin, where is the gate to India's major cities : Delhi and Mumbai.

 

[Voldemort]

1. South Tibet is hard to defence and it is far from central area of Tibet. Supply lines are only available for two months Oct. and Nov.( yes, we choose the time to attack.)

2. we can turn it into a water pool by build a few damns in the side we are controlling.

3. It is much less important than Aksai Chin, where is the gate to India's major cities : Delhi and Mumbai.

What is South Tibet?

 

[CCP]

What is South Tibet?

India call it Arunachal,

 

[Voldemort]

India call it Arunachal,

Have some shame. Even Tibet is forcefully occupied. Explain point 2.

 

[CCP]

Have some shame. Even Tibet is forcefully occupied. Explain point 2.

you will know look at a map .
hint: rivers

 

[roma]

@Bhadra @LETHALFORCE @Kunal Biswas @Ray @Voldemort @ITBP @arya @Sam2012

1. South Tibet is hard to defence and it is far from central area of Tibet. Supply lines are only available for two months Oct. and Nov.( yes, we choose the time to attack.)
2. we can turn it into a water pool by build a few damns in the side we are controlling.
3. It is much less important than Aksai Chin, where is the gate to India's major cities : Delhi and Mumbai.

I agree with your reason #1

Your reason #2 doesnt hold much water ( pun intended ) . Depending on the govt in power in India - they can blast
your dam and then the flooding goes to your side !~~

Your reason #3 is historically and logically of no value . China would NEVER want to go into India and control the populations in Delhi and Mumbai. That would have been among the last things they would have wanted. What would have been of value to China was to have their medium range weapons in Tibet threaten the northern cities of India - and that they could have done with the technology they did have in 1962 . Long range artillery would have been one possibility .

Also consider that China had missiles which easily could be deployed in Tibet with ranges easily covering Delhi and other Northern cities of India

So the reason for taking Aksai was not to have a gateway to march into India - hardly .
The whole idea was to add deployable strength to the Gilgit Baltistan region to aid Pakistan - to make the connection with Pakistan for a route to the Indian ocean and to signal to India not to get too tough with Pak otherwise China was in a position to intervene.

It was also to severely check and inhibit any possible ideas by India to expand influence to the Central asian areas.
and to cut any energy supply lines coming from the CAR region into India.

For all those purposes, Aksai was of value and not arunachal . So china put huge resources to defend aksai
and basically didnt bother much about arunachal and used their withdrawal from there as a PR exercise .

 

[CCP]

[MENTION=9097]


The whole idea was to add deployable strength to the Gilgit Baltistan region to aid Pakistan - to make the connection with Pakistan for a route to the Indian ocean and to signal to India not to get too tough with Pak otherwise China was in a position to intervene.

It was also to severely check and inhibit any possible ideas by India to expand influence to the Central asian areas.
and to cut any energy supply lines coming from the CAR region into India.

For all those purposes, Aksai was of value and not arunachal . So china put huge resources to defend aksai
and basically didnt bother much about arunachal and used their withdrawal from there as a PR exercise .

first of all,I am agree with your last 3 paragraphs.

But my reason #2 and #3 is also valid.

Your reason #2 doesnt hold much water ( pun intended ) . Depending on the govt in power in India - they can blast
your dam and then the flooding goes to your side !~~

I don't think India dare to blast Chinese dam in peace time.

Your reason #3 is historically and logically of no value . China would NEVER want to go into India and control the populations in Delhi and Mumbai. That would have been among the last things they would have wanted. What would have been of value to China was to have their medium range weapons in Tibet threaten the northern cities of India - and that they could have done with the technology they did have in 1962 . Long range artillery would have been one possibility .

Also consider that China had missiles which easily could be deployed in Tibet with ranges easily covering Delhi and other Northern cities of India

So the reason for taking Aksai was not to have a gateway to march into India - hardly .

I don't want to control the population in India. It is basically not possible. But, we may want to capture your government and destroy your industry and business in that area.

That is why the most strong PLA amour divisions with most advanced weapons are developed at Aksai Chin.
They are training to use the less time to reach Delhi and Mumbai.

My have missile to attack Delhi and Mumbai does not means my will not use our land force.

Aksai chin is indeed a gateway to march into India. Indus-Gangetic Plain is in-front of PLA amour divisions and not mountain in they way to Delhi.

 

[t_co]

@CCP Aksai Chin is not a gateway into India. The altitude is too high for prolonged troop deployments and the road infrastructure still not developed enough to sustain a land offensive south.

On the flip side, it functions as a wonderful barrier to any attacking troops, since it is a big, barren bowl surrounded by mountains on two and a half sides, with south-facing entrances and exits at mountain passes barely 1km wide. Those passes are narrow enough for constant satellite observation and/or constant artillery preparation.

Any Indian forces that push into Aksai Chin would be entering into a death trap. The more mountainous terrain there is over 5500m in elevation, which means altitude sickness would start causing casualties and eventually fatalities without any enemy intervention, and the flatter terrain there has no forest or urban cover, which means any troops not in bunkers or tunnels would be naked to airpower and guided artillery on a scale not seen since Gulf War I and II. A single cruise missile battery or strike squadron anywhere in the western half of Tibet (or Northern third of Pakistan) could completely wreck a ground battalion for free with as little as 10 minutes notice.

The defending forces there would hold enormous advantages in cover, mobility, and the luxury of a prepositioned air-defense network. Any air cover on the attacking side would have to come from aircraft itself, which means the defenders simply have to wage a campaign of air denial while the attackers have to repeatedly put their aircraft in a known position and wait for the defenders to shoot at them.

 

[t_co]

As for dams to flood Arunachal, that is a last-ditch option. It's possible, but a highly unfriendly act. Much better to negotiate without resorting to that level of coercion.