Indian Special Forces (archived)

[sum1]

And yet they don't accept casualties on the border.

They actually never have a problem in accepting on western front and are always blabbering to US about number of security forces they sacrificed on behalf of US

Its Eastern front where the face has to be maintained and everything denied

 

[Darth Malgus]

They actually never have a problem in accepting on western front and are always blabbering to US about number of security forces they sacrificed on behalf of US

Its Eastern front where the face has to be maintained and everything denied

On eastern front Pakistani soldiers have Matrix level evasion skills, which is why no one ever dies. Bullets automatically change course when heading towards a paki soldier.

 

[WARREN SS]

Please provide me the links to where the SSG has has shown valor and changed the game at theatre level against India.

For you the SSG will be humans..but for me a unit which trains terrorists to kill innocents in Mumbai and kills its own children in schools as claimed by their own operator can only be filthy pests.

Have you seen me justifying there Acts

Read my previous post I mentioned that SSG polluted with religious fundamentalism and martial theory which is a trait of Pakistan army


Mumbai,pathankot
Those are total intelligence based ops

That is what Pakistan gained from Afghanistan how to fight
Cheap proxy war against superior enemy

You and I both know tables turns both ways

Though we don't get our hands dirty ourselves

Secondly Have you seen me any where comparing PARA SF and SSG

All SSG campaign failed against India

Majorly during Siachin war when

When Musharaff himself was commanding whole battalion
Of SSG and lost more than 200+ operators
Including support infantry numbers were close to 500 casualties

Both are different from each other and so are there operational use

Though you should commend there daring to launch multiple failed raids on saltaro ridge posts

Even knowing there fate

Para SF from day one shown it's operational effective Ness

Eg: mandhol raid ,capture poongli bridge in Dhaka

 

[HarshBardhan]

Indian Navy-Marine Commandos MARCOS

 

[aditya g]

Not necessarily .......

MAJ UDAI SINGH 22 SF SPECIAL GP
NK AMIYA RANJAN SAHOO 22 SF (SPL GP)
NK RANJEET SINGH 22 SF SPECIAL GP​

Above are some quotes from how the names are listed on IA awards announcements.

IMO SG losses show up in the parent unit of the operator. But can't confirm.

 

[rkhanna]

Not necessarily .......

MAJ UDAI SINGH 22 SF SPECIAL GP
NK AMIYA RANJAN SAHOO 22 SF (SPL GP)
NK RANJEET SINGH 22 SF SPECIAL GP​

Above are some quotes from how the names are listed on IA awards announcements.

Thats citation. But I think the "casualty" in Orbat is reflected in Parent Unit. SG is not an official Unit and does not show up in an Org Structure. Soldiers go to SG on deputation and rotate out when their tour is over.

But then again i could be wrong

 

[south block]

chutiya fighter & mulla zaravan a** is on fire on other forum .... Piglets can't handle bitter facts about SSG massive failure as a SF & now only left with posting modelling pics of few Piglet soldiers from different angles as fighting record on the ground is dismal

 

[Johny_Baba]

chutiya fighter & mulla zaravan a** is on fire on other forum .... Piglets can't handle bitter facts about SSG massive failure as a SF & now only left with posting modelling pics of few Piglet soldiers from different angles as fighting record on the ground is dismal

Do the needful and post some pics in Porkistan Idiotic Musings thread,brother.

 

[HarshBardhan]

Not to derail the thread but since SSG has became a matter of discussion here , here is an article exposing the Super-image of SSG and that too by a popular news outlet DailyO

___________________________

Continuing my series of notes on some of the more interesting aspects of the 1965 war with Pakistan in its 50th anniversary year, let me take you back to one of the most remarkable, but short-lived and relatively less talked about, events of that war.

It was the audacious para-commando attack by Pakistan with the intention of crippling three of the Indian Air Force's (IAF) most crucial and largest airbases in Punjab: Pathankot, Halwara (near Ludhiana) and Adampur (near Jalandhar).

This was on the night between September 6 and 7. On the September 6, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) carried out rather successful raids on those bases, causing large-scale destruction at Pathankot. Combined with an early setback over Chhamb, the loss of four Vampires, this was supposed to have left the IAF in disarray. And nightly commando drops were to take full advantage of that.

These were no small bands of paratroopers. Large C-130 Hercules aircrafts were used, taking advantage of the fact that India had no night-capable fighters in that war, and three groups of 60 paratroopers each were dropped in the vicinity of each airbase. Each group was lead by one or two officers and a junior commissioned officer (JCO).

The Pathankot group was the first to be discovered. It had an unintercepted yet far-from-perfect drop at 2.30am and was first noticed by a villager who raised an alarm. The Halwara group was spotted immediately thereafter. The Adampur group, in fact, partly landed inside the airbase perimeter and could have posed an immediate threat to an airbase bustling with frontline fighters and personnel, but only lightly protected by a Punjab Armed Police contingent as nobody had anticipated such tactical aggression and risk-taking by the Pakistanis.

On paper, the plan was brilliant. If it had even partly succeeded, it would have caused a serious blow to the IAF's strength and India's morale hours after initial reverses in the air and on the ground, mainly at Pathankot.

But true to Pakistan's track record, from Chhamb to Pathankot to para-commando raids, or from Kutch to Khem Karan to Kargil, great tactical dash is invariably followed by thoughtlessly incompetent execution, leading to disaster.

We have several accounts of the fate of these very well-trained paratroopers. But the amazing thing is how this is a chapter in that 50-year-old war where chroniclers of both sides agree. Both say the operation was a complete rout.

Of the 180 para-commandos dropped, 138, including all officers but one, were captured and safely taken to prisoner of war (POW) camps. Twenty-two were killed, or rather lynched by joint combing teams of villagers armed with sticks, police and even bands of muleteers released by the Army, from the animal transport battalion of the nearby Corps headquarters.

Only 20 para-commandos were unaccounted for and most escaped back to Pakistan under the fog. Most of these were from the Pathankot group, dropped less than 10km from the border in an area that had plenty of ravines, riverine tracks to navigate back along. One notable, commando-style escape was of Major Hazur Hasnain, the Halwara group commander who, along with his friend, hijacked an IAF jeep and somehow managed to return safe. I take the figures from Lt General Harbakhsh Singh's book, but Pakistani accounts fully confirm these.

The Pakistani accounts, the latest of which comes now from several participants in the wake of the 1965@50 commemorations, acknowledged the para-commando disaster but blamed it on poor briefing, planning and callous arrogance of the commanders. Some of these former Pakistani soldiers even write about having met some of these paratroopers and exchanged notes with them on how badly planned the operation was. Here is the account of Col SG Mehdi, himself a commando officer then.

The raid had immediately spread panic on the Indian side. A hurried defence was organised with the police leading the search parties along with large bands of enthusiastic villagers, NCC cadets and, of course, the muleteers whom the Army had released to fight one of the most ironical battle ever: muleteer versus para-commando. For airfield defence, a couple of wheeled armoured personnel carriers allocated to the local college NCC Wings were spared. By the time the sun shone in the morning, however, even the mopping up was over.

Pakistani accounts, however, claim that the raid caused confusion in Indian headquarters and resulted in its 14 Infantry Division, being moved from Lahore to the Sialkot sector to beef up the 1 Corps assault there, to be diverted to deal with the paratrooper menace. Some fanciful accounts now even claim that in the confusion, the 14 Division convoys were jammed on the highway and the PAF attacked these during daytime.

There is no confirmation from Indian accounts and Harbakhsh puts the total number of vehicles destroyed by the PAF quite low in that war. It’s an aside but this incident matches Anna Hazare's own spiced-up account of having been the lone survivor when the PAF hit a troop truck he was driving on a Punjab highway in that war.

Haste, arrogance and tactical foolhardiness had caused Pakistan the loss of the cream of it special forces then. Mule-drivers, other animal-handlers, NCC cadets, Punjab Police and ordinary villagers had earned their battle honours.

The picture of this successful manhunt that is used here has been picked from vayu-sena.tripod.com. It is hazy and old but leaves no doubt that what is going on is a motley band of lightly armed Indians, policemen and civilians hunting for the elite Pakistani troops.

(This post first appeared in Shekhar Gupta's Facebook page.)

Source :
http://www.dailyo.in/politics/1965-...harbakhsh-singh-indian-army/story/1/6300.html

chutiya fighter & mulla zaravan a** is on fire on other forum .... Piglets can't handle bitter facts about SSG massive failure as a SF & now only left with posting modelling pics of few Piglet soldiers from different angles as fighting record on the ground is dismal

I found this on net and started thinking are these pics for modelling or what ?

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Brave men with no leader dont long last in a battle.

SSG are way inferior to Para commandos in the way they are trained..and i can write a long post to prove it.

If they were worth any respect i would have..i respect Bangladesh para co,indonesian,malayasian SF way over Pak and arab SF.

 

[vasusuman]

Indian Navy-Marine Commandos MARCOS

Ships navigating in piracy waters of Somalia carry armed guards.Previously most of them were Ex-British navy commandos.But later on,though these private companies were still British,they started recruiting Ex Indian Marcos to save costs.I met both British and Indian guys.So i asked an Indian Ex Marcos,why did they retreat during Mumbai attack from Taj.It had left a very bad impression on me.Training is all good.But when time came,you withdrew.He was a very nice guy and with very good physique,in early forties.He said humbly that it was call of commanding officer to retreat.And why,-because they were small force of 50 which is required for strategic purpose and they are not trained for urban warfare.I asked then why,if suppose you had lost couple of your men,then what.You could have recruited more.He didn't reply but expression told all.I could make out that he also felt that it was not a courageous thing to do in that circumstances.

 

[ezsasa]

Ships navigating in piracy waters of Somalia carry armed guards.Previously most of them were Ex-British navy commandos.But later on,though these private companies were still British,they started recruiting Ex Indian Marcos to save costs.I met both British and Indian guys.So i asked an Indian Ex Marcos,why did they retreat during Mumbai attack from Taj.It had left a very bad impression on me.Training is all good.But when time came,you withdrew.He was a very nice guy and with very good physique,in early forties.He said humbly that it was call of commanding officer to retreat.And why,-because they were small force of 50 which is required for strategic purpose and they are not trained for urban warfare.I asked then why,if suppose you had lost couple of your men,then what.You could have recruited more.He didn't reply but expression told all.I could make out that he also felt that it was not a courageous thing to do in that circumstances.

I'd say what he says is right. They were not trained for it. Good call to pull back.

It is wrong of us to expect of them to to do things they were not trained to do.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Ships navigating in piracy waters of Somalia carry armed guards.Previously most of them were Ex-British navy commandos.But later on,though these private companies were still British,they started recruiting Ex Indian Marcos to save costs.I met both British and Indian guys.So i asked an Indian Ex Marcos,why did they retreat during Mumbai attack from Taj.It had left a very bad impression on me.Training is all good.But when time came,you withdrew.He was a very nice guy and with very good physique,in early forties.He said humbly that it was call of commanding officer to retreat.And why,-because they were small force of 50 which is required for strategic purpose and they are not trained for urban warfare.I asked then why,if suppose you had lost couple of your men,then what.You could have recruited more.He didn't reply but expression told all.I could make out that he also felt that it was not a courageous thing to do in that circumstances.

Look Marcos,SFF,NSG and Garuds are one dimensional force.Each has their one speciality for which they are the best.

Now what fanboys do is that without thinking they say Marcos is the best because Seal is the best and Marcos are Indian seals...which is bullshit.

Marcos wont last much if we put them in Thar desert as compared to 10 Para.Similarly Garuds would not last long in himalayas as compared to SFF or ITBP.

Same for NSG when you take them out of urban warfare...Marcos could not handle 26/11 and NSG cannot handle maritime warfare.

This is why i say that Para commandos are the only complete SF in India.

They have the best moutain warriors.
The best desert raiders.
The best ex nsg SAG guys.
The best jungle warriors.
And combat divers who can hold their own.

 

[Coalmine]

Ships navigating in piracy waters of Somalia carry armed guards.Previously most of them were Ex-British navy commandos.But later on,though these private companies were still British,they started recruiting Ex Indian Marcos to save costs.I met both British and Indian guys.So i asked an Indian Ex Marcos,why did they retreat during Mumbai attack from Taj.It had left a very bad impression on me.Training is all good.But when time came,you withdrew.He was a very nice guy and with very good physique,in early forties.He said humbly that it was call of commanding officer to retreat.And why,-because they were small force of 50 which is required for strategic purpose and they are not trained for urban warfare.I asked then why,if suppose you had lost couple of your men,then what.You could have recruited more.He didn't reply but expression told all.I could make out that he also felt that it was not a courageous thing to do in that circumstances.

I dont know this story. I saw Marcos landing on roof via mi17. So after that they didnt go inside to kill terrorists??

 

[Indian Sniper.001]

I dont know this story. I saw Marcos landing on roof via mi17. So after that they didnt go inside to kill terrorists??

No, they had gone to the site, but didn't participate in the assault.

 

[vasusuman]

Look Marcos,SFF,NSG and Garuds are one dimensional force.Each has their one speciality for which they are the best.

Now what fanboys do is that without thinking they say Marcos is the best because Seal is the best and Marcos are Indian seals...which is bullshit.

Marcos wont last much if we put them in Thar desert as compared to 10 Para.Similarly Garuds would not last long in himalayas as compared to SFF or ITBP.

Same for NSG when you take them out of urban warfare...Marcos could not handle 26/11 and NSG cannot handle maritime warfare.

This is why i say that Para commandos are the only complete SF in India.

They have the best moutain warriors.
The best desert raiders.
The best ex nsg SAG guys.
The best jungle warriors.
And combat divers who can hold their own.

You are right and i don't contest you.But for me,soldier of RR or Para SF,who risks his life daily in Kashmir is way braver than any other soldier.Experience can never be taught in school or training ground.Right now what i see is lot of photos of training.I remember first time i saw Marcos in full attire n looking deadly,being covered by India Today magazine with lot of photos.That was almost 22 yrs back.And there in Mumbai,it was soldier's spirit that was required.Of course,wisdom of senior officer or officer above him,told otherwise.

 

[aditya g]

I think you were unfair to the commando. MARCOS responded first and engaged the jehadis first. They were not trained for the task at hand as they are not an urban counter terrorist force. It is not their mandate either so best to withdraw once NSG came in.

Also, I don't think there were 50 of them. They came across on 2 Geminis from INS abhimanyu.

I think thanks to Somali piracy they may have trained a lot for counter hijacking but am not sure in 2008.

Ships navigating in piracy waters of Somalia carry armed guards.Previously most of them were Ex-British navy commandos.But later on,though these private companies were still British,they started recruiting Ex Indian Marcos to save costs.I met both British and Indian guys.So i asked an Indian Ex Marcos,why did they retreat during Mumbai attack from Taj.It had left a very bad impression on me.Training is all good.But when time came,you withdrew.He was a very nice guy and with very good physique,in early forties.He said humbly that it was call of commanding officer to retreat.And why,-because they were small force of 50 which is required for strategic purpose and they are not trained for urban warfare.I asked then why,if suppose you had lost couple of your men,then what.You could have recruited more.He didn't reply but expression told all.I could make out that he also felt that it was not a courageous thing to do in that circumstances.

 

[aditya g]

Further to my post above, the kind of jehadi attacks we saw in Pathankot or Mumbai need a large body of men.

Similar to 26/11, a small force of Garud SF was present in Pathankot. they engaged the attackers but could not eliminate them.

It will interesting to compare how akshar dham, 2611, pathankot, edi pampore and CPL pulwama were handled by the forces.

 

[Vinod DX9]

Legendary pic of Para 10,in Jaffna

 

[Vinod DX9]

High Altitude warfare is the thing which Para completes with efficiency