India-China Border conflict

[mokoman]

ChatGPT summary -

Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla engages in a comprehensive discussion on the current global geopolitical landscape, with a particular focus on military challenges, technological advancements, and the need for India to strengthen its defense capabilities. The conversation covers various key points:

1. Global Challenges and Conflicts:
- Describes the current global situation as being on the edge, likening it to a powder keg.
- Mentions the idea that the world entered a pre-war era in 2014, a perspective echoed by military thinkers.
- Highlights ongoing conflicts and threats worldwide, from Europe to Asia.

2. Failure of American Deterrence:
- Points out the failure of American deterrence, citing examples such as China's military coercion and the challenges faced by the U.S. Navy.
- Discusses the impact of China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy on American military influence in the Pacific.
- Raises concerns about the mismatch between American defense spending, global commitments, and the actual outcomes in conflicts.

3. Technological Shift and Military Strategy:
- Emphasizes the transformative power of technology in shaping military strategies.
- Highlights China's success in converting economic and technological advantages into hard power.
- Stresses the importance of AI, quantum computing, and other advanced technologies in modern warfare.

4. India's Response and National Security Makeover:
- Advocates for a comprehensive national security makeover in India, integrating advanced technologies into military planning.
- Recommends reducing the power asymmetry with China through technological advancements.
- Discusses the role of AI, quantum computing, and civil-military fusion in strengthening India's defense capabilities.

5. Role of Private Sector and Cultural Transitions:
- Discusses the changing role of the private sector in defense, citing examples like Airbus challenging the monopoly of certain defense technologies.
- Emphasizes the need for cultural transitions within the armed forces to foster innovation, with a focus on joint collaboration between military, academia, and the private sector.
- Advocates for military leaders to be actively involved in the development and understanding of advanced technologies.

6. Ideation, Innovation, and Execution:
- Highlights the importance of ideation coupled with execution, with an emphasis on understanding and embracing new technologies.
- Recommends deep reforms, especially in the areas of unlocking military data and fostering a data-driven and AI-supported military environment.

7. Strategic Reforms and Collaboration:
- Recommends reforms such as involving the private sector at the conceptual stage and changing the career trajectories of military officers to foster strategic thinking.
- Advocates for the creation of think tanks and innovative platforms akin to China's approach.

8. Conclusion:
- Stresses the urgency of scaling up and speeding up technological advancements and collaborations to address evolving security challenges.
- Encourages India to think originally and strategically to compete with China in technological and military innovation.

Overall, Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla's discussion underscores the critical intersection of global geopolitics, technological advancements, and the imperative for India to strengthen its defense capabilities through innovation and strategic reforms.

with the tejas mk2 and AMCA circus seems like gov doesnt think any conflict with China is likely .

meanwhile chinese pumping out fighter jets / tankers / 30 airports in Tibet .

 

[mist_consecutive]

with the tejas mk2 and AMCA circus seems like gov doesnt think any conflict with China is likely .

meanwhile chinese pumping out fighter jets / tankers / 30 airports in Tibet .

This is what happens when we put all the eggs in one basket (of HAL & DRDO). Despite PSUs consistently overpromising & underdelivering, GoI took the leap of faith and put the nation's airforce's future in the hands of DRDO & PSUs.

Now when we will direly need aircrafts we will have to sell our backsides to get them. Chandigarh lobby will have the last laugh.

 

[Master Chief]

with the tejas mk2 and AMCA circus seems like gov doesnt think any conflict with China is likely .

meanwhile chinese pumping out fighter jets / tankers / 30 airports in Tibet .

You don't need an air force like, when you can give away land.. (since 1962)

 

[mist_consecutive]

You don't need an air force like, when you can give away land.. (since 1962)

 

[Covfefe]

Despite PSUs consistently overpromising & underdelivering, GoI took the leap of faith and put the nation's airforce's future in the hands of DRDO & PSUs.

What option did GoI have? Which private player will invest money given the uncertainties in the procurement process?

Tata (C295, Apaches), LnT (K9) put money only for assembly after there's an order certainty.

US jaisa MIC chahiye toh US jaisa paisa invest karo

 

[mist_consecutive]

What option did GoI have? Which private player will invest money given the uncertainties in the procurement process?

Tata (C295, Apaches), LnT (K9) put money only for assembly after there's an order certainty.

US jaisa MIC chahiye toh US jaisa paisa invest karo

Option of distributing risk into many baskets. We should have bought 3-4 more squadrons of Rafale as stop-gap measure till LCA Mk2 & AMCA succeeds.

This would have put less burden on DRDO & ADA to quickly develop & deliver. Such high-level R&D projects almost always run into troubles and get delayed. This simple foresight was lacking.

Now with US arm-twisting us on GE-404 we are not even sure of more LCA Mk1A orders.

 

[raju1982]

This is what happens when we put all the eggs in one basket (of HAL & DRDO). Despite PSUs consistently overpromising & underdelivering, GoI took the leap of faith and put the nation's airforce's future in the hands of DRDO & PSUs.

Now when we will direly need aircrafts we will have to sell our backsides to get them. Chandigarh lobby will have the last laugh.

Its not just air force's future but nation's security in the hands of few sarkari babus. India is surrounded by enemies and we were enslaved for 800 years under intense torture. Our temples were broken and people massacred. Bit we did not learn from history. We take national security lightly.

Looking at Xi's agenda, he for sure has plans for Arunachal, Ladakh and Sikkim.

 

[mist_consecutive]

Fresh information, read.

MSN

 

[mokoman]

interesting peice of history

if volcano in tibet hadnt erupted , china wouldnt have cared for aksai chin , and it could have been in our hands. maybe no 1962 war .

 

[vidhwanshak]

Fresh information, read.

MSN

Straight from the horses mouth.

 

[jai jaganath]

Fresh information, read.

MSN

I have one doubt from beginning
Why our brass quote Australian and Russian media reports linking it with their intelligence report wrt pla casualties
What does our intelligence report states of anyone has any hint, I am damn sure they would have made one

 

[mist_consecutive]

I have one doubt from beginning
Why our brass quote Australian and Russian media reports linking it with their intelligence report wrt pla casualties
What does our intelligence report states of anyone has any hint, I am damn sure they would have made one

Lt. Gen. YK Joshi, then Northern Command head has mentioned 50-60 casualty evacuation by the Chinese observed. When asked “how many killed”, he said it’s not army’s job to count ”dead”, but said it is not unreasonable for it to be around ballpark figure of 30-40.

Personally, I think 30-35 dead is a pretty accurate estimate from the gruesomeness of the conflict & type of battle (meele battle death ratio will be almost 1:1).

 

[Master Chief]

I have one doubt from beginning
Why our brass quote Australian and Russian media reports linking it with their intelligence report wrt pla casualties
What does our intelligence report states of anyone has any hint, I am damn sure they would have made one

Yes.. since the Australian and Russian reports quote second hand intelligence from India or China..

 

[Azaad]

Yes.. since the Australian and Russian reports quote second hand intelligence from India or China..

Unlikely. The reason Gen Narawane's quoting non Indian & Chinese sources is we've destroyed our own credibility thanks to our LeLi presence across MSM & the SM eager to take a piss on India under the guise of opposition to the present government.

Hence a foreign source , any foreign source especially a western one still carries more weight out here especially in such matters. Sadly , this has resulted in Gen Narawane's passing on foreign validation as the basis for his credibility.

As far as Russian or Australian sources go , the former have sources in China itself whereas the latter usually tap Taiwanese sources. Whether this happened specifically in this case is not known but generally speaking this is the trend . Japan RoK & HK previously too are good sources to tap as far as information on China goes.

 

[raju1982]

Fresh information, read.

MSN

He may be a s great General but one of the worst information handler. Reading the article is very depressing. Specially, PLA were more prepared part. In Glawan as an Army chief he totally failed in information warfare, which is important.

China is our direct enemy, how many Chinese IA killed need to be confirmed by IA chief from Aus or Russian sources is sad.


Also the first tweet after the skirmish from adgpi was "many indoam.soldoers killed bu chinese" which later they deleted and added "Chinese also had bihe fatalities". LeLis mocked IA and Modi for that.

I repect him for his service to the nation and bravery but I do not like him.

 

[mokoman]

855 km road that will bypass G219 passing trough aksai chin and close to india - china border at GAR near demchok

~7 years to construct

 

[mokoman]

"resetting india's tibet policy"

 

[another_armchair]

855 km road that will bypass G219 passing trough aksai chin and close to india - china border at GAR near demchok

~7 years to construct

G219 was too close to Indian borders for comfort anyway. Was wondering when they would rebuild a new one further away from Indian borders.

At many places, they were well within our Arty range which we would exploit during a full fledged war.

Losing that one road would result in losing road access and supply lines to their troops in Leh & nearby regions.

 

[Blank]

Some juicy new details....

'I was handed a hot potato' with carte blanche, says Naravane on Rajnath's message during Eastern Ladakh tensions

New Delhi, Dec 18 (PTI) ‘Jo ucchit samjho woh karo’ (Do whatever you deem appropriate), this is what Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the then Army Chief Gen MM Naravane on the night of August 31, 2020 following a tense situation arising out of Chinese PLA moving tanks and troops in Rechin La...

theprint.in

New Delhi, Dec 18 (PTI) ‘Jo ucchit samjho woh karo’ (Do whatever you deem appropriate), this is what Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the then Army Chief Gen MM Naravane on the night of August 31, 2020 following a tense situation arising out of Chinese PLA moving tanks and troops in Rechin La mountain pass on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.

In his memoir ‘Four Stars of Destiny’, Naravane recounts Singh’s direction as well as a flurry of phone calls between the defence minister, external affairs minister, the national security advisor and the chief of defence staff that night on the sensitive situation.

After Singh’s call, Naravane says a hundred different thoughts “flashed through” his mind. “I conveyed the criticality of the situation to the RM (Raksha Mantri), who said he would get back to me, which he did, by about 2230 hours,” writes Naravane.
“He said that he had spoken to the PM and that it was purely a military decision. ‘Jo ucchit samjho woh karo’ (Do whatever you deem is appropriate).” “I had been handed a hot potato. With this carte blanche, the onus was now totally on me. I took a deep breath and sat silently for a few minutes. All was quiet save for the ticking of the wall clock,” he says.

“I was in my den at Army House, with the map of J and K and Ladakh on one wall, Eastern Command on another. They were unmarked maps, but as I looked at them, I could visualise the location of each and every unit and formation. We were ready in all respects, but did I really want to start a war?” he writes.

In the memoir, Gen Naravane reflects on his thought process that night.

“The country was in bad shape, reeling under the Covid pandemic. The economy was faltering, global supply chains had broken down. Would we be able to ensure a steady supply of spares, etc., under these conditions, in case of a long-drawn-out action?” “Who were our supporters in the global arena, and what about the collusive threat from China and Pakistan? A hundred different thoughts flashed through my mind,” he writes.

“This was no war game being played in a sand model room of the Army War College, but a life and death situation.” Naravane says after a few moments of quiet reflection, he called up Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi.

“‘We cannot be the first ones to fire,’ I told him, as it would provide the Chinese with an excuse, a casus belli, to escalate and paint us as the aggressors “Even at Mukhpari (on the Kailash Range) the previous day, it had been the PLA who had fired first (being only two rounds by the PLA and three rounds by us, it had escaped the attention of the media),” he writes.

Naravane says he felt that the Army should maintain this stance.

“Instead, I told him to move a troop of our tanks right to the forward slopes of the Pass and depress their guns so that the PLA would be staring down the barrels of our guns,” he writes.

“This was done forthwith and the PLA tanks, which had by then reached within a few hundred metres of the top, stopped in their tracks,” he says

“Their light tanks would have been no match for our medium tanks. It was a game of bluff and the PLA blinked first.” Naravane writes the PLA moved troops from Moldo to the area of Chuti Changla towards the South Bank of the Pangong Tso on the intervening night of August 29-30.

By evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, he says.

By the evening of the 30th, the Indian Army was in a strong position both on the North and South Bank of Pangong Tso as well as the Kailash Range.

“The PLA reaction was not long in coming. On the 30th evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, stopping about 500 metres short of our locations and started digging in,” he says.


Naravane says the PLA locations were at lower heights and directly under our observation.

“As such, they were of no threat to us, but if they were to come up in strength and try to outflank or surround our localities, then we would have to take action. The situation was tense and nearing breaking point,” he says.

Naravane says the daylight hours of August 31 saw a lot of movement on the PLA side, even as the Army consolidated its own position.

Towards the afternoon, movement of PLA armour was also observed in the area of their garrison at Moldo. Seeing this, our tanks at Tara Base were also ordered to move up to Rechin La, he says.

troops was seen in some other locations as well.

“At 2015 hours on the evening of 31 August, Jo (Joshi) rang me up, quite worried. He reported that four tanks supported by infantry had slowly started moving up the track towards Rechin La,” he says.

“They had fired an illuminating round but this had had no effect. I had clear orders not to open fire, ’till cleared from the very top’. A flurry of calls followed, between the RM, EAM, NSA, CDS and myself over the next half-hour,” he adds.

“To each and every one my question was, ‘What are my orders?’ At 2110 hours, Northern Command again rang up, the tanks had continued moving ahead and were now less than a km from the top.

“I rang up the RM again at 2125 hours, with the latest and once more asked for clear directions. The situation was tense. Telephone lines were buzzing.” Meanwhile, there had been an exchange of Hot Line messages and the PLA Commander, Maj Gen Liu Lin, suggested that both sides should stop any further move and that the two local commanders should meet at the pass at 0930 hours the next morning.

Naravane says he called up Defence Minister Singh and NSA Ajit Doval at 2200 hours to share this news.

“I had hardly put the phone down when Jo (Northern Army Commander Joshi) rang up once again at 2210 hours.

“He said that the tanks had started moving up again and were now only about 500 metres away,” he says.
Naravane says Joshi recommended that the only way to stop the PLA was by opening up with our own medium artillery, which he said was ready and waiting.

“My position was critical…,” he says as he explains how the situation was handled. PTI MPB RT RT RT

 

[Jimih]

"resetting india's tibet policy"

Flags in the background-

East Turkestan
Tibet
Inner Mongolia