The Shrike
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I think the Chinese have already released one more…thread is dying .
army needs to leak another vid of chinese getting thrashed .
India-China Border conflict
- Thread starter ezsasa
- Start date
Hari Sud
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New York Times recent Articles on India-China Fight.
The following is an essay on India-China Fight in the Himalayas published by the left oriented The New York Times (US). The article, it would appear has been authored by an Indian military Strategist Ajay Shukla; who publishes articles on his local website every week or so mostly dealing about acquisition of military hardware etc. This is his, I would say first attempt to offer opinion about India - China, Himalayan fight.
I see Ajay Shukla’s articles on his website quite often. The following article under his name does not appear to be his writing. It is mostly authored by the New York Times editorial board or their local news correspondent and used his name to give it an Indian authentication. It says nothing what we already not know. The clash at Tawang on December 9th is the subject they are talking about in length totally unnecessary. In summary, it is India bashing for the China-India fight.
cheers….
Why India and China Are Fighting in the Himalayas
Jan. 1, 2023, 11:00 a.m. ET
NEW DELHI — On a freezing December day on a remote Himalayan mountain ridge, Indian and Chinese soldiers foughtwith sticks, stones, clubs and bare fists. Scores were bloodied and injured. The incident, according to the Indian authorities, occurred on Dec. 9, when about 300 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army of China attempted to occupy Yangtse, a mountainous border post on the disputed India-China border in the Tawang area in northeastern India.
Soldiers from China and India, nuclear-armed Asian neighbors, have been clashing on their disputed border with an alarming frequency owing to the rise of aggressive nationalisms in President Xi Jinping’s China and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India. Insecurity is also growing in New Delhi and Beijing over intensified construction of border infrastructure by both countries. And mutual suspicion is deepening as China contemplates the increasing strategic cooperation between the United States and India as competition and conflict between Washington and Beijing intensifies.
China and India share a disputed 2,100-mile border, which has neither been settled on a map nor marked on its difficult mountainous and glacial terrain. Broadly, it runs between China’s Tibet Autonomous Region and the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and the federally administered territory of Ladakh in the north. Neither the colonial British authorities nor the leaders of independent India were able to agree on the detailed alignment of a border with China.
A few years after China invaded Tibet in 1950, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India ordered official maps of India’s borders to be updated, and India laid claim to the alkaline desert of Aksai Chin, which lies between its northern Ladakh region and China’s Xinjiang province. China contested India’s claim by displaying its control and possession of Aksai Chin, where it had completed a strategic highway linking Tibet with Xinjiang by 1957.
With no apparent way of settling conflicting border claims, India and China fought a war in 1962 in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, which created the Line of Actual Control, or LAC — the de facto border between the two countries. Both countries interpret its alignment to suit their conveniences. With little human habitation along the China-Indian border, there are few land or revenue records — traditional ways of establishing ownership. Chinese and Indian border troops assert their territorial claims by patrolling up to their claimed boundary line and sometimes end up clashing in places where they make conflicting claims.
Throughout the 1960s and the ’70s, India’s military, traumatized by China’s comprehensive victory and fearful of setting off another conflagration, deployed well to the rear of the border, which was covered only by long-range patrols. In the early 1980s, the Indian military leadership came to be dominated by a new generation of bolder commanders and New Delhi greenlighted a move forward, much closer to the Line of Actual Control.
This set off a confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in the Tawang area in Arunachal Pradesh in 1986-87, which forced Beijing and New Delhi to engage. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India traveled to Beijing to meet China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, and they set up a joint working group for dialogue and confidence-building measures to keep the peace.
Between 1989 and 2005, the Indian and Chinese sides had 15 meetings and no blood was shed for 30 years. After the Gandhi-Deng meeting, the two sides signed an agreement in 1993 for restraint and joint action on the disputed border whenever Indian and Chinese patrols differed on the alignment of the LAC. It was followed by four more pacts, aimed at keeping the peace on the border.
Minor Chinese intrusions in Ladakh in 2008, 2013 and 2014 were resolved through dialogue. A major escalation followed in June 2017 in the Doklam Plateau in the Himalayas, where India, China and Bhutan meet. The Chinese military was building a road into the area, which is claimed by both China and Bhutan.
The plateau is close to “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow corridor of Indian territory that connects mainland India to its northeastern states, an area the size of Oregon, where 45 million people live. India saw the Chinese incursion and construction as a dangerous move toward control over the Doklam Plateau, and it reawakened New Delhi’s fear of China cutting off northeastern India in a war by taking over Chicken’s Neck.
Indian soldiers blocked the Chinese. After an intense face-off for 73 days, both sides withdrew, but in the past five years the People’s Liberation Army has moved back into the area and continued building border infrastructure. A few years later, the most lethal confrontation on the disputed border occurred in the northern Ladakh region in June 2020 when Chinese soldiers killed at least 20 Indian soldiers with wooden staves and nail-studded clubs, and the Chinese military seized more than 40 square miles of territory controlled by India.
After the Dec. 9 clashes, the border agreements between India and China lie in tatters. Indian strategic planners, traditionally preoccupied with the Pakistan threat, now face a more complex security calculus. After the lethal clashes in Ladakh in 2020, India reinforced its defenses there with an additional 50,000 troops. Indian military planners worry that sufficiently reinforcing the border with China might come at the cost of their ability to deter Pakistan.
For New Delhi, China’s new aggressiveness presents a clear dilemma: Should India continue to build strategic and military relations with the United States and the partnership of America, Australia, Japan and India — known as the Quad — even though Beijing has made it clear it sees the Quad as an anti-China grouping? While the Quad, and its more overtly militaristic version, the AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) alliance, constitute a viable deterrent to China in the maritime Indo-Pacific theater, India is the only partner that confronts China on its land border.
From New Delhi’s perspective, the Chinese military aggression on the disputed border is the price India is paying for joining hands with the Western alliance. New Delhi takes pains to portray its independence, even turning down an American offer of assistance against China at the time of the 2020 intrusions in Ladakh. New Delhi has restricted Indo-U.S. cooperation to the realm of intelligence and privately asked Washington to lower the rhetoric over China. This is unlikely to change.
Within India, Mr. Modi’s strongman image has taken a dent from the confrontation with China. His insistence that India has not lost territory to China provides ammunition to his supporters, but the numbers of his blind supporters have dwindled. The Chinese military’s most recent aggression shows that Beijing continues to fuel the confrontation, and relations between India and China face a negative spiral without a predictable end. The political cost to Mr. Modi, it seems, will eventually be decided in Beijing as much as in New Delhi.
Ajai Shukla, a retired Indian Army colonel, is a consulting editor for the Business Standard newspaper in New Delhi
The following is an essay on India-China Fight in the Himalayas published by the left oriented The New York Times (US). The article, it would appear has been authored by an Indian military Strategist Ajay Shukla; who publishes articles on his local website every week or so mostly dealing about acquisition of military hardware etc. This is his, I would say first attempt to offer opinion about India - China, Himalayan fight.
I see Ajay Shukla’s articles on his website quite often. The following article under his name does not appear to be his writing. It is mostly authored by the New York Times editorial board or their local news correspondent and used his name to give it an Indian authentication. It says nothing what we already not know. The clash at Tawang on December 9th is the subject they are talking about in length totally unnecessary. In summary, it is India bashing for the China-India fight.
cheers….
Why India and China Are Fighting in the Himalayas
Jan. 1, 2023, 11:00 a.m. ET
NEW DELHI — On a freezing December day on a remote Himalayan mountain ridge, Indian and Chinese soldiers foughtwith sticks, stones, clubs and bare fists. Scores were bloodied and injured. The incident, according to the Indian authorities, occurred on Dec. 9, when about 300 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army of China attempted to occupy Yangtse, a mountainous border post on the disputed India-China border in the Tawang area in northeastern India.
Soldiers from China and India, nuclear-armed Asian neighbors, have been clashing on their disputed border with an alarming frequency owing to the rise of aggressive nationalisms in President Xi Jinping’s China and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India. Insecurity is also growing in New Delhi and Beijing over intensified construction of border infrastructure by both countries. And mutual suspicion is deepening as China contemplates the increasing strategic cooperation between the United States and India as competition and conflict between Washington and Beijing intensifies.
China and India share a disputed 2,100-mile border, which has neither been settled on a map nor marked on its difficult mountainous and glacial terrain. Broadly, it runs between China’s Tibet Autonomous Region and the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and the federally administered territory of Ladakh in the north. Neither the colonial British authorities nor the leaders of independent India were able to agree on the detailed alignment of a border with China.
A few years after China invaded Tibet in 1950, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India ordered official maps of India’s borders to be updated, and India laid claim to the alkaline desert of Aksai Chin, which lies between its northern Ladakh region and China’s Xinjiang province. China contested India’s claim by displaying its control and possession of Aksai Chin, where it had completed a strategic highway linking Tibet with Xinjiang by 1957.
With no apparent way of settling conflicting border claims, India and China fought a war in 1962 in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, which created the Line of Actual Control, or LAC — the de facto border between the two countries. Both countries interpret its alignment to suit their conveniences. With little human habitation along the China-Indian border, there are few land or revenue records — traditional ways of establishing ownership. Chinese and Indian border troops assert their territorial claims by patrolling up to their claimed boundary line and sometimes end up clashing in places where they make conflicting claims.
Throughout the 1960s and the ’70s, India’s military, traumatized by China’s comprehensive victory and fearful of setting off another conflagration, deployed well to the rear of the border, which was covered only by long-range patrols. In the early 1980s, the Indian military leadership came to be dominated by a new generation of bolder commanders and New Delhi greenlighted a move forward, much closer to the Line of Actual Control.
This set off a confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in the Tawang area in Arunachal Pradesh in 1986-87, which forced Beijing and New Delhi to engage. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India traveled to Beijing to meet China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, and they set up a joint working group for dialogue and confidence-building measures to keep the peace.
Between 1989 and 2005, the Indian and Chinese sides had 15 meetings and no blood was shed for 30 years. After the Gandhi-Deng meeting, the two sides signed an agreement in 1993 for restraint and joint action on the disputed border whenever Indian and Chinese patrols differed on the alignment of the LAC. It was followed by four more pacts, aimed at keeping the peace on the border.
Minor Chinese intrusions in Ladakh in 2008, 2013 and 2014 were resolved through dialogue. A major escalation followed in June 2017 in the Doklam Plateau in the Himalayas, where India, China and Bhutan meet. The Chinese military was building a road into the area, which is claimed by both China and Bhutan.
The plateau is close to “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow corridor of Indian territory that connects mainland India to its northeastern states, an area the size of Oregon, where 45 million people live. India saw the Chinese incursion and construction as a dangerous move toward control over the Doklam Plateau, and it reawakened New Delhi’s fear of China cutting off northeastern India in a war by taking over Chicken’s Neck.
Indian soldiers blocked the Chinese. After an intense face-off for 73 days, both sides withdrew, but in the past five years the People’s Liberation Army has moved back into the area and continued building border infrastructure. A few years later, the most lethal confrontation on the disputed border occurred in the northern Ladakh region in June 2020 when Chinese soldiers killed at least 20 Indian soldiers with wooden staves and nail-studded clubs, and the Chinese military seized more than 40 square miles of territory controlled by India.
After the Dec. 9 clashes, the border agreements between India and China lie in tatters. Indian strategic planners, traditionally preoccupied with the Pakistan threat, now face a more complex security calculus. After the lethal clashes in Ladakh in 2020, India reinforced its defenses there with an additional 50,000 troops. Indian military planners worry that sufficiently reinforcing the border with China might come at the cost of their ability to deter Pakistan.
For New Delhi, China’s new aggressiveness presents a clear dilemma: Should India continue to build strategic and military relations with the United States and the partnership of America, Australia, Japan and India — known as the Quad — even though Beijing has made it clear it sees the Quad as an anti-China grouping? While the Quad, and its more overtly militaristic version, the AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) alliance, constitute a viable deterrent to China in the maritime Indo-Pacific theater, India is the only partner that confronts China on its land border.
From New Delhi’s perspective, the Chinese military aggression on the disputed border is the price India is paying for joining hands with the Western alliance. New Delhi takes pains to portray its independence, even turning down an American offer of assistance against China at the time of the 2020 intrusions in Ladakh. New Delhi has restricted Indo-U.S. cooperation to the realm of intelligence and privately asked Washington to lower the rhetoric over China. This is unlikely to change.
Within India, Mr. Modi’s strongman image has taken a dent from the confrontation with China. His insistence that India has not lost territory to China provides ammunition to his supporters, but the numbers of his blind supporters have dwindled. The Chinese military’s most recent aggression shows that Beijing continues to fuel the confrontation, and relations between India and China face a negative spiral without a predictable end. The political cost to Mr. Modi, it seems, will eventually be decided in Beijing as much as in New Delhi.
Ajai Shukla, a retired Indian Army colonel, is a consulting editor for the Business Standard newspaper in New Delhi
Blademaster
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Then why bother posting here? We are not gonna waste our bandwidth reading this trash of an article. NYTimes can go fuck itself. I stopped my subscription to them. Ajay Shukla is a commie traitor.
AlphaLegis
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Fear of truth, fear of escalation: China has assessed Modi correctly
www.deccanherald.com
"Democracy has been India’s strength, and public opinion should be used smartly by the government during negotiations with China. Hiding the truth only emboldens China, which has seen through the veneer of Modi’s image.
A free and frank discussion in Parliament will not tie the hands of a leader who is self-confident and sure of himself. Running away from the truth is not only evasion of democratic accountability but 32 months after the border crisis with China, also a strategic folly.
"
Blademaster
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Commie author detected, opinion rejected.Fear of truth, fear of escalation: China has assessed Modi correctly
"Democracy has been India’s strength, and public opinion should be used smartly by the government during negotiations with China. Hiding the truth only emboldens China, which has seen through the veneer of Modi’s image.
A free and frank discussion in Parliament will not tie the hands of a leader who is self-confident and sure of himself. Running away from the truth is not only evasion of democratic accountability but 32 months after the border crisis with China, also a strategic folly.
"
srevster
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The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the military of the People's Republic of China, and it is one of the largest militaries in the world in terms of personnel and equipment. However, despite its size and modern capabilities, the PLA has been criticized for its lack of real fighting experience.
One of the main reasons for this lack of experience is the fact that China has not been involved in a major military conflict since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. As a result, the PLA has not had the opportunity to test its capabilities in a real-world military setting. This has led some to question the effectiveness of the PLA in the face of a more experienced military adversary.
There are also concerns about the quality of training and readiness within the PLA. The military has undergone significant modernizations in recent years, but there are still concerns about the ability of its troops to operate effectively in a real-world conflict. This lack of experience and training has led some to question the PLA's ability to defend China's interests in the event of a military crisis.
Despite these concerns, the PLA has made efforts to improve its capabilities and gain real-world experience. It has participated in a number of international military exercises and peacekeeping operations, and has also established a number of military bases overseas. These efforts have helped the PLA to gain some experience and improve its capabilities, but it remains to be seen whether it is truly prepared to face a more experienced military adversary in the event of a conflict.
The One Child Policy was a population control measure implemented by the Chinese government in 1979 to curb the country's rapidly growing population. The policy, which was in effect until 2015, restricted most families to having only one child, with exceptions made for some ethnic minorities and rural families.
While the One Child Policy was successful in slowing population growth in China, it has also had a number of negative consequences. One of the most significant is the lack of young people available to serve in the military. With only one child per family, there is a smaller pool of potential recruits for the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This could potentially affect the PLA's ability to sustain itself in the event of a major military conflict.
In addition to the impact on military recruitment, the One Child Policy has also been criticized for its human rights abuses. The policy was enforced through a variety of means, including forced abortions and sterilizations. This has led to a backlash against the policy and calls for a more humane approach to population control.
Another factor that may contribute to the lack of real-world experience and appetite for fatalities within the PLA is the Chinese government's emphasis on avoiding military conflict and maintaining stability. China has traditionally preferred to use diplomatic and economic means to resolve disputes, and has shown a willingness to make concessions in order to avoid military conflict. This approach may have contributed to the PLA's lack of real-world fighting experience, as it has not been heavily tested in battle.
Overall, while the PLA is a formidable military force in terms of personnel and equipment, its lack of real-world fighting experience and the Chinese government's emphasis on avoiding military conflict are important factors to consider when evaluating its capabilities.
Gray zone warfare, also known as hybrid warfare, refers to the use of a mix of military and non-military tactics to achieve strategic objectives without triggering a full-scale war. These tactics may include the use of covert operations, propaganda, cyberattacks, and economic coercion, among others.
It is possible that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) may prefer to engage in gray zone warfare due to a number of factors, including the One Child Policy and lack of real-world fighting experience.
The One Child Policy, which was in effect in China from 1979 to 2015, restricted most families to having only one child. This has resulted in a smaller pool of potential recruits for the PLA, which could potentially affect the military's ability to sustain itself in the event of a major military conflict. As a result, the PLA may be more inclined to use tactics that involve fewer military personnel and rely more on technology and other non-military means.
The PLA's lack of real-world fighting experience may also make it more inclined to use gray zone tactics. While the military has undergone significant modernizations in recent years and has participated in a number of international military exercises and peacekeeping operations, it has not been heavily tested in battle. This may lead the PLA to prefer tactics that involve less direct military engagement and are less risky in terms of potential casualties.
One of the main reasons for this lack of experience is the fact that China has not been involved in a major military conflict since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. As a result, the PLA has not had the opportunity to test its capabilities in a real-world military setting. This has led some to question the effectiveness of the PLA in the face of a more experienced military adversary.
There are also concerns about the quality of training and readiness within the PLA. The military has undergone significant modernizations in recent years, but there are still concerns about the ability of its troops to operate effectively in a real-world conflict. This lack of experience and training has led some to question the PLA's ability to defend China's interests in the event of a military crisis.
Despite these concerns, the PLA has made efforts to improve its capabilities and gain real-world experience. It has participated in a number of international military exercises and peacekeeping operations, and has also established a number of military bases overseas. These efforts have helped the PLA to gain some experience and improve its capabilities, but it remains to be seen whether it is truly prepared to face a more experienced military adversary in the event of a conflict.
The One Child Policy was a population control measure implemented by the Chinese government in 1979 to curb the country's rapidly growing population. The policy, which was in effect until 2015, restricted most families to having only one child, with exceptions made for some ethnic minorities and rural families.
While the One Child Policy was successful in slowing population growth in China, it has also had a number of negative consequences. One of the most significant is the lack of young people available to serve in the military. With only one child per family, there is a smaller pool of potential recruits for the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This could potentially affect the PLA's ability to sustain itself in the event of a major military conflict.
In addition to the impact on military recruitment, the One Child Policy has also been criticized for its human rights abuses. The policy was enforced through a variety of means, including forced abortions and sterilizations. This has led to a backlash against the policy and calls for a more humane approach to population control.
Another factor that may contribute to the lack of real-world experience and appetite for fatalities within the PLA is the Chinese government's emphasis on avoiding military conflict and maintaining stability. China has traditionally preferred to use diplomatic and economic means to resolve disputes, and has shown a willingness to make concessions in order to avoid military conflict. This approach may have contributed to the PLA's lack of real-world fighting experience, as it has not been heavily tested in battle.
Overall, while the PLA is a formidable military force in terms of personnel and equipment, its lack of real-world fighting experience and the Chinese government's emphasis on avoiding military conflict are important factors to consider when evaluating its capabilities.
Gray zone warfare, also known as hybrid warfare, refers to the use of a mix of military and non-military tactics to achieve strategic objectives without triggering a full-scale war. These tactics may include the use of covert operations, propaganda, cyberattacks, and economic coercion, among others.
It is possible that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) may prefer to engage in gray zone warfare due to a number of factors, including the One Child Policy and lack of real-world fighting experience.
The One Child Policy, which was in effect in China from 1979 to 2015, restricted most families to having only one child. This has resulted in a smaller pool of potential recruits for the PLA, which could potentially affect the military's ability to sustain itself in the event of a major military conflict. As a result, the PLA may be more inclined to use tactics that involve fewer military personnel and rely more on technology and other non-military means.
The PLA's lack of real-world fighting experience may also make it more inclined to use gray zone tactics. While the military has undergone significant modernizations in recent years and has participated in a number of international military exercises and peacekeeping operations, it has not been heavily tested in battle. This may lead the PLA to prefer tactics that involve less direct military engagement and are less risky in terms of potential casualties.
Knowitall
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Bas aircraft bhi aajaye ab.
srevster
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The Indian army is renowned for its strength and capabilities as a mountain fighting force. Located in a region with some of the highest mountain ranges in the world, including the Himalayas and the Karakoram, the Indian army has developed a unique set of skills and tactics for operating in these challenging environments.
One of the key reasons for the Indian army's strength in mountain warfare is its extensive training and experience. The Indian military has a dedicated mountain warfare training center, where soldiers undergo rigorous physical and tactical training to prepare them for the unique challenges of operating in high altitude environments. In addition to this specialized training, the Indian army also has a long history of conducting operations in mountain regions, including the Siachen Glacier, which is one of the highest and most inhospitable battlefields in the world.
Another factor contributing to the Indian army's strength in mountain warfare is its advanced equipment and technology. The Indian military has invested heavily in developing specialized gear and weapons for use in mountain environments, including high altitude clothing and gear, advanced communication systems, and modified vehicles that are capable of operating in rugged, mountainous terrain.
In addition to its training and equipment, the Indian army also has a strong organizational culture that values teamwork and cohesion. This culture, combined with the rigorous physical and mental conditioning that soldiers undergo, enables the Indian army to operate effectively as a cohesive unit in some of the most challenging environments on earth.
Overall, the Indian army is widely recognized as one of the strongest mountain fighting forces in the world. Its extensive training, advanced equipment, and strong organizational culture have all contributed to its success in operations in high altitude environments.
The Indian army has a long history of operations in mountain regions, including its experience in World War II in the Himalayan theater. During this time, the Indian army played a crucial role in defending British India against the advancing Japanese forces. Indian soldiers, many of whom were recruited from the mountainous regions of the country, fought bravely in some of the highest and most challenging battlefields of the war.
The Indian army's experience in mountain warfare also includes its involvement in the Kashmir wars. The mountainous region of Kashmir has been a source of conflict between India and Pakistan for decades, and the Indian army has played a central role in defending India's interests in this region. In addition to its efforts to secure the border with Pakistan, the Indian army has also conducted numerous operations against militant groups operating in the mountainous regions of Kashmir.
In addition to these conflicts, the Indian army has also been involved in operations against China in 1967. This conflict, which took place in the Himalayan region of Sikkim, saw the Indian army successfully defend against a Chinese incursion into Indian territory. This conflict, while brief, demonstrated the Indian army's strength and capabilities as a mountain fighting force.
Overall, the Indian army's experience in mountain warfare, including its involvement in World War II, the Kashmir wars, and the conflict with China, has allowed it to develop a unique set of skills and tactics for operating in these challenging environments. This experience, combined with the Indian army's extensive training and advanced equipment, has made it one of the strongest mountain fighting forces in the world.
The Indian army's massive airlift capability is a key factor in its strength as a mountain fighting force. The ability to move troops and equipment quickly and efficiently in mountain regions is essential for success in these challenging environments, and the Indian military has invested heavily in developing a robust airlift capability.
One example of the Indian army's airlift capabilities is its fleet of transport helicopters. These aircraft are specifically designed for operations in high altitude environments and are capable of transporting troops and equipment quickly and safely to even the most remote and inaccessible locations in the mountains.
In addition to its transport helicopters, the Indian army also has a fleet of fixed-wing transport aircraft that are used for larger-scale airlifts. These aircraft are capable of carrying heavy loads over long distances, making them essential for logistics and resupply operations in mountain regions.
In addition to its airlift capabilities, the Indian army also has the ability to go behind enemy lines in mountain regions. This ability is crucial for conducting surprise attacks and disrupting enemy supply lines, and the Indian army has developed a range of tactics and techniques for operating effectively in these types of missions.
Overall, the Indian army's massive airlift capability and its ability to go behind enemy lines in mountain regions are key factors in its strength as a mountain fighting force. These capabilities, combined with the Indian army's extensive training and advanced equipment, have allowed it to operate effectively in some of the most challenging environments on earth.
One of the key reasons for the Indian army's strength in mountain warfare is its extensive training and experience. The Indian military has a dedicated mountain warfare training center, where soldiers undergo rigorous physical and tactical training to prepare them for the unique challenges of operating in high altitude environments. In addition to this specialized training, the Indian army also has a long history of conducting operations in mountain regions, including the Siachen Glacier, which is one of the highest and most inhospitable battlefields in the world.
Another factor contributing to the Indian army's strength in mountain warfare is its advanced equipment and technology. The Indian military has invested heavily in developing specialized gear and weapons for use in mountain environments, including high altitude clothing and gear, advanced communication systems, and modified vehicles that are capable of operating in rugged, mountainous terrain.
In addition to its training and equipment, the Indian army also has a strong organizational culture that values teamwork and cohesion. This culture, combined with the rigorous physical and mental conditioning that soldiers undergo, enables the Indian army to operate effectively as a cohesive unit in some of the most challenging environments on earth.
Overall, the Indian army is widely recognized as one of the strongest mountain fighting forces in the world. Its extensive training, advanced equipment, and strong organizational culture have all contributed to its success in operations in high altitude environments.
The Indian army has a long history of operations in mountain regions, including its experience in World War II in the Himalayan theater. During this time, the Indian army played a crucial role in defending British India against the advancing Japanese forces. Indian soldiers, many of whom were recruited from the mountainous regions of the country, fought bravely in some of the highest and most challenging battlefields of the war.
The Indian army's experience in mountain warfare also includes its involvement in the Kashmir wars. The mountainous region of Kashmir has been a source of conflict between India and Pakistan for decades, and the Indian army has played a central role in defending India's interests in this region. In addition to its efforts to secure the border with Pakistan, the Indian army has also conducted numerous operations against militant groups operating in the mountainous regions of Kashmir.
In addition to these conflicts, the Indian army has also been involved in operations against China in 1967. This conflict, which took place in the Himalayan region of Sikkim, saw the Indian army successfully defend against a Chinese incursion into Indian territory. This conflict, while brief, demonstrated the Indian army's strength and capabilities as a mountain fighting force.
Overall, the Indian army's experience in mountain warfare, including its involvement in World War II, the Kashmir wars, and the conflict with China, has allowed it to develop a unique set of skills and tactics for operating in these challenging environments. This experience, combined with the Indian army's extensive training and advanced equipment, has made it one of the strongest mountain fighting forces in the world.
The Indian army's massive airlift capability is a key factor in its strength as a mountain fighting force. The ability to move troops and equipment quickly and efficiently in mountain regions is essential for success in these challenging environments, and the Indian military has invested heavily in developing a robust airlift capability.
One example of the Indian army's airlift capabilities is its fleet of transport helicopters. These aircraft are specifically designed for operations in high altitude environments and are capable of transporting troops and equipment quickly and safely to even the most remote and inaccessible locations in the mountains.
In addition to its transport helicopters, the Indian army also has a fleet of fixed-wing transport aircraft that are used for larger-scale airlifts. These aircraft are capable of carrying heavy loads over long distances, making them essential for logistics and resupply operations in mountain regions.
In addition to its airlift capabilities, the Indian army also has the ability to go behind enemy lines in mountain regions. This ability is crucial for conducting surprise attacks and disrupting enemy supply lines, and the Indian army has developed a range of tactics and techniques for operating effectively in these types of missions.
Overall, the Indian army's massive airlift capability and its ability to go behind enemy lines in mountain regions are key factors in its strength as a mountain fighting force. These capabilities, combined with the Indian army's extensive training and advanced equipment, have allowed it to operate effectively in some of the most challenging environments on earth.
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Weird, why invite private players when BRO can do it efficiently? Bagdogra airport was recently re-furbished in one-third of the anticipated time quoted by private players and then BRO does it within like 6 months' time.
What exactly are they trying to mimic ? Unless PLA is planning to invade honeybees, a normal human does not move like a ping-pong ball.
srevster
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They took gholgappa kayega very seriouslyWeird, why invite private players when BRO can do it efficiently? Bagdogra airport was recently re-furbished in one-third of the anticipated time quoted by private players and then BRO does it within like 6 months' time.
Everyone was king fu fighting, everyone was fast as lightning….
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Jimih
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The BRO itself has invited the bid, seeking contractors to execute the job.
Blademaster
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You lost your argument when you said that China had not been involved in a major military conflict. The vets of the Korean War is calling you and demanding that you hand back your history card or pass whatever it is and mark it grade F. Another major conflict was the 1962 war with India in which PLA has decisively defeated the IA and captured a significant part of Indian territory which to this day still controls. And do not forget the conflict with Vietnam during 1979 and 1984 in which the PLA has achieved the military and political objects that the CCP set out for the PLA.
srevster
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PLA fought in those wars via proxy, they didn’t send their own. Korean War was between North Korea and South Korea. The role of PLA was assistance. The actual people who found were from the PVA. Those vets are not part of the PLA which is a separate organization.
regarding 1962, I don’t really count it. They didn’t fight a prepared enemy that is entrenched.
Regarding the Vietnam war, that is the only active theater where they fought and got their ass handed to them. All skirmishes where the opponent was prepared, they lost. 1967, 1986-1987.
Hari Sud
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Whenever Chinese loose e.g. with Vietnam in 1979, they call it that they achieved military and political objectives which the CCP set out….., ha….ha…..ha.
Korean War was no victory. It was killing ground of the Chinese.
Overlord
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Lmao...What military objective did CCP maggots achieve in Sino-Vietnam war ?
Only objective they achieved was to get their @$$ handed over to them very badly & treated like the roaches they are, their military objective was to save their & sh!trican genocidal puppet Pol-pot's Khymer rouge regime of Cambodia, which they failed to do so...he got disposed by Viets.
Also Viets continued to occupy Cambodia until '89.
The Shrike
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I remember reading they were planning to upgrade Nyoma (along with others) at least as far back as 2019
.
srevster
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The Boxer Rebellion was a violent uprising in China that was directed against foreign influence and the spread of Christianity. The rebellion, which began in 1899 and was centered in Beijing, was fueled by a mix of anti-foreign sentiment, nationalism, and traditional Chinese religious and cultural beliefs. The rebels, who were known as the Boxers, sought to drive out foreign influence and restore China to its traditional values.
In response to the rebellion, an international military force, including troops from the British Indian Army, was sent to Beijing to restore order and protect foreign diplomats and civilians. The military campaign to suppress the rebellion was led by an alliance of foreign powers, including Britain, the United States, Japan, and several European countries.
The foreign troops faced fierce resistance from the Boxers, and the campaign to suppress the rebellion was not easy. However, the foreign powers eventually gained the upper hand, and the rebellion was suppressed. The foreign troops, including the British Indian Army, were involved in several key battles in and around Beijing, including the capture of the city's Forbidden City.
After the rebellion was quelled, the foreign troops, including the British Indian Army, returned home. The suppression of the rebellion was a significant victory for the foreign powers and marked the end of the Boxer Rebellion. However, it also had significant consequences for China, as it was forced to pay significant reparations to the foreign powers and accept further foreign influence in the country.
In response to the rebellion, an international military force, including troops from the British Indian Army, was sent to Beijing to restore order and protect foreign diplomats and civilians. The military campaign to suppress the rebellion was led by an alliance of foreign powers, including Britain, the United States, Japan, and several European countries.
The foreign troops faced fierce resistance from the Boxers, and the campaign to suppress the rebellion was not easy. However, the foreign powers eventually gained the upper hand, and the rebellion was suppressed. The foreign troops, including the British Indian Army, were involved in several key battles in and around Beijing, including the capture of the city's Forbidden City.
After the rebellion was quelled, the foreign troops, including the British Indian Army, returned home. The suppression of the rebellion was a significant victory for the foreign powers and marked the end of the Boxer Rebellion. However, it also had significant consequences for China, as it was forced to pay significant reparations to the foreign powers and accept further foreign influence in the country.
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