India-China 2020 Border Dispute - Military and Strategic Discussion

[fire starter]

The writer is Anti BJP so yeah he may instigating a propaganda I guess.

thread.

 

[fire starter]

we should make sure China pays heavy for this standoff and never repeats again.

India & friends, are prepared. Democracy & territorial integrity of peace loving nations against adventurism & expansionist ideology, will be defended at all costs & the same, defeated.

 

[FalconZero]

All ready

View attachment 53379

It's from an ig account : It's not IA

 

[fire starter]

 

[fire starter]

 

[doreamon]

The writer is Anti BJP so yeah he may instigating a propaganda I guess.

There r 3 option if these r true ..
1 . Compromise on fingers . Give in to chinese claim till f4 / f5 in return for depsang as it is strategically imp . But this ll embolden them in future .
2. Allow their petrol in depsang without much public awareness untill situation is in our favour.. Break agreement like they did whn right time comes.. but i expect chinese to build lots of permanent structure in near future
3. Military confrontation in sept/oct or next summer . But for this we must be sure of our capabilities nd strategies .

 

[cereal killer]

There r 3 option if these r true ..
1 . Compromise on fingers . Give in to chinese claim till f4 / f5 in return for depsang as it is strategically imp . But this ll embolden them in future .
2. Allow their petrol in depsang without much public awareness untill situation is in our favour.. Break agreement like they did whn right time comes.. but i expect chinese to build lots of permanent structure in near future
3. Military confrontation in sept/oct or next summer . But for this we must be sure of our capabilities nd strategies .

I'd like to go for option 3. Keeping all these equipment & managing troop along LAC is a costly thing to do. China may afford that but we can't allow them to do that especially if we are planning to retake GB. A short military action is much more feasible & cost efficient rather than manning LAC all along the year for at least half a decade.

 

[Sehwag213]

I'd like to go for option 3. Keeping all these equipment & managing troop along LAC is a costly thing to do. China may afford that but we can't allow them to do that especially if we are planning to retake GB. A short military action is much more feasible & cost efficient rather than manning LAC all along the year for at least half a decade.

There is an easier solution if we are prepared for confrontation.
We should occupy some of their land across LAC in Arunachal, Sikkim and Himachal and refuse to vacate it.

 

[doreamon]

I'd like to go for option 3. Keeping all these equipment & managing troop along LAC is a costly thing to do. China may afford that but we can't allow them to do that especially if we are planning to retake GB. A short military action is much more feasible & cost efficient rather than manning LAC all along the year for at least half a decade.

Whether it ll be short or long will not be our decision once we start pounding them . Whn thousands of body bags reaches home on both sides we cnt be sure whr it ll go.. chinese nationalism is fuel for stability of ccp.. At this point they r aiming for global domination.. even a stalemate ll be shameful . So we have to calculate accordingly .. How much global support we can expect especially frm usa.. we must ensure sufficient equipment , money, ammunition for a long / short war . Also the risk of two front war has to be consider .

 

[ARVION]

I think this is extremely important's to ths thread's, just my thought's.

 

[Tanmay]

somebody please shed some light on :
don't our T90 tanks have missile firing capability? :O

and engine needs to be started for 10/20 min every 4 hr, is it the problem for our T series tanks or every tank model have to follow that routine there due to weather?

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/02/17/the-trials-in-ladakh

Late 1980s scenario

Selective quoting ....


1 MECH INF was to take over the 20 BMPs (Infantry Combat Vehicle) of the ad hoc mechanised force already in Ladakh. We had to induct 32 BMP and three Armoured Recovery Vehicles(ARV).

Tanks and BMPs were moved to the various areas to validate their performance. BMPs also crossed the Pangong Tso to validate the amphibious capability. Terrain similar to the operational area in the rear areas was utilised to conduct field exercises

Standard operating procedures (SOP) for technical maintenance and preservation of the equipment in extreme cold temperatures were evolved.
The Russian-origin tanks and BMPs were tailormade for cold temperatures as long as the correct procedures were followed.

At extreme cold temperatures, special oils and lubricants have to be used. The equipment must be stored in sheds during peacetime. Before starting the tanks and BMPs, pre-heaters were used to raise the oil pressure. If this was not done, the engine would wear out (particularly accessories like the air compressor). The ad hoc mechanised force was following the practice normal for wheeled vehicles of starting the engines every night for 1.5 to 2 hours, to prevent the oil and lubes and the coolant from congealing/freezing and keeping the batteries charged. While even in wheeled vehicles this is a wrong practice – tailormade oils/coolants and batteries for sub-zero temperatures are available and pre-heaters thin the congealed oil – but for tanks and BMPs, it was a disaster as engine life is measured in hours and not kilometres.

Engine life of the 20 BMPs of the ad hoc force had been considerably reduced and a large number of compressors had packed up

. I refused to accept the logic advanced and did a detailed study. I found that pre-heaters were not being used. In fact, drivers were not aware that they existed. Thus, the oil pressure never reached the requisite levels and was not adequately thinned to pass through narrow tubes leading to various components. Also, the basic starting method in tanks and BMPs is the ‘air start’ or ‘air cum battery start’ – the air stored in a cylinder fires the engine and in the latter case, there’s also an electric spark. In emergencies, when the air cylinder is empty, a battery start with fully charged batteries is undertaken. We found that the air bottles were leaking due to worn-out stoppers. The batteries at minus 20 degrees Celsius are reduced to 10-20 per cent capability. Air bottles are filled by the compressors when the tanks/BMPs engines are running. Hence, with empty air bottles and weak batteries, the tanks and BMPs would not start. Thus the night static running was being undertaken to charge the batteries and fill up the air bottles! In a nutshell, for the want of air cylinder stoppers and charged batteries, the engines and other parts costing lakhs of rupees were being run down.


We resolved the issued by simply repairing/replacing the air cylinder stoppers to keep the air bottle full and removing the batteries which were kept in heated rooms on trickle charge, using generators.
Also, the use of pre-heaters for 1.5 to 2 hours before a attempting a start was enforced. We faced no problem thereafter. All our equipment remained battle-worthy.

So strict I was on this issue that in winters, before a start was attempted, the driver had to personally confirm to me that the SOP had been followed!

In January 2000, I was Brigade Commander in Batalik and came to know that the practice had restarted. I spoke to the Corps Commander – who dug out my SOP – to stop it. In 2005, as Corps Commander, I visited Ladakh and found that the practice had commenced again. Once again, I got it stopped. In 2007, when I became GOC in C Northern Command, to my horror I found that it had recommenced due to change of units and the SOP being buried under files. Once again, I got fresh SOPs written to enforce the same. In 2016, a Combat Command was inducted into Ladakh. I read a detailed article about it in newspapers. You must have guessed: the report mentioned that this practice was in vogue to “preserve” the equipment. During my visit to 14 Corps, I briefed the staff in detail. I am sceptical whether the ghost of “static runs” for tanks and BMPs has been finally buried or still haunting the mechanised forces!

 

[ARVION]

I think a Theatre Command's should be implemented's. Just my thought's.

 

[Akula]

Did chinese copied russian Tsnk's Engineering's.

China may have acquired Soviet stuff after the fall, or from the former Soviet republics (as America also did), but the only purpose of those purchases would be to gain intel on soviet equipment and other's to Reverse Engineer's it's. Had once seen something or used something as target practice the top domestic platforms are copies of that something.

You can clearly's Knew's that's "they didn't have today's level", that they were not world leading mean they would have want to copy something from a nation that didn't had a R &D's inte Armoured's Technology's. Let alone tank industry. That made tanks with civilian grade steel and was proven undisputedly one of the worst at war. Because the gun can't that accurately hit targets on the move something which the MODERN Russian 2A46M5 on the T72B3M Succiede's with an the easilye's

I have read entire thread on Pakistan defence forum about Chinese tank development. There was a Serbian engineer (if I am correct) who helped Chinese in their tank development. But I read that thread 3-4 years ago.

 

[garg_bharat]

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/02/17/the-trials-in-ladakh

Late 1980s scenario

Selective quoting ....


1 MECH INF was to take over the 20 BMPs (Infantry Combat Vehicle) of the ad hoc mechanised force already in Ladakh. We had to induct 32 BMP and three Armoured Recovery Vehicles(ARV).

Tanks and BMPs were moved to the various areas to validate their performance. BMPs also crossed the Pangong Tso to validate the amphibious capability. Terrain similar to the operational area in the rear areas was utilised to conduct field exercises

Standard operating procedures (SOP) for technical maintenance and preservation of the equipment in extreme cold temperatures were evolved.
The Russian-origin tanks and BMPs were tailormade for cold temperatures as long as the correct procedures were followed.

At extreme cold temperatures, special oils and lubricants have to be used. The equipment must be stored in sheds during peacetime. Before starting the tanks and BMPs, pre-heaters were used to raise the oil pressure. If this was not done, the engine would wear out (particularly accessories like the air compressor). The ad hoc mechanised force was following the practice normal for wheeled vehicles of starting the engines every night for 1.5 to 2 hours, to prevent the oil and lubes and the coolant from congealing/freezing and keeping the batteries charged. While even in wheeled vehicles this is a wrong practice – tailormade oils/coolants and batteries for sub-zero temperatures are available and pre-heaters thin the congealed oil – but for tanks and BMPs, it was a disaster as engine life is measured in hours and not kilometres.

Engine life of the 20 BMPs of the ad hoc force had been considerably reduced and a large number of compressors had packed up

. I refused to accept the logic advanced and did a detailed study. I found that pre-heaters were not being used. In fact, drivers were not aware that they existed. Thus, the oil pressure never reached the requisite levels and was not adequately thinned to pass through narrow tubes leading to various components. Also, the basic starting method in tanks and BMPs is the ‘air start’ or ‘air cum battery start’ – the air stored in a cylinder fires the engine and in the latter case, there’s also an electric spark. In emergencies, when the air cylinder is empty, a battery start with fully charged batteries is undertaken. We found that the air bottles were leaking due to worn-out stoppers. The batteries at minus 20 degrees Celsius are reduced to 10-20 per cent capability. Air bottles are filled by the compressors when the tanks/BMPs engines are running. Hence, with empty air bottles and weak batteries, the tanks and BMPs would not start. Thus the night static running was being undertaken to charge the batteries and fill up the air bottles! In a nutshell, for the want of air cylinder stoppers and charged batteries, the engines and other parts costing lakhs of rupees were being run down.


We resolved the issued by simply repairing/replacing the air cylinder stoppers to keep the air bottle full and removing the batteries which were kept in heated rooms on trickle charge, using generators.
Also, the use of pre-heaters for 1.5 to 2 hours before a attempting a start was enforced. We faced no problem thereafter. All our equipment remained battle-worthy.

So strict I was on this issue that in winters, before a start was attempted, the driver had to personally confirm to me that the SOP had been followed!

In January 2000, I was Brigade Commander in Batalik and came to know that the practice had restarted. I spoke to the Corps Commander – who dug out my SOP – to stop it. In 2005, as Corps Commander, I visited Ladakh and found that the practice had commenced again. Once again, I got it stopped. In 2007, when I became GOC in C Northern Command, to my horror I found that it had recommenced due to change of units and the SOP being buried under files. Once again, I got fresh SOPs written to enforce the same. In 2016, a Combat Command was inducted into Ladakh. I read a detailed article about it in newspapers. You must have guessed: the report mentioned that this practice was in vogue to “preserve” the equipment. During my visit to 14 Corps, I briefed the staff in detail. I am sceptical whether the ghost of “static runs” for tanks and BMPs has been finally buried or still haunting the mechanised forces!

This article shows something very serious - lack of communication within organization. The change in SOP is not spread throughout army because there is no means/method to spread it. This shows army acts very much like a bureaucracy rather than a dynamic organization. I sincerely hope Army changes. And the issue raised here is correct - the equipment is not maintained properly resulting in defects and downtime.

No repeated trials can solve this problem. This shows a low technical level of both officers and soldiers. Only option is to incorporate technical courses within curriculum of training.

 

[Synergy]

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/02/17/the-trials-in-ladakh

Late 1980s scenario

Selective quoting ....


1 MECH INF was to take over the 20 BMPs (Infantry Combat Vehicle) of the ad hoc mechanised force already in Ladakh. We had to induct 32 BMP and three Armoured Recovery Vehicles(ARV).

Tanks and BMPs were moved to the various areas to validate their performance. BMPs also crossed the Pangong Tso to validate the amphibious capability. Terrain similar to the operational area in the rear areas was utilised to conduct field exercises

Standard operating procedures (SOP) for technical maintenance and preservation of the equipment in extreme cold temperatures were evolved.
The Russian-origin tanks and BMPs were tailormade for cold temperatures as long as the correct procedures were followed.

At extreme cold temperatures, special oils and lubricants have to be used. The equipment must be stored in sheds during peacetime. Before starting the tanks and BMPs, pre-heaters were used to raise the oil pressure. If this was not done, the engine would wear out (particularly accessories like the air compressor). The ad hoc mechanised force was following the practice normal for wheeled vehicles of starting the engines every night for 1.5 to 2 hours, to prevent the oil and lubes and the coolant from congealing/freezing and keeping the batteries charged. While even in wheeled vehicles this is a wrong practice – tailormade oils/coolants and batteries for sub-zero temperatures are available and pre-heaters thin the congealed oil – but for tanks and BMPs, it was a disaster as engine life is measured in hours and not kilometres.

Engine life of the 20 BMPs of the ad hoc force had been considerably reduced and a large number of compressors had packed up

. I refused to accept the logic advanced and did a detailed study. I found that pre-heaters were not being used. In fact, drivers were not aware that they existed. Thus, the oil pressure never reached the requisite levels and was not adequately thinned to pass through narrow tubes leading to various components. Also, the basic starting method in tanks and BMPs is the ‘air start’ or ‘air cum battery start’ – the air stored in a cylinder fires the engine and in the latter case, there’s also an electric spark. In emergencies, when the air cylinder is empty, a battery start with fully charged batteries is undertaken. We found that the air bottles were leaking due to worn-out stoppers. The batteries at minus 20 degrees Celsius are reduced to 10-20 per cent capability. Air bottles are filled by the compressors when the tanks/BMPs engines are running. Hence, with empty air bottles and weak batteries, the tanks and BMPs would not start. Thus the night static running was being undertaken to charge the batteries and fill up the air bottles! In a nutshell, for the want of air cylinder stoppers and charged batteries, the engines and other parts costing lakhs of rupees were being run down.


We resolved the issued by simply repairing/replacing the air cylinder stoppers to keep the air bottle full and removing the batteries which were kept in heated rooms on trickle charge, using generators.
Also, the use of pre-heaters for 1.5 to 2 hours before a attempting a start was enforced. We faced no problem thereafter. All our equipment remained battle-worthy.

So strict I was on this issue that in winters, before a start was attempted, the driver had to personally confirm to me that the SOP had been followed!

In January 2000, I was Brigade Commander in Batalik and came to know that the practice had restarted. I spoke to the Corps Commander – who dug out my SOP – to stop it. In 2005, as Corps Commander, I visited Ladakh and found that the practice had commenced again. Once again, I got it stopped. In 2007, when I became GOC in C Northern Command, to my horror I found that it had recommenced due to change of units and the SOP being buried under files. Once again, I got fresh SOPs written to enforce the same. In 2016, a Combat Command was inducted into Ladakh. I read a detailed article about it in newspapers. You must have guessed: the report mentioned that this practice was in vogue to “preserve” the equipment. During my visit to 14 Corps, I briefed the staff in detail. I am sceptical whether the ghost of “static runs” for tanks and BMPs has been finally buried or still haunting the mechanised forces!

@Tanmay then can we conclude, that was wrong reporting by the wire?
if faulty sop, then also I'm not finding 15/20 min of engine start after 4hrs. or it's the new sop that is being followed there?

and I know T90 can fire missiles. but they were saying it can't. what's the case?

 

[ezsasa]

Ek baar jaikara phir se bol dijiye: @rajnathsingh.

This is too good.

 

[Tanmay]

View attachment 53272

what is this?

As pointed by @Saumyasupraik , its a diver propulsion vehicle DPV

 

[shankyz]

Goosebumps guaranteed


If this is what few Sikhs do in peacetime, imagine the mayhem they caused that night in anger.

 

[Tanmay]

This article shows something very serious - lack of communication within organization. The change in SOP is not spread throughout army because there is no means/method to spread it. This shows army acts very much like a bureaucracy rather than a dynamic organization. I sincerely hope Army changes. And the issue raised here is correct - the equipment is not maintained properly resulting in defects and downtime.

No repeated trials can solve this problem. This shows a low technical level of both officers and soldiers. Only option is to incorporate technical courses within curriculum of training.

Well the same redtape of bureaucracy is there in militaray too

https://tkstales.wordpress.com/

More selective quoting

A fatal accident took place in Bhuj. .... (read entire article. I only quote selectively now ..)

Files of all Hunter accidents that were unresolved or had reports of rolling while going down were segregated. Between 1962 and 1978 there were more than ten cases. Then we started investigating technical health of each of these aircraft. Slowly it emerged that a particular technical instruction regarding the hydraulic system leading to the aileron servo dynes had not been implemented. It was strange that an instruction related to the control system was on concession on all Hunters throughout the Airforce for about fifteen years without raising a stink.

We went deeper. Logistically the mod kits had been received from the UK and had been distributed to the bases. In the base, the instructions were not carried out because the kits appeared to be incomplete, some parts could not be found/identified. We could not trace any activity to rectify this logistic/technical situation.

We enlarged our enquiry to technical training. It was discovered that the manufacturer had considered this instruction to be of critical importance and had offered to train one fitter for installing this instruction. A smart Sergeant was selected and sent. He completed his training and was complimented for his performance .

On return, the SNCO was posted to a non Hunter station far away because he had spent many years in the North: the rules demanded that he must share his time in the South or East. For the next fifteen years he never worked on a Hunter.

These accidents happened off many bases and on many exercises.

This story stands in the calendar year of 1977 or 1978. We flew the Hunter for more than another decade there after. Thankfully we did not have any further incidents of uncontrolled rolling.

The story gives me shivers even now. Why did so many of us senior guys fail our juniors over fifteen years and indirectly cause so many young deaths? If any of you young tech managers go through this story now and try to find parallels in the present environment, you might find some things that you have never imagined; who knows? You might end up with the satisfaction of saving some lives from accidents that get prevented by your actions.

I shall not spell out the lessons from this story. My readers are smart. They will find the lessons for themselves.

 

[tarunraju]

LOL SAIC. Bhaad me gaya spare parts and resale value of MG Hector.

Imagine the poor bastard who spent 30 lacs on an MG ZS EV instead of listening to his papa and buying a Fortuner.