That course of action pre-supposes 100% access to Chinese deployments which India may not have had.
Nowhere in the world do you have 100% access at any given time.
Intelligence gathering is one aspect. Making sense of the data and then formulating a response to it, another. If you have been to the NTRO data analysis center, you will be able to appreciate the fusion of information from multiple inputs that are operational. A fascinating process by itself.
Heck, if India could not even figure out that 5000 PLA troops were diverted from a training exercise in Xinjiang or Tibet into the disputed areas, then the question is how confident was the IA in the early days as to exactly how many more PLA forces were already deployed indepth behind the front lines?
Firstly, diversion of troops towards the LAC was duly noted and flagged. Again, you have to be embedded/plugged into the system, to understand how the information is processed. At times, you will be facing a stiff challenge when you provide an input, from another sister intelligence agency, whose domain is foreign intelligence, to raise the necessary red flags, as there may be a delay in the same agency being able to corroborate the information you have provided or the necessary corroborative 'signs' may not be presenting themselves immediately, thereby rendering your input into a pending tray of the processing tray of a desk somewhere.
It is irrelevant as to how many troops were present in depth, for the simple reason that the moment the PLA moved onto, for example, a ridge on Finger 4, the ITBP post there would have sent the information up the channel.
So to start action at that stage could have resulted in a full scale war for which India was not prepared and had not deployed.
Sorry, I disagree. The fact that the Chinese were detected, should have resulted in massive pouring in of troops into the region, irrespective of whether was would have broken or not.
We did it in DBO back in 2013, we did it in 2014 at Chumar, we did it in Dokalam. Again, it was a political call that resulted in these situations resolving as they did.
My counter to the point above is very simple.
Mr. Shah made a categorical statement on the floor of the house over Aksai Chin. That, as a Home Minister of the Government of India.
Honestly, can you state that the GoI was not prepared to militarily deal with a situation arising out of such a statement?
And if it was not, what would you call this act of Mr. Shah?
And if it was indeed prepared, what would you call the situation that has played out?
If the contention is that India was not prepared to fight, then could you kindly comment on this particular act of Mr Shah? Can you then term the statement as being responsible?
My personal view:
An elected representative holding an Office of Trust under the Government of India can not be accused of making a loose statement. And if a loose statement has been made, then the said representative has no business being in office.
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Unrelated
PS: For those whose understanding of importance of understanding the thought process of the enemy is limited to the SM posts of random geniuses: "maneuver" is the cornerstone of every strategy. Be it corporate, market, warfare, diplomacy or political.
Certain countries have games based on precisely on that. There is a reason why there is a "Game Theory" too.