Civil war in Ukraine

[jouni]

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[sorcerer]

Poroshenko bans…well, everyone..
Petro Poroshenko has just stepped on his western supporters’ narrative of a glorious, free and happy post-Maidan Ukraine, by rather embarrassingly banning a whole slew of people from setting foot in his country – including “at least three” BBC employees. Nobody seems to know why. Either because they are a “threat to national interests” or because they are helping the “terrorists.” The list is vague.

Andrew Roy, the BBC’s foreign editor, said “This is a shameful attack on media freedom,” but the BBC website is burying the story of their own journalists being banned inside another item about how the rebel elections are a “threat to peace.”

The Guardian reports the story but does its best with its headline to give the impression there’s some sanity behind it all…



And just can’t bring itself to condemn even this flagrant attack on journalistic freedom. After all, more than many other MSM outlets, they have nailed their colors to Ukraine’s mast, and there’s no going back now. However nuts the place goes, however many purges and massacres there are, however many rights are expunged, the Graun is still going to have to try to find some sort of bogus rationale, and however many nazis PP has in his government or running his militias, they are still going to have to put the word “fascist” in quotes.

Meanwhile in another part of the forest, Alec Luhn is busy quoting fearless “citizen journalist” bellingcat (aka Eliot Higgins) on the subject of alleged Russian troops in Ukraine Syria. Eliot was scrolling through Google images recently – as most serious investigative journalists do – and found a pic of a piece of Russian military hardware in Syria. He claims it proves Russia is sending military hardware to Syria.

For once we actually agree with him. But then Russia has been openly sending military hardware to Syria for at least ten years, so it’s not exactly surprising that some of it has been photographed there. And it’s most definitely not news.

Eliot is very possibly too confused to realise the presence of Russian hardware does not mean the presence of Russian armed forces, even though it was pointed out to him on Twitter by many helpful people. But Alec isn’t that confused. So we can only speculate why he wants to associate his name with that of the increasingly ridiculous and entirely discredited “citizen Higgins”.

http://off-guardian.org/2015/09/17/poroshenko-bans-well-everyone/

 

[pmaitra]

#JesuisBBC: Poroshenko Bans Western Journalists From Ukraine
Expect Poroshenko to backtrack on the BBC ban. Don't expect Kiev's attitude towards reporters as a whole to change, or for western journalists to stop flattering it

Bryan MacDonald | (RT) | Russia Insider


Has also banned two Spanish journalists who are missing in Syria and pressumed captured by ISIS

This article originally appeared at RT

Maidan is eating itself: President Poroshenko has distracted the Western media from its important role as a cheerleader for his government. Banning BBC journalists was a big mistake for the chocolate king.

Crazy rulers are not a new phenomenon. Back in the 6th Century, the Byzantine Emperor, Justin II was forced to abdicate after he began devouring people.

Then there was King Charles VI of France who refused to bathe because he believed he was made from glass.

Also, lest we forget Russia’s own Feodor I who used to wander the country ringing church bells. For fun.

Before Justin decided to have a human dinner, he developed a taste for flesh by biting lesser folk while being pushed around on a wheeled throne. There is no record of the Emperor eating himself. However, Ukraine’s ‘Maidan’ government is doing this now. The coup, or ‘revolution’ if you prefer, has turned cannibal.

If you were a PR adviser to Ukraine’s leaders and they asked you to compile a list of things they must not do, banning journalists would be high up there. Perhaps even at number one. While those who understand Ukraine know that the regime is even worse than its horrible predecessor, Western media has not reported this reality. Hence, the general public in Europe and North America doesn’t have the foggiest notion. Firing cluster bombs at civilians would be prominent too. Nevertheless, Kiev has already done that. Luckily for them, the western press doesn’t seem to mind.

On Wednesday night, President Poroshenko signed a decree banning 388 people from Ukraine. That was not a major surprise. After all, the Kiev government has been jailing domestic critics for some time. Like Ruslan Kotsaba for instance. So banning a few hundred Russians and others from minor Eastern European nations like Poland or Hungary, would barely get any attention.

Why Steve Rosenberg?

However, Poroshenko included 41 international journalists and bloggers on his blacklist. They came from countries as diverse as Germany, Israel, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. If they had been fringe hacks, Western media representatives in Kiev and Moscow would have merely stroked their hipster beards. A few might have even expressed regret. One or two might have made a half-hearted attempt to get a “#jesuis” hashtag going on Twitter.

Poroshenko wasn’t that smart. The billionaire president of Europe’s poorest country (per capita) decided to go for a few really big fish. Wielding his oligarchical pen, he signed a decree that included two prominent BBC journalists: Steve Rosenberg and Emma Wells. The reason? For being a “threat to national interests”.

I’ve never met Steve Rosenberg. He may be the nicest man since Gandhi. Or a bad egg. I’ve no idea. Emma Wells used to work for RT, before joining the BBC. Again, I haven’t interacted with her.

This is not the point. The fact is that Rosenberg, Wells and the entire BBC team have been more than fair to the Maidan regime. Many would say too kind altogether. While the BBC, unlike most Western outlets, make some attempts to show both sides in Ukraine’s civil war, it is pretty obvious that the network sympathizes with Poroshenko’s administration. As does the British government, with great enthusiasm. Indeed, a number of BBC employees are openly hostile to Russia. That usually goes down well in Kiev.

Take for example, BBC World Service news editor Olexiy Solohubenko. The intrepid Olexiy has been running a one-man Twitter propaganda campaign for the Maidan crew for almost two years, blocking and ridiculing critics of the coup. Strangely, Olexiy didn’t take to Twitter last night to support his BBC colleagues. On the other side of the coin, the BBC’s Fergal Keane brought guile and nuance to coverage of the Donbas conflict that beat hacks could not match in a million years.

Rosenberg seems a curious choice for Poroshenko’s conniption. He has never exhibited any signs of being particularly pro-Russian. Indeed, only 13 months ago, he was framing Russian troop movements on Russian territory as something sinister.


That white truck is a DAF commercial lorry, by the way, not a KamAZ. Also, a BBC team headed by Rosenberg were allegedly attacked in southern Russia last year.

The Spanish angle

Meanwhile, Poroshenko didn’t stop at the BBC. He also banned two prominent Spanish journalists, Antonio Jose Rodriguez Pampliega and Ángel Sastre of El Pais. Sadly, neither Antonio or Angel are likely to visit Ukraine any time soon. Both are missing in Syria, presumed captured by ISIS. Their families probably could have done without Poroshenko’s insensitivity and downright stupidity.

There are also a number of Russian reporters and bloggers on the chocolate king’s list –one that is more Schindler’s than Willy Wonka’s. The BBC’s Daniel Sandford did not seem concerned about them. In a Twitter exchange with RT’s social media chief, Ivor Crotty, he said: “it would be hard to use words “honourable” and “excellent” to describe LifeNews coverage for example.” I’m no fan of LifeNews myself but you are either for press freedom or you are not. If you are, you cannot divide journalists into different categories to suit yourself.


Herein lies the whole problem. When Russian journalists of great integrity like Andrey Mironov were killed in Ukraine, their Western colleagues, with some exceptions, showed little solidarity. Whether they see Russians as some kind of untermensch or simply don’t care is unclear. Nevertheless, there has been more noise about two BBC journalists receiving bans from Ukraine than there has been about numerous Russian reporters being murdered.

Nothing is real, not much is possible

That said, rather than angrily condemning Poroshenko’s move, Western hacks on the Russia/Ukraine beat used puzzling language. “Worrying,” said Mashable’s Christopher Miller.


Freelancer Oliver Carroll, frequently seen in The Independent, felt it was “quite a pickle”.


The pair then hooked up with the American neocon activist Michael Weiss to soft-soap Poroshenko’s foolishness.

Kiev has been harassing, blacklisting and imprisoning reporters since the Maidan coup. Reporters hostile to the regime have even been murdered, like the unfortunate Oles Buzina. All along, their Western peers have turned a blind eye. Last night, they shamefully attempted to exculpate Poroshenko for his blacklist by pinning the blame on his ‘advisers.’ Do they really imagine that he wasn’t told that there were BBC journalists on the list? If he wasn’t and he signed it without even glancing at the 388 names on it, he’s a bigger fool than we ever imagined.

Poroshenko will probably backtrack. Some minor lackey will take the blame. Then the Western media can get back to the important things. Like wholeheartedly supporting the pro-US/NATO administration in Kiev and ignoring its sins. It’d be a lot more productive if a number of journalists stared into a very large mirror for a long time.

_____________________________________________________________________________
Commentary: That BBC Twitter-Troll Daniel Sanford has been countered.

 

[pmaitra]

 

[pmaitra]

 

[pmaitra]

According to these comments, the chocolate seller has backtracked.


paul• 13 hours ago
Poroshenko has indeed backtracked. About 2 hours ago. BBC reporters reinstated along with a few other European journalists.

American Graffiti paul • 5 hours ago
Good doggy. Vicky will toss you your milk bone now.

Jane paul • 13 hours ago
Interesting. He obviously was told he over stepped the mark banning bbc puppets!!!

American Graffiti Jane • 6 hours ago
Bad doggy. No milk bone biscuits for you today.​

 

[sorcerer]

According to these comments, the chocolate seller has backtracked.


paul• 13 hours ago
Poroshenko has indeed backtracked. About 2 hours ago. BBC reporters reinstated along with a few other European journalists.

American Graffiti paul • 5 hours ago
Good doggy. Vicky will toss you your milk bone now.

Jane paul • 13 hours ago
Interesting. He obviously was told he over stepped the mark banning bbc puppets!!!

American Graffiti Jane • 6 hours ago
Bad doggy. No milk bone biscuits for you today.​

Truly hilarious..

 

[soldier of Putin]

Another improved Kilo for the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine don't even have a sub

 

[pmaitra]

Neocon Blowhard Admits the Obvious: Putin Won in Ukraine
Note to neocons: we told you this would happen - you should start reading Russia Insider

Marvin Kalb | (The Washington Post) | Russia Insider

Marvin Kalb is a typical old-school neocon media tool, a kind of American media establishment dinosaur. Ignore all the inuendo like “Putin's war”, and democracy-spreading boilerplate. What is interesting about this is article is that even people like Kalb are admitting they seriously miscalculated.

This article originally appeared at The Washington Post

The war in Ukraine has slipped off the front pages. Eighteen months ago, when Russian President Vladimir Putin seized Crimea and then instigated a pro-Russian rebellion in the Donbas region, Ukraine was hot news. Putin was roundly denounced, and Russia was hit with damaging economic sanctions. East-West relations soured badly, and diplomats wondered whether they were witnessing the beginnings of another cold war.

Now Ukraine, as a European crisis, has lost its urgency. One reason is the rush of other news, from global economic jitters and the flood of desperate Arab and African migrants to Europe to the preoccupying nuttiness of the U.S. presidential campaign. But there is another equally important reason. Putin seems to have won his little war in Ukraine, and his Western critics watch from the sidelines, sputtering with helpless rage.

Roughly a year ago, Putin faced one of the biggest decisions of his presidency: whether to strike a compromise deal with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko or openly commit his troops and tanks to the war. Much to the surprise of many observers, the Ukrainian army and militias seemed a battle away from defeating Putin’s rebels. Putin, facing defeat, doubled-down and ordered his forces to cross the border and turn back the Ukrainian advance. He clearly wanted to prove to Poroshenko and his Western backers that in a war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would win.

Within a few weeks, Putin and Poroshenko reached agreement on a rickety cease-fire, which predictably did not hold. Early this year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed to negotiate another cease-fire, but she knew, as did President Obama, that it depended in large part on whether Poroshenko and his Kiev colleagues would extend recognition (a form of legitimacy) to rebel leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk and grant them autonomous status within Ukraine. This was and remains a bitter pill for Poroshenko to swallow. He faces violent opposition from right-wing extremists, and he runs a fragile country in serious economic and political trouble. More important, perhaps, he knows by now that neither Germany nor the United States will fight for Ukraine. Yes, they will offer warm words of support, modest financial and military assistance, of course — but apparently little more.

In this environment of caution and retreat, Putin has, slowly but surely, “frozen” the conflict, much as he did in 2008 in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Far more than Western leaders, Putin can now influence and, when necessary, control the flow of economic, political and diplomatic developments in Ukraine.

For this “victory,” Putin has had to pay a heavy price. His economy has floundered, his reputation has suffered and Russia has experienced a return to domestic disorder and discontent that is real, even spreading. But as yet this has not had any discernible effect on his position within Russia. He seems perfectly capable of retaining his almost dictatorial grip on political power.

I sometimes dream an impossible dream — that somehow we could magically transport Ukraine into Western Europe, where it would prosper as a Western democracy with a vibrant economy. It deserves such a future. But we cannot. Ukraine will always share a common border with Russia in much the same way that it shares a common culture, language and religion with Russia. For most of its existence, Ukraine has been a part of Russia, separating itself as an independent nation only in 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Ukraine lives uncomfortably in Russia’s “near abroad,” its backyard, its “sphere of influence.” Whether we like it or not, Russia is the dominant power in Eastern Europe, and no solution to the current crisis can realistically emerge unless and until Russia and Ukraine work out an acceptable modus vivendi between them.

Putin’s attitude toward Ukraine is similar to that of other Russian leaders. He is not breaking new ground. His definition of nirvana is a Slavic confederation consisting of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine — all, as he puts it, “historically Russian land.” Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, he labels “the mother of all Russian cities,” and he speaks of the “aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia . . . of ancient Rus,” as Russia and Ukraine bound together by a common history of more than a thousand years.

Putin can tolerate an independent Ukraine so long as it is “friendly” to Russian national interests, and, as any good despot, he trusts only himself to define this friendship. Down the road, he has hinted that he would like to convene a Yalta-type conference, at which he and other world leaders would redraw the map of post-1991 Europe. It’s not a very likely possibility, but Putin thinks he has time. He has Ukraine squirming in the palm of his hand, and he sees his Western adversaries as weak, divided, corrupt and, maybe, in this circumstance, ready to strike a deal to his liking.

 

[pmaitra]

A Top Russian Pundit: Integrate Donbass and Gain 3.5 Million Russians
Since Donbass residents want to become part of Russia and are culturally, and often ethnically, Russian many Russians don't see a reason why they wouldn't be let in

Rostislav Ishchenko | (Russkaya Vesna) | Russia Insider



This article originally appeared at Russkaya Vesna. Translated by N_V at The Vineyard of the Saker

The Russian state was built as multinational since the days of ancient (pre-Mongol) Rus. However, with the total equality of peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of modern Russia, state-forming was the triune Russian nation (composed of the Great Russians, Malorussians, a.k.a. Ukrainians, and Belarusians).

Now the territory inhabited by Malorussians and Belarusians have disconnected from the main body of Russian territories. Local elites, having gotten their hands on the newly emerged states, started the formation of the respective nations and even achieved some success in this effort.

However, a considerable number of Belarusians and Ukrainians do not want to become Litvin (the historic term applied to the population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania regardless of the ethnicity – translator’s note) or Ukrainians, but still maintain their Russian identity. Besides, on the territory of modern Ukraine have lived and still live millions of Russians exposed to forced Ukrainization.

On the other hand, the percentage of the Russian population in Russia itself has been steadily declining. While this reduction is not critical, in twenty years the issue of ethnic character, religion and cultural traditions of the Russian state might turn out to be no longer trivial. And we are not talking about changing identity of state-forming people, as, for example, in 988 when the pagan Rus became Orthodox. The threat is that the state-forming people may become a minority in their own state.

And it already threatens both the stability and the very existence of the Russian Federation. There are two problems:

1. While the state-forming people become a minority, the state for a long time, by inertia, relies on their culture and traditions. It evokes the feeling of injustice among representatives of other nations.

There is a logical question: “If we are the majority, and we live on our own land, why do we have to follow other people’s tradition?” By the way, this contradiction has made irreparable rift between western and eastern Ukraine. At the time, as the minority population of Galicians tried to impose on the whole Ukraine Galician culture, history and tradition, Russian people of the south-east and the Malorussians of the central Ukraine could not understand why, while they make up the majority of the population, they should obey the traditions of strangers, just because suddenly the province of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union has become a Ukrainian state, as a result of some terrible geopolitical mistakes.

At a time when the non-Russian and non-Orthodox peoples would make up a clear majority of the population of the Russian Federation, they would absolutely objectively perceive the situation as it is perceived by Russians in Ukraine. Naturally, Russians will be outraged by the fact that representatives of the people, for whom the Russian state for centuries was a safe haven, protecting them from extinction or assimilation, claim the right to change the cultural code of the State according to their will. The reason for the mutual insults and devastating internal conflict is ready. And each side will be convinced it is right.

2. I have already had occasions to write that only Russia was able to create an imperial state based not on suppression of small nations and their assimilation, but on their convergence or integration into the common space where all live comfortably. But it was the overwhelming majority of the Russian people in the Russian state that guaranteed such ethnic idyll.

It is enough to look around the former lands of the Russian Empire, separated from the Soviet Union, to see what happens to those territories where the Russian people are losing state-status. Remember the civil and interstate war in the Caucasus. Civil war in Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine, Tajikistan (relatively hushed), civil conflict in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Endangered Baltic ethnocracy.

Only Kazakhstan and Belarus, which preserve and develop the strongest integration ties with Russia, thus avoided major trouble. Now, with all the difficulties and problems, despite incompleteness and imperfection of the post-Soviet system of power in Russia, the Russian people by default regarded as the arbiter and guarantor of the existing ethnic balance.

Meanwhile, in the XVII century, when the whole of Siberia up to the Pacific Ocean was already covered with towns and forts populated by Russian servicemen, indigenous people and tribes were fighting wars of all against everyone. Weak were driven out further north, the strongest fought their way south.

An example of the North Caucasian republics, the territories that are parts of the Russian Federation, shows convincingly how the critical reduction in the number of Russians (Russian population in Chechnya – 2%, in Ingushetia – 1% and in Dagestan – 4%) leads to the reappearance of the old and the emergence of new international, tribal and clan conflicts.

Thus, the numerical decline of the Russian people below the critical limit will lead to destabilization and destruction of the Russian Federation, contrary to the objective interests of all the peoples living in it. Many nations in this process could simply become extinct.

To understand the overall dynamics of the Russian population, let us recall the data from the relatively successful year of 2012. It was the third year of the population growth, which began in 2010. T

he lowest mark since 1985 was reached in 2009, when the population of the Russian Federation dropped to 141,903,979 people. In 2012, Russia had a population of 143,056,383 people (roughly a million more than in 2009). By 2013, Russia’s population has increased by almost 300 thousand people. Most of the growth was provided by a positive migration balance, but a miniscule (20,000) excess of births over deaths was also noted, that is, in 2012, Russia’s population for the first time has increased, and not only due to migration.

But where did these 20 thousand come from? The number of Russians decreased by 88 000 people, while the population of other nationalities has increased by 108 000 people. The negative balance of 196 thousand is not for the benefit of the Russian people.

Forecast of births until 2030 does not give grounds for optimism. The regions with the highest birth rate with a high probability will remain the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Tyva, Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the Nenets Autonomous District, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, and the Republic of Kalmykia. At the same time, the region with the lowest birth rate in 2030 will be: Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Voronezh, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov regions and the Republic of Mordovia.

So, in the next 15 years, we have very little chance to counteract the situation with a gradual decrease in the number of Russians in Russia solely due to the natural population growth. Meanwhile, only from 1989 to 2010, the Russian population lost 8 million. Also we can deduct another 2 million Ukrainians (i.e., actually, the same Russian).

However, the population is changing not only due to the natural growth, but also due to migration flows, as well as by the addition of new territories. For example, over the same period (1989 to 2010) the number of Uzbeks in Russia doubled, and the number of Tajiks increased 1.5-fold . This change was achieved by migration.

At the same time, along with the Crimea, Russia received 1.9 million people. Of these, there are at least 300 thousand Tatars and 1.4 million Russians (Russian, Ukrainians, Belarussians). One extra million Russians – refugees from the Ukraine (from Donbass, as well as from central and southern regions). Of this number, approximately one fifth has already received Russian citizenship or is in the process of receiving it.

Thus, in just one year the country has received almost 2.5 million additional Russians. Moreover, the potential to fill the demographic losses from this source remains. With the worsening economic situation and increasing Nazi terror, the migration from the central and southern regions of Ukraine will intensify. Of course, not all who disagree with the policy of official Kiev are willing and able to go, but we can safely rely on another million of migrants.

However, it is much more profitable to take the Russian population with the territories. The number of Russian refugees from Ukraine is comparable to the number of Russians, who returned to Russia with Crimea. But what was needed in Crimea was just to change the documents and establish the government control, while refugees were left without livelihoods, and their care became a burden on the federal and local budgets, as well as volunteers collecting and delivering humanitarian aid. And many of refugees are still not settled.

In this connection, I wish to remind you about Donbass. At the beginning of 2014, about 7.5 million people lived in Donetsk and Lugansk regions. In contrast to Crimea, there was no significant Tatar community, that is, the number of Russians in Donbass exceeded the number of Russians in Crimea not only in absolute terms but also in the percentage of the population (if you include Ukrainians on paper).

In areas now controlled by DNR/LNR, the population was about 4.5 million people. During the year of war, many became refugees, but the estimated population of the republics even now stands at 3-3.5 millions, and counting the population from the districts of DNR/LNR currently occupied by Kiev it reaches 5 million.

For all intents and purposes, DNR/LNR are already rapidly integrating into Russia. The economy, the finances , the education system, police and administrative structures – all tied to the Russian Federation. Without this, the republics will simply not survive.

Also, there is no doubt that the population of the republics will be issued Russian passports in the near future. Otherwise, millions of people will remain without papers, but children will be born, people will marry, die, and, most importantly, cross the border to the Russian Federation. So, the problems that will be created by citizens of DNR/LNR without passports will overwhelm the problems potentially caused by the issue of Russian passports.

Kiev promises to launch a military operation to subdue Donbass, and Zakharchenko promises to liberate the territories of the republics occupied by Kiev. As you can see, the plans are the same. Poroshenko only needs to begin the military actions, and the territory (and the population) of DNR/LNR could increase dramatically.

Well, if the republics are economically, financially and administratively integrated into Russia, if they are inhabited by Russian citizens (after certification), all that is left is to hold a referendum, and the Russian population in Russia will increase by 3.5-5 millions.

Together with Crimea and the refugees, it will fully compensate for the loss of eight millionth Russians in the period between 1989-2010 years, and the total population of Russia will increase to 150 million people (one and a half million more than it was at the peak of growth in 1995).

The population of Donbass will have a future (without having to leave their homes), and Russia will receive a few million additional Russian Orthodox citizens.

 

[pmaitra]

1948 CIA Report: Don't Try to Separate Ukraine From Russia - It Wont Work
Remarkably prescient analysis. The reasons given are as true today as they were then, even more so

Kristina Rus | (Fort Russ) | Russia Insider

This article originally appeared at Fort Russ

Source: NSC 20/1, section 4: “US objectives with respect to Russia”

US National Security Council, August 18, 1948

…The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent state.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Its very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is true that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of.

While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire,
they have shown no signs of being a “nation” capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition.

• The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept.
• In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities.
• There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one.
• The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish.
• The real basis of “Ukrainianism” is the feeling of “difference” produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts.
• The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.
• The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole.
• There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population.
• To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- if any real border can be drawn in the Ukraine , it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot be indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force.

There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not otherwise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence.

With respect to the Ukrainians, things are different. They are too close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different. For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians. It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part. It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright.

To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side.

If it were to maintain itself successfully, that would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine does have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status.

Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediately affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities.

It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time.

However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question.

On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.​

 

[pmaitra]

Ukraine Has Lost Taste for Futile War
The mood in the country has changed and there is chance for real peace now

Mary Dejevsky | (The Independent) | Russia Insider


Not fun

Originally appeared in The Independent

A peculiarity of the stand-off between the West and Russia over Ukraine has been the extent to which so much else has remained the same. The status quo trundled on. Opportunities for sabotage were passed up by both sides, but most conspicuously by Russia.

Moscow did not halt the vital transit support it gave to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It continued as the sole provider of transport to the International Space Station. It did nothing to thwart the nuclear talks with Iran. Nor did the Kremlin markedly alter its stance on Syria; it still believes that it would be irresponsible to cut President Bashar al-Assad off precipitately while there is no day-after scenario and jihadism remains a threat. All the firepower (real, and rhetorical) was trained on Ukraine and its eastern regions – the last battleground, potentially, between Russia and the West.

In Kiev, after the revolutionary euphoria faded, the choice seemed an unenviable one between bad and worse: the former a “frozen conflict” in the east, designed by Russia to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty; the latter, the Russian capture of more Ukrainian territory. A new Russian offensive had been confidently forecast for the summer.

So when I set off for Kiev last week it was with a certain foreboding. It had been a year since I last set foot in the Ukrainian capital, a year that had brought the West to the very brink of war with Russia and called into question Ukraine’s viability as a state. I was pleasantly surprised.

The brilliant autumn sunshine helped; but Kiev felt less backward-looking than it did 12 months ago. Then, the city was still gripped – understandably, but in a strangely macabre way – by the memory of those who died in the uprising that toppled Viktor Yanukovych. There were bizarre incongruities, such as the reality of a war being fought, street by street, in parts of the east, and toy combat helicopters being sold on the souvenir stalls of central Kiev.

This year the capital looked more settled, although it was barely a week since three soldiers were killed in a fracas outside Parliament over the devolution law being debated within. The city’s fabric looked better; there were more newer cars. Whole families flocked cheerfully to Cossack Day festivities, posing for photos with huge Cossack swords and costumed atamans, and buying candyfloss in Ukraine’s national colours. Any war seemed a long way away.

Could it be that many Ukrainians have accepted that not only Crimea is lost, but the Donbass, too? There were signs a year ago that there was little appetite to recover it by force of arms, at least among those young people who would have to do the fighting. But there was still fierce (albeit impotent) anger about Crimea. There were also totally unrealistic expectations about Western military help and Ukraine’s European future. Had its sacrifice not earned it fast-tracked EU membership?

A year on, the mood seems incomparably more realistic and less angry. There is concern, at many levels, that the West in general is losing interest – in part out of frustration that Ukraine’s institutional reform is too slow; in part because of the press of other concerns – refugees, Syria, Islamic State.

But perhaps being out of the international limelight has been beneficial, in helping to convince Ukrainians that, in the end, their fate lies primarily in their own hands. The US and the EU can provide – conditional – economic assistance and debt relief. They can supply templates for tax, judicial and regulatory reforms. And they can help to train and equip the country’s relatively small, and backward, armed forces.

From last year to this, acceptance seems to have settled that Kiev’s early expectations were hopelessly inflated. And the change sounded loud and clear at the conference of the annual Yalta European Strategy forum, which I attended.

The first difference was that few Ukrainian officials voiced any serious criticism of the Minsk-2 agreement. President Petro Poroshenko announced early in his speech that the previous night had been the first in the whole conflict with no shelling. The lull is seen as a chance to extend the ceasefire and fulfil the rest of the agreement, rather than another pretext for demonising Putin.

A second change was on the Western side, where even inveterate cold warriors – such as the ultra-hawkish former Nato secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and the US assistant secretary for European affairs, Victoria Nuland (the official overheard treating Ukrainian government appointments as if they were in the gift of the US and dismissing the EU with a profanity) – were singing a different song.

While insisting on Ukraine’s right to make its own choices of alliance, they were far less militant than before. Alluding to Russia, Nuland even corrected herself, replacing the word “aggression” with “pressure”, as though instructed not to jeopardise the fragile peace. Nato membership was almost universally ruled out. The overall impression was of a wiser West, but a wiser Ukraine – with a young, energetic and well-qualified team of ministers. It is a Ukraine that may finally have understood its eastern lands must be wooed, rather than bombed, back into a more devolved Ukraine.

The country’s prospects are excruciatingly finely balanced. Pervasive corruption remains barely tackled, despite a newly trained and equipped police force in major cities. Nor is it clear that the bright, young government can carry public opinion with it on such basics as new tax structures and higher fuel bills. And if it can’t, then Ukraine will all too easily sink back into the resigned cynicism that followed independence in the early 1990s, and the Orange Revolution in 2004. Its leaders may plead not to be forgotten, but a period for reflection outside the international spotlight could be exactly what Ukraine needs.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Commentary:

• Ukrainians have realized that they can’t go on blaming Russia for everything that happens to them, and that they are responsible for their well or ill being.
• They have understood that it is one thing to toss Molotov cocktails and jump to tunes of “European Values,” and quite another to sit in a slushy trench in harsh cold winters with just a couple of layers of tarpaulin separating the head from drizzling snowflakes with the sheer possibility of a hail of Grads landing there any moment.
• The potty mouthed cookie distributor has been brought down from her heat and is acting less of a harridan.
• The greatest realization is that no Ukrainian prosperity can be built on the graves of at least six thousand innocent non-combatants, who were indiscriminately slaughtered in Donbass.

 

[bhramos]

The Israeli mother who went to fight Nazism in Ukraine

By Alon Reznik. published on PZM Magazine (Israel), Sept 3, 2015. Original article here . Translation to English by Joshua Tartakovsky.

Thousands of innocents killed, East versus West, neo-Nazis against the Communists – the civil war in Ukraine is a bloody and tough battle scene, although it is almost unheard about from the media. One Israeli, a mother of two, became aware of the horrors taking place in the east of the country and decided to go and help the separatists in Ukraine. “How could I respond differently to the phenomenon of Nazism that is thriving here”?

“They arrested a civilian in one of their check points and cut off all his internal organs. I saw with my own eyes a fighter who returned from captivity with his nose cut off, an ear severed the tongue amputated, without one eye, and when he took off his clothes, when he undressed completely, his entire body had carvings of swastikas . These cases speak for themselves, even though the Israeli media does not talk about them.”


Inna Levitan

When one first hears these things, one can imagine that this was a testimony of someone returning from Iraq or Syria and saw the horrors of ISIS. But these difficult words were uttered by Inna Levitan, an Israeli citizen of the age of 37, a mother of two girls, who left everything behind and went to the front of the civil war in Ukraine. She joined the pro-Russian separatists, not to fight Ukraine but to combat the phenomenon of Nazism growing in the country. “I came to destroy fascism. Not Ukraine.”

From Tel Aviv to Ukraine

Until a year ago, Inna, a native of Azerbaijan, did not know what was going on between Russia and Ukraine. “I knew that something was happening there, as most Israelis,” she says. We are carrying out the conversation with her while she is in the East of Ukraine, at the heart of the conflict.

“One day, someone I knew very well told me that he is going to Ukraine. My immediate reaction was – ‘for what?’. He started to explain to me about the neo-Nazis there, but I did not listen to him so carefully. The man left and disappeared, although he promised to stay in touch every day. I decided to find out what’s going on there and searched online for information from both directions.”

The information Inna discovered online shook her to the core. She read about severe cases of abuse of innocents, of innocent citizens who were left without a shelter after their homes were bombed and entirely destroyed, of a difficult economic situation and of entire villages existing in primitive conditions, all following the aggressive actions of the Ukrainian army. As a result, she decided to pack a few of her belongings and get on a plane in an attempt to find the same friend. At first she arrived in Russia and was told that he was killed, but finally she went to the center of Ukraine and managed to locate him.

After two weeks, she returned to Israel with her heart restless. After a month and a half, she decided to return to Ukraine, this time to the east and for an unlimited period of time. “I wanted to see for myself what is really going on here. If everything said about the Nazis and their actions was indeed the truth”.

“I am unable to kill”

Inna joined a Communist brigade by the name of “Prizak” (Ghost), which fights in the eastern city of Lugansk and contains between 100 to 120 soldiers who are citizens of Ukraine, Russia and other countries. She says that they purchase by themselves the improvised uniforms in stores, unlike weapons and ammunition, whose origin she understandably refuses to disclose. “I’m not fighting with weapons, absolutely not. I am also unable to kill,” she said when recounting succinctly about her job in the front as a gatherer of intelligence.

“You have no idea in what conditions people live here here. Before I came I did not imagine that it was possible. It is a level where an old woman needs to calculate whether she can afford herself to buy sugar so she can have sweet tea, and finally comes to the conclusion that she has no such option,” she says when explaining the difficult conditions.”By the way, I gave to that woman whatever was left of my money, but we are not discussing here just one woman, it’s an entire nation.” Moreover, she also talks about the good people who surround her, her friends at the brigade: “many people were gathered here from many places in the world. Here no one regards your nationality or religion and every person accepts the other as he is. For example, they know I do not eat pork and try to get myself kosher food, as much as possible “.

If there is one thing which she is determined about, it is the claim about assistance of Russian military forces on the front – which she says has no connection to reality. “There’s no Russian army here. There are some people here, some of whom never served in a military, who do not accept that any financial consideration and they arrived there just the principle,” she explains.

In all the conversations with her, she reiterates and emphasizes that she did not go to fight against Ukraine but against fascism and Nazism. She tells of cases of horrific atrocities to which she exposed, which awaken the most difficult feelings: “I talked to a woman who told me about how she received the body of her 14 years old daughter in a wooden box, she was raped by a group of Nazis, underwent torture (it was clear from viewing the body) and after that her genitals were filled with foam of concrete. I do not know where this woman is now, I do not know if she is even alive, I just know that this was not an isolated incident. I heard a lot of things, also from people who are with me and who witnessed such cases.”

It should be noted that the evidence of similar horror stories, can be found in a wide range of horrific images running online.

Swastikas sponsored by the Ukrainian army

Nazism in the Ukrainian army, for example in the Aydar Battalion, is a familiar phenomenon. The same fighters wave Nazi flags and have swastikas tattooed on their bodies, and you can easily find an endless number of photos and videos of them making the Nazi salute. They are not concerned and do not even try to hide the fact that they are Nazis, which clearly signifies their burning hatred for the pro-Russian separatist communists, and the other way around. We shall note that in recent weeks, the Internet is full of disturbing news about the intensification of the phenomenon – we hear about neo-Nazi summer camps, and run into shocking videos as the one seen this week in which a little girl is making the Nazi salute and is holding an enormous knife.

However, even though they boast of being Nazis, those “Ukrainian patriots” do not hesitate to accept into their ranks Islamic militants – and even Israeli Jews. A year ago, the Israeli media exposed the story of a former Golani fighter, who was drafted to the same extreme right-wing brigade and did not even hide his identity. In the interview, he recounts the horrors committed actually by the Russian opponents, who rob, rape and murder civilians. He also described how his friends in the battalion respect him despite his identity and how they worship the Israeli army and wish to hear more about it. The combat background of the same Golani fighter – himself of Russian origin – is the reason he receives respect from these fighters and not due to their love of Israel. In the Ukrainian army, which takes on major hits in the battle with the separatists, there are also Arab Muslim fighters, and the Israeli soldier recounted in the same interview that they are also respected as they are. It would be interesting to see what kind of treatment they would have received if they were not wearing the Ukrainian uniform.

The Aidar battalion was recognized as part of the Ukrainian army only in August 2014, when its fighters received uniforms and more sophisticated equipment. Earlier, it was a volunteer unit composed of Ukrainian right-wing extremists who wanted to fight the Russian invasion of their country. The same patriotic battalion which was financed by one of the world’s richest people, who, it must be said, is a Jew, is accused by human rights organizations of committing violent war crimes. Despite this, when the same Russian-Israeli-Ukrainian individual heard accusations regarding this and regarding a severe violation of human rights, he explained that in a war, everything happens and that they, the extremist right-wing battalion, earned their good reputation because they are lethal.

The global media does not discuss too much, if at all, the horrors that Inna describes. These horrible crimes, unlike those committed by ISIS, are not done in front of the camera in order to create a PR effect, but quietly, apparently even in chilling spontaneity.

Inna recounts that only in the past several days did foreign journalists begin to enter the conflict zone, and a Russian channel even interviewed her by Skype. After the full interview was put on YouTube, she encountered Israelis online who responded with threats: “Just come back here, whore”, one of them wrote, while others sent her private messages and wanted to know where her daughters are located. “One of them wished me I will be left without a hand and a leg, and that I will live as a crippled person all my life,” she says.

“I also got a message where I was told that surely I must know that once I get back, they will break my arms and legs. With these people I lived for 25 years? It this the Israeli people?”

‘People here are very simple but with very different ideologies’

When delving deeply into what is taking place in Ukraine, one understands that at its core, the confrontation does not necessarily stem from a conflict over territory or due to national or ethnic differences, but also, and perhaps especially, it is an ideological war which hatred and racism only accompany it.

Alexei Marko (Dobri), one of the founders of Prizrk brigade which Inna joined, argues that the war is not even being waged between Russians and Ukrainians, as most of the world believes. “Many people think that the war here is being waged between Russia and Ukraine, but it is far from the truth. On both sides there are very simple people, but with very different ideologies. The war being waged here is between a Western pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist ideology and a Eastern pro-socialist and Communist ideology, even though there are Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Arabs, and even Armenians, Italians and Hispanics on both sides. ”

According to Inna, the goal is not to destroy, but to build. “I did not come here to kill. I believed that just as Israel was built from scratch at the time, it is possible to build here too a more fair state.”

You have two daughters at home. Are you not afraid that something may happen to you?“Some of my friends were killed, mostly by mines, but I do not even think about such things. I went through many crises in my life, ever since childhood, but I always had complete faith that everything will be alright in the end. Here too – I have within me the same faith.

I grew up and was raised in Israel. You tell me as an Israeli, after all, I’m sure you commemorate the Holocaust every year on Holocaust Day by standing when the siren is played, I stand, everyone stands, why did they educate us in this way? For beauty? How could I react differently to the phenomenon of Nazism that is thriving here?”

But beyond her iron principles, behind which she stands one hundred percent, very difficult personal concessions accompany the challenging step she took. Following her decision to leave for Ukraine, she basically lost almost everyone dear to her in Israel. “The most heavy price paid is the connection to my daughters. I lost contact with my family and friends. They do not understand and do not support me”.

Finally, Inna requested just one thing: “I will be more than happy if you manage to open people’s eyes. Then they will forget eating fast food and watching reality TV for a moment and begin to think for a moment for themselves.”

http://newcoldwar.org/the-israeli-mother-who-went-to-fight-nazism-in-ukraine/

 

[jouni]

1948 CIA Report: Don't Try to Separate Ukraine From Russia - It Wont Work
Remarkably prescient analysis. The reasons given are as true today as they were then, even more so

Kristina Rus | (Fort Russ) | Russia Insider

This article originally appeared at Fort Russ

Source: NSC 20/1, section 4: “US objectives with respect to Russia”

US National Security Council, August 18, 1948

…The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent state.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Its very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is true that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of.

While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire,
they have shown no signs of being a “nation” capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition.

• The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept.
• In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities.
• There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one.
• The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish.
• The real basis of “Ukrainianism” is the feeling of “difference” produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts.
• The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.
• The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole.
• There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population.
• To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- if any real border can be drawn in the Ukraine , it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot be indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force.

There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not otherwise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence.

With respect to the Ukrainians, things are different. They are too close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different. For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians. It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part. It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright.

To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side.

If it were to maintain itself successfully, that would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine does have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status.

Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediately affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities.

It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time.

However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question.

On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.​

I thought Ukraine has been independent for the last 25 years. There are no limits for you Russia fan boys disillusions.

 

[bhramos]

"Citizen of the European Union Benes Ajo talks about his war in the Donbass. Volunteer Benes Ajo, National-Bolshevik Latvian, who had studied in England, a microbiologist, a citizen of the European Union, talks about his war in the Donbas." I am an Army sergeant Luhansk People's Republic. He took part in the fighting in the winter near the village of Lugansk, in February about a week I was under Debalcevo, there I was attached to the mortar battery, "- said Benes Ajo." At this time, we fully comply with the Minsk agreement. We do not shoot guns more than 100 mm. The army is engaged exclusively with LC protection of our cities, if necessary, using a gun with a caliber up to 100 mm ", - said a volunteer from the European Union."

 

[bhramos]

LC youth ready to defend their city from those who try to destroy them

 

[pmaitra]

I thought Ukraine has been independent for the last 25 years. There are no limits for you Russia fan boys disillusions.

Ukraine has been financially dependent on Russia. De jure independent, but de facto, on a Russian life support. The so called "wealthy" G-7 nations cannot provide even one tenth of the support that Russia has been providing. Do read the article, and if you don't get it, then laissez faire.

Before calling me a fan boy, have you considered that you might be in a position aptly described by Radoslav Sikorsky in reference to Poland's relationship with the US?

Take it out of your gullet and breathe easy, bro.

 

[Akim]

Ukraine has been financially dependent on Russia. De jure independent, but de facto, on a Russian life support. The so called "wealthy" G-7 nations cannot provide even one tenth of the support that Russia has been providing. Do read the article, and if you don't get it, then laissez faire.

Before calling me a fan boy, have you considered that you might be in a position aptly described by Radoslav Sikorsky in reference to Poland's relationship with the US?

Take it out of your gullet and breathe easy, bro.

Diary of a madman. Before the war, exports to Russia accounted for 35%. This is certainly a lot, but it is not critical. Ukraine all these years economically distant from Russia. In the mid-90s, I even socks bought Russian production. The level of welfare changed dramatically. I can describe to you the level changes, but you are unlikely to understand.

 

[pmaitra]

Diary of a madman. Before the war, exports to Russia accounted for 35%. This is certainly a lot, but it is not critical. Ukraine all these years economically distant from Russia. In the mid-90s, I even socks bought Russian production. The level of welfare changed dramatically. I can describe to you the level changes, but you are unlikely to understand.

No, not critical, but you know, one thing leads to the other. Moreover, what about 1.5 million living and working in Russia? What about transit fees for Crimea, which thankfully, is now officially part of Russia. What about transit fees for gas via Bratsvo pipeline? I couldn't miss the irony there.

Yes, please describe the changes. I might or might not agree with you, but I guarantee that @jouni will. Then there is always @Cadian who can correct your information.

 

[Akim]

No, not critical, but you know, one thing leads to the other. Moreover, what about 1.5 million living and working in Russia? What about transit fees for Crimea, which thankfully, is now officially part of Russia. What about transit fees for gas via Bratsvo pipeline? I couldn't miss the irony there.

Yes, please describe the changes. I might or might not agree with you, but I guarantee that @jouni will. Then there is always @Cadian who can correct your information.

And the territory of Ukraine for natural gas wear buckets? All countries have the pipeline receive money from the transit.
To describe the quality of life? 'll try.
In the early 90s, after the collapse of the USSR, was on TV advertising, offering to buy detergent to wash greasy dishes in cold water. In the early 2000s, advertising has already offered to buy the boiler, before the war - already the dishwasher. In the mid-90s, the VCR was a rarity in the family, in the early 2000s - DVD-player was already almost at all, before the war IP-prefix was given for free.
The purchasing power of the typical family grew.