Adux
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Who is best in mountain warfare? India or China?
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pmaitra
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Should there be a conflict, it better be on the PRC side of the border. Targets should be civilian areas and military infrastructure. PLA and PLAAF might not hesitate to massively bomb out areas under Indian occupation, especially since the population is Tibetan. I could be wrong.
Should India, at the end of the conflict, or till the first ceasefire, hold more PRC territory than the other way around, we can indeed negotiate very well. It would be nice to get Aksai Chin back on the Western Himalayas. PLA should not be allowed to step anywhere close to the foothills in India. If that happens, it will be very easy for a massive PLA thrust that could cut off the NE. It will also be easy for PRC to, then, support the insurgents in NE.
Very murky scenario.
Should India, at the end of the conflict, or till the first ceasefire, hold more PRC territory than the other way around, we can indeed negotiate very well. It would be nice to get Aksai Chin back on the Western Himalayas. PLA should not be allowed to step anywhere close to the foothills in India. If that happens, it will be very easy for a massive PLA thrust that could cut off the NE. It will also be easy for PRC to, then, support the insurgents in NE.
Very murky scenario.
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Well, what is the scene as far our defenses go? Tshering says that AP is fortified. That means men and material are already on the ground. Now whats the strength and for how long can they hold before we are able to send reinforcements is a question those in the know can only answer.
pmaitra
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Never been to Arunachal, but looking at Google Maps, large parts of Arunachal are (1) roadless, (2) sparsely populated, (3) dense forests or craggy mountain ridges and passes.
The roads in Sikkim, when I went there several years ago, were pathetic. Don't know about them now. Even a Carl Gustav Shell on the hillside after heavy rains could trigger a landslide.
The roads in Sikkim, when I went there several years ago, were pathetic. Don't know about them now. Even a Carl Gustav Shell on the hillside after heavy rains could trigger a landslide.
Adux
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1. It is impossible for us to keep war time deployment including reserves on borders with war time support and materials. ITS IMPOSSIBLE. It is the same issue with the Chinese, but when the situation arises, they can move faster and move more in lesser time than us. Making our stationed troops under enormous pressure. All the while we gather speed to meet them. Several advantages might be lost by then.
Why should we even let them face such a situation, when we can do better.
Like the times article I posted, the window of Chinese attack will be in the next 10-15 years.
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If an Airborne Division is to be dropped to correct an adverse combat situation as a tactical asset, then maybe the appreciation of the Threat and conduct of battle is a bit odd.
What are the scenarios where an Airborne Division is dropped to correct an adverse battle situation, one wonders.
What are the scenarios where an Airborne Division is dropped to correct an adverse battle situation, one wonders.
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I am not surprised. With growing Indian stature, the needs of the military is increasing and within closed confines there could be talks of building up expeditionary capacity.
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Again you proved yourself to to be blind folded and dont want to hear anyone but yourself..
I never said anything you trying to portrait here, It easy to call other Fan boy before copy post his material here..
Your Knowledge is based on Media reports and your own assumptions..
Plane man idea is Google earth, I dont need for myself because i have been their and spend years, surviving..
Terrain and geography play a major role on Indian Side, 1967 and 87 proved that..
Ray Sir, too done telling you that..
Besides you have been avoiding the my questions..
1. What they are fielding against us, What is the strength of Indian size battalion force and Division.. ?
2. What type of doctrine PLA is following in TAR ?
3. How India operate its PARA units ?, And How in OPS falcon Indian troops were mobilized over Sikkim ?
Know these basics before even start acting like a Armed Chair General..
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Airhead.
An airhead is a designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, allows the air landing of further troops and material via an airbridge, and provides the manoeuvre and preparation space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. It may also be used as a staging or refuelling point for less permanent operations.
Typically, an airhead is established by helicopter-landed or paratrooper forces, and often will take place at an airport (to allow conventional transport to land later on) or at a helicopter or glider-accessible area.
Notable airhead operations include Battle of Crete and Operation Market Garden during World War II, and Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989. Operation Castor was intended to establish an offensive airhead, but quickly degenerated into the Siege of Dien Bien Phu.
Wiki
An airhead is a designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, allows the air landing of further troops and material via an airbridge, and provides the manoeuvre and preparation space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. It may also be used as a staging or refuelling point for less permanent operations.
Typically, an airhead is established by helicopter-landed or paratrooper forces, and often will take place at an airport (to allow conventional transport to land later on) or at a helicopter or glider-accessible area.
Notable airhead operations include Battle of Crete and Operation Market Garden during World War II, and Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989. Operation Castor was intended to establish an offensive airhead, but quickly degenerated into the Siege of Dien Bien Phu.
Wiki
Adux
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I am very very surprised, this akin to increasing the fighter squadron by 300 numbers above the sanctioned strength, we just upped the ante. China has been found wanting to do something about it. We have taken one of the best decision in going for something that is in Production, and can come online in the smallest amount.
What we have achieved is an airbridge, in our own territory to offset our own logistical weakness. By 2015, We will have 33 Strategic airlifters and multiple airfields in North East providing something the roads should have! Logistics. Indian Army and Air Force has decided, it doesnt matter what the conditions of the roads are and when they are going to come. We will defend it. This is the Indian air bridge.
We really should be looking at what our airlifters can provide in 2016-2017, I expect an availability of 80% for the C-17's and 50% for the IL-76
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Airborne Operations
Delivering small, highly trained military units behind enemy lines has been an essential tool of warfare since the gates of Troy were thrown wide to drag in an odd wooden horse left by departing Greek warriors. Airdrop is the employment and resupply of forces through the aerial delivery of troops and equipment without landing the aircraft. Formation operations are essential for adhering to the principles of mass and security. The airdrop capability directly supports the JCS requirement for an immediate response capability to deploy airborne forces throughout the world. This is the basis for maintaining strategic airdrop capabilities. While airland is the preferred method of deploying forces, the capability to airdrop troops and equipment is a crucial capability that remains an integral part of Army doctrine.
Since World War II, paratroopers have continually distinguished themselves in battle, earning 69 Congressional Medals of Honor and hundreds of other awards for valor. Beginning with the first combat jump by the men of the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, over North Africa in November 1942, by one count by the year 2001 airborne and special operations soldiers had made a total of 93 combat jumps [this number must surely include a large number of jumps involving very small numbers of jumpers]. By another count, the March 2003 jump of the the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 44th combat jump in US history [this number is much closer to the reported number of large jumps].
In any event, only seven jumps were conducted following the end of World War II, and the airborne operationa in Panama in 1989 were the only instance since 1951 of Brigade-sized operations. Two brigade airdrops were conducted with good results during the Korean War, and there were three battlion-sized airdrops in Vietnam. In 1983 a Ranger battalion conducted a combat aidrop into Grenada, and in 1989 two Ranger battalions conducted combat airdrops into Panama. On 20 December 1989 the three battalions of the Division Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted a combat airdrop into Panama, the first 82nd combat jump since Operation MARKET-GARDEN in September 1944. Brigade-sized airdrops were planned for the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Haiti in 1994, but in both cases the airdrops were cancelled shortly before they were scheduled to begin. A Ranger battalion conducted a combat jump in October 2001 in southern Afghanistan. Parachute operations by smaller units are far more common, but almost impossible to document, particularly since most are clandestine Special Operations activities.
The 26 March 2003 jump by the 173rd Airborne Brigade into Northern Iraq was advertised as "the largest airborne assault since D-Day" but that was manifestly untrue. Operation MARKET, which followed D-Day, was larger than the Normandy assault, and operations in Korea and Panama were larger than the 2003 airdrop. In early 2004 the 26 March 2003 jump was classified as a combat jump, even though the Kurdish controlled drop zone was in friendly hands and little resistance was anticipated.
Direct delivery, involves airlifting personnel and materiel from ports of embarkation (POEs) to forward operating locations in the theater, bypassing intermediary operating bases and the transshipment of payloads typically associated with hub and spoke operations. Direct delivery uses airland or airdrop delivery methods. For example, personnel can be airlifted from CONUS and delivered directly to the theater by airlanding them at a forward operating location or airdropping them as part of a strategic brigade airdrop operation. Direct delivery shortens in-transit time, reduces congestion at main operating bases, and enhances the sustainment of forward bases. One challenge for aircrews conducting direct delivery is obtaining up-to-date information during the lengthy flight.
Combat employment missions allow a commander to insert surface forces directly and quickly into battle and to sustain combat operations. For example, combat missions may involve airdropping paratroopers behind adversary lines. Combat sustainment missions may consist of reinforcement of front-line forces engaged with the adversary. Airlift affords commanders a high degree of combat maneuverability permitting adversary troop strongholds to be bypassed. This provides to friendly forces a potent offensive advantage, complicating the adversary's defensive preparations. The combat employment and sustainment mission usually accounts for a small percentage of total airlift sorties; nevertheless, its importance is far greater than the number of sorties indicates. This is a capability which, in most circumstances, cannot be accomplished by other means.
While this mission provides significant capabilities, it also carries substantial risk. Success in combat and combat support hinges on air superiority and threat avoidance. This requires accurate and timely intelligence regarding threats along the ingress and egress routes and over the target area. Once delivered to the target area, the inserted force may be totally dependent upon subsequent airlift operations for sustainment, movement, withdrawal, or redeployment.
The commander and planners must recognize the limitations of airborne forces and plan accordingly. An airborne force depends on USAF aircraft for long-range movement, fire support, and CSS. The availability and type of aircraft dictates the scope and duration of airborne operations. Airborne forces are vulnerable to enemy attack while en route to the DZ. Although the USAF can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large operations require neutralization or suppression of enemy air defenses. This may require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft in addition to transport and CAS sorties. After the initial airdrop, the sustained combat power of airborne forces depends on resupply by air. Any interruption in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a potential weakening of the airborne force. Enemy air defense fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and mortar fires on the DZ can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical supplies. Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on the number and type of vehicles and helicopters that can be brought into the objective area.
Another important aspect of combat employment and sustainment is the concept of forcible entry. In performing this mission, airlift forces are usually matched with airborne, air assault, light infantry, or ranger forces specifically designed for delivery by air. This mission normally involves the insertion of airborne forces via airdrop; however, carefully planned airland assault operations can be equally effective. An example of intertheater forcible entry operations is the strategic brigade airdrop capability that the Air Force provides for the Army. This gives the President and Secretary of Defense a unique military force projection capability.
Airborne forces execute parachute assaults to destroy the enemy and to seize and hold important objectives until linkup is accomplished. The parachute assault enhances the basic infantry combat mission: to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver, to destroy or capture him, and to repel his assaults by fire, close combat, and counterattack.
Missions for airborne forces can be strategic, operational, or tactical.
Strategic missions. Simply alerting airborne forces for employment is a show of force that is politically significant in a strategic context. Airborne forces have strategic mobility. They can move from distant bases to strike at important targets deep in enemy-held territory with little warning. Strategic missions may require airborne forces to seize an airhead from which follow-on ground or air operations can be launched. Operation Just Cause was a strategic mission.
Operational missions. Airborne forces can be employed anywhere in the theater of war. They attack deep to achieve operational-level objectives. For example, the seizure of objectives, such as airfields, bridges, or other key terrain deep in the enemy's rear area, is an operational mission. This is linked to the operational-level commander's concept and simplifies his accomplishment of assigned tasks. These airborne operations are usually short and require a linkup with other friendly forces or extraction of the airborne force. Operation Market Garden in the fall of 1944 is a good example of an operational mission.
Tactical missions. Airborne forces assault in the rear or to the flank of the enemy, preferably where few fixed defenses exist and where well-organized enemy combat units are not initially present. Airborne units either assault their objectives and move to link up with friendly forces, or seize an objective and hold for the arrival of other friendly ground forces. They can also be used for rapid reinforcement of friendly ground units.
Since a stated goal of Focused Logistics is reducing the footprint of combat service support in a theater, aerial resupply must be considered as a critical requirement to support this process. This is especially true in operations such as Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, when GLOCs were either lacking or insecure. The Air Force is concerned, as it should be, with the efficient use of its resources, while the Army is concerned, as it should be, with accomplishing its mission.
Currently, airdrop is considered an option of last resort. Future airdrop systems, however, will allow for delivery of cargo and supplies with increased accuracy while protecting the delivery system. The commander on the ground is concerned with receiving resupply when it is needed. If predictability is gained through airdrop, then the commander can accept this method. One of the greatest advantages of airdrop is its availability when aircraft cannot land because of weather, conditions of the landing area, or enemy threat.
However, there are five disadvantages with airdrop. First, and probably the largest concern, is the condition in which the cargo and supplies will land. Next, the cargo may not arrive at the desired location because of many possible variables, including enemy interdiction, a parachute malfunction, or a possible disruption or malfunction of the GPS signal. For example, US forces destroyed six Iraqi devices designed to jam signals from the GPS satellite navigation and weapon-guidance system. Third, retrograde of unserviceables is not possible. Fourth, the amount of cargo that can be delivered is reduced because of the configuration required to prepare the load to be dropped. And finally, the items must be dropped well in advance to allow support personnel to retrieve and deliver the cargo to the customer at the required date and time.
The other option available to deliver cargo and supplies on the battlefield is airland. Airland relates to delivery of supplies by either rotary wing or fixed wing which requires a semi-improved airfield. The advantages of airland are that it is accurate, the cargo has a higher probability that it will arrive at its destination in a serviceable condition, more cargo can be delivered, and unserviceables can be retrograded. The disadvantages are that the aircraft is more prone to enemy threat and may not be able to land because of airfield conditions or weather.
Airborne Operations
Delivering small, highly trained military units behind enemy lines has been an essential tool of warfare since the gates of Troy were thrown wide to drag in an odd wooden horse left by departing Greek warriors. Airdrop is the employment and resupply of forces through the aerial delivery of troops and equipment without landing the aircraft. Formation operations are essential for adhering to the principles of mass and security. The airdrop capability directly supports the JCS requirement for an immediate response capability to deploy airborne forces throughout the world. This is the basis for maintaining strategic airdrop capabilities. While airland is the preferred method of deploying forces, the capability to airdrop troops and equipment is a crucial capability that remains an integral part of Army doctrine.
Since World War II, paratroopers have continually distinguished themselves in battle, earning 69 Congressional Medals of Honor and hundreds of other awards for valor. Beginning with the first combat jump by the men of the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, over North Africa in November 1942, by one count by the year 2001 airborne and special operations soldiers had made a total of 93 combat jumps [this number must surely include a large number of jumps involving very small numbers of jumpers]. By another count, the March 2003 jump of the the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 44th combat jump in US history [this number is much closer to the reported number of large jumps].
In any event, only seven jumps were conducted following the end of World War II, and the airborne operationa in Panama in 1989 were the only instance since 1951 of Brigade-sized operations. Two brigade airdrops were conducted with good results during the Korean War, and there were three battlion-sized airdrops in Vietnam. In 1983 a Ranger battalion conducted a combat aidrop into Grenada, and in 1989 two Ranger battalions conducted combat airdrops into Panama. On 20 December 1989 the three battalions of the Division Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted a combat airdrop into Panama, the first 82nd combat jump since Operation MARKET-GARDEN in September 1944. Brigade-sized airdrops were planned for the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Haiti in 1994, but in both cases the airdrops were cancelled shortly before they were scheduled to begin. A Ranger battalion conducted a combat jump in October 2001 in southern Afghanistan. Parachute operations by smaller units are far more common, but almost impossible to document, particularly since most are clandestine Special Operations activities.
The 26 March 2003 jump by the 173rd Airborne Brigade into Northern Iraq was advertised as "the largest airborne assault since D-Day" but that was manifestly untrue. Operation MARKET, which followed D-Day, was larger than the Normandy assault, and operations in Korea and Panama were larger than the 2003 airdrop. In early 2004 the 26 March 2003 jump was classified as a combat jump, even though the Kurdish controlled drop zone was in friendly hands and little resistance was anticipated.
Direct delivery, involves airlifting personnel and materiel from ports of embarkation (POEs) to forward operating locations in the theater, bypassing intermediary operating bases and the transshipment of payloads typically associated with hub and spoke operations. Direct delivery uses airland or airdrop delivery methods. For example, personnel can be airlifted from CONUS and delivered directly to the theater by airlanding them at a forward operating location or airdropping them as part of a strategic brigade airdrop operation. Direct delivery shortens in-transit time, reduces congestion at main operating bases, and enhances the sustainment of forward bases. One challenge for aircrews conducting direct delivery is obtaining up-to-date information during the lengthy flight.
Combat employment missions allow a commander to insert surface forces directly and quickly into battle and to sustain combat operations. For example, combat missions may involve airdropping paratroopers behind adversary lines. Combat sustainment missions may consist of reinforcement of front-line forces engaged with the adversary. Airlift affords commanders a high degree of combat maneuverability permitting adversary troop strongholds to be bypassed. This provides to friendly forces a potent offensive advantage, complicating the adversary's defensive preparations. The combat employment and sustainment mission usually accounts for a small percentage of total airlift sorties; nevertheless, its importance is far greater than the number of sorties indicates. This is a capability which, in most circumstances, cannot be accomplished by other means.
While this mission provides significant capabilities, it also carries substantial risk. Success in combat and combat support hinges on air superiority and threat avoidance. This requires accurate and timely intelligence regarding threats along the ingress and egress routes and over the target area. Once delivered to the target area, the inserted force may be totally dependent upon subsequent airlift operations for sustainment, movement, withdrawal, or redeployment.
The commander and planners must recognize the limitations of airborne forces and plan accordingly. An airborne force depends on USAF aircraft for long-range movement, fire support, and CSS. The availability and type of aircraft dictates the scope and duration of airborne operations. Airborne forces are vulnerable to enemy attack while en route to the DZ. Although the USAF can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large operations require neutralization or suppression of enemy air defenses. This may require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft in addition to transport and CAS sorties. After the initial airdrop, the sustained combat power of airborne forces depends on resupply by air. Any interruption in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a potential weakening of the airborne force. Enemy air defense fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and mortar fires on the DZ can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical supplies. Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on the number and type of vehicles and helicopters that can be brought into the objective area.
Another important aspect of combat employment and sustainment is the concept of forcible entry. In performing this mission, airlift forces are usually matched with airborne, air assault, light infantry, or ranger forces specifically designed for delivery by air. This mission normally involves the insertion of airborne forces via airdrop; however, carefully planned airland assault operations can be equally effective. An example of intertheater forcible entry operations is the strategic brigade airdrop capability that the Air Force provides for the Army. This gives the President and Secretary of Defense a unique military force projection capability.
Airborne forces execute parachute assaults to destroy the enemy and to seize and hold important objectives until linkup is accomplished. The parachute assault enhances the basic infantry combat mission: to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver, to destroy or capture him, and to repel his assaults by fire, close combat, and counterattack.
Missions for airborne forces can be strategic, operational, or tactical.
Strategic missions. Simply alerting airborne forces for employment is a show of force that is politically significant in a strategic context. Airborne forces have strategic mobility. They can move from distant bases to strike at important targets deep in enemy-held territory with little warning. Strategic missions may require airborne forces to seize an airhead from which follow-on ground or air operations can be launched. Operation Just Cause was a strategic mission.
Operational missions. Airborne forces can be employed anywhere in the theater of war. They attack deep to achieve operational-level objectives. For example, the seizure of objectives, such as airfields, bridges, or other key terrain deep in the enemy's rear area, is an operational mission. This is linked to the operational-level commander's concept and simplifies his accomplishment of assigned tasks. These airborne operations are usually short and require a linkup with other friendly forces or extraction of the airborne force. Operation Market Garden in the fall of 1944 is a good example of an operational mission.
Tactical missions. Airborne forces assault in the rear or to the flank of the enemy, preferably where few fixed defenses exist and where well-organized enemy combat units are not initially present. Airborne units either assault their objectives and move to link up with friendly forces, or seize an objective and hold for the arrival of other friendly ground forces. They can also be used for rapid reinforcement of friendly ground units.
Since a stated goal of Focused Logistics is reducing the footprint of combat service support in a theater, aerial resupply must be considered as a critical requirement to support this process. This is especially true in operations such as Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, when GLOCs were either lacking or insecure. The Air Force is concerned, as it should be, with the efficient use of its resources, while the Army is concerned, as it should be, with accomplishing its mission.
Currently, airdrop is considered an option of last resort. Future airdrop systems, however, will allow for delivery of cargo and supplies with increased accuracy while protecting the delivery system. The commander on the ground is concerned with receiving resupply when it is needed. If predictability is gained through airdrop, then the commander can accept this method. One of the greatest advantages of airdrop is its availability when aircraft cannot land because of weather, conditions of the landing area, or enemy threat.
However, there are five disadvantages with airdrop. First, and probably the largest concern, is the condition in which the cargo and supplies will land. Next, the cargo may not arrive at the desired location because of many possible variables, including enemy interdiction, a parachute malfunction, or a possible disruption or malfunction of the GPS signal. For example, US forces destroyed six Iraqi devices designed to jam signals from the GPS satellite navigation and weapon-guidance system. Third, retrograde of unserviceables is not possible. Fourth, the amount of cargo that can be delivered is reduced because of the configuration required to prepare the load to be dropped. And finally, the items must be dropped well in advance to allow support personnel to retrieve and deliver the cargo to the customer at the required date and time.
The other option available to deliver cargo and supplies on the battlefield is airland. Airland relates to delivery of supplies by either rotary wing or fixed wing which requires a semi-improved airfield. The advantages of airland are that it is accurate, the cargo has a higher probability that it will arrive at its destination in a serviceable condition, more cargo can be delivered, and unserviceables can be retrograded. The disadvantages are that the aircraft is more prone to enemy threat and may not be able to land because of airfield conditions or weather.
Airborne Operations
Adux
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If you think so, I rather listen and learn from the Brigadier, Rohitvas, vikasrehman, deltacamelately, planeman, D Roy, tsarkar, dbrewal, OeE. You are not one of them.
I have been the forum world for far too long, to know a fanboy when I see one. Regarding 'surviving', what are you Chuck Norris? Jungle Jack? People who usually know stuff, but talk like the above!
The difference is Kunal, today in the same amount of time, they can bring in exponentially more men and material, offsetting the terrain and our stationed troops.
Ray Sir, too done telling you that..
Besides you have been avoiding the my questions..
You have no clue other than the usual specs, numbers and other paintballer stuff, do you?
What their objective is, especially when we hold the territory claimed by them, is clear as daylight. So what do you think their doctrine is going to be? Defensive?
As good as that Operation was, in today scenario, that will be offset. You keep on forgetting today they have attained capability of mass troop movement. As soon as the situation get's tense, they will start to move, and before we know they will outnumber us 1 to 8. Add our severe logistical and geographical situation to this.
I rather learn, but not from a fan boy.
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pmaitra
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Adux,
You are one incorrigible moron who has no sense of decorum. You don't know how to talk to people. You like to yell but not listen. Your questions are usually answered, yet you keep asking the same question. Apparently, you have too much time to kill.
Get some help!
You are one incorrigible moron who has no sense of decorum. You don't know how to talk to people. You like to yell but not listen. Your questions are usually answered, yet you keep asking the same question. Apparently, you have too much time to kill.
Get some help!
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I am not supporting or opposing any views.
I am merely trying to explain the employment of Airborne forces and the limitations in mobilisation in generic terms as best as I can in an open forum and within the limitations of the brevity essential to be within the limitations of a post.
I am merely trying to explain the employment of Airborne forces and the limitations in mobilisation in generic terms as best as I can in an open forum and within the limitations of the brevity essential to be within the limitations of a post.
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Edited.
Please calm down.
This is not a psychology class or a class on sociology.
Please calm down.
This is not a psychology class or a class on sociology.
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Adux
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I am quite aware of that Brigadier, I am also aware that you are being dragged into post's of couple of members unnecessarily , It is quite simple, throwing your name around, gives them more weight age.
I am sure you understood, what I meant, and I thank you for your replies. In a situation where our logistics can be cut off by the chinese, Where will it be and by which of the Chinese forces. 15th Corps isnt a strategic force for nothing, is it. Airborne asset gives quite a bit movement options, with the pathetic set of infrastructure at our side, we need'em very badly. In a very defensive posture, which would imply Chinese would have already amassed in. We need them to move into our territory, while they help our own stationed troops, before the re-enforcement come.
Today we can at best, bring about a Brigade level asset. While China can lift a Division a day and has a Corps at their disposal.
Brigadier, How will it take for us to take train and raise a Airborne Corps
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China, if it come to a war with India, will also have many borders to neutralise.
Russia is not too happy with China taking its place or attempting to be a global power.
The US is in no way pro China, notwithstanding what one may feel. I believe they have entered the Vietnam oil exploration fray with their own attempt for oil exploration off Vietnam.
China has hegemonic aspirations and so it requires AB troops of the size that they have.
Russia is not too happy with China taking its place or attempting to be a global power.
The US is in no way pro China, notwithstanding what one may feel. I believe they have entered the Vietnam oil exploration fray with their own attempt for oil exploration off Vietnam.
China has hegemonic aspirations and so it requires AB troops of the size that they have.
