Who is best in mountain warfare? India or China?

[Adux]

Wait a min, what are we discussing here? An Indian Airborne op on our own territory in response to a Chinese op into ours or are we talking about an aggressive op by us into their territory?
If its tr former, then troops sizes would not matter I would imagine to the extent that we are the ones holding defensive lines and can round them up and convert tr plains of Assam if they come there into killing fields.

OTOH if we are talking about Indian troops going behind enemy lines then again the size of the troops compared to the Chinese (15th) does not matter as we will be inserting as many troops as we think are required for the job.

I think to understand this whole thing better, we will have to come up with perceived OPOBJ wrt to the Chinese for any op using their 15th. Till then we are all talking all over the place a d actually discussing nothing useful.

Likewise Indian OPOBJ for any op behind enemy lines and in which sectors.

According to new Indian doctrine, which came about after Ex.Sudarasan Chakra, where do you think Indian battlespace is going to be in the event of a attack from the Chinese, or our pre-emptive attack? That is the question! Lets calculate how much China can muster in 72 hours window, take the time frame as the next 5 years. How much can we muster in the same window or add another 24 hours to that? You can take every logistical route available, and can also include the already stationed troops.

Both of us , cannot afford to have massive troops on the border

 

[ALBY]

much is said about the para capability of both countries what about the size of mechanized infantry units or true armoured units which we could deploy in the initial days of war as a backbone of the counter offensive after holding and containing the PLA offensive?
How much strong is their AA capability across the border?did they had fielded any active missiles along the border?

 

[Iamanidiot]

Sir,A shock and Awe capmaign in 1962 gave us a bad jhappad

 

[Ray]

According to new Indian doctrine, which came about after Ex.Sudarasan Chakra, where do you think Indian battlespace is going to be in the event of a attack from the Chinese, or our pre-emptive attack? That is the question! Lets calculate how much China can muster in 72 hours window, take the time frame as the next 5 years. How much can we muster in the same window or add another 24 hours to that? You can take every logistical route available, and can also include the already stationed troops.

Both of us , cannot afford to have massive troops on the border

Where the the Chinese bases and posts in Tibet, the equipment and organisation that they will muster from hinterland China and how long will it take?

Take their air effort and the number of trains they can move per day to Lhasa.

Are you aware of their stocking profile of war materiel in Tibet and the turnaround time?

The reactions of nations on their periphery and what they will require at each front for deterrent value?

Add them up and you will be able to get a fair estimate.

Where exactly will the Chinese use their AB Div and can they lift it in one go to that intended place? Will there be no contest in the air to prevent it happening so? What is the staff estimate of success? An AB Div is not merely men, it means the logistic and reserve backup in men, materiel, guns, tanks, etc etc.

And at what phase of the campaign would the AB Div be used for optimum results?

 

[Adux]

Strategic assets, its size, organisation, reach and equipment is based on the Threat Perception.

You are one of the people who have been in the higher echelon of military decision making in the country, What is your thoughts on this.

It is not organised,equipped or employed for cosmetic 'Shock and Awe' or to give a 'feel good' feeling.

When you dont have adequate roads and need to deploy fast, and the route available is ONLY AERIAL. A larger airborne asset is imperative. We havent even reached what Gen.Sundarji envisioned, the threats have increased exponentially after his assessment.

One must understand what is the strategic reach one desires and based on that and the Threat Perception is it designed

Our greater design's as well as the PakChin nexus, which very well be a combined military force in the future, I think it is imperative to rethink and remodel our view of the present threat perception.

One may well argue as to why is the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force not similar to that of the US and hence they are no Navy or Air Force. The reason is obvious, we have no intention of having any expeditionary force aspirations.and it is organised and kitted to meet Indian's requirement and growing!

I think we are lying to ourselves here Brigadier, we don't have'em simply because we dont have the capacity to resource them,

 

[Iamanidiot]

Do China and India want to fight over a pile of rocks.The Chinese cannot afford war in short they have to rely more on intimidation skills than fighting skills

 

[Ray]

Sir,A shock and Awe capmaign in 1962 gave us a bad jhappad

Yes to the civilian population it was indeed a Shock and Awe.

To the military, it was a total unpreparedness in all ifs facets.

 

[Ray]

Do China and India want to fight over a pile of rocks.The Chinese cannot afford war in short they have to rely more on intimidation skills than fighting skills

You sound like Nehru!

He wondered if the Chinese incursion was worth the worry where 'not a blade of grass grows'!

But, yes, war is the last resort.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Where the the Chinese bases and posts in Tibet, the equipment and organisation that they will muster from hinterland China and how long will it take?

Take their air effort and the number of trains they can move per day to Lhasa.

Are you aware of their stocking profile of war materiel in Tibet and the turnaround time?

The reactions of nations on their periphery and what they will require at each front for deterrent value?

Add them up and you will be able to get a fair estimate.

Where exactly will the Chinese use their AB Div and can they lift it in one go to that intended place? Will there be no contest in the air to prevent it happening so? What is the staff estimate of success? An AB Div is not merely men, it means the logistic and reserve backup in men, materiel, guns, tanks, etc etc.

And at what phase of the campaign would the AB Div be used for optimum results?

Sir,For the War Zone Campaign the Chinese are going to define their point of engagement I think.That means they already have a good idea of their logistics and what sources they are going to allocate.I find the IA more reactionary in Engagement.

Now when it comes to Tawang they have to occupy territory which means WZC will go void as it doesn't envision occupation of territory

 

[Adux]

Where the the Chinese bases and how long will it take?

Brigadier,

The 15th Corps are able to deploy 11000 men, a division level asset, with all their bells and whistles in 24 hours. Do note, Chinese airlift capacity is woefully low, this might dramatically change around in 5 years time, if they are able to induct strategic air lifters, like we have been able to do with the C-17.

Take their air effort and the number of trains they can move per day to Lhasa.

50,000 troops through train in a 24 hour window.

Are you aware of their stocking profile of war materiel in Tibet and the turnaround time?

I dont have much info on this, I will look around.

In the Tibet Autonomous Region, China's high altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway that opened in 2006 is being used as a supply line to enhance PLAAF mobilization capability (People's Daily, 4 August 2010; PLA Daily, 3 August 2010; The Hindu, August 6, 2010). On August 3, 2010, PLA Daily reported that a train loaded with important air combat readiness material for the PLAAF arrived in Tibet via the railway. China is rapidly upgrading railways and airports in Tibet, with four operational airports and a fifth one under construction (South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No 3966, August 5, 2010; Defense Update, December 20, 2010). During the March 2008 Tibetan protests, the Qinghai Tibet rail enabled rapid PLA deployment. Within 48 hours, at the start of Lhasa riots, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets—apparently from the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Regional Command (UPI Asia Online, June 27, 2008). This was indicated by the "leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operation from the 149th Division (UPI Asia, June 27, 2008). Should Sino-Indian relations ever deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and if riots in Tibet spread, the PLA's Mountain Brigades can rapidly deploy to the region via the railway. Indeed, railway and road construction have been China's Himalayan strategy for decades—as the PLA prepared to annex Tibet, Mao Zedong advised it "to advance while building roads" (Asia Times Online, October 16, 2010).

The PLA's “Orient Express”: Militarization of the Iron Silk Road | Intelligence Quarterly

 

[Iamanidiot]

Everybody is forgetting this esp Adux ,the brigadier and Yusuf like it happened in 1987.Sir the PoK might try to open a front through Gilgit-Baltistan like in 1987 when they intended to do it

 

[pmaitra]

Questions to those that know better:

• How easy will it be to airdrop light or medium armour in Arunachal-Tibet border areas?
• What is the scenario of roads there? This seems to be a major concern for all of us.
• What is the geological condition of the Eastern Himalayas? Speaking from personal experience, I was stuck there (Sikkim HWY 31A) at a landslide following one night of rains.
• Why are we having a large number of helicopter crashes in that region? Is it the weather, fog, visibility?
• On the PRC side, there appears to be more population centres than on the Indian side. Will they be legitimate targets for siege/occupation by IA in case hostilities break out?

 

[Adux]

Yusuf,

Its not only about landing behind enemy lines. What is airborne asset

The basic premise of the Airborne is that they can arrive with such speed that a coherent defence cannot be mounted against them for some time. It is assumed that this tactical advantage cannot be sustained for very long, so effective Airborne missions require the rapid advance of ground based troops in support. Another problem regularly faced by Airborne troops, is that they are usually defenceless in transit and while they descend. However, it is rather difficult to hit a moving target, especially a paratrooper because their movements while descending will be erratic and not in a straight line.

Since we have acute logistical issues in North East. And we can, if we want to raise a Airborne Corps in 5 years time with our phenomenal airlift capacity of 17 IL-76 and 16 C-17. I think people are not aware of what has happened here, regarding our capacity to airlift. Is the IL-76 going to be retired 'within' the next 5-10 years? NO. So why are we increasing our airlift capacity by 100% (33 Strategic Airlifters from 17, may go upto 40) in the next 3-4 years? What is the logic behind it? Did we buy them to show gratitude to the Americans? Or do you think our Defense forces feel there is acute possibility of war within in the next 10 years on the Chinese front?
There is a reason for those C-17's, You can be damn well sure that in the end we will have around 40 C-17's. Now that we have the airlifters? Where are our troops and related equipment? What is happening for the ground support and logistics?

 

[Adux]

Everybody is forgetting this esp Adux ,the brigadier and Yusuf like it happened in 1987.Sir the PoK might try to open a front through Gilgit-Baltistan like in 1987 when they intended to do it

Hence the PakChin nexus comment. We have to be more swift footed than two very worth adversary's. That should be our primary capacity, to be swift and decisive. Which unfortunately is what we lack the most today.

 

[Adux]

We rather be fighting in on their side, than on our dis-advantaged geographical location.

 

[Adux]

Where exactly will the Chinese use their AB Div and can they lift it in one go to that intended place?

They can lift 11,000 with support of their force of 50,000 in 24 hours. The 15th is not a division rather a corps.

Will there be no contest in the air to prevent it happening so?

I would expect it to be, question is what if they are doing this on their side of the border before a single bullet is fired, and their idea is to amass troops in frightening levels in 72 hours.

What is the staff estimate of success?
An AB Div is not merely men, it means the logistic and reserve backup in men, materiel, guns, tanks, etc etc.

This where their advantage of being in the plains comes to play, and their Trains and better road network.

And at what phase of the campaign would the AB Div be used for optimum results?

You tell me Brigadier.



PS: They made the 15th Corps as a Strategic asset for a reason just like the 2nd artillery.

 

[Ray]

Brigadier,

The 15th Corps are able to deploy 11000 men, a division level asset, with all their bells and whistles in 24 hours. Do note, Chinese airlift capacity is woefully low, this might dramatically change around in 5 years time, if they are able to induct strategic air lifters, like we have been able to do with the C-17.

Take their air effort and the number of trains they can move per day to Lhasa.

50,000 troops through train in a 24 hour window.

your claim that the Chinese can move 50, 000 troops with their 'bells and whistles' in a 24 hour window.

Though commendable, may I ask a few questions?

1. How many trains can the Chinese move from Chengdu to Lhasa per day, taking that there will no civilian traffic?
2. It should be remembered that trains to Lhasa are not ordinary trains. They are pressurised. Even if the troops move in ordinary trains, they will not be operationally fit since they will be afflicted with High Altitude illness, which in turn, would mean a very large medical infrastructure at the Tibet end.
3. How many units can be moved per day? It maybe noted that combat support arms require more than one train and even the infantry finds it difficult to move in one train. The combat service support units of a Division require even more trains than two or three.
4. It should be noted that the empty rakes will have to return for the next lot to be lifted. It must be remembered that the Chinese do not have unlimited rakes capable of lifting 50,000 troops
5. If some of the troops are moved by road, imagine the number of troop transporter vehicles required and how many routes lead to Tibet?
6. What should be the logistic back up in situ for the troops and what would it be as the battle is joined and for the campaign?
7. Once battle is joined, will the Chinese have total command of the sky i.e. air superiority?
I could go on giving other issue, but we will leave it at that.

In the Tibet Autonomous Region, China's high altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway that opened in 2006 is being used as a supply line to enhance PLAAF mobilization capability (People's Daily, 4 August 2010; PLA Daily, 3 August 2010; The Hindu, August 6, 2010). On August 3, 2010, PLA Daily reported that a train loaded with important air combat readiness material for the PLAAF arrived in Tibet via the railway. China is rapidly upgrading railways and airports in Tibet, with four operational airports and a fifth one under construction (South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No 3966, August 5, 2010; Defense Update, December 20, 2010). During the March 2008 Tibetan protests, the Qinghai Tibet rail enabled rapid PLA deployment. Within 48 hours, at the start of Lhasa riots, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets—apparently from the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Regional Command (UPI Asia Online, June 27, 2008). This was indicated by the "leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operation from the 149th Division (UPI Asia, June 27, 2008). Should Sino-Indian relations ever deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and if riots in Tibet spread, the PLA's Mountain Brigades can rapidly deploy to the region via the railway. Indeed, railway and road construction have been China's Himalayan strategy for decades—as the PLA prepared to annex Tibet, Mao Zedong advised it "to advance while building roads" (Asia Times Online, October 16, 2010).

The PLA's "Orient Express": Militarization of the Iron Silk Road | Intelligence Quarterly

A riot and a war are two different things. There is no airspace control to be concerned about.

A war and a riot on at the same time is even more catastrophic!

Indeed the Chinese in situ Mountain Beigades can deploy and will deploy before the balloon goes up, but then mobilisation to fight a campaign are two different thing.

 

[Ray]

And at what phase of the campaign would the AB Div be used for optimum results?
You tell me Brigadier.

I am on the side of the argument that AB Div is not a magic wand!

And therefore I am not too fired up about the Chinese AB Div.

It is others who are drawing up scenarios.

 

[Yusuf]

I think the discussion is confusing for me at least.

First up, we are comparing chinese AB to indian one in terms of manpower. Why?

Second, we have defenses in the north east already. Any chinese airdrop will be met by our existing defense. The point to talk about here is is our defense that is already there adequate in terms of men, material and supply lines.

OTOH, talk about indian airlift capability comes into picture only if we talk about an offensive role for the AB of india. I dont know if we are planning in adventure in Tibet that would require our AB to be dropped in there

 

[Adux]

I think the discussion is confusing for me at least.

First up, we are comparing chinese AB to indian one in terms of manpower. Why?

Why did the Chinese back down in 67 and 87?

Second, we have defenses in the north east already. Any chinese airdrop will be met by our existing defense. The point to talk about here is is our defense that is already there adequate in terms of men, material and supply lines.

Will we fire the first bullet? China cant completely man the border, So they have to send in troops as a situation arises, same is our case. So who can do it faster?

OTOH, talk about indian airlift capability comes into picture only if we talk about an offensive role for the AB of india. I dont know if we are planning in adventure in Tibet that would require our AB to be dropped in there

That depends where we intend to fight, even when we are attacked.

Yusuf,

You are looking at airborne assets as something that will always by rule dropped behind enemy lines. Not necessarily, they are fastest deploy able asset in a military, when we lack logistics on the ground in our own country, that means a lot.