Sukhoi PAK FA

[Armand2REP]

India announced its participation on 29, Sept 2008, it is two years later and nothing is signed. The longer the wait, the less R&D India gets. WTH is MoD waiting for?

 

[SHASH2K2]

India announced its participation on 29, Sept 2008, it is two years later and nothing is signed. The longer the wait, the less R&D India gets. WTH is MoD waiting for?

A deal with equal partnership rather than a financer and developer one. When India is investing money we should get technical knowhow of the projects.

 

[Patriot]

The more work share the Indian agencies will get to work on FGFA development , it will be very helpful in the development of the new technology for AMCA project. When we are investing such a huge amount in the development, we should exploit the opportunity by negotiating larger role & involvement in the development. In addition, we must get access to all the development records ,flight testing data etc.

 

[Armand2REP]

A deal with equal partnership rather than a financer and developer one. When India is investing money we should get technical knowhow of the projects.

While India is haggling, Russia is developing without them missing key levels of R&D.

 

[SHASH2K2]

While India is haggling, Russia is developing without them missing key levels of R&D.

Its foolishness to invest money into a deal without knowing exactly what you will be getting in return. This delay is somewhat justified.

 

[Agnostic_Indian]

So for fgfa we will develop another pro type 90% based on t50. We will use our own weapons.an export to china is highly unlikely because china must be flying some 5th gen pro types by now, remember UFO stories from china. if export happens it will be a scaled down version of russian pak fa.

 

[Anshu Attri]

F-35 JSF: Can It Meet Canada's Needs?


http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-191010-1.html

The ongoing controversy in Canada over the bureaucratic decision to procure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in preference to conducting an open competition to select a replacement aircraft for Canada's fleet of obsolete and worn out CF-18A Hornets, bears careful scrutiny. The parallels between the bureaucratic behaviours observed in Canada surrounding the F-35, and like behaviours in the Canberra DoD bureaucracy, are remarkable. The mismatch between the F-35 and Canada's strategic needs is fundamentally no different from the mismatch between the F-35 and Australia's strategic needs. Both nations are gravitating into a black hole which will see their respective air forces emasculated and unable to perform their primary mission of protecting national airspace from foreign air forces1.

This also means the Australian Defence Force will not meet the strategic directives of successive Australian Defence White Papers, and will not achieve air superiority in the regional environment.

The F-35 is an aircraft which was defined as a battlefield interdictor, intended to attack and destroy hostile battlefield ground forces, once opposing air defences have been stripped away by the much more capable, and now cheaper F-22 Raptor. The JSF aircraft was defined for a very narrow niche role, and its intended performance and capabilities were constrained to avoid overlapping other US Air Force capability niches, such as "deep strike" occupied by the F-15E and F-22A, and "air dominance", occupied by the F-22A.

The actual F-35 aircraft, as it has "devolved" through a problematic and protracted development process, shows all the signs of falling well below the promised and mediocre performance targets set in the original definition document. This is largely the result of cumulative and failed efforts to control weight and unit procurement costs, and also the failed effort to achieve high commonality between variants intended for radically different deployment regimes2.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is now a prime example of a poorly defined design which is being poorly implemented. It remains a funded program primarily due to incessant political protection by the United States OSD (Office of the Secretary for Defense) which has for the last several years shielded the program from proper scrutiny, while systematically working to shut down production of every possible alternative design being built by US industry, including the vastly superior and far more cost effective F-22A Raptor.

The behaviour of the OSD in relation to the F-35 program is clearly irrational from the perspectives of maintaining US and Allied strategic weight in air power, and maintaining essential diversity in the industrial base. However, it is the well understood behaviour of a bureaucracy that has blundered badly and wishes to protect itself from criticism. Such is the power of Janis' Groupthink, in organisations where it is actively fostered and promoted by the leader, in this instance the Secretary himself. By all conventional measures applied in project management, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter clearly and unequivocally qualifies in all respects as a "failed project", but survives as the political credibility of the OSD and its Secretary have been wedded by prior actions to the survival of the project.

What is remarkable about the Canadian government decision to pursue the F-35 is that it occurred during a period where the failure of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is patently obvious, well documented publicly, and provable by reading a myriad of US and non-US public documents. While Australia's dysfunctional Canberra DoD bureaucracy wedded itself to the F-35 program in 2001 - 2002, primarily through the actions of a small internal cabal of civilian and some uniformed senior bureaucrats, when only the failure of the F-35 JSF definition could be proved, Canada's DND bureaucracy has improved upon this by doing exactly the same when the failure of the program's implementation is also provably obvious.

That there has been intensive domestic public criticism of the Canadian decision should come as no surprise, as many Canadians do read overseas publications and are prepared to think critically about their nation's future. A number of Canadians have complained privately to APA about the behaviour of their DND bureaucracy, and its unwillingness to put long term national defence needs above the very short term political needs of the Washington OSD.
Contemporary Foreign Capabilities Canada's Fighters Must Defeat

Tu-160 Blackjack launching a Kh-55SM from its aft bay. Russia is currently expanding its fleet of these formidable strategic bombers (Russian MoD).

The Raduga Kh-55SM (above) is a Russian analogue of the never deployed AGM-109 air launched Tomahawk. It was reverse engineered by the PLA to develop the CJ-10 Long Sword (below), an air launched variant of which is expected (Russian Internet, Chinese Internet).

The Chinese PLA almost acquired refurbished Russian Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-22M3 Backfire C aircraft post 2001. The funding was later diverted into the Xian H-6K turbofan Badger and development of an aircraft carrier fleet (Tupolev bureau image).

Advanced SAM systems are now proliferating globally. The Russian S-300PMU2 / SA-20B and S-400 / SA-21 (above 5P85TE2 common TEL) outperform the US MIM-104 Patriot in most key performance parameters, while China's HQ-9/FD-2000 (below) is based on Russian S-300PMU technology (Almaz-Antey, Zhenguan Studio, © 2010 Air Power Australia).

Second prototype of the Su-35S Flanker. This fully digital fighter is a deep redesign of the mature T-10 Flanker family, and outclasses all Western fighters other than the F-22A Raptor. Russia's KnAAPO intends to export hundreds of these long range fighters (KnAAPO image).

The stealthy supercruising PAK-FA was developed to directly compete against the F-22A Raptor and will outperform the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in all key parameters. Its highly refined stealth shaping indicates that its stealth performance will be similar to that of the F-35. Like the Su-35S, it is intended for volume exports (KnAAPO image).

This begs the question of "What are Canada's national strategic needs in air power?".

The geostrategic realities which Canada confronts today are in many respects no different from those during the Cold War period, in the sense that Canada is a geographical buffer space between the CONUS and any nations which choose to compete against the US and are located on the Asian continental mass.

During the Cold War the Soviet Union threatened massive air attacks, to be flown by strategic bombers over the Arctic wasteland to hit targets in the CONUS. Canada, as a closely allied nation, would have been treated by the Soviets no differently to the US. The imperatives during that period, for the RCAF, were to provide a robust air defence barrier to keep Soviet bombers away from Canadian and CONUS air space. A secondary imperative during that period was for the RCAF to support NATO forces in Europe with reinforcements, in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact.

While the Soviet Union is now gone, the geostrategic considerations remain. Russia continues to operate its fleet of Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-160 Blackjack A nuclear armed strategic bombers, and recently authorised assembly of additional Tu-160 aircraft from stockpiled production components to build up its fleet size. These bombers are armed with the Kh-55SM strategic cruise missile, similar in design to the US Tomahawk cruise missiles, but may also carry high yield free fall nuclear bombs where target value is considered high enough. The Russians have in recent times resumed aerial alert patrols by the strategic bomber fleet, and have repeatedly tested NATO air defence response times. The Russian Bear may no longer be driven by Soviet ideological agendas, but it has not lost any of its strategic teeth, nor its appetite for confrontational behaviours3.

The bigger "grand strategic" consideration for Canada is China's evident intention to become a strategic peer competitor to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. China has been conducting a major and deep restructure of its military force structure, investing heavily in capabilities to strike high value targets with nuclear and conventional munitions, to a radius currently of around 2,500 nautical miles. This is intended to put at risk existing US basing infrastructure across the Western Pacific region.

China has yet to invest in true strategic air power, in the manner the Soviets did, but have repeatedly flirted over the previous decade with the Russians over the purchase of Tu-95MS Bear H strategic bombers, and refurbished Tu-22M3 Backfire C "sub-strategic" bombers. The Backfire C would have been operated now by the PLA-AF, had it not been hobbled by domestic aerospace industry lobbying to continue development of the extended range H-6K "turbofan Badger" and PLA Navy lobbying to fund aircraft carriers. So at this time China lacks the strategic bomber fleet required to hold at risk CONUS and Canadian territory, in the manner the Soviets did, and Russia continues to do.

Whether the PLA-AF deploys a strategic bomber fleet along the lines of Russia's Dal'naya Aviatsia remains to be seen, and will depend on future perceived strategic priorities in Beijing. China clearly has the capability to reverse engineer Soviet era designs, and could develop a capability in the medium term based on legacy Soviet bombers, or indigenous technology. China already manufactures a diverse range of "Tomahawk-like" cruise missiles, largely based on Soviet Kh-55SM technology, illegitimately obtained from the Ukraine though a covert operation, the subject of major controversy in the Ukrainian parliament some years ago. Any future PLA strategic bomber fleet would fly profiles against the CONUS over the northern Arctic region as this presents the shortest great circle distance from northern Chinese basing sites. Geography will drive the PLA into the same game plan the Soviets played to.

What is clear is that Canada's long term strategic needs in air power will be dominated by capabilities to provide robust air defence against strategic bombers and especially their cruise missile payloads, accepting that strategic "needs" may be diametrically opposed to DND bureaucratic "wants".

In terms of secondary strategic priorities, expeditionary warfare campaigns supporting the United States and/or British Commonwealth nations will produce an ongoing demand for Canadian air component participation.

In supporting expeditionary campaigns, needs become much less clearly defined in comparison with the protection of Canada's landmass and territorial ocean areas.

Expeditionary campaigns can be broadly divided into two categories – those where the opponent is an underdeveloped Third World "failed state" where the fighting force are insurgents unable to contest control of the air, and those where the opponent is a nation with an air force and air defence system, and the capability to contest control of the air.

The former category encompasses Iraq, Afghanistan, and various African nations, where fighting is exclusively limited to COIN (COunter INsurgency) operations. Aircraft which are simple, rugged, easy to deploy and support from remote sites, and capable of delivering good firepower and endurance with a robust sensor payload work best. The best performers in the United States fleet, in COIN operations, have been the A-10 Thunderbolt II or "Warthog", the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the heavy B-52H Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer.

Expeditionary campaigns in the latter category are now becoming problematic due to the global proliferation of advanced Russian fighter aircraft such as the T-10 Flanker series, T-50 PAK-FA, and advanced Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems such as the S-300PMU2 and S-400. In time, this collection of potent Russian technology will be added to and further diversified as China exports advanced modern systems like the HQ-9/FD-2000, based on the Russian S-300PMU series, and the J-10B Sinocanard and J-11B Flanker B+, based on modern Russian fighter technology4, 5, 6, 7.

These advanced systems are now available to any buyer with the funds, other than Iran, the latter due to the recent UN embargo. They are, in basic technology, comparable to American and European weapons designs, but often outperform their Western competitors in key areas, especially kinematics and/or radar power.

As a result, defining a strategic need for Canadian expeditionary force capabilities is a more complex problem, as the need depends fundamentally on what types of expeditionary campaigns the Canadian military is intended to participate in. If Canada only wishes to partake in COIN campaigns, fighter capability choices would be driven by costs primarily, whereas if Canada intends to partake in a wider range of expeditionary campaigns, fighter capabilities become absolutely critical.

There is one more consideration which applies to Canada's strategic needs in fighter re-equipment, which is that of evolving doctrine and fighter capabilities in non-Western nations.

Russia is now in the early production phase of the Su-35S Flanker E+, and in the flight testing phase for the T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter. The Su-35S is a formidable conventional fighter, which outperforms all US and EU types other than the F-22A Raptor, and is intended for high volume exports. The PAK-FA is Russia's answer to the F-22A Raptor, which is expected to aerodynamically outperform the F-22A in key flight regimes, but will not match the stealth performance of the F-22A. The PAK-FA will almost certainly match the stealth performance of the much inferior F-35.

Both of these Russian fighters are built to achieve an unrefuelled combat radius of around 1,000 nautical miles, and can be refuelled by a tanker aircraft. As a result, both could be used to escort other aircraft into defended airspace.

Stated Russian and Chinese strategic bombardment doctrine has yet to incorporate the use of fighter aircraft to escort heavy bombers. As the escort of heavy bombers by long range fighters is a practice dating back to 1943, the notion that the Russians, Chinese or any of their clients would not deploy fighter escorts when in possession of long range fighters like the Su-35S or PAK-FA and aerial refuelling tankers is simply naïve.

If Canada does deploy the F-35 JSF as its primary fighter aircraft, the Su-35S and PAK-FA could operate in and fly through Canadian sovereign airspace with complete impunity.

If we take a hard analytical perspective on what Canada's long term strategic needs in fighter aircraft are, as distinct from DND bureaucratic "wants" in this area, several considerations become prominent:
National air defence will require a large twin engined fighter with superlative supersonic performance, superlative radar performance, and a large missile payload to defeat strategic bombers and their cruise missile payloads;
The proliferation of advanced long range fighters such as the Su-35S and PAK-FA will put a premium on combat agility for both beyond visual range (BVR) and within visual range (WVR) engagements, supersonic agility, and stealth performance;
Expeditionary campaigns into "contested" airspace will require the ability to survive against advanced SAM systems such as the S-400, S-300PMU2, HQ-9 and planned S-500, putting a premium on high stealth performance;
Expeditionary campaigns in COIN environments will require the ability to operate from shorter airfields, with high endurance and large, varied weapon payloads.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, by both definition and design, is fundamentally unsuited to any one and every one of these basic needs.
The F-35 lacks the range, missile payload, radar performance and especially supersonic performance to be effective in the strategic air defence role, and with a single engine puts the lives of Canadian pilots at unnecessary risk in harsh Arctic conditions.
The F-35 lacks the supersonic performance, missile payload, radar performance, agility and stealth performance to be effective in combat against the Su-35S Flanker E+, and has no ability to compete with the Sukhoi PAK-FA. This makes the F-35 ineffective in strategic air defence, if fighter escorts are deployed, and ineffective in expeditionary campaigns where the opponent operates such fighters.
The F-35 lacks the stealth performance to penetrate modern air defence systems armed with weapons such as the S-400, S-300PMU2, HQ-9 and planned S-500, especially if these SAMs are supported by modern "counter-stealth" radars operating in the lower radar bands.
In uncontested COIN operations, the F-35 lacks the payload and endurance to perform well, does not have the ballistic survivability for Close Air Support (CAS), and the CTOL variant demands long runways for operations, limiting choices in deployment sites.
Against each and every one of these clearly identifiable strategic needs for Canada's future fighter force, the F-35 JSF is an abject failure.

Which aircraft currently in production meet Canada's strategic needs?

The only single type of fighter which can meet all of these needs is the F-22A Raptor, which Canada can clearly afford to procure, given that the DND is quite happy to fund the much inferior F-35 JSF at a similar or higher unit cost. Canada was identified a decade ago in a US Air Force study by Molloy as one of the nations to which the F-22A Raptor could be safely exported8.

Are there any genuinely credible alternatives for Canada, other than the F-22A Raptor?

If Canada wishes to limit its future air force roles to COIN and strategic air defence against unescorted heavy bombers and cruise missiles, then a derivative of the F-15E with the APG-82 AESA radar could fill such a requirement. It would however leave Canada vulnerable in any air defence scenario where Su-35S or PAK-FA fighter escorts are present, and would deny Canada participation in expeditionary campaigns where these advanced fighters, or advanced SAMs are deployed.

If the "Gates Doctrine" of stripping the US Air Force down and optimising it for COIN operations persists beyond the Obama Administration's term of office, then Canada will not be able to rely on the Americans providing upper tier F-22A wings to supplement Canadian air defence units, or protect Canadian fighters from advanced SAMs and fighters in expeditionary campaigns, since the US Air Force will not have enough F-22s to perform even its own basic missions.

In this respect Canada is confronting the same fundamental strategic problem which Australia confronts. That is, advancing threat capabilities leave only the F-22 Raptor as a viable aircraft in contested airspace; yet, under the "Gates Doctrine", even the US Air Force is to be denied sufficient numbers of the these aircraft to be effective in anything other than the smallest of contingencies. Just as Australia's Canberra DoD has failed to study and articulate national needs properly, so it would appear that the Canadian DND has fallen into the very same trap.

Canadians therefore need to ask some very serious questions about the DND's performance in assessing fighter needs, and some equally serious questions about why Canada appears to be espousing the completely bankrupt and intellectually dishonest "Gates Doctrine" for air power planning.

 

[EagleOne]

HAL has big designs for fifth gen fighter

When the country's fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) project — one that will give India the smartest and most lethal class of fighters in this part of the world — takes off as expected in the coming months, it would be the biggest ever design and development venture to be taken up by defence enterprise Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

HAL would be joining Russia's Sukhoi Corporation to co-design, co-develop, and manufacture 200-250 FGFA; each separately for its respective air force. Joint development and production by HAL for the Indian Air Force are estimated to cost Rs 135,000 crore ($30 billion) or around Rs 500 crore each.

HAL's Chairman, Mr Ashok Nayak, told Business Line that the requirements for the Indian version were known but the work packages, that is, HAL's share in the design and development, were to be specified. "We would like to do as much as we can of the design aspect," he said.

Although the Russian side was testing a single-seater FGFA prototype for its air force, he explained that the Indian version would demand lot of work in new design as well as changes for what could be a two-seater for the IAF.

Mr Nayak said he could not say how long it would take to build the prototypes and reach them to flight certification.

Reports say a preliminary design agreement is to be signed in December when the Russian President, Mr Dmitry Medvedev, comes to India.

Meanwhile, the defence public sector unit is creating a special team from existing and fresh engineers at its design bureau — the Aircraft Research and Design Centre — according to a person familiar with the programme, but who did not wish to be named. It would start with 30-50 engineers, and gradually take it to around 300 people.

HAL would also have to create some of the large infrastructure required for the FGFA, and the lead centre could be Nashik, which has a ready Sukhoi platform. Other divisions would chip in.

At the prototype development stage, HAL would primarily involve the many defence and scientific labs such as National Aerospace Laboratories in Bangalore.

A highly placed HAL official conceded that the FGFA design is extremely complex, and no country will trade the technology; you have to be an investing partner.


Stealth — the feature that makes it undetectable by enemy radars — is the main element of this futuristic aerial killer. For this it has to have a radar-eluding shape and configuration. Its supersonic cruising speed, advanced fire power and manoeuvring, modern avionics, and a 360-degree view set it apart from the fighter products of the 1990s.

The first versions have to make a few thousand flights before they are certified for operation. "Even after 25 years, the LCA (light combat aircraft) is still to be certified for operations," the official observed.

Design alone takes 30-50 per cent of the cost of an aircraft. Building prototypes could be at least 10 per cent of the cost. The two partners are to equally share the costs from this stage onwards. The HAL version will also be jointly marketed to other countries, but may be made by either partner.

The Chief of Air Staff recently said FGFAs would be inducted by 2018, and would be the main part of a four-brand future air fleet. It includes the MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft, currently being evaluated for purchase); the home-made LCA and the Sukhoi-30MkI that is already in use.

In January this year, Russia flew the first single-seater prototype (PAK FA) that its own air force will use. India joined the Russian programme (Sukhoi PAK/FA) in 2007 after a long consideration, while Sukhoi has been at it for at least five years.

Only two other FGFA dreams have taken off: US major Lockheed Martin is leading a pack of European nations in the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35); Lockheed Martin and Boeing are developing the F-22 Raptor. Japan and China are also said to be opening their separate fifth-generation accounts.

The Sukhoi/HAL FGFA will be far superior to the most advanced ones available today: among them the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; Lockheed Martin F-16; the Dassault's Rafale that is still being developed; Russian MiG-35; Eurofighter Typhoon, or Sweden's Saab 39 Gripen; interestingly, all these are in the race for the IAF's Rs 40,000-crore purchase tender for 126 MMRCAs

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/10/19/stories/2010101952580400.htm

 

[black eagle]

Putin meets PAK_FA

 

[hitenray09]

any news about amca?

 

[Anshu Attri]

http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/fifth-gen-fighters-to-plug-into-satellite-network/412732/


Fifth-Gen fighters to plug into satellite network
:emot180:

The Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), already planned to be loaded with top-end combat features like advanced stealth and super-cruise capability, could also be plugged, uniquely, into a network of satellites. With Moscow willing to grant India unprecedented access to military signals from Russia's constellation of GLONASS (GLObal NAvigation Satellite System) satellites, the FGFA could access real-time details of its own and enemy positions, terrain information, and have the ability to communicate with Indian forces anywhere on the globe.

A senior Russian diplomat, speaking anonymously to Business Standard, reveals that after extended negotiations with India, Moscow has okayed the provision of military data from GLONASS, in the form of digitised signals. So far, Russia had only agreed to provide India with civilian-grade navigation signals, which permitted an accuracy of 25-30 metres. Now, the military grade signals will allow a far higher accuracy, crucial for military operations.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the New Delhi-based Russian diplomat explained, "India is the only country that Moscow is willing to supply GLONASS military data to. Russia has recently okayed an agreement which officials from both sides have been negotiating for some time. From our side, we are ready to sign, even during (Russian president Dmitry) Medvedev's visit to India this December."
Business Standard first reported (Sept 11: 'India, Russia to ink gen-5 fighter pact') that India and Russia were set to sign a Preliminary Design Contract to co-develop the FGFA during Russian president Dmitry Medvedev's visit to India this December. The FGFA programme, towards which each partner will contribute an initial $6 billion (Rs 26,600 crore), aims to develop the world's premier fighter. The Russian and Indian air forces each plan to buy 250-300 of these aircraft.

Providing satellite navigation and communications to the FGFA would place the aircraft at a higher technological level than even the F-35 Lightning II, the futuristic fighter that America is currently developing. The F-35 uses satellite communications, but not satellite navigation.

Says the Russian diplomat, "It is next-generation features like real-time satellite navigation that will take the FGFA technologically far beyond Sukhoi's T-50 prototype fighter, which made its first flight in January."

Russia's GLONASS network will provide navigational signals worldwide through a constellation of 24 satellites, 18 of which are already operational. America already has an operational satellite navigation system, called the Global Positioning System (GPS). The European Union is implementing its own Galileo system, while India is planning its own network, called Gagan.

India and Russia had earlier agreed to cooperate on the civilian aspects of GLONASS. In January 2007, during President Putin's visit to India, Russia's Federal Space Agency and the Indian Space Research Organisation signed agreements to launch GLONASS satellites on Indian booster rockets and to jointly build new-generation satellites.

With President Medvedev's visit a month after President Obama's, Moscow has successfully lined up a slew of high-profile signings and events that underscore the strategic nature of the Russia-India partnership. Besides signing of the FGFA development contract and the possible GLONASS agreement, Russia is racing against time to hand over during this period an Akula-class nuclear attack submarine to the Indian Navy. INS Chakra, as the Indian Navy will call this submarine, has been provided by Russia on a 10-year lease for an estimated $900 million (Rs 400 crore).

"All this shows the depth of the Russia-India strategic relationship," points out the Russian diplomat. "There are other countries that might be having better technology than Russia, though I cannot say for sure. But they are not willing to part with it."

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Eye Candy! :happy_2:

PakFa > > > > > > > >

 

[Anshu Attri]

:emot0:

 

[hitenray09]

when is the work on fgfa going to commence

 

[Anshu Attri]

Russia, India to begin design of 5G-fighter in December:emot159::emot180:

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101027/161108468.html


Russia is planning to sign in December an agreement with India on the preliminary design of a joint fifth-generation fighter aircraft, a senior Russian aircraft industry official said on Wednesday.
Russian Sukhoi holding and Indian Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) agreed in early 2010 to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter jet, tentatively dubbed PAK FA.
"An agreement with India on the pre-design of the PAK FA will be signed in December," said Alexei Fyodorov, head of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation.
The sides agreed to develop both a single-seat and a two-seat version of the aircraft by 2016, focusing on the single-seat version in the initial stages of development.
The new aircraft will most likely be based on Russia's T-50 prototype fifth-generation fighter, which has already made several test flights and is expected to join the Russian Air Force in 2015.
Russia has been developing its fifth-generation fighter since the 1990s. The current prototype, known as the T-50, was designed by the Sukhoi design bureau and built at a plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in Russia's Far East.
Russian officials have already hailed the fighter as "a unique warplane" that combines the capabilities of an air superiority fighter and attack aircraft.

 

[sesha_maruthi27]

DRDO to roll out own fifth-generation fighter
Vijay Mohan/TNS

Chandigarh, October 23
While the indigenously developed Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, is expected to receive operational clearance in the next two months and its induction into the IAF is scheduled for next year, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has embarked upon a project to develop its own fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

The proposed DRDO aircraft would be in the medium-weight (20-tonne) category and different from the joint Indo-Russian fifth-generation fighter that is on the cards, which is in the heavier 30-tonne category like the Su-30.

"The seed project for the new aircraft has started and is expected to be complete in about 18 months," P.S. Subramanyam, Director, Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), and head of the Tejas project, told The Tribune here today. The seed project would define the technical and operational requirements and lay out the broad concepts for developing the aircraft.

"Our proposed fighter would be a twin-engined aircraft in the category of the MiG-29," Subramanyam said.

On the status of the Tejas project, Subramanyam said the aircraft trials for launching R-73 short-range anti-aircraft missiles and 1000 lbs bombs have been successful. "The 10 prototypes and pre-production variants have undertaken 1,450 sorties, which include about 200 with weapons," he said.

The IAF has projected a total requirement for about 120 Tejas and 16 two-seater trainer variants for equipping seven squadrons, while the Navy wants 57 aircraft of this type.

The ADA is also looking at integrating the Israeli Python air-to-air missile with the Tejas to meet the IAF requirements, while the Navy wants it to examine the possibility of the Israeli Derby missiles that it already uses on the Sea Harrier. The Tejas' avionics system, Subramanyam said, was open-ended so that weapon systems could be changed over seamlessly.

Of the 200-odd Tejas to be produced, each of which would cost Rs 200 crore, about 100 would be powered by the American General Electric 414 engine. Subramanyam said that a new project had been taken up for the development of the Kaveri engine in collaboration with French firm SNECMA that would meet the revised weight and flight parameters of the Tejas.

 

[Anshu Attri]

The second T-50 is already finished.

http://www.argumenti.ru/army/n261/81886/
The first flying prototype fifth-generation fighter, Sukhoi T-50, who has performed several dozen operations, will soon add a second. This will greatly speed up the testing of the airplane.
plane is almost assembled and take off, perhaps in November. Followed her from Moscow to Komsomolsk-on-Amur flew the host team of specialists. The second board is equipped with facilities to be installed on combat aircraft. Although his full kit - all radars, defense system and armament control system be installed only on the third and fourth T-50. They raise the air in 2011.
Following the first four aircraft will be assembled boards of pre-party. Its size is estimated to be between 6 to 10 aircraft. These cars will complete a cycle of flight tests, and then pass the state and army trials, which will begin in 2013.

original......
К первому летному экземпляру истребителя пятого поколения «Сухой» Т-50, который выполнил уже несколько десятков полетов, скоро добавится второй. Это сильно ускорит испытания самолета.
Машина уже практически собрана и взлетит, возможно, в ноябре. За ней из Москвы в Комсомольск-на-Амуре вылетела принимающая бригада специалистов. Второй борт оснащен оборудованием, которое будет установлено и на боевом самолете. Хотя полный его комплект – все радары, комплекс обороны и систему управления вооружением установят только на третьем и четвертом Т-50. Их поднимут в воздух в 2011 году.
Следом за первыми четырьмя бортами будут собраны самолеты предсерийной партии. Ее размер ориентировочно составит от 6 до 10 самолетов. Эти машины завершат цикл летных испытаний, затем пройдут государственные и войсковые испытания, которые начнутся в 2013 году.

 

[neo29]

Indian FGFA will be real challenge for American F-22 : German Defense Expert Helmut

"Indian FGFA will be real challenge for American F-22 " claims German Defense Expert Helmut Hirsch , MR Hirsch in private conversation with our Admin ( idrw.org) , have said that FGFA which will be based on T-50 / Pak-FA will have major design changes to its fuselage due to twin pilot configuration and Indian Expertise in Composite will only enchance Stealth characters of the Aircraft .

MR Hirsch believes that Russians have compromised on stealth to keep the aircraft more maneuverable and under a tight budget to keep per aircraft cost under control , Russians simply cannot afford to have such a expensive plane in large numbers , but Indians seems to have realized that and will be doing 30 % of the design changes to improve stealth characters of the aircraft .

When asked if Indian Version will be more stealthy ? MR Hirsch seems confident on that matter , MR Hirsch also believes that real challenge for F-22 will come from Indian FGFA rather than F-35 or Chinese J-XX. MR Hirsch also adds that Indians will add best of technology (Avionics / Radars / Weapons ) from west in their version which makes it even more lethal then F-35 and a real challenge for F-22"²s Superiority .

MR Hirsch also added that F-22 is excellent aircraft but production of it which will stop just under 200 makes any one believe that aircraft has some real issues which have been kept under wraps but issues of rusting in airframe has already surfaced , and recent reports of USAF already looking for F-22 Replacement by 2030 all points to that direction .

MR Hirsch was also critical of F-35 , and slammed it for being over priced and expensive , and also went on to say that European countries who will ultimately purchase it and are partners in the program could have built among them self a better 5th Gen fighter just like Euro-fighter which he believes can take on F-35 in BVR fight .

NOTE : Above article is based on private conversion held between Ajay(Admin idrw.org) and renowned German Defense Expert Helmut Hirsch and reproduced with his permission, article is based on this views and his expertise's on FGFA . M R. Helmut Hirsch will not be writing on Indian defence matters , but idrw.org will consult him on his expertise on regular basis to get outside different point of view on Indian Defense matters .

idrw.org

 

[Anshu Attri]

 

[blade]

Indian FGFA will be real challenge for American F-22 : German Defense Expert Helmut

"Indian FGFA will be real challenge for American F-22 " claims German Defense Expert Helmut Hirsch , MR Hirsch in private conversation with our Admin ( idrw.org) , have said that FGFA which will be based on T-50 / Pak-FA will have major design changes to its fuselage due to twin pilot configuration and Indian Expertise in Composite will only enchance Stealth characters of the Aircraft .

MR Hirsch believes that Russians have compromised on stealth to keep the aircraft more maneuverable and under a tight budget to keep per aircraft cost under control , Russians simply cannot afford to have such a expensive plane in large numbers , but Indians seems to have realized that and will be doing 30 % of the design changes to improve stealth characters of the aircraft .

When asked if Indian Version will be more stealthy ? MR Hirsch seems confident on that matter , MR Hirsch also believes that real challenge for F-22 will come from Indian FGFA rather than F-35 or Chinese J-XX. MR Hirsch also adds that Indians will add best of technology (Avionics / Radars / Weapons ) from west in their version which makes it even more lethal then F-35 and a real challenge for F-22"²s Superiority .

MR Hirsch also added that F-22 is excellent aircraft but production of it which will stop just under 200 makes any one believe that aircraft has some real issues which have been kept under wraps but issues of rusting in airframe has already surfaced , and recent reports of USAF already looking for F-22 Replacement by 2030 all points to that direction .

MR Hirsch was also critical of F-35 , and slammed it for being over priced and expensive , and also went on to say that European countries who will ultimately purchase it and are partners in the program could have built among them self a better 5th Gen fighter just like Euro-fighter which he believes can take on F-35 in BVR fight .

NOTE : Above article is based on private conversion held between Ajay(Admin idrw.org) and renowned German Defense Expert Helmut Hirsch and reproduced with his permission, article is based on this views and his expertise's on FGFA . M R. Helmut Hirsch will not be writing on Indian defence matters , but idrw.org will consult him on his expertise on regular basis to get outside different point of view on Indian Defense matters .

Link: idrw.org