Sukhoi PAK FA

[A.V.]

nice pictures coming up now ....

 

[Kinshuk]

Trial are going to start this month, 2000 flight hours are pretty decent I reckon. Minimum 6 years of hard work required. But Russia seems quite demented with the project and will try to achieve denouement ASAP.

Can some one tell if the tail looks are going to change with the new engines? Picture would do a piquant job.

Regards,

KS

 

[Anshu Attri]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Putin-to-cement-Russias-partner-No-1-status-during-India-visit/articleshow/5648408.cms

Putin to cement Russia's partner No. 1 status during India visit.

NEW DELHI: Israel and US may be cornering major chunks of the lucrative Indian defence market but Russia still reigns supreme. This will be driven home when Russian PM Vladimir Putin comes visiting here next week, with a flurry of defence deals and joint projects slated for finalisation.

The contracts range from the fresh $2.34 billion deal for refit of aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and the $1.2 billion deal for 29 more MiG-29K maritime fighters to the joint development of the stealth fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) and the multi-role transport aircraft (MTA), say officials.

Plans are also afoot to procure an additional 40-45 Sukhoi-30MKIs to add to the 230 of these fighters already contracted in deals worth $8.5 billion, as also more regiments of the Smerch MLRS (multiple-launch rocket systems) in addition to three already raised.

Putin's visit is also likely to see the finalisation of the commissioning of the K-152 Nerpa Akula-II nuclear-powered submarine in Indian Navy by May-June, under a 10-year lease flowing from a secretive deal inked in 2004.

The fresh agreement on Gorshkov, rechristened INS Vikramaditya by India, will however be the emblem to pronounce `all is well' in the bilateral defence relationship.

Acrimonious negotiations over the huge cost escalation in Gorshkov's refit have led to lot of bitterness over the last few years, which has also been fuelled by Russia's propensity to delay deliveries, jack-up costs midway and not provide proper product support.

India, on its part, is now reconciled to getting Gorshkov in 2013 - instead of the earlier August 2008 - by paying $2.34 billion instead of the $974 million earmarked for it in what was thought to be `a fixed price contract' when it was inked in January 2004.

The 29 more MiG-29Ks will be in addition to the 16 of these jets already contracted in the $1.5 billion Gorshkov package deal of 2004. With six MiG-29Ks already inducted in the Indian Navy, the jets are slated to operate both from the 44,570 tonne Gorshkov as well as the 40,000 tonne indigenous aircraft carrier being built at Cochin Shipyard, which should roll out by 2014-2015.

FGFA will be the futuristic project, with Russia's technology demonstrator Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA beginning its flight trials earlier this year. India wants 250 of these fighters, built to its own specifications, to be inducted from 2017 onwards.

With supercruise capability, thrust-vectoring and integrated avionics, these stealth fighters will not come cheap. India's share of the developmental costs alone could touch $5 billion, with each jet costing extra.

Under the joint MTA project, worth $600 million in developmental costs, Russia will get 100 such planes, capable of carrying a 15-20 tonne military payload, while India will take 45 of them initially. Another 60 will be sold to other countries. At a later stage, the MTA will also be modified into a passenger aircraft of a 100-seater capacity.

 

[Anshu Attri]

http://nellenmellen.deviantart.com/art/Sukhoi-T-50-PAK-FA-156028252

 

[Armand2REP]

It has a decent internal payload. 8 R-77 or 2 1,500kg bombs.

 

[Quickgun Murugan]

http://nellenmellen.deviantart.com/art/Sukhoi-T-50-PAK-FA-156028252

This is the sexiest pic yetclap

This one looks great too

 

[Anshu Attri]

This is the sexiest pic yetclap

thank you very much sir....

 

[plugwater]

....................................

 

[marcos98]

Enjoy people.........

 

[ankur]

i have heard that HAL engineers have missed out on critical designs features in PAK-FA and they are only contributing in certain sections.is it right?

 

[Anshu Attri]

Enjoy people.........

awesome pictures,the front veiw is cool...

 

[gogbot]

i have heard that HAL engineers have missed out on critical designs features in PAK-FA and they are only contributing in certain sections.is it right?

HAL has completely missed out on all the design and development work for the PAK-FA by a decade.
The Russians asked us in 1999 its been a long time since them.

India has nothing to do with the PAK-FA in terms of development. I think we finance the PAK-FA, thats the kind of stuff still being negotiated,
What India and Russia will be doing is building a fighter based on the Technology demonstrated by the PAK-FA. This plane is the FGFA.
India will build and design 25% of this aircraft, and also Modify it to fit Indian specifications.
The I think the Russians give us Full ToT. We share the project 50-50 and we finance it 50-50

From my understanding, and i may be wrong.
I will use the Su-27 as metaphor for this

the Russians make the Su-27(pak-fa), We work with the Russians to make 25% of the SU-30(Basic FGFA) and then We make the SU-30 MKI ( THE FGFA our air force will get) and manufacture that in India .
And then INDIA and Russia sell the Basic FGFA to the foreign Markets. EG Brazil.

Also note one thing that seems to get contradictory rumors is that India will Buy 50 PAK-FA when ready as well as its 200 FGFA, and Russia will not only get 200 PAK-FA but may also get 50 FGFA.

 

[ankur]

will the FGFA be better when compared to PAK-FA and what about chinese FGFA?what is it's status right now and if sometime in the future do we get our own twin seater FGFA what is the guarantee that we will be maintaining qualitative edge vis-a-vis china and pakistan?

 

[Singh]

Pogosyan: The 2nd stage engine for PK FA will be ready after 2015 ​

Russian 'United Airbuilding Corporation' (UAC) will be the system integrator of 2nd stage engine for 5th gen fighter,- said today Mikhail Pogosyan, the Sukhoi corp chief.

According to ARMS-TASS, he also have said, that the 'United Engine-building Corporation' will merge 'Salut' corp - second prominent center of gas-turbine manufacturing and design in Russia. 'The specification of the prospective engine is decided, but the whole time of development will take 10-12 years, so this engine will not be ready in 2015 for sure'? - he said.

He also marked that there is nothing critical with the fact that the tests of PAK FA have started with 1st stage engine. 'THe plane took-off with the engine, which was projected for this fighter, 'it's very modern device, allowing long term exploitation of the plane'. The plane will start its service in RuAF with the 1st phase engine.

As regards 2nd phase engine, the terms of the program need elaboration, it will be decided during 2010 - 2011 maximum , he added. During Putin visit to 'Sukhoi' facility in Moscow Pogosyan also declared that 27 degree AoA was achieved throughout last PAK FA testing. 'When Su-27 was tested, such AoA was achieved only after some months of active testing' he added.

http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2010/03/pogosyan-2nd-stage-engine-for-pk-fa.html

 

[Singh]

PAK-FA, F-35, F-22 and “Capability Surprise”​

The first flight of Russia's stealthy PAK-FA is the best recent example of the problems examined in the United States Defense Science Board report on “Capability Surprise”, released in September last year. This study is an important step forward in identifying the causes of many past, current and developing strategic failures. A capability surprise arises whenever an opponent makes use of a new capability, or uses an existing capability in a different way, catching the target or victim off guard1.

Al Qaeda's use in September, 2001, of passenger laden hijacked aircraft as cruise missiles was a good example of a capability surprise.

The PAK-FA is, but at many more levels, another case of capability surprise for Western military leaders.

The DSB study divides capability surprises into two broad categories, and makes some important observations:

Capability surprise can spring from many sources: scientific breakthrough in the laboratory, rapid fielding of a known technology, or new operational use of an existing capability or technology. A review of many surprises that occurred over the past century suggests that surprises tend to fall into two major categories:

“Known” surprises—those few that the United States should have known were coming, but for which it did not adequately prepare. For this category of surprise, the potential and evidence are clear; the effects are potentially catastrophic; and dealing with them is difficult, costly, and sometimes counter-cultural. We specifically include space, cyber, and nuclear in this category today. We might also have included bio, but with a focus on threats to military operations, we chose not to.

“Surprising” surprises—those many that the nation might have known about or at least anticipated, but which were buried among hundreds or thousands of other possibilities. In this case, the evidence and consequences are less clear, the possibilities are many, and the nation cannot afford to pursue them all.

In both cases, the biggest issue is not a failure to envision events that may be surprising. It is a failure to decide which ones to act upon, and to what degree. That failure results, at least partially, from the fact that there is no systematic mechanism in place within DOD or the interagency to help decide which events to act on aggressively, which to treat to a lesser degree, and which to ignore, at least for the time being. Thus, the principle recommendations of this study focus on developing the approaches and the talent to better manage surprise—to prevent it from happening or, should surprise occur, to be in a position to rapidly mitigate its consequences.

The DSB argues that five specific measures should be implemented to manage capability surprises. These are:

1. Integration and management of surprise at a high enough level to affect senior decision making.

2. Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception.

3. Rapid fielding that is truly rapid and can be effectively employed when the circumstances warrant.

4. Pointed improvements in “strategic” intelligence.

5. For known surprises, the Secretary of Defense establish a formal mechanism to ensure Department progress in addressing the limited number of most critical threats.

For surprise management to be successful, however, there needs to be support from leadership at the highest levels—a recurring theme of this study. Emphasis should be placed on encouraging alternative viewpoints, requiring broad risk/opportunity assessment, integrating and synthesizing, and enhancing knowledge through cross-domain teaming. Without such leadership, the tendency will be to maintain the status quo … and the nation will be seriously surprised.

The reasoning by the DSB is sound. The open question is whether in the current political climate produced by SecDef Gates and his inner circle, the five proposed measures have any chance of being robustly implemented, let alone implemented at all.

Let us consider but one level where the PAK-FA effects ‘capability surprise’ - the issue of the diminishing United States Tactical Air combat capability effectiveness currently in progress, a decline that changes the United States’ ranking from air dominance to ‘also ran’.

The collapse of United States TACAIR qualifies as a “known surprise” in every respect. Surprisingly, it is not included in the three “current” types of surprise the DSB covered in detail; being nuclear, cyber, and space surprise.

Numerous analysts including APA, academics, US Air Force generals serving and retired, and the Air Force Association, have repeatedly commented on the increasing mismatch between existing and planned United States tactical fighter fleet capabilities, and the ever advancing capabilities of foreign fighter aircraft, sensors and air defence weapons, being developed and marketed globally by Russian, Chinese and Indian industry.

APA has published numerous works on this topic, and compiled a collection of more than eighty quite detailed technical reports covering the area, by multiple authors, necessitating the translation of hundreds of foreign language publications.

At the rate of decline of United States air combat power, and the rise of foreign air combat capability, there are but a few years before ‘mismatch’ becomes ‘overmatch’ - at the expense of the United States and its Allies.

The TACAIR problem is well understood by the expert community and well documented in the public domain, yet multiple consecutive policy decisions, and public statements, clearly indicate that the OSD and its analogues in other Western nations neither acknowledge nor accept its existence, or where its existence is partially acknowledged, its relevance is not.

The absence of any meaningful response to the development and first flight of the PAK-FA from the Washington OSD is proof positive, more likely proof absolute, that the mechanisms of organisational breakdown and failures in governance discussed by the DSB are currently and actively in play within the OSD.

The PAK-FA is a “known capability surprise” in the sense that everybody knew the Russians were developing it. It is a “surprising capability surprise” in the sense that Russian mastery of stealth shaping is much better than Western analysts, including APA, expected. The advances in PAK-FA kinematic and aerodynamic capability qualify as “known capability surprise”, the clever way that stealth was not compromised by the aerodynamic design and vice-versa is a “surprising capability surprise”2.

If the DSB report has one weakness, it is that it insufficiently explores the internal mechanisms of organisational dysfunction which produce capability surprises. The report does usefully summarise some of these as:

* Thought it could respond without doing anything new;

* Knew it was likely, understood the magnitude of the implications, but didn’t pursue it appropriately;

* Did not foresee the full consequences of an action and thus “did it to ourselves”;

* Believed the adversary was not up to it;

* Believed the adversary would not dare;

* Knew it might happen, but was trapped in its own paradigms;

* Didn’t imagine or anticipate the strategic impact;

* Lost it in the “signal-to-noise” of other possibilities;

* Imagined it, but thought it was years away;

* Was willing to take the risk that it would not happen.

The more fundamental underlying root causes of these behaviours deserve much better treatment and we summarise them here:

1. Failure to think critically about critical problems;
2. Strategic illiteracy;
3. Technological illiteracy;
4. Operational illiteracy;
5. Indifference to material reality in the pursuit of self vested interests a.k.a “a total indifference to what is real”;
6. Insistence that subordinates deliver “good news” rather than “bad news”; a.k.a. “shooting the messenger”;
7. Insistence on consensus-seeking behaviour rather than critical argument;
8. Denial of facts, data or findings which are not politically convenient;
9. Institutionalising groupthink behaviours to maintain internal organisational cohesion;
10. Institutionalising group-narcissistic behaviours to maintain internal organisational cohesion;
11. Optimising planning for very short term outcomes with no regard for long term consequences;
12. Prioritising political self-interest over national interest, or alliance interests; and
13. Simple organisational laziness and hubris – failure to focus on potential and emerging threats on the basis that “we are too big to fail”.

These failures are more than often inter-related, and more than often mutually supporting.

We should also give some thought about what is NOT stated in the DSB report.

A powerful analytical tool is to divide a complex problem into ‘Process’ and ‘Content’, which the DSB does in part. As mentioned above, if the Processes are not in place, there is no chance of delivering cogent, timely and hence effective ‘Content’.

The report does not make a recommendation on how to assess the risk from a Capability Surprise, once identified. One method is this:

(Consequence of a Surprise) x (Likelihood of Surprise) = (Level of Risk)

Some strategic changes are made at an imperceptible but inexorable rate, so that by the time the problem is detected, it is too late to recover the situation. A domestic example is termites eating the structure of your house. A military example is the decline of United States' TACAIR Capability, the rise of potential adversaries’ TACAIR Capabilities such that in a military conflagration, the United States is soundly defeated and in losing the battle, is at risk of losing the war. Even if the adversaries’ overmatch is detected, there may be insufficient time to recover – building air combat capability is the work of decades, not months. If the tactically defeated, the United States is forced into a retreat to a nuclear exchange, that will draw the entire world into holocaust.

Lastly, there is no mention in the DSB Paper of any prevention or intervention response once a Capability Surprise is discovered by a robust ‘Process and Content’ structure, and an assessment of unacceptable Levels of Risk.

Again, we may use the PAK-FA as an example. The existence and potential air combat capability can be no longer classified as a ‘surprise’ as it has happened. The critical question is what national response the United States and its allies will mount to the PAK-FA.

The only air combat aircraft in the world that can match an operational PAK-FA is the F-22. Yet on the recommendation of SecDef Gates, the F-22A program was terminated at 187 aircraft – an insufficient number when Russia and India are planning to produce 500 plus PAK-FAs, and Sukhoi will be aggressively marketing export versions of the PAK-FA. Would Congress, finely balanced over the termination of the F-22A, have approved the program termination had they known about the surprisingly advanced PAK-FA at the time? Highly unlikely.

Another element of the PAK-FA ‘surprise’ is that the aircraft has been designed with a clear understanding of the effects of ‘stealth’ on air combat when both sides present with low-observable aircraft. Obviously, the combatants will be closer when their radar sensors detect the other side, so close in fact that the Infra-Red Scan and Track (IRST) might be the first sensor to detect the presence of an enemy aircraft. The problem is this: the PAK-FA has IRST capability and the F-22A does not. Worse, the extreme agility of the PAK-FA will allow it to dodge the F-22A’s AIM-120 missile shots, while the Raptor will likely not be able to out-turn the more advanced Russian (and Chinese) missiles. Surviving F-22As would then be committed to what fighter pilots call a ‘knife fight’ – close-in dogfights where superior agility wins – and the PAK-FA will out-manoeuvre the F-22A.

The answer to this air combat puzzle is simple: build more F-22s and build a better F-22, and give it better missiles. The basic design of the F-22 is sound and there is internal space for additional sensors such as IRST, cheek AESA arrays and possibly lower frequency radar that will detect the PAK-FA first. The thrust of the F119 series engines could be increased and a more advanced 3D thrust-vectoring nozzle fitted. Controls with more power and driven by smarter software can be added. The MBDA Meteor missile has a specification and design to kill a 9G target at 50,000 feet – about the edge of where the PAK-FA can operate. If the Europeans can make such a missile, why not the United States?

So, the question is this: if the answer is simple and obvious, will the United States respond to the PAK-FA surprise with a reversal of the decision to end F-22A production and fund the ongoing production of the F-22A while the upgraded F-22C is being designed?

Will it release the F-22A to its allies like Australia, Japan and Israel, and ask its NATO partners if any would induct the F-22A into their air combat aircraft fleets?

Will it offer F-22A upgrade programs as the full capability of the PAK-FA is revealed?

And, finally, will it commit to the development of a missile capable of killing aircraft with extreme agility, such as the PAK-FA and, similarly, the Su-35S?

The PAK-FA surprise places the United States right at the fork in the road of military capability development. One path is the ‘we are too big to fail’ / ‘there is no alternative’ hubris that leads to certain defeat in future air combat. The other is an immediate commitment to use existing United States technology, weapons development skills and military financing to produce a PAK-FA killer before the PAK-FA becomes operational.

The Defense Science Board’s Capability Surprise Report and the recently published Supporting Papers are a giant step forward. However, these fine works are but a first and necessary step in a long journey that we must all traverse if the World is to enjoy peace and prosperity. The PAK-FA surprise is a litmus-test for the United States. We can all watch and wait to see the United States' reaction, starting with SecDef Gates' recommendation to his Commander-in-Chief President Barack Obama, and then to Congress. Or we can exert our democratic right to demand our political leaders to engage in the debate and insist SecDef Gates does what is right and what is best.

If he fails this simple test by failing to heed the message and act responsibly, then the United States and its allies can expect many more ‘Capability Surprises’. None of them will be pleasant.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-230210-1.html

 

[Singh]

PAK FA from technological POV ​

An interesting video about T-50 program was published by Russian 'Roscosmos TV'. The follow text is my translation to English:

Short acceleration – 200 m only – and the take-off is done! Other aircrafts can do this only from carriers. However, the Russian 5th gen fighter has a number of features allow it to take-off from a short horizontal airstrip. The 5th gen engine effectively provides it.
Ilia Fedorov, the Supervising Director of NPO 'Saturn', deputy general director of the Russian 'United Engine-building Corporation' (UEBC) tells about the difference of t-50's engine:
- "It has different thrust, naturally different tuning control. The number of constructive differences allow better thrust with lower fuel consumption. And the most important – it has totally different system of control".


The new engine of NPO 'Saturn' for PAK FA is the evolution of an engine family marked by the index '117'. Its tests on 'Saturn's facility in Rybinsk can be seen on this video. It proved its characteristics on the 1st PAK FA prototype: the taking-off is very steep on the video.

Sergey Chemezov, the Director General of 'Rostechnology' state corporation (NPO 'Saturn' owner) says:
- "The engine allows long time supersonic fly without the afterburner. The thrust-vectoring is provided for better maneuverability".

The engine is the heart of a fighter, but the radar is its eyes and ears. And the navigation system is like a 'vestibular system'. All these indispensible features of 5th generation were developed together with the fighter itself.
Sergey Chemezov, the Director General of 'Rostechnology' state corporation (NPO 'Saturn' owner) says:
- "The sub-units of 'Rostechnology' Corp. are produced engines and different devices for different planes including of course - PAK FA. I think they produce about 70% in this class of parts".
The pilots notice with pride: even the first prototypes have almost serial avionics. They have 5 next years for elimination this 'allmost' by tests.
Boris Obnosov, Director General of 'Tactical Missiles Weapon' Corp., says:
- "The intensity of the tests had no examples even in USSR era. It due to the big numbers of devices (missiles) and shorten terms of development. As it was already declared by RuAF Commander General we are responsible to provide this plane as a weapon system".
It's not kind of 'demonstration aircraft' for an air-show, but the formidable universal weapon system: air-to-air, air-to-ground, short, medium and long range. R-73 – is the smallest but formidable air-to-air missiles. It's in modernization. It's a 'digital' missile like all T-50's weapon systems.
Boris Obnosov, Director General of 'Tactical Missiles Weapon' Corp., says:
- "The obligate condition for 5th gen fighters like F-22 and PAK FA as well is intra-fuselage placement of missiles. It's provided for RCS reduction".
The American F-22 'Raptor' was considered invincible till T-50 appearance. F-22's constructive 'ideology' is stealthiness against ground-based radars. The 'Sukhoi's fighter 'ideology': to spot 'Raptor' early and to overwhelm it in the short range fighting. In fighting stealth vs. stealth the better radar will decide the winner.
Vladimir Zagorodny, Constructor General, the department Chief in NIIP 'Tikhomirov' says:
- "We will be able to counter these stealth fighters and even win them in some duel situations".
Vladimir Zagorodny shows his team 'baby': the radar for the new fighter. Due to secrecy the door here is usually closed for press, but they did exception for us. The AESA has more then 1500 MMICs. This radar is named AFAR in Russian: the active phased antenna array. Five AESA radars over all airframe will detect the targets in any direction.
Vladimir Zagorodny, Constructor General, the department Chief in NIIP 'Tikhomirov' says:
- "I didn’t see such technology in 'Raptor' or F-35".

All T-50's electronics is netted in a unified intellectual complex, able to prompt pilot what to do in the fly. Indeed, the 5th gen fighter – is sometimes called 'flying computer'. The part of the pilot work will be done by the computer.
Andrey Tyulin, Director General of 'Aviapriborostroyenie' concern, says:
- "The avionics allow high precision flying to the needed point, successful using high precision weapon, and aircraft precise positioning in the air space".

Stealth technology means less IR emission and less metal in the airframe. Then, the engine blades must be hidden and the composites must be used broader.
Nikolay Vymornov, the Chief Technologist of NPK 'Composite' says:
- "In F-22 and F-35 the use of composites in airframe is not less, then 40%. We are sure, in our PAK FA fighter the use of composites will not fall of this number".
The new carbon-plastic composite was already developed specially for 5th gen fighters. The metal details are made with new technologies too. The plane will fly on critical and even super-critical fly regimes. So the special requirements for the materials are needed. It's OK now in Russia: our country is the biggest titan consructions supplier.
Sergey Chemezov, the Director General of 'Rostechnology' state corporation (NPO 'Saturn' owner) says:
- "The titan alloys (of T-50) are manufactured in VSMPO 'Avisma' – the world biggest titan alloys and titan products manufacturer".
The first flying prototype – is only a subject for testing. When T-50 appears in RuAF colors it probably will look rather different. However, the work done is not done in vain.

http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2010/02/pak-fa-from-technological-pov.html

*Not sure if I posted before. Please PM if it has already been posted before.

 

[Singh]

Sukhoi PAK-FA - Russia's Strategic ‘Game Changer’​

When a nation accustomed to decades of projecting power loses control of large tracts of airspace, that is a strategic disaster. If that nation loses control of the airspace over its homeland, that is a strategic catastrophe.

America has enjoyed air superiority over airspace in locations of its choice for about 40 years. The F-22A ‘Air Dominance’ Raptor and the clear intent to establish the next level, air dominance, was an aircraft thirty years ahead of its time. Its concept design is now twenty years old, and the aircraft should be in full stride and in its prime. The Sukhoi PAK-FA is the new, younger, tougher kid on the block, and is likely to become the nemesis of the F-22A, but still prey to a more advanced F-22C.

Some will say, “if we are defeated in the air, the Navy will protect us”. “With what?”, is the response; “legacy aircraft like the F/A-18s, or the F-35B/C, with performance worse than the pre-legacy F-4E, so that its manifold deficiencies must be papered over by marketing spin like: ‘manoeuvre is irrelevant – let the missiles do the turning’?”. So when these aircraft are shot down by the PAK-FA escorting a swarm of Su-35S Flankers delivering carrier-killing supersonic missiles, the USN fleet is a sunk cause.

“Oh, well, the Army will protect us,” is the next response. Pity the poor Army. No US ground forces in recent times have ever operated without overhead air superiority, and as professionals, they know the dire consequences if the enemy controls the air. As an example, an Su-30/35 can carry three KAB-1500 bombs with a thermobaric fill. Detonate these in airburst above a dug-in Battalion, and nobody emerges alive or without serious, debilitating injury. One aircraft, three bombs, one Battalion.

“Well, we all know that Russian aircraft are rubbish, and won’t work in a real war” is the next piece of hubris. America, you have been here before. Here is what Robert Coram wrote in his biography of John Boyd, whose ‘energy-manoeuvre’ analysis became the genesis of the hugely successful air combat aircraft of the latter part of the 20th century, the F-16 and the F-15 – which has over 100 kills and no losses in air combat (‘Boyd’, Page 211):

’If there was a turning point, a time when even the most jingoistic Air Force General at last understood that Communist forces could build fighter aircraft superior to anything that America put in the air, it was Vietnam in 1967, the worst year of the war for the Air Force. It finally sank in that, as Boyd had said for years, the air force had no true air-to-air fighter. It is said that combat is the ultimate and unkindest judge of fighter aircraft. That was certainly true in Vietnam. The long-boasted-about ten-to-one exchange ratio from Korea sank close to parity in North Vietnam; at one time it even favored the North Vietnamese. When the war finally ended, one Air Force pilot would be an ace. North Vietnam would have sixteen.’

And so it goes. Yet today, the Gates OSD has killed the only program that has a chance of developing a capability to engage and defeat the PAK-FA – the F-22 Raptor, designed from the outset as an ‘air dominance fighter’. To make matters worse, the Gates OSD has delivered a ‘double-dog-in-the-manger’ to its allies by not producing enough F-22A aircraft to protect its own airspace of interest, let alone airspace of its threatened allies, AND by denying its allies access to the F-22A through a Foreign Military Sales export program.

Killing the Raptor program is transparently a marketing ploy designed to ensure that the F-35 JSF will be bought simply because it becomes a forced monopoly in the production and sale of US air combat aircraft.

The entry of the PAK-FA could see this backfire big-time on US industry. Nations like Japan and Israel could well take the attitude: “OK USA, we are under imminent threat, you cannot protect us with a meagre 187 F-22As, the F-35 is not up to the task, you won’t sell us the F-22A, so we will see what Sukhoi has to offer. And we will save money as the way things are going with the JSF Program, the PAK-FA will likely cost less than half the price of an F-35 and be fully operational that much sooner.”

Sukhoi has negotiated co-production of the PAK-FA with India, and further co-production deals could the centre of gravity of production of top-tier air combat aircraft to East Asia. Israel would no doubt be delighted to participate; its excellent avionics industry already provides equipment used in several types of Sukhoi combat aircraft. Operating the PAK-FA would give it access to Regional airspace where no F-35 would be able to enter and survive.

The US would be left with the scraps, producing ineffective combat aircraft that could only be sold by forcing purchases onto the wary and resentful US Armed Services, who would know that they are now ‘second tier’ and likely to be slaughtered en-masse in a shooting war.

This outcome would overturn President Obama’s 28 January 2010 statement that “I do not accept second-place for the United States of America” when it comes to any contest with Russia, India or China.

President Obama, ask your Intelligence Services for a ‘warts and all’ assessment of the air combat capabilities of the F-22A and the F-35 JSF, and those of the Su-35S and the PAK-FA, and be prepared to change the course of the Nation to ensure you are developing air dominating air power1.

The new Air Power Australia Analyses technical analysis paper ‘Assessing the Sukhoi PAK-FA’, produced by Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon, both of whom are experienced design engineers with complementary skills in other areas, while necessarily preliminary because of the recency of the maiden flight of the PAK-FA, clearly reveals this aircraft will become a giant, standing on the giant shoulders of the F-22A and the YF-232.

Sukhoi and the Russian MoD have maintained a clear understanding of the strategic value of control-of-the-air, and through a cost-effective and risk mitigating merge of evolutionary and revolutionary capability development, have drawn from their own knowledge, and knowledge borrowed from the USA, to produce what could, if left unchecked, become the world’s deadliest air combat fighter. There should be no sentimentality about these aircraft, they are killing machines in a world where it is ‘kill or be killed,’ and technical systems superiority puts pilots and nations well along the path to victory.

For the F-22A to defeat the mature versions of the PAK-FA requires that the existing production line remain open to provide interim protection for the US, and export aircraft for its allies, and to provide the industrial base to develop the F-22C Raptor II, with advanced capabilities such as an expanded kinematic operating envelope, more range, improved sensors and missile countermeasures, and a range of new air-to-air weapons that will be effective in finding and killing the PAK-FA3.

These capabilities could be added to the F-22 design in minimal time and at modest cost. The Raptor needs IRST sensors, more advanced control surfaces and control authority to provide extreme agility, advanced countermeasures including apertures for electronic jamming and towed decoys, 3D thrust vectoring and a variable-cycle engine to improve thrust and fuel efficiency at all altitudes. Using the Russian ‘evolutionary development’ model rather than the now favoured US rent-seeking ‘start from scratch development’ model, these enhancements would be added to a proven and effective aircraft at a fraction of the cost of development of the failed F-35 JSF, or the development of an entirely new aircraft. The US has sufficient lead in this area to stay ahead of the PAK-FA for the foreseeable future if it acts decisively, and acts now.

And how to fund the F-22C? Well, the answer has been staring everybody in the face for ages: kill the deeply troubled F-35A program and transfer the funds and recoverable technology to future F-22A and F-22C production – the economies of scale will result in a lower unit cost, saving around US$50 to US$70 million per aircraft.

The USMC F-35B? Well maybe, but the Marines should be asked again whether they really want to be in an F-35B with Su-35S and PAK-FA’s in the airspace. Perhaps they would feel safer and more effective in an F-22A or F-22C fleet, as proposed last year by APA4.

And the USN F-35C? No way – the PAK-FA (and, likely, the Su-35S) will be carrier based and to counter this, the USN needs a navalised F-22N developed in parallel with the F-22C to keep those supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles away from vulnerable surface fleet hulls5.

To conclude on a lighter note, NATO should assess the PAK-FA as a new type of air combat aircraft. We can speculate on what ‘F’ word they will choose, but ‘Fighter’ seems appropriate, for the time being.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-150210-1.html

 

[Singh]

DefPro : Sukhoi PAK FA: First Observations ​

Part 1 of a comprehensive overview on Sukhoi’s 5th generation fighter

06:51 GMT, February 10, 2010 On 29 January 2010, the Sukhoi PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally "Future Front line Aircraft System"), which could variously be described as a technology demonstrator, the first prototype of the future T-50 fighter, or an intermediate step between the two, took to the air for the first time from the freezing runway of Dzemgi Air Force Base (shared with the KnAAPO plant) at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East Siberia (see also http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/497/). A fundamental step has at last been accomplished in the development of the long-expected Russian response to the American F-22 RAPTOR air dominance fighter.

The aircraft, with Sukhoi test pilot Sergey Bogdan in the cockpit, remained airborne for 47 minutes, enabling an initial evaluation of its controllability, engine performance and primary systems operation, including retraction and extraction of the landing gear. “The aircraft performed excellently at all flight-test points. It is easy and comfortable to pilot”, said Sergey Bogdan.

“Today we’ve embarked on an extensive flight test programme of the 5th generation fighter,” commented Mikhail Pogosyan, Sukhoi Company Director General. “This is a great success of both Russian science and design school. This achievement rests upon a cooperation team comprised of more than a hundred of our suppliers and strategic partners. The PAK FA programme advances Russian aeronautics together with allied industries to an entirely new technological level. These aircraft, together with upgraded 4th generation fighters will define Russian Air Force potential for the next decades.

“Sukhoi plans to further elaborate on the PAK FA programme which will involve our Indian partners”, Mr Pogosyan added. “I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel its Western rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allow strengthening the defence power of Russian and Indian Air Forces, but also gain a significant share of the world market”.

Some Russian sources have suggested that the T-50 will enter service in 2015 (e.g. Russian 5th-generation fighter deliveries delayed until 2015), but this is but wishful thinking. Only another flyable PAK FA prototype and a ground test item exist thus far, while Sukhoi has indicated they will complete five prototypes for initial testing. These are scheduled for completion in 2011-12, with the company expecting to then produce an initial batch of pre-series aircraft for operational trials by 2015. A more credible projected IOC date for the T-50 would thus be towards the end of the decade - i.e. some 12-15 years after the F-22. Such a delay would be roughly in line when not with the scientific and technological potential of the Russian aerospace industry, then certainly with the Russian MoD’s financial muscle and the irredeemable time loss of the “black years” following the collapse of the USSR. There are persistent rumours of the PAK FA programme being largely financed directly by Sukhoi (some 75%, with the remaining 25% being provided by India), and in any case it is quite obvious that it could only progress thanks to the substantial revenues from export sales of Su-27/-30s.

Much has already been written and speculated about this first Russian 5th combat aircraft, but virtually nothing is known for certain. The few photos and the couple of videos documenting the first flight are all that is available for a first assessment of the aircraft’s characteristics, analysing its overall external configuration and trying to deduct the Russian Air Force’s requirements on which the PAK FA design can be assumed to be tailored.


Operational Considerations

As expected, the twin-engine PAK FA is a large aircraft, with roughly the same physical size and weight class as the Su-27/-30 family it is aimed to replace. The aircraft’s general configuration strongly suggests a design optimised primarily for the air superiority role, even though the T-50 will almost certainly eventually go along the same road as the Su-27 and evolve into a very capable multirole fighter-bomber. This emphasis on air-to-air combat is arguably due to both the Russian Air Force perceiving its main roles in a very different way than the USAF, and the fact that the Service’s deep strike requirements are satisfactorily covered by the very capable (although admittedly not stealthy) Su-34s currently being delivered.

Even though it is nearly automatic to think of the PAK FA/T-50 in terms of a direct confrontation vs. the F-22, and this may indeed have been the original goal when the programme was first launched in the late 1980s, in the current global strategic scenario it is perhaps more likely that the Russians are rather interested in maintaining an air superiority edge over China’s current J-11s/SU-27s/-30s and future J-12. Also, the expected future worldwide usage of the F-35 JSF attack aircraft with its low observability qualities requires an interceptor capable to deal with this peculiar threat.

Further considerations can be done as regards the expected future place of the T-50 in the Russian Air Force’s inventory, and thus the overall combat aircraft programmes in Russia. When first information on the PAK FA project started to circulate, the programme was widely reported to be intended to replace both the Su-27 and the MiG-29, thus leading to a single-type combat aircraft fleet not unlike the French Air Force’s with its RAFALE. Whether this was purely “disinformacija”, or the Russians were actually planning in that direction back then, it is impossible to ascertain. The fact is, the T-50 given its size and expected avionics complexity will most definitely be an expensive aircraft both to procure and operate, and it is very difficult to imagine how the Russian Air Force could ever be able to acquire it in large number - not to mention the type, for all of Mr Pogosyan’s rosy forecast, having a rather limited potential export market. Current Western and unofficial Russian estimates are of a production run of some 250 aircraft for the Russian Air Force, and even this may prove to be overoptimistic. The combination of the T-50 as the spearhead of a tactical combat fleet composed largely by modernised 4th generation types, as suggested by Mr. Pogosyan, does certainly make sense - but it is rather doubtful whether it could really last for “decades”, apart from the Su-35. Also, the upgrade programmes currently underway do not involve the MiG-29.

Hence, and although the notion of the Russian MoD and national industry being able to sustain the simultaneous development and eventual procurement of t w o different 5th generation fighters does admittedly defy imagination, the eventual launch of a programme for a smaller and less expensive “lo” fighter in a “hi/lo” mix with the T-50 looks virtually compulsory. Failing to do so would leave the Russian Air Force critically crippled in quantitative terms, and would consign the future export market for “affordable” fighter aircraft to Western and Chinese designs.


Part 2 of a comprehensive overview on Sukhoi’s 5th generation fighter

06:53 GMT, February 11, 2010 On 29 January 2010, the Sukhoi PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally "Future Front line Aircraft System"), which could variously be described as a technology demonstrator, the first prototype of the future T-50 fighter, or an intermediate step between the two, took to the air for the first time from the freezing runway of Dzemgi Air Force Base (shared with the KnAAPO plant) at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East Siberia (see also http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/497/). A fundamental step has at last been accomplished in the development of the long-expected Russian response to the American F-22 RAPTOR air dominance fighter.

Airframe

The aerodynamic configuration of the PAK-FA maintains a vague reference to the Su-27 as regards the fuselage and the location of the engines, which are installed in widely separated nacelles forming a tunnel with the flat bottom of the fuselage. The general planform is a tailed delta, similar to the F-22, with the all-moving horizontal tailplanes close-coupled and on the same plane to the wing without any gap. The twin vertical surfaces, canted outward by perhaps 25°, are also all-moving. This solution has been used rarely in recent times; in particular the ill-fated Northrop YF-23 had a pair of all-moving butterfly tailplanes. The all-moving verticals however had been fairly used in supersonic designs dating back to the late 1950s or 60s, in particular the SR-71 which used a pair of all-moving verticals canted inward to reduce the induced roll moment when the surfaces were rotated, and most of the North American design of the period - the RA-5C VIGILANTE, its contemporary YF-107 and the unique XB-70 - as well as the British BAC TSR 2 used a similar solution. In the PAK FA design, their reason d’être arguably consists in enabling the smallest possible vertical surfaces for the sake of reduced radar signature and supercruise drag, while at the same time also maintaining (in combination with the 3D TVC nozzles) excellent manoeuvrability.

The underfuselage tunnel between the engine nacelles contributes significantly to the overall aerodynamic lift generation, just as in the Su-27 and MiG-29 as well as in the F-14 - arguably the real originator of the “centreplane lift” concept. This lift is added to that provided by the large wing and should enable excellent manoeuvrability even at high altitude - a potential advantage of the F-22 and now the PAK FA over all their rivals. The widely separated engines also offer much better survivability in the event of battle damage or accidental fire/explosion.

The fuselage sides have marked “chines”, again like the F-22 and its unfortunate competitor, the YF-23. This shaping can be assumed both to contribute toward reducing radar reflectivity and to develop, at high angles of attack, favourable lift-enhancing vortexes flowing above the inner wing upper surface just above the engine nacelles. The wing has dropping leading edges providing for a variable camber airfoil and separate flaps and ailerons, these latter contributing towards enhanced TO/landing performance (this should anyway be very good, given the huge lift generated by the aircraft configuration as a whole). The inner part of the wing leading edges is stepped longitudinally with a much longer chord which blends forming, in part, the engine nacelles’ upper “lips” and then merging into the fuselage to enhance the lift generating characteristics of the overall aircraft configuration, somewhat akin to a lifting body. Possibly for this reason, but also to ease a smooth airflow into the engines at very high angle of attack, the upper intake projecting false “lips” appear to be hinged parallel to the sweep real intake lips, thus providing a variable camber like the wing leading edge. In this way, the upper surface of the air intake contributes to overall lift generation. It is also possible that the movements of these peculiar elements, when linked to the full authority digital flight control system, could contribute in some way to the aircraft’s longitudinal control, acting like a third control surface (in line with the Sukhoi tradition as exemplified in the three-surfaces Su-30MKI). It seem however clear that the “lips” cannot move as fully independent control surfaces, due to their primary role in ensuring a correct airflow to the engines.

The possible rationale behind the fuselage “chines” and wing strakes could be to generate two vortexes over each wing upper surface, thus enhancing lift (via more diffused vortex lift) at high angle of attack (AoA). In particular, the two inner vortexes (those generated by the fuselage “chines”) would energise the airflow over the inner wing upper surface blending with the fuselage above the engine nacelles. The two outer vortexes (those generated from the wing strakes outboard the intakes lips) would transfer their kinematic energy to the upper outer panel wing airflow. Furthermore, given the expected path of such latter vortexes, they would also interact with the upper airflow over the all-moving horizontal tailplanes - thus replicating the superior longitudinal control provided in the Su-27 by its peculiarly located slab tailplanes.*

Summing up, lift appears to be generated by following elements, working in a synergic way:

• Wing outer panels (outside the engine nacelles) with dropping leading edges (variable camber airfoil);
• Engine nacelles upper surface blended with outer wing panels and fuselage with dropping intake upper false lips/leading edges (variable camber);
• Fuselage tunnel between the engine nacelles;
• Vortexes generated from the front fuselage “chines“, enhancing the engine nacelles upper surface lift and possibly the all-moving verticals’ control authority at very high AoA;
• Vortexes generated by the wing strakes outboard the engine nacelles, enhancing the outer wing panels lift and possibly the all-moving horizontal tailplanes control authority at very high AoA.

The fuselage has the already mentioned flat bottom and a straight tapered upper part ending in a flat and somewhat smaller “sting” between the engine exhausts. The installation of a braking parachute in a bay in the upper part of the sting makes room for the rational introduction in the extreme tailcone of a wide-scanning ECM antenna or perhaps a rear hemisphere surveillance/tracking radar (experiments were carried out a few years ago on a modified Su-32FN). The second prototype, which was used for taxi trials on 23 January appears to have a different tail cone, for unclear reasons.

The rear fuselage beavertail appears wider than in the Su-27/-30 albeit with a similar layout, and should offer more freedom of movement to the multi-axis thrust vectoring control (TVC) exhaust nozzles which will most certainly be fitted to the engines of the T-50 (although their current presence on the PAK FA is not certain). This configuration with the widely exposed round engine exhaust nozzles is however detrimental in terms of rear-emisphere IR and radar signature.

The PAK FA is claimed by Sukhoi to offer “unprecedented small signatures in the radar, optical and infrared range”, and this is certainly true as regards Russian combat aircraft and quite possibly all existing non-American designs. At the same time, it is evident that the PAK FA has been designed with a close attention to stealth characteristics, but is not intended to be an uncompromising stealth aircraft à la F-22. When certain design features detrimental to low observability were deemed to be all-important, these were adopted nonetheless. It would be extremely interesting to watch the eventual results of this approach in terms of maintainability and operational availability, particularly in the light of the in-service experience so far with the F-22.

An element which maintains some similarity to the Su-27 family is the landing gear. All the members retract forward, easing the emergency extension which in this way can be accomplished simply by gravity and air pressure. The main tyres, again like the previous Sukhoi design, when retracted lays flat in bays partially above the air intakes and partially inside the thick wing root fairing born out from the air intake upper part and as a continuation of the sweep surface linking the fuselage side to the outer wing, running above the upper air intake lip.

The PAK FA appears to be built with a significant percentage of composites, including most of the wing, horizontal tailplanes and dropping intake lips skin, centre-forward engine nacelles, most of the fuselage skin and the doors of the weapons bays and landing gear bays. Metal parts seem to include the dropping wing and intake lips leading edges (with the exception of the inner sections where the conformal aerials are expected to be installed, and which should thus be built of dielectric material), the engine intakes and the wide fairings blending the outer wing panels to the fuselage. Press reports suggest a 75% (being weight) being made of titanium alloys and 20% by composites, which sounds plausible.


Powerplant

The planned engine for the T-50 is understood to be the new Saturn AL-41F, expected to offer about 17.5 tons of thrust in full afterburning mode and somewhere in the range of 12 tons in dry mode. The latter figure would comfortably enable supercruising (i.e., supersonic cruise flight without afterburner) at around Mach 1.5, thus in the same class as the F-22. The prototype/technology demonstrator now flying was expected to be powered by the Saturn 117S, a much improved version of the AL-31F intended for the Su-35 but still less powerful at 14.5 tons in full afterburning than the AL-41F. There however are some indications to suggest that the aircraft already has the new engines.

The engines are fed by two-dimensional raked air intakes with the upper lip generating an oblique shock wave favourable to dynamic pressure recovery in the supersonic regime, which for the PAK FA could approach Mach 2.3÷2.5. While in appearance of fixed geometry, it is possible that a variable-position upper ramp, to generate multiple oblique shocks is part of the system for a further better dynamic pressure recovery in the high supersonic speed regime.

The tight shape of the engine nacelles and the position of the ventral “venetian blind” auxiliary intakes seem to suggest that the PAK FA does not feature a serpentine air duct to the engine compressors, as typically adopted for low-RCS aircraft. It is possible that the Sukhoi designers have preferred to limit the compressors’ strong radar reflection by inserting a grill in front of them, while optimising the air intakes for higher max. speed and supercruise performance.

The engines are mounted with a slight forward convergence (some 3°). This, in twin-engine aircraft with conventional exhaust nozzles, would typically reduce thrust asymmetry in the event of an engine flame-out - although with the drawback of reduced controllability. Given however the installation of TVC nozzles, the choice of converging axis built into the nacelles could be the outcome of an aerodynamic local airflow optimisation due to interaction of all the aircraft elements.

A large fuel capacity in line with the previous Sukhoi fighters is certainly provided, let’s say in the order of 12,000 litres. A fully-retractable in-flight refuelling probe is installed on the left side of the fuselage in front of the windscreen.


Armament

The standard air-to-air armament is carried internally in two identical tandem weapon bays, which can be estimated at about 5m x 1.2-1.3m. The bays’ position inside the tunnel between the engine nacelles ensures a discrete opening of their doors at weapons launch, otherwise a drawback for a stealth aircraft. In addition, the doors have saw tooth-shaped edges to further reduce radar signature. The size of the bays can be assumed to allow internal carriage of eight R-77-class radar-guided AAMs with folding wings, i.e. the same figure as for the F-22.

Similar to American 5th generation types, for the “second/subsequent” days of war operations, four additional underwing hardpoints can be installed under the outer wing panels. However no wingtip store positions appear to have been foreseen. A dark area to the right side of the upper front fuselage under the cockpit betrays the installation, similarly to the Su-27, of a single cannon (a 30mm GSh-30-1?) for close combat engagements.


Avionics

The combat avionics of the T-50 has been under development for some time, and some elements will almost certainly be installed in the Su-35 interim fighter. The main sensor will be a Tikhomorov NIIP X-band radar with active AESA antenna, which was unveiled at the latest MAKS Air Show in August 2009. The 1m-dia. antenna contains some 1,500 solid stat transmit/receive modules by NPP Pulsar, which places it in the same class as the F-22’s APG-77. Tikhomorov claims an exceptional range of ~400km against a 1m² equivalent radar surface target. The radar entered bench testing in November 2008, and a flyable operational prototype will be completed by mid-2010.

In a very innovative development, the main X-band antenna will be supplemented by auxiliary L-band antennas installed in the wing inboard leading edges. In addition to the obvious IFF/SSR functions, this arrangement (which is also being offered for retrofit on the Su-27/-30 family as well as the Su-35), has a very clear anti-stealth search function. Most current stealth or semi-stealth designs - and most particularly the F-35 JSF, although not the F-22 - are optimised to reduce radar signature against X-band fire control radars as the main threat, and their low-observability features and shapings do not work as well against L-band radars. Of course, the lower the frequency the higher the wavelength the poorer the accuracy of distance and angular measurements, and thus even apart from excessive volume, weight, power and cooling requirements a fighter aircraft could not possibly rely on a main L-band system alone. However, the presence of the additional L-band antennas will provide an important early warning function against at least some low-observable targets, and it may also enable a “mini-AWACS” role. It is additionally conceivable that these antennas could also be used for the detection and disruption of sensors and digital communications systems operating in L-band, including e.g. the all-important JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16.

While the PAK FA has no functioning radar yet, it already sports the protruding head of an electro-optic IRST system in front and to the right of the cockpit’s windscreen. This will maintain the excellent mixed solution (radar/IRST) used in all modern Russian fighters, event tough the IRST seeker’s “ball” is at odds with the search for a reduced radar signature in the front emisphere. The decision to add the L-band antennas while maintaining the IRST reinforces the perception of the T-50 being mainly intended for air defence roles against intruding low-observable strike aircraft.


The Indian Factor

Back in early 2007, Russia and India reached an agreement to cooperate on a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) based on the PAK FA for the Indian Air Force. The programme is officially described as involving a 50-50% split as regards both financing and R&D activities, but it is nearly universally understood to rather cover a scheme, under which India will fund a substantial portion of the PAK FA’s development bill in exchange for access to the relevant technologies.

The Indian Air Force’s requirements do differ rather substantially from the Russian Air Force’s, and are reported to demand a twin-seat configuration as well as possibly a different wing and control surfaces. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd is expected to become responsible for some 25% of the total development workload for the FGFA programme, involving modifying the PAK FA single-seater airframe to a twin-seater configuration as well as the mission computer, navigation system, cockpit displays and ECM dispensers. HAL will of course also take care of eventual series production of a tentatively planned total of some 200-250 aircraft.

Indian sources have ventured into suggesting that the FGFA could be in service by 2015, but this is quite obviously not feasible given that development has not yet started. A logical date would be well into the 2020s.


Conclusions

As a first tentative assessment and on the basis of the basis of the scarce information as currently available, the PAK FA (T-50-1?) looks like a mix of well-proven solutions from previous Sukhoi designs married to several new ideas, in particular as regards the still superior quality of Russian aerodynamic research.

It is also possible that the significant delay suffered in developing a Russian counterpart to the F-22 could have turned into a blessing in disguise, giving Sukhoi designers a period of reflexion to generate a well balanced design. This would relate in particular to the decision not to push for extreme low observability characteristics at the expense of everything else, including not only flight performance but also acquisition costs and most importantly maintenance requirements and thus operational availability.


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By Sergio Coniglio


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* The Author cannot resist the self-incensing temptation to recall that exactly the same layout for exactly the same reasons - that is, leading edges alignment to reduce radar reflectivity and enhance high AoA lift by generating four separate vortexes spread along the wing span - was presented in the drawings of a notional future fighter in his article, “A New Fighter for a New World” published in MT 3/1993. The plan view showed the same alignment (sweep angle) of fuselage “chines” with the wing strakes outside the engine intakes, and the same alignment of the air intakes upper “lips” with the outer wing leading edges, as now adopted for the T-50.

http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/506/

 

[Kinshuk]

will the FGFA be better when compared to PAK-FA and what about chinese FGFA?what is it's status right now and if sometime in the future do we get our own twin seater FGFA what is the guarantee that we will be maintaining qualitative edge vis-a-vis china and pakistan?

FGFA is an Indian Variant of PAK FA, a two seater PAKFA to be specific. Indian already has SU 30 mki which is also a Variant of flanker, with Israel and french systems, It turns out to be the best flanker ever produced. It is too early to compare FGFA and PAKFA. Let the prototype fly first.

FGFA is our own twine seater, variant of PAKFA as I said. Don't forget its a joint venture. Pakistan and China both, won't be fielding FGFA in this decade at least..

 

[ankur]

but there are reports confirming chinese invovlement in developing their FGFA and they may be moving fast