LETHALFORCE
Mod
- Joined
- Feb 16, 2009
- Messages
- 29,966
- Likes
- 48,913
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/shooting-straight/flagging-off-our-northern-frontiers/
Flagging off our northern frontiers
July 23, 2017, 6:00 AM IST Lt General H S Panag in Shooting Straight | India, World | TOI
What India inherited in 1947 as far as Tibet is concerned, was a frontier region shaped by the Himalayan chapter of the Great Game, played over 150 years by British India, China, Russia and Tibet. It is difficult to apply Westphalian logic to the rival claims as India, China and Tibet are ancient civilisations and memories go back to centuries.
All this notwithstanding, the 1842 Treaty between the Sikh/Dogra Empire and Tibet and the Simla Convention of 1914 between Britain, Tibet and China were good start points to negotiate a settlement of the Himalayan frontier region.
But conventions and treaties are given short shrift by nation states in the frontier regions where physical, political and military control decides the eventual delimitation of the international boundary.
Such was the backdrop when the Sino-Indian frontier dispute began in early 1950s.
British India, China and Tibet were well-versed in oriental statecraft and we had inherited a first rate foreign office left behind by Britain. However, the legacy of our freedom struggle made us a romantic state with respect to international relations, as opposed to the hard realpolitiks, which China practised.
India understood the need for securing its northern borders, but was initially complacent due to difficulties of the terrain, a false sense of security due to the inherited military outposts in Tibet at Yatung and Gyantse, a Counsel General at Lhasa, a number of trading posts and a dysfunctional Tibetan state. This was despite knowing that Tibet was in virtual political control of area upto Tawang and some area in the Lohit division.
With respect to Aksai Chin, we were completely ignorant due to its remoteness even though the Dogras had patrolled the area and maintained an outpost at Shahidula upto 1947.
Thus, three years were wasted. It was only when China seized Tibet in 1950 that we woke up. Employing the traditional forward policy to flag the frontier, we first secured Tawang, Lohit and other areas up to the McMahon Line by 1951. Then we began the same process in the more inaccessible Ladakh.
Our military was weak and without any border infrastructure it was virtually impotent on the northern borders. Consequently, the strategy adopted was to rely upon diplomacy, avoid conflict and plant our flag in the frontier regions at the earliest to be in a better negotiating position for a final settlement. Contingent to this strategy was the urgent need to create the border infrastructure and prepare our armed forces for an inevitable conflict.
Alas, there was complete lack of will shown in this regard and very little was done for the 10 years that we gained. This was Jawaharlal Nehru’s biggest failure as the Prime Minister.
China adopted a much more aggressive strategy than India. It not only seized Tibet and Xingiang in 1950, but linked the two via Western Highway through disputed frontier region of Aksai Chin, thus establishing de facto control over entire Aksai Chin by mid 1950s.
As we woke up and moved forward Assam Rifles in the north east and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Ladakh along with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) posts, we came in contact with Chinese Border Guards on the western and southern fringes of Aksai Chin and along the watershed marked by the McMahon Line in 1959.
Given our poor infrastructure and weak military, we had done exceptionally well until now with the traditional forward policy to flag major parts of our frontier with Tibet, except for Aksai Chin where the Chinese pre-empted us. A de facto border that ran roughly along the present-day LAC was virtually established.
Now was the time for diplomacy to take centerstage and accept the actual ground positions as a mutually acceptable border without giving up our claims for a final settlement. Due to the revolt in Tibet and India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959, China hardened its position and came out with a new claim line in Ladakh.
With changing claim lines, border clashes were inevitable which took place on August 25, 1959 at Longju in Lohit and on October 21, 1959 at Kongka La in Ladakh. Until now, the goings on in the frontier regions had been secretive and were not in the public domain.
However, the border clashes and causalities led to immense parliament and public pressure. The PM lost his nerve and he abandoned a fairly successful strategy. All his subsequent actions became knee jerk tactical actions bereft of strategic thought. NEFA and Ladakh were placed under the Army control in August and December 1959.
A more aggressive ‘forward policy’ was adopted — not to be confused with the traditional frontier flagging forward policy adopted so far — which actually became ‘forward movement of troops’, to call the Chinese bluff along their claim lines.
Less by design and more by default, the PM blundered into a military confrontation on unfavourable terrain and with an Army that was ill-prepared for the task that was thrust upon it despite its vehement protests. Rather than calling the bluff of the Chinese our own bluff was called. Rest is history.
DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author's own.
Flagging off our northern frontiers
July 23, 2017, 6:00 AM IST Lt General H S Panag in Shooting Straight | India, World | TOI
What India inherited in 1947 as far as Tibet is concerned, was a frontier region shaped by the Himalayan chapter of the Great Game, played over 150 years by British India, China, Russia and Tibet. It is difficult to apply Westphalian logic to the rival claims as India, China and Tibet are ancient civilisations and memories go back to centuries.
All this notwithstanding, the 1842 Treaty between the Sikh/Dogra Empire and Tibet and the Simla Convention of 1914 between Britain, Tibet and China were good start points to negotiate a settlement of the Himalayan frontier region.
But conventions and treaties are given short shrift by nation states in the frontier regions where physical, political and military control decides the eventual delimitation of the international boundary.
Such was the backdrop when the Sino-Indian frontier dispute began in early 1950s.
British India, China and Tibet were well-versed in oriental statecraft and we had inherited a first rate foreign office left behind by Britain. However, the legacy of our freedom struggle made us a romantic state with respect to international relations, as opposed to the hard realpolitiks, which China practised.
India understood the need for securing its northern borders, but was initially complacent due to difficulties of the terrain, a false sense of security due to the inherited military outposts in Tibet at Yatung and Gyantse, a Counsel General at Lhasa, a number of trading posts and a dysfunctional Tibetan state. This was despite knowing that Tibet was in virtual political control of area upto Tawang and some area in the Lohit division.
With respect to Aksai Chin, we were completely ignorant due to its remoteness even though the Dogras had patrolled the area and maintained an outpost at Shahidula upto 1947.
Thus, three years were wasted. It was only when China seized Tibet in 1950 that we woke up. Employing the traditional forward policy to flag the frontier, we first secured Tawang, Lohit and other areas up to the McMahon Line by 1951. Then we began the same process in the more inaccessible Ladakh.
Our military was weak and without any border infrastructure it was virtually impotent on the northern borders. Consequently, the strategy adopted was to rely upon diplomacy, avoid conflict and plant our flag in the frontier regions at the earliest to be in a better negotiating position for a final settlement. Contingent to this strategy was the urgent need to create the border infrastructure and prepare our armed forces for an inevitable conflict.
Alas, there was complete lack of will shown in this regard and very little was done for the 10 years that we gained. This was Jawaharlal Nehru’s biggest failure as the Prime Minister.
China adopted a much more aggressive strategy than India. It not only seized Tibet and Xingiang in 1950, but linked the two via Western Highway through disputed frontier region of Aksai Chin, thus establishing de facto control over entire Aksai Chin by mid 1950s.
As we woke up and moved forward Assam Rifles in the north east and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Ladakh along with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) posts, we came in contact with Chinese Border Guards on the western and southern fringes of Aksai Chin and along the watershed marked by the McMahon Line in 1959.
Given our poor infrastructure and weak military, we had done exceptionally well until now with the traditional forward policy to flag major parts of our frontier with Tibet, except for Aksai Chin where the Chinese pre-empted us. A de facto border that ran roughly along the present-day LAC was virtually established.
Now was the time for diplomacy to take centerstage and accept the actual ground positions as a mutually acceptable border without giving up our claims for a final settlement. Due to the revolt in Tibet and India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959, China hardened its position and came out with a new claim line in Ladakh.
With changing claim lines, border clashes were inevitable which took place on August 25, 1959 at Longju in Lohit and on October 21, 1959 at Kongka La in Ladakh. Until now, the goings on in the frontier regions had been secretive and were not in the public domain.
However, the border clashes and causalities led to immense parliament and public pressure. The PM lost his nerve and he abandoned a fairly successful strategy. All his subsequent actions became knee jerk tactical actions bereft of strategic thought. NEFA and Ladakh were placed under the Army control in August and December 1959.
A more aggressive ‘forward policy’ was adopted — not to be confused with the traditional frontier flagging forward policy adopted so far — which actually became ‘forward movement of troops’, to call the Chinese bluff along their claim lines.
Less by design and more by default, the PM blundered into a military confrontation on unfavourable terrain and with an Army that was ill-prepared for the task that was thrust upon it despite its vehement protests. Rather than calling the bluff of the Chinese our own bluff was called. Rest is history.
DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author's own.
