LOC, LAC & IB skirmishs

[Shredder]

China Talks To Nepal About Doklam Standoff, May Conduct 'Small-Scale' Operations Soon
http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/0...klam-standoff-may-conduct-small-s_a_23066816/

They've gone bit(hing to Nepal now. This is getting ridiculous by the day, these lizards are just absolutely shameless!
Conduct your freakin operation already, it's almost been two months you bunch of pussies

 

[indus]

Who's saving the face.
I say the minute things go back to normal or kind of statuesque. Chinese propose a new threat with better calculation this time. They will be arguing to give back what they got.


Sent from my irisX8 using Tapatalk

I m surprised at the often use of the word face saver. Why is India so interested in saving face of the chinese. Why cant we bluntly say. Dear u made a mistake. Plz go back to where u were before. Its up chinese whether they want their face to be saved to asses to be saved. Only one thing can be saved at a time....

 

[lcafanboy]

Can India Embarrass China In A Limited Military Conflict?
Prakhar Gupta- Jul 26, 2017, 8:10 am
Shares 1 K

SNAPSHOT




Can India ward off a limited Chinese attack along the Line of Actual Control or the international boundary in Sikkim?

The answer lies in analysing force concentration and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear on the common border.





On 18 July, the South China Morning Post reported that China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had moved “tens of thousands of tonnes of military vehicles and equipment into Tibet”, quoting the PLA mouthpiece. Many such moves in the past one week, seen in the light of aggressive statements made by China’s foreign ministry and the blatant warmongering rhetoric from the country’s state-owned media, has triggered a debate in India. Although reports suggest that the PLA has not mobilised troops towards the border with India and that the recent live-fire exercise in Tibet was a routine affair – putting off the chances of a full-blown military conflict, prospects of a peaceful walk-back from the brink appear to be shrinking with every passing day.

Though the Doklam crisis will most likely not lead to war, a localised conflict is indeed possible if the PLA decides to up the ante – something China recently indicated as possible.

Under these circumstances, the question that arises is if India can ward off a limited Chinese attack along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or the international boundary in Sikkim. The answer lies in analysing force concentration and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear on the common border.

There are some misconceptions about the military balance along the Sino-Indian border. The most common of these is that China’s localised military strength along the border far outweighs India’s. However, studying the deployment of troops and air assets along the border, and particularly in Sikkim – the site of the current stand-off, one arrives at an entirely different picture.

Ground ForcesEastern Sector

The Indian Army has nine of its 12 mountain divisions deployed in the eastern sector. Each of these divisions usually consists of 15,500 combat troops and 8,000 support elements. Of these, three divisions – seventeenth, twenty-seventh and twentieth – are deployed near the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction, the site of the ongoing stand-off. These divisions are based in Gangtok (Sikkim), Binnaguri (West Bengal) and Kalimpong (West Bengal) respectively, guarding India’s vulnerable chicken’s neck, the Siliguri Corridor, which connects seven northeastern states with the rest of India.

Three mountain divisions – fifth, twenty-first and seventy-first – are deployed in Bomdila (Arunachal Pradesh), Rangiya (Assam) and Missamari (Assam). Bomdila is located just 170km from Tawang, an important centre of Tibetan Buddhism claimed by China as a part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). Additionally, three mountain divisions of the Indian Army – second, fifty-sixth and fifty-seventh – are deployed in Dibrugarh (Assam), Zakhama (Nagaland) and Leimakhong (Manipur) respectively.



Sino-Indian border deployments (units located via IHS Jane’s database, August 2016)


Against this, China has two mountain motorised infantry brigades and a mechanised infantry brigade close to the Indian border. While the mountain infantry brigades are based in Nyingchi region of Tibet facing Arunachal Pradesh, the only mechanised infantry brigade deployed close to the LAC is stationed in Lhasa, Tibet’s capital.

Western Sector

In the western sector, India has an infantry division and a mountain division. While the former is stationed in Leh, the latter is based in Dras. India also has an armoured brigade (with over 100 T-72 tanks) to cover the flat approaches from Tibet towards India’s crucial defences at Chushul.

The Indian side of the LAC in Ladakh sector is much more conducive for mechanised warfare than the Chinese side. In the Sino-Indian war of 1962, six vintage AMX-13 tanks of the Indian Army, which were airlifted to Chushul, inflicted severe losses and delay on the advancing Chinese Army.

In comparison, China has deployed a mechanised infantry division based in Hotan in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, north of Askai Chin – a part of Jammu and Kashmir that China currently occupies and claims as its own.



Sino-Indian border deployments (units located via IHS Jane’s database, August 2016)


Therefore, in terms of the number of troops deployed close to the boundary in both eastern and western sectors, India possesses a clear advantage.

However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military balance has limits. China’s newly carved out the western theatre command, which is tasked all along the Sino-Indian border, is known to have three Group Armies(corps-level military formations). Although stationed away from the border, China’s superior infrastructure allows it to quickly move troops, such as its Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) that it has raised in the last two decades, to the conflict zone. By some accounts, China can use RRF groups based in its western theatre against India within three to five days of having taken a decision to do so. This will erode the advantage that India has in terms of the number of troops deployed close to the border. China has built oxygen-rich, hyperbaric chambers in order to quickly acclimatise the forces it will bring to the war front.

While India has made some progress in terms of infrastructure development in certain areas such as Arunachal Pradesh, most of its strategically important roads and railway lines being built close to borders have faced considerable delay. That India has a lot of catching up to do is undisputed.

Air Force

As many as 31 Indian airfields – nine in the western and 22 in the eastern sector – are located close to the LAC. These include air bases in Leh, Jalpaiguri (closest Indian air base to the Chumbi Valley), Chabua (Assam) and Tezpur (Assam). Bases in Chabua and Tezpur are particularly important because of their proximity to the LAC and the presence of the front-line Sukhoi-30MKI fighters. Indian airbases in the northern plains, including those in West Bengal, can be used against China.

In addition, India has multiple advance landing grounds (ALG), such as the one in Daulat Beg Oldi (Ladakh), on which it has landed its heavy-lift aircraft. In the past few years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has also operationalised multiple ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, most recently in Ziro and Along. These ALGs augment IAF’s ability to operate from forward areas.



Location of air bases along the Sino-Indian border.


In comparison, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has nine major airfields in its western theatre command, which it can use to launch conventional air operations against India. These include bases in Hoping, Bangda, Shiquanhe, Bayixincun (facing Arunachal Pradesh) and Kongka. China also has airfields in Lhasa, Shannan and XIgaze, which it can make operational in short time. One of its bases in Tibet's Nyingchi prefecture is just 30km away from Arunachal Pradesh. It also has a score of tactical airstrips and helipads spread across the region.

However, most of PLAAF’s air bases in Tibet are located at an altitude of 4,500 metres. This puts the PLAAF in a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis IAF when deploying fighter jets on the Tibetan plateau because the load-carrying capability of the jets degrades significantly when they take off from bases at high altitudes. Due to reduced payload, the PLAAF has to cut down on the amount of ammunition and quantity of fuel its fighter jets can carry, significantly affecting its combat capabilities. The IAF, on the other hand, can operate with ease from its many airfields located in the plains in both the western and eastern theatres without compromising on its payload capabilities.

Lack of support infrastructure in air bases on the Tibetan Plateau is also a concern for the PLAAF. Most of these bases lack hardened shelters to protect aircraft on the ground, leaving them vulnerable to attacks. Rudimentary support infrastructure would make it difficult for the PLAAF to carry out large-scale air operations in a sustained manner.



PLAAF airfields in Tibet lacking support infrastructure (ETH Zürich)


In the Chengdu military region facing Arunachal and Lanzhou military region facing Jammu and Kashmir, which have now been largely merged to form the new western command, the PLAAF is know to have four fighter divisions, one transport division and one bomber division. All these divisions are currently based outside Tibet. Due to the lack of support infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau, the PLAAF cannot bring all of its air capabilities to the region. This significantly erodes the quantitative advantage that the PLAAF enjoys over the IAF. Moreover, the relatively long lines of communication for Chinese forces, strung across Tibet, would be vulnerable to interdiction by the IAF.

In comparison, most Indian air bases in both eastern and western sectors have sufficient support infrastructure, including reinforced aircraft hangars.



An aerial view of the Leh airfield showing aircraft shelters


Therefore, India possesses an edge in air power along the LAC. However, the advantages that India has are eroding rapidly, largely due to the decreasing size of India’s fighter fleet and the deployment of China’s integrated air defence networkin Tibet. By 2025, China will likely have more airfields in the wider Tibetan region, significantly increasing its ability to use air power against India.

In the broader sense, China has a numerical advantage over India in almost every area. But, along the border, India enjoys both operational and numerical superiority. This is clear when one looks at the character of force deployment and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear along the common border. So, can India embarrass China in a limited military conflict along the border? It likely can.

Former national security adviser Shivashankar Menon, in his book Choices, argues along similar lines. Beijing, Menon writes, backed down in the 2013 incursion at the Depsang valley in Kashmir’s Ladakh region “because of India’s improved capabilities, which left the Chinese in no doubt that India could embarrass them”.

India’s diplomatic efforts, he states, “have focused on convincing China that any misadventure would result in embarrassment and pain”.

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/can-india-embarrass-china-in-a-limited-military-conflict

 

[Chinmoy]

http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/spat.asp?id=2017/aug0617/BigPage14.jpg

 

[Mikesingh]

Two points:

First, the article above says, "Each of these divisions usually consists of 15,500 combat troops and 8,000 support elements."

It should read, "Each of these divisions usually consists of 15,500 combat troops WITH 8,000 support elements."

Meaning that the total is 15,500 INCLUDING supporting arms such as Artillery, armour, signals, engineers etc.

Second, the author doesn't have a clue on what 'hyperbaric chambers' are. He says, "China has built oxygen-rich, hyperbaric chambers in order to quickly acclimatise the forces it will bring to the war front."

This is bull. These chambers are only for treatment for those who suffer from high altitude sickness, hypoxia, High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema (HAPO) etc and not for acclimatization! There are basically two types of chambers: monoplace and multiplace which is self explanatory.

Acclimatization is done in two stages. The first at 10,000 feet and the second at 17,000 feet if deployment is higher than this altitude like many posts on Siachen Glacier that are over 17,000 feet. One has to ideally spend a minimum of 7 days for the body to get acclimatized at each stage. There's no quick fix solution to this.

 

[square]

China's three-pronged approach to hide its illegal activities and then justify them, all this for its hunger for land and resources and increasing its military might.

While there is still no resolve in the Indo-China Doklam standoff that erupted earlier last month, a new act of transgression by the Dragon has come to the fore - this time encroaching upon the sovereignty of Bhutan.

The Indian Army was informed by the Bhutan counterpart about the illegal road construction by the Chinese PLA by intruding upon the Bhutanese area so as to gain a strategically important location in Doklam area.

To China's consternation, India did not give in and stood firm to protect Bhutan's land, which China is dubbing as "unnecessary meddling by India in China-Bhutan relations".

Bhutan does not have an Ambassador posted in China and always communicates with the Dragon through the Indian Embassy. But having proclaimed itself as Big Brother in the region, India's stand of protecting Bhutanese land is sure to have angered and upset the Dragon.

With India not ready to listen, China is now resorting to its "Three Warfares" tactic, popular as "San Zhong Zhanfa" in China. This tactical approach is practised on the lines of mass (mis)information sharing so as to misguide and demoralise the opponent's defence forces and its population.

The Think Tank behind this unusal approach is the CMC - The China Military Commision. The CMC had first approved the use of such a move for the PLA - People's Liberation Army in 2003.

The 'Three Warfares' tactics are based on three mutually reinforcing strategies:

MEDIA WAR

Using Chinese Media to misguide their own public and shape international opinion about the present situation, by lying about how China's wrong stand is right, while at the same time garnering support of the international community, so as to justify if PLA takes any military action, China's acts should not be viewed as transgressions but rather as valid responses by the international community.

That is why China is bombarding the media with daily press briefings through its official media. China's nervousness is exhibited by regular and venomous threats by mouthpieces like Global Times and Xinhua.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR

With the audio-visual and photos released by Chinese media in the past few weeks of PLA war exercises, China is trying to create an impression that PLA is in such a position that it can assimilate the entire Indian Army in its Indo-China Border. This approach is to undermine Indian defence forces and their motto is to deter, and demoralise Indian military so that they are psychologically on a back foot. At the same time, the morale of the civilian population is also crushed. An example of this is China trying to remind India about the 1962 war while at the same time China says it will interfere in Jammu and Kashmir as well as liberate Sikkim.

LEGAL WAR

Talking on the Legal Warfare tactic, Lt Gen (retd) Shekatkar said that China's policy is that while dealing with its enemy on a land dispute, it will not leave the rival's area which China has intruded, instead it will demand more land from the enemy in the adjacent area, by bullying it. "This bullying strategy in practise by the Chinese is not only against India but all of its surrounding nations. Only this time it is Bhutan's turn to face the Dragon".

As far as Doklam is concerned, China can respond anywhere militarily, but the Indian government disapproving the Dragon's threatened act has behaved in a composed manner with a balance in military, diplomatic and political channels which the world has considered as a professional approach and this might have further rattled the Red Dragon.

• And thus the Chinese have come up with the power of "Three Warfare Tactic" concept. China has designed it to do this to India and India's befitting reply to China should be a united stance as a whole, which means the ruling party, the Opposition, the media and the citizens need to come together to counter it effectively and swiftly.

https://www.google.co.in/amp/m.indi...doff-war-three-warfare-tactics/1/1020390.html

 

[Hari Sud]

China Talks To Nepal About Doklam Standoff, May Conduct 'Small-Scale' Operations Soon
http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/0...klam-standoff-may-conduct-small-s_a_23066816/

They've gone bit(hing to Nepal now. This is getting ridiculous by the day, these lizards are just absolutely shameless!
Conduct your freakin operation already, it's almost been two months you bunch of pussies

Chinese are preparing for that small scale operation for their own internal consumption as their internal political mindset has gone vociferous. They would come in hundreds, all unarmed and try to push Indian out in a hand to hand fight from Doklam.

Well Modi is well prepared for that and equal number of Indian Army soldiers will go for hand to hand fisticuffs.

This incidentdent will be used by the Chinese political media as a victory if Indian soldiers yield even an inch. On the other hand, practice and training in Karate to the forward guards for the Indian Army is part of their training. They will match the Chinese tactic.

Cheers

 

[Screambowl]

Few days back even I went through such psycho situation but you will come back to normalcy soon. I can understand your frustration due to lack of action.

never underestimate ur enemy and plan things very very carefully if ur enemy is 5times bigger then u.
90% of ur media is run by Chinese funded left wing . 7 States of ur are living hell for security forces(Maoist are also funded by Chinese) near about all terror outfit's in NE are also funded by them. they are also running a bankrupt country in ur neighbour just to control u.
in short jinnke ghar shishe ke hote hai vo dusro pe patthar nahi marte

 

[Mikesingh]

............................................

 

[NeXoft007]

5 Porki terrorists killed in Machil Sector LoC. All 5 weapons also recovered.

 

[Hari Sud]

I

Can India Embarrass China In A Limited Military Conflict?
Prakhar Gupta- Jul 26, 2017, 8:10 am
Shares 1 K

SNAPSHOT




Can India ward off a limited Chinese attack along the Line of Actual Control or the international boundary in Sikkim?

The answer lies in analysing force concentration and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear on the common border.





On 18 July, the South China Morning Post reported that China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had moved “tens of thousands of tonnes of military vehicles and equipment into Tibet”, quoting the PLA mouthpiece. Many such moves in the past one week, seen in the light of aggressive statements made by China’s foreign ministry and the blatant warmongering rhetoric from the country’s state-owned media, has triggered a debate in India. Although reports suggest that the PLA has not mobilised troops towards the border with India and that the recent live-fire exercise in Tibet was a routine affair – putting off the chances of a full-blown military conflict, prospects of a peaceful walk-back from the brink appear to be shrinking with every passing day.

Though the Doklam crisis will most likely not lead to war, a localised conflict is indeed possible if the PLA decides to up the ante – something China recently indicated as possible.

Under these circumstances, the question that arises is if India can ward off a limited Chinese attack along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or the international boundary in Sikkim. The answer lies in analysing force concentration and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear on the common border.

There are some misconceptions about the military balance along the Sino-Indian border. The most common of these is that China’s localised military strength along the border far outweighs India’s. However, studying the deployment of troops and air assets along the border, and particularly in Sikkim – the site of the current stand-off, one arrives at an entirely different picture.

Ground ForcesEastern Sector

The Indian Army has nine of its 12 mountain divisions deployed in the eastern sector. Each of these divisions usually consists of 15,500 combat troops and 8,000 support elements. Of these, three divisions – seventeenth, twenty-seventh and twentieth – are deployed near the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction, the site of the ongoing stand-off. These divisions are based in Gangtok (Sikkim), Binnaguri (West Bengal) and Kalimpong (West Bengal) respectively, guarding India’s vulnerable chicken’s neck, the Siliguri Corridor, which connects seven northeastern states with the rest of India.

Three mountain divisions – fifth, twenty-first and seventy-first – are deployed in Bomdila (Arunachal Pradesh), Rangiya (Assam) and Missamari (Assam). Bomdila is located just 170km from Tawang, an important centre of Tibetan Buddhism claimed by China as a part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). Additionally, three mountain divisions of the Indian Army – second, fifty-sixth and fifty-seventh – are deployed in Dibrugarh (Assam), Zakhama (Nagaland) and Leimakhong (Manipur) respectively.



Sino-Indian border deployments (units located via IHS Jane’s database, August 2016)


Against this, China has two mountain motorised infantry brigades and a mechanised infantry brigade close to the Indian border. While the mountain infantry brigades are based in Nyingchi region of Tibet facing Arunachal Pradesh, the only mechanised infantry brigade deployed close to the LAC is stationed in Lhasa, Tibet’s capital.

Western Sector

In the western sector, India has an infantry division and a mountain division. While the former is stationed in Leh, the latter is based in Dras. India also has an armoured brigade (with over 100 T-72 tanks) to cover the flat approaches from Tibet towards India’s crucial defences at Chushul.

The Indian side of the LAC in Ladakh sector is much more conducive for mechanised warfare than the Chinese side. In the Sino-Indian war of 1962, six vintage AMX-13 tanks of the Indian Army, which were airlifted to Chushul, inflicted severe losses and delay on the advancing Chinese Army.

In comparison, China has deployed a mechanised infantry division based in Hotan in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, north of Askai Chin – a part of Jammu and Kashmir that China currently occupies and claims as its own.



Sino-Indian border deployments (units located via IHS Jane’s database, August 2016)


Therefore, in terms of the number of troops deployed close to the boundary in both eastern and western sectors, India possesses a clear advantage.

However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military balance has limits. China’s newly carved out the western theatre command, which is tasked all along the Sino-Indian border, is known to have three Group Armies(corps-level military formations). Although stationed away from the border, China’s superior infrastructure allows it to quickly move troops, such as its Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) that it has raised in the last two decades, to the conflict zone. By some accounts, China can use RRF groups based in its western theatre against India within three to five days of having taken a decision to do so. This will erode the advantage that India has in terms of the number of troops deployed close to the border. China has built oxygen-rich, hyperbaric chambers in order to quickly acclimatise the forces it will bring to the war front.

While India has made some progress in terms of infrastructure development in certain areas such as Arunachal Pradesh, most of its strategically important roads and railway lines being built close to borders have faced considerable delay. That India has a lot of catching up to do is undisputed.

Air Force

As many as 31 Indian airfields – nine in the western and 22 in the eastern sector – are located close to the LAC. These include air bases in Leh, Jalpaiguri (closest Indian air base to the Chumbi Valley), Chabua (Assam) and Tezpur (Assam). Bases in Chabua and Tezpur are particularly important because of their proximity to the LAC and the presence of the front-line Sukhoi-30MKI fighters. Indian airbases in the northern plains, including those in West Bengal, can be used against China.

In addition, India has multiple advance landing grounds (ALG), such as the one in Daulat Beg Oldi (Ladakh), on which it has landed its heavy-lift aircraft. In the past few years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has also operationalised multiple ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, most recently in Ziro and Along. These ALGs augment IAF’s ability to operate from forward areas.



Location of air bases along the Sino-Indian border.


In comparison, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has nine major airfields in its western theatre command, which it can use to launch conventional air operations against India. These include bases in Hoping, Bangda, Shiquanhe, Bayixincun (facing Arunachal Pradesh) and Kongka. China also has airfields in Lhasa, Shannan and XIgaze, which it can make operational in short time. One of its bases in Tibet's Nyingchi prefecture is just 30km away from Arunachal Pradesh. It also has a score of tactical airstrips and helipads spread across the region.

However, most of PLAAF’s air bases in Tibet are located at an altitude of 4,500 metres. This puts the PLAAF in a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis IAF when deploying fighter jets on the Tibetan plateau because the load-carrying capability of the jets degrades significantly when they take off from bases at high altitudes. Due to reduced payload, the PLAAF has to cut down on the amount of ammunition and quantity of fuel its fighter jets can carry, significantly affecting its combat capabilities. The IAF, on the other hand, can operate with ease from its many airfields located in the plains in both the western and eastern theatres without compromising on its payload capabilities.

Lack of support infrastructure in air bases on the Tibetan Plateau is also a concern for the PLAAF. Most of these bases lack hardened shelters to protect aircraft on the ground, leaving them vulnerable to attacks. Rudimentary support infrastructure would make it difficult for the PLAAF to carry out large-scale air operations in a sustained manner.



PLAAF airfields in Tibet lacking support infrastructure (ETH Zürich)


In the Chengdu military region facing Arunachal and Lanzhou military region facing Jammu and Kashmir, which have now been largely merged to form the new western command, the PLAAF is know to have four fighter divisions, one transport division and one bomber division. All these divisions are currently based outside Tibet. Due to the lack of support infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau, the PLAAF cannot bring all of its air capabilities to the region. This significantly erodes the quantitative advantage that the PLAAF enjoys over the IAF. Moreover, the relatively long lines of communication for Chinese forces, strung across Tibet, would be vulnerable to interdiction by the IAF.

In comparison, most Indian air bases in both eastern and western sectors have sufficient support infrastructure, including reinforced aircraft hangars.



An aerial view of the Leh airfield showing aircraft shelters


Therefore, India possesses an edge in air power along the LAC. However, the advantages that India has are eroding rapidly, largely due to the decreasing size of India’s fighter fleet and the deployment of China’s integrated air defence networkin Tibet. By 2025, China will likely have more airfields in the wider Tibetan region, significantly increasing its ability to use air power against India.

In the broader sense, China has a numerical advantage over India in almost every area. But, along the border, India enjoys both operational and numerical superiority. This is clear when one looks at the character of force deployment and capabilities that the two countries bring to bear along the common border. So, can India embarrass China in a limited military conflict along the border? It likely can.

Former national security adviser Shivashankar Menon, in his book Choices, argues along similar lines. Beijing, Menon writes, backed down in the 2013 incursion at the Depsang valley in Kashmir’s Ladakh region “because of India’s improved capabilities, which left the Chinese in no doubt that India could embarrass them”.

India’s diplomatic efforts, he states, “have focused on convincing China that any misadventure would result in embarrassment and pain”.

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/can-india-embarrass-china-in-a-limited-military-conflict

Indian Army sources have confirmed that no large scale movement of troops and hardware has taken place either to Chumbi or to Tibet. Hence all this paper is nonesense and true copy - paste of Global Times, who has been leading a virulent verbal attack against India.

 

[Kazah]

5 porkie pigs killed with no casualties on our side.. .Wow! ....i guess the porki post which supported this will get blown tonight

 

[sorcerer]

View attachment 18641
http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/spat.asp?id=2017/aug0617/BigPage14.jpg

Global times expect Indian and Indian media to be hyped up and against the administration after that shitty piece of an article.
chinese should undertand that by now, India has already vectored in everything and is ready for a show when the push comes to a shove.
India and Its citizens has always been behind the administration as a single entity always and always when there is an escalation.
if china doesnt know about the Indian resolve, china can ask its only friend in the world pakistan about the futile wars pakistan waged on behalf of china.

 

[captscooby81]

Well the chinese wont do anything in LAC as they are busy in SCS doing this ...bloody land grabbers ...
grab the poo ..

 

[sthf]

Apparently Chini morons are posting banner ads on various defence sites. "India's excuses for infiltrating China's land". To learn more visit Xinua.net.

Someone from the Chini propaganda department needs to be fired. Ain't nobody clicks on the banner ads anymore.

 

[Bornubus]

Pak Rnager - BSF

========================================================

 

[sayareakd]

https://t.co/C84IUYt0NU

Pakistani General on #DoklamStandoff according to him #China has failed to take action, is setback for China-Pak

 

[Kazah]

Pak Rnager - BSF

View attachment 18651

========================================================

who is this BSF uncle, looks like some cook

 

[Bornubus]

who is this BSF uncle, looks like some cook

Should be SI or ASI, look carefully the rank of his Pakistani counterpart.


==============

 

[Vinod DX9]

Hope situation gets back to normal,or may be the situation is already under control