That was the same pedal turn exhibited by the F-35 as in other TVC aircrafts. It's a turn with full authority.
The video posted above of the F-35 making what looks like a pedal turn was a stall testing. The F-35 there was falling after the test pilot intentionally made it stall. The video I posted was a "pedal turn" of the F-35 from the Paris Air show.
Re F-35's turning radius, well didn't I posted a video clip of the F-35 making a 360 degrees turn? You must be brainwashed by these Russian trolls and Dassault snake oil salesmen if you did not realized what I posted. And BTW, in case you again missed the characters shown in the video clip, that F-35 there beat Mig-35 despite being limited only to 7Gs due to temporary software limits.
And if you're thinking that any jet can escape a modern BVR infrared missile while doing a 360 degrees turn, no matter how tight it is, then you're out of your league posting in this forum.
A report about the F35 choice by Australia :
Lockheed Martin explained that there are five key elements that define fifthgeneration fighters: very low observable (VLO) stealth, fighter performance, sensor fusion, net-centric operations and advanced air-defence environments.18 When asked to explain the key differences between fourth and fifth generation fighters, Mr Jeff Babione, the Executive Vice President and General Manager of the F-35 Program at Lockheed Martin, emphasised the stealth, network-centric capability and sensor fusion provided by fifth generation fighters, noting that these advantages cannot be simply added to fourth-generation fighters but must be designed from the beginning.
Where is supercruise ?
A number of submissions raised concerns regarding the F-35's manoeuvrability and flight capabilities.7
Mr Peter Goon, Head of Test and Evaluation for Air Power Australia, told the committee that the F-35's flight capabilities do not exceed those of the F-16 and F/A-18 and questioned whether this would adequately serve Australia's future needs:
The F-35A has combat weight of 18.3 tonnes, a wing loading of 428 kg/m2, thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.07 and span loading of 1.75 tonnes/m. Wing sweep is 34°, and the engine has a power-to-frontal area ratio of 17.9 N/cm2.
As a result, the F-35 has very low instantaneous and sustained turn rates (less than half of the F-22's sustained turn rate, or ~11° per second) as well as low acceleration, while its weight harms the transient performance. The F-35's inefficient aerodynamics and inefficient power plant also limits combat endurance despite an excellent fuel fraction of 0.38. The F-35 has a specific fuel consumption of 0.9 lb/lb/hour versus 0.75 for other advanced combat jet engines.
The F-35's unequalled situational awareness, combined with advanced weapons and countermeasures, makes the F-35 highly survivable and lethal when confronting advanced threats in the air, land and sea battle space. It is not designed to perform like the F-22, a high altitude air-to-air combat aircraft. It is a multi-role aircraft designed to avoid Within Visual Range operations with acceptable turn performance comparable to the F-15E and F/A-18.
The JSF's stealth performance, reflected in shaping, was optimised around this model, with independent technical analyses showing that
the Aircraft will have viable stealth in the front sector, but much weaker stealth performance in the beam and aft sectors. The evolving market for radars and surface to air missiles has, however, taken a different turn to that anticipated when the JSF program was launched. Highly mobile long range SAMs, supported by high-power aperture radars, have been far more popular in the market than the short and medium range weapons which the JSF was defined to and built to defeat.
Mr Daniel Nowlan asserted that
the F-35 is not 'all aspect stealth' and that as a consequence, 'any
stealth advantage the F-35 enjoys is temporary at best and already compromised'. Mr Nowlan explained that the F-35's
inferior stealth capabilities are a consequence of shaping and cannot be changed.
What all this means in plain English is that any stealth advantage the F-35 enjoys is temporary at best and is already compromised. A very stark example of this is that Russia has ordered 100 55Zh6ME Nebo M radars. This is a mobile radar that combines VHF, L-band and S-band components with data fusion for counter-stealth. It is also highly likely this radar system will be available for export.
number of submissions raised concerns regarding the performance of the F-35's mission systems. Mr Mills noted that the F-35's air combat capabilities are dependent on the proper functioning of the mission systems software and that the mission systems software development 'is said to be the largest project of its type in the world'. This engenders significant risks of failure: In software development, increasing the size of the code-base presents an exponentially increasing risk of failure. For example, 'regression testing' must prove that a sub-program for one operational function does not have adverse or unforeseen consequences to other operational subprograms. Synchronising 'real time' computations across a complex multifunction platform such as the JSF aircraft is another substantial risk.28
Aided Night Vision Acuity: in which there was insufficient contrast in low light conditions; and • Alignment/Optical Targeting Accuracy: in which symbols' alignment accuracy met requirements for Block 2 capabilities but needed to be improved to meet alignment accuracy requirements for Block 3 and up, which are driven by gun strafe capabilities requirements
Some submissions raised concerns regarding the F-35's reliance on data exchanges. Mr Archibald warned that disruptions to data exchanges could significantly compromise the F-35's effectiveness and noted that aircraft turn-around will be directly linked to the speed with which the necessary data can be downloaded and uploaded:
Mr Robert Charette asserted that the F-35 cannot function without all of its software operating at an extremely high level, describing the F-35's reliance on ALIS as a 'major source of operational risk'Software is the heart and soul of the F-35: without it functioning at an extremely high level of reliability, availability and maintainability, the F-35 is no more than a nice aircraft museum piece. This includes both the embedded software found on the aircraft itself, as well as the ALIS system which is tightly coupled in an unprecedented manner to the F-35…If ALIS indicates that an F-35 isn't ready to fly, it takes significant manual effort to override its decision. Further, it is a major source of operational risk: if ALIS doesn't work correctly, it is no exaggeration to state that the aircraft doesn't work, either. From a systems view, the reliability of the F-35 is a combination of both the embedded flight systems' software and the ALIS system, a fact that the F-35 program understandably does not wish to highlight.
there is now a requirement for greatly enhanced cyber security above that which was planned for when the F-35 and ALIS were first being developed. As the F-35 contractor program team has admitted, this was an 'unforeseen requirement', at least in its scope. While debatable, the fact remains that to implement security into a system after the fact, rather than designing it in from the beginning, is a well-known 'original sin' of any software system development. With the extensive use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software in ALIS, much without robust cyber security built in from the beginning, is an especially worrying concern.
[The simulation results] only represent parts of a virtual F-35 in a virtual world (Lockheed Martin Land) where the laws of physics, advanced threats and systems are ignored and the virtual F-35 has capabilities that do not exist outside of the simulation. Right now [the simulation] is not only incomplete in terms of contemporary and future threats as well as models for the combat scenarios but also inaccurate for its intended purpose.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) asserted that Defence should prepare a hedging strategy that provides for the possibility of further delays to the
F-35 delivery. ASPI explained that a failure to do so could 'drastically limit the range of possible responses in the early 2020s, and a capability gap could become a possibility'.12 ASPI noted the wisdom of past hedging stratégies:
ASPI advised that the 'most sensible hedge' would be to order another tranche of F/A-18F Super Hornets. ASPI explained that this would be the best option as no other fifth-generation aircraft is available on the world market; most, if not all, of the fixed costs of acquiring the Super Hornet have already been borne; and any other type of aircraft would bring with it new supply chains and flight and ground crew training requirements, putting strain on the RAAF's capacity to absorb the several other new types of aircraft in the pipeline. ASPI noted that, taking into consideration a three or more year lead time for the delivery of a new-build Super Hornet, a decision would need to be made by 2019 at the latest.
ASPI noted that, taking into consideration a three or more year lead time for the delivery of a new-build Super Hornet, a decision would need to be made by 2019 at the latest.
While it may not have the stealth capabilities of 5th generation aircraft such as the F-35, the Gripen has many other attributes such as higher speed, better manoeuvrability due to its canard-delta wing configuration, the ability to carry a greater weapons payload for sustained fighting, and perhaps most importantly, a better range and combat radius, able to be extended even further through aerial refuelling with our fleet of KC-30A MRTT aircraft. As a complete package, it out-performs the F-35A in almost every arena, and would give our forces one of the best platforms with which to fight and win against the newest generations of Sukhoi, Mikoyan and various Chinese-built fighters which have been talked about already.36
Some submissions mentioned the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale as potential alternatives to the F-35.38 Mr Marcus Kollakides noted that '
the Eurofighter Typhoon is probably the world leading dogfighter and air superiority fighter, possibly just inferior to the F-22 Raptor'.
Mr Kollakides described the Dassault Rafale as 'a brilliant dogfighter, so close to the Typhoon in ability it is difficult to call'. Mr Kollakides also noted the Dassault Rafale's multi-role capabilities: 'it has exceptional strength and design features which lend themselves to multi role capabilities above and beyond the Gripen or Typhoon' and 'would meet or exceed all the requirements for Australia'
Is it enough for you, mate?
