Dogfighting and the F-35
Recently I have been working on a post on the F-35 and «dogfighting» and after new allegations have surfaced concering the effectiveness of the F-35 in this area (or lack of such) it becomes even more relevant. In this post I will therefore try to elaborate a bit more on air-to-air combat and which factors help determine its outcome.
A dogfight is combat in the air between two aircraft where the distance is short enough that the pilots are able to see each other with their own eyes. When training for this kind of combat, we call it «Basic Fighter Maneuvers» (BFM). Before the days of missiles and radars, dogfighting was the only form of air combat, and machine guns (or cannons) were the only weapons. This changed rapidly during the 1960s, but it turned out that early missiles were unreliable. Machine guns and «dogfights» were therefore still relevant in both the Vietnam and Yom Kippur wars.
The F-16 was also immature in many ways when the Norwegian Air Force received them during the 1980s. The radar was «shortsighted», and the only armament were guns and short ranged heat-seeking missiles. During the 1980s, Norwegian pilots trained to meet Soviet aircraft with long-range missiles. The Norwegian pilots could certainly hope that the Soviet missiles would not work, but it would be foolish to rely on such an assumption. As a result, Norwegian F-16s would go defensively into any dogfight, with the aim of surviving the initial long range fire of their opponent, before being able to hopefully retaliate once the battle moved within visual range. To do so, the only thing our F-16s could do was to try to confuse the enemy with deceptive maneuvers; perhaps this would allow at least one of our aircraft to survive all the way to a merge and hence have an opportunity to catch up? The problem was that such diversionary maneuvers tended to confuse both parties. Therefore, the starting point for the ensuing dogfight was poor.
With the F-35 however the situation is quite different. Today’s missiles are far more reliable and the sensors are in a completely different league. I know that the F-35 will perform formidably at long range, but it is not my intention in this post to discuss whether dogfighting is relevant or not for the F-35. There are several reasons why the F-35 could end up in a dogfight. After all, when all the missiles are gone the gun is the only option that we are left with. Or what if we meet an opponent with an even smaller radar signature? Or an opponent that is able to evade all our missiles, in one way or another? My focus in this post is therefore the factors that help determine the outcome of a dogfight.
The performance of the airplane is important. The most relevant factors are how small I can make my turn radius, how quickly I can turn the aircraft around and how quickly the airplane can accelerate and gain speed. But let’s say that I am training BFM in «my» F-16 against a SAAB Safari (basic trainer) from the pilot training school at Bardufoss. Would this be an easy match? As it happens, the Safari is actually better than the F-16 in two relevant areas; it has a smaller turning radius and can fly slower. As a consequence, I will lose if I enter the fight on the Safari’s terms, and try to win by «out-turning» my opponent (just ignore for the moment that the Safari is completely unarmed).
The relevance is that although the F-16 is an agile airplane, I cannot beat neither the SAAB Safari nor any other combat aircraft without having a good plan for doing so. In a dogfight between an F-16 and a SAAB Safari I will have other strenghts; I can find the Safari on my radar and enter the fight unseen, I can sustain five times the speed of the Safari and I can fly higher.
So what would I actually have done in a theoretical dogfight like this one?
I would have done anything I could to sneak in undiscovered; plunge down on the Safari from an almost vertical position, slightly behind. The Safari-pilot wouldn´t have had any realistic chance to see me before the attack was over. If I had missed with the first volley from my cannon, the plan would have been to «escape» vertically upward again, and repeat the attack. This is not something the Safari would be able to match. I would be fighting the Safari on my own terms.
So how does this apply in the case of an engagement between the F-16 and the F-35? It depends, and it particularly depends on how the F-16 is loaded. A stripped-down F-16 is a formidable opponent to anyone in BFM. However, this changes quickly when we dress the F-16 up for combat. If we are to compare the F-16 and F-35 on an equal basis, we must assume that the F-16 will be carrying both external fuel, a «jamming pod» for electronic warfare, weapon mounts for bombs, missiles and a camera pod for target acquisition and illumination. With this loadout, the F-16´s performance is significantly reduced: The maximum angle of attack is reduced by 40% (the ability to move the nose away from the direction of travel), the roll rate is lowered, the maximum allowable airspeed is reduced and the g-limitations are stricter.
So what, you might ask? My point is that a that a well thought-out plan is essential. I need to know the strengths and weaknesses of both my own airplane and that of my opponent. Even with a superior and modern fighter I must utilize my own strengths and not let my opponent dictate the terms of the fight.
Overall I can say that a stripped-down F-16 has slightly better sustained turn rate than the F-35. However, an F-35 has the advantage with regards to getting inside the turn of its opponent. In a dogfight between the F-16 and the F-35 they will therefore both have strengths to play on.
When we train BFM in Norway – F-16 against F-16 – it is often the case that one of the two plays the role of the opponent. When an instructor acts as the opponent to an inexperienced pilot, the instructor commonly refrains from using the afterburner. Compared to the instructor, the student pilot has 60% more engine power available – a «twin engined» F-16! Still, the student pilot does not always win, despite superior power and performance.
Another common scenario is to train from a defensive starting point. At exercise start, the ‘aggressor’ will usually be 3,000 ft behind, in a lazy turn. In this situation, the aggressor has every advantage. With a skilled pilot, the defending aircraft should not be able to survive an attack from such a short distance. Nevertheless, it still happens that the roles are switched, and the hunted becomes the hunter. My main thesis is therefore hardly controversial; the pilot who trains consistently and builds experience – the pilot with a large «bag of tricks» – will win!
How I end up in a dogfight is also a critical factor. Just earlier today I was lucky enough to be able to practice three BFM sets in the F-16. Two defensive sets, and one «high aspect» set. Before we took off, we went through the initial parameters, our roles, safety rules and objectives for the exercise. The world was simple; two fighters in the training area and one mission to complete. I was 100% ready to defend myself in the best way possible when my colleague called «fight’s on» over the radio. When we run larger and more realistic scenarios, however, my experience is that the path leading up to a BFM-engagement tends to be both confusing and chaotic. If we are in control, know what we are doing and interpret the tactical situation correctly, we will not end up in a dogfight. When we do end up in a dogfight anyway, it tends to be both unexpected and inconvenient.
The first hint of an unseen foe could be cannon rounds slamming into the hull. That rarely ends well. Fortunately, the F-35 is tricky to spot and has very good sensors. It’s hard to sneak up on an F-35 without being detected. I think it is unlikely that I will be caught completely off guard in the F-35. I my opinion, the most likely scenarios for an F-35 to end up in a dogfight is that an opponent somehow has evaded its missiles, or that all missiles are spent. Therefore, I believe that the F-35 will be the one to enter the arena with the best situational awareness. Having an overview of the situation will allow me to plan my attack; I can prepare myself mentally for what will happen, I can minimize my signature, maybe try to sneak up on my opponent from a dead angle. I can adjust my speed, height and geometry, I can dump heavy weapons to make the aircraft more maneuverable, and I can prepare my desired weapon and optimize the sensors as I approach the merge. I would therefore argue that the situational awareness of a well-trained pilot is the strongest factor when it comes to winning a dogfight.
Kampflybloggen (The Combat Aircraft Blog) is the official blog of the Norwegian F-35 Program Office within the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The author of this piece, Captain Morten Hanche, is a F-16-pilot with the Royal Norwegian Air Force, and has been picked to lead Norwegian Operational Testing & Evaluation of the F-35.
