Indo China War Simulation Thread

[Angel of War]

Do study PLA tactics. They have a habit of infiltrating behind lines and attacking enemy posts, isolating them and taking them by surprise. They did this in Korean War and 1962. They managed to capture large amounts of Indians in 1962 Becuase of the simple fact they had infiltrated behind forward posts and ambushed withdrawing Indian columns. These tactics were instrumental in causing not just large amounts of casualties but also taking large amounts of POWs.

Ahh , I remember reading about this . PLA's plan for isolating indian troops between Tawang and bomdila . It goes as follows - Smashing the head - Sela
snapping at the waist - senge
Disecting the belly - Dirang
Cutting the tail - bomdila
The concept of operations was to: advance along multiple axes, envelope (outflank) Se La and Bomdila, and reduce these subsequently. The plan was as follows:

55 Infantry Division (comprising three infantry regiments and three artillery regiments) was to advance along Axis Tawang – Se La and launch the main attack against Se la. The division was given the task of ‘smashing the head’.
Simultaneously, 419 Tibetan Division (three infantry regiments) was to advance from the West, through the narrow corridor between Se La and India-Bhutan border, to assist in the capture of Se La from the South and capture Dirang Dzong in concert with troops of 11 Infantry Division advancing from the East. This was aimed at ‘dissecting the belly’.
Four companies of SMS were to carry out an outflanking move from the East and position themselves North of Dirang Dzong along the road to Se La; their task being to ‘snap at the waist’.
In coordination with the attack against Se La, 157 Infantry Regiment ex 419 Tibetan Division was to carry out a further outflanking move (from the West) to capture Senge Dzong (South of Se La and North of Dirang) and link-up with four infantry companies of SMS which were carrying out a similar outflanking move from the East, in order to cut-off the Road Se La – Dirang completely.
11 Infantry Division (comprising two infantry regiments) was to carry-out a wide outflanking move along route Rho – Tse La – Poshing La – Thembang and cut-off Road Dirang Dzong – Bomdi La(cutting-off the tail). Thereafter, in concert with 1 or 2 infantry regiments of 419 Tibetan Division, to capture Dirang Dzong, and develop further operations for capture of Bomdi La.
164 Infantry Regiment ex 55 Infantry Division was to act as reserve and was tasked to clear the road axis to Bomdi La.

 

[Joe Shearer]

First, fortify positions on dominating peaks. We need the tactical high ground. Dig down and let them bash you head on, repulsing attack after attack.

Second, the most overlooked part of war, is logistics. In 1962, Indian troopers on newly established posts were poorly supplied. Similarly, in Kargil, Pakistani troopers on their posts were also poorly supplied after India isolated their posts. Logistics is key especially in areas like Ladakh and Arunachal.

Third, this is just a personal suggestion, but mountainous terrain like Ladakh, it can be suitable for ambushes. Again, not sure if they would work, but they are def. worth giving a try.

Do study PLA tactics. They have a habit of infiltrating behind lines and attacking enemy posts, isolating them and taking them by surprise. They did this in Korean War and 1962. They managed to capture large amounts of Indians in 1962 Becuase of the simple fact they had infiltrated behind forward posts and ambushed withdrawing Indian columns. These tactics were instrumental in causing not just large amounts of casualties but also taking large amounts of POWs.

All of this is true, what you say is correct, but perhaps if you read what I am about to present later during this day, you will understand why we are not getting into defensive pockets and fighting a back-to-the-wall war.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers

In 1962, the Chinese did not use human wave tactics, except in one sector, the west, at Rezang La and, later, at Chushul, attacking Gurung Hill and the Spangur Gap.

In NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh, what they did was far more nuanced.

First, in capturing the Thag La Ridge positions, first there was the psychological intimidation. Then, when they crossed the Namka Chu in force, they did so at night, gathered at one end of the trenches, and rolled up the entire line. The troops that got away from this debacle got away by retreating west, going into Bhutan and emerging in the lowlands.

Second, in the subsequent battle to dominate and annihilate the 4th Division, the PLA advanced on several axes, mainly off-road, against a division helplessly strung out on the Se La - Tawang road; one section came down the road Tawang to Se La and put pressure on the front of the column. Another section - several sections - marched down the Bailley Trail and cut the road between Se La and Dirang. Other sections from west and east launched a further pincer movement and cut the trail at several more places.

The whole manoeuvre has been described clearly and lucidly by @Angel of War in post 441.

It was a battle of a mobile, focussed enemy with a very clear plan of action against a single division that tried to build a box at Se La with some memory of the remarkable Battle of the Box from the actions in Burma during the Second World War, but without the essential element of being able to live on air-dropped supplies.

Detachments of Indian troops that broke away from the road and tried to escape south were ambushed by machine gun parties that had set themselves up in anticipation of such a retreat and gunned down the escaping jawans.

Walong was a third, different case.

Because the numbers were greater than ours, the PLA tactically were perceived, wrongly, to be using human wave tactics. On the contrary, they concentrated all their strength against our weak points and broke our line.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Joe Shearer How did the PVA manage to give stiff competition to US forces in Korea despite having technological inferiority. Does that somehow prove that numerical superiority can offset Massive technological And infrastructural advantages On the enemy's side ? Can we take some lessons from the korean experience of the PLA in fighting a technologically superior force and use it for ourselves to offset PLA's technological and infrastructural superiority over us ?

As you have illustrated yourself in your graphic description of the Battle of Se La, what the Chinese did to win was not overwhelm us with numbers, but seek out the weak points, the junctures between two formations of the enemy, and attack those with concentrated force.

In other cases, they infiltrated at night, and attacked a formation on the flank.

In most cases, they set up ambushes on the path that retreating enemy troops would be likely to take, and intercepted and captured or killed large numbers of the retreating enemy.

Can we use these tactics against the Chinese? Yes, but not in defensive mode.

 

[Joe Shearer]

RAND has established a paper on PLA ORBAT , you can find the PDF copy

I am using data like that with caution, because they change their deployment very rapidly and very often.

Today, while they have concentrated some matching numbers against us throughout the border, and stopped the bottle, their own main concentration is facing Taiwan..

 

[karn]

As you have illustrated yourself in your graphic description of the Battle of Se La, what the Chinese did to win was not overwhelm us with numbers, but seek out the weak points, the junctures between two formations of the enemy, and attack those with concentrated force.

In other cases, they infiltrated at night, and attacked a formation on the flank.

In most cases, they set up ambushes on the path that retreating enemy troops would be likely to take, and intercepted and captured or killed large numbers of the retreating enemy.

Can we use these tactics against the Chinese? Yes, but not in defensive mode.

When one is heavily outnumbered.. countering such infiltration is not possible right .? And this scenario probably won't be repeated if both sides have equal troops..

 

[Joe Shearer]

When one is heavily outnumbered.. countering such infiltration is not possible right .? And this scenario probably won't be repeated if both sides have equal troops..

Yes, you are right.

Did you notice that this infiltration can happen in broken country, in mountain country, in forest country and by taking maximum advantage of low visibility conditions, such as night-time?

The point I am trying to present to you is that once a problem is recognised, it can be addressed.

What I hope to do is proceed sequentially, in a line, one consideration after the other. After we have appreciated the geo-political context, and the psychological milieu, we can look at the present-day ORBAT and the possible expansion or contraction eight years later, or greater, with a view to incorporating visible development of technology, and from that only proceed further.

That proceed further would consist of framing our war aims, keeping the geo-political context, and the psychological milieu in mind, and keeping the capability of the PLA in mind; of structuring our ORBAT for that period in the future, of ensuring that the forces have the right equipment and sufficient supplies to fight to the extent that the war aims demand, and preparing a plan that indicates how we should move and why.

It is for that reason that I have not gone into details yet. The time for that is after the preliminaries are done and dusted.

 

[hit&run]

Shriman , what is linear frontal attack ?

No or minimal maneuvering. Allow them to entrench and then flush them out head-on.

 

[Love Charger]

No or minimal maneuvering. Allow them to entrench and then flush them out head-on.

Sir. If everything goes right then i will take part in such a attack one day in real life too, god willing

 

[Joe Shearer]

Shriman , what is linear frontal attack ?

This had a different meaning in different ages of warfare.

In times when there was no organisation but two armed forces met for battle, both would close (after bows were discharged, on occasion, if either or both forces had archers), frontally, at a walk or at a run, and a melee would ensue.

With the Greeks, in the 5th century BCE, the armed line moved forward with each member of a line keeping up with his neighbours to left and right until they clashed with their opposites. These hoplites were very heavily armoured, with breastplate, helmet and greaves, and carrying a shield and a spear, and swords at their sides, for melee combat.

This went through stages, from the original hoplite line to the longer spears of the Thebans, and their tactics of 'refusing' or keeping one side of the line behind the other, so that the enemy line was hit at different times, and then to the combined arms of the Macedonians, that won Philip and his son such famous victories.

The Romans destroyed the phalanx with their creation of the legion, and were unstoppable even by masters of warfare like Pyrrhus, until they encountered the military genius of the age, Hannibal. Under the Romans, the frontal assault consisted of a walking advance until spear-throwing range, when the spears were thrown, swords drawn and the enemy charged.

A period of complete domination of the battlefield by horsemen ensued; there were episodes like Stamford Bridge, where two sets of northern armoured soldiers fought it out hand to hand, in the old style of advancing towards each other's ranks and engaging in a melee; the side that was victorious was slaughtered only a few days later by Norman horsemen.

The next revival of the frontal assault came with the Swiss, who brought enormously long pikes to battle, and effectively quelled cavalry more than anyone else had done, except for the flashes of brilliance provided by the Welsh, later, the English long-bowmen. The Swiss phalanx of long pikes was completely unbreakable and a long period of Swiss and imitation pikemen dominating the battlefield followed.

The advent of firearms brought the tercio, that fought in a 1:5 combination of arquebusiers and pikemen, where each protected the other. Tercios marched at a regular pace, in time, allowing no space for the enemy to get through to the soldiers within; what penetrated through the pike-line was shot by the arquebusiers. The tercio dominated Europe until Rocroi, when the genius of the Prince of Conde broke the tercio for ever.

In the subsequent flintlock musket era, when a musket-ball could pierce plate armour at 100 yards, the trouble was to get the firing line to within range of the enemy, who more often than not had an identical firing line. So the two lines (often) marched at a marching pace (typically 120 paces per minute or less) until they got to firing range, and then fired at each other. This was the most cold-blooded version of frontal linear attack.

Frontal assaults such as this continued for some time; the Crimean War was one of the worst examples, in terms of casualties, until the next episode, the American Civil War.

With the invention of the machine gun and formation of larger and larger artillery batteries; frontal linear assaults led to the hideous casualties of the American Civil War, and served to warn Europe of what was to ensue. Although frontal linear assaults continued, but at a run, with bayonets fixed, during later wars in Europe, notably the Second Schleswig War, the Austro-Prussian War, and finally, the Franco-Prussian War.

After these hostilities the First World War followed, and there is nothing to be gained by ploughing through the details of trench warfare. Subsequent events in the modern world are too well known to require repetition or analysis. Perhaps one last sentimental mention? 3rd Jat at a flat-out run at the Battle of Dograi, in the face of machine gun fire.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Back this evening after medical procedures.

 

[Love Charger]

Back this evening after medical procedures.

All the best sir

 

[Kumaoni]

6 Kumaon had actually counterattacked and tried to capture Chinese positions in Walong, and the attack was an initial success, but it petered out due to inadequate artillery support. Again, you need coordination between Infantry and artillery. So many instances of lack of coordination in the 1965 war especially on the first 2 days of the Lahore Front. This war will most likely be a limited one so I doubt airforce of armor will be used.

 

[Angel of War]

6 Kumaon had actually counterattacked and tried to capture Chinese positions in Walong, and the attack was an initial success, but it petered out due to inadequate artillery support. Again, you need coordination between Infantry and artillery. So many instances of lack of coordination in the 1965 war especially on the first 2 days of the Lahore Front. This war will most likely be a limited one so I doubt airforce of armor will be used.

Airforce will not be ruled out even in a limited war . Without the air force we're fukked in certain sectors . In the central sector where our force levels are inadequate it is the air force which will have to take the lead in counter offensives in case chinese launch an attack there

 

[Kumaoni]

Airforce will not be ruled out even in a limited war . Without the air force we're fukked in certain sector . In the central sector where our force levels are inadequate it is the air force which will have to take the lead in counter offesnives in case chinese launch an attack there

PLAAF airforce is fifteen times superior to ours In terms of quality. It’s best if we *dont* bring in the airforce

 

[Angel of War]

PLAAF airforce is fifteen times superior to ours In terms of quality. It’s best if we *dont* bring in the airforce

How did you reach that conclusion ? If you had said 3 three then I would have still agreed with you. PLAAF bases in tibet suffer from various handicaps which our bases in tezpur , jorhat , chabua , adampur , srinagar , bareilly , dehradun , hasimara and pasighat don't face

 

[Kumaoni]

How did you reach that conclusion ? If you had said 3 three then I would have still agreed with you. PLAAF bases in tibet suffer from various handicaps which our bases in tezpur , jorhat , chabua , adampur , srinagar , bareilly , dehradun , hasimara and pasighat don't face

How many 5th gens do each have?

 

[Angel of War]

How many 5th gens do each have?

That's not a valid reason to say they are 20 times better . Even with 4.5 generation fighters we have certain qualitative advantages over them . For example , how many 3rd gen jets do they operate ? Some 400 J7s , 250 JH7As , and even some J8s. We only operate 180 3rd gen jets

 

[Kumaoni]

That's not a valid reason to say they are 20 times better . Even with 4.5 generation fighters we have certain qualitative advantages over them . For example , how many 3rd gen jets do they operate ? Some 400 J7s , 250 JH7As , and even some J8s. We only operate 180 3rd gen jets

Just give a comparison between the two air forces in quality.

 

[Angel of War]

@Joe Shearer Here is an analysis on the Operations in walong Sector
While the Chinese main offensive in the Eastern Theatre was directed against the Tawang – Bomdi La Sector, the subsidiary was launched in the Walong Sector. The Chinese aim was to annihilate the Indian troops deployed in Walong Sector and in the process advance upto their claim line of 07 Nov 1959, i.e. almost the foothills. Initially on the Indian side, Walong Sector was the responsibility of 5 Infantry Brigade which was part of 4 Infantry Division. It was the Assam Rifles which manned the border posts. In response to occasional Chinese incursions through the Lohit Valley, 2 RAJPUT was moved into the area. In Mar 1962, it was replaced by 6 KUMAON
Walong, a small hamlet, is situated in the vicinity of Tri Junction of Tibet, Myanmar and India. It lies astride the ancient trade route. The terrain in the area is characterised by high mountains, narrow valleys and dense forests. The valley is divided by the Lohit River, a very fast flowing stream about 100 metres wide at its narrowest point and is 20-30 feet deep. There was no bridge and movement from one bank to the other was by a cable called a twine. There are numerous small branches joining in, both from the East and West, emanating from steep narrow valleys. From the valley floor-around 700m, the mountain peaks rise to approximately 5000m, with vast variation in the temperatures.
Operations in Walong Sector can be divided into three distinct phases as under :-

(a) Initial Operations: 18 – 24 Oct.

(b)Reorganisation and Build-Up: 25 Oct-I3 Nov.

(c)Main Battle: 14 – 21 Nov.
i will post further info on all three phases