Indo China War Simulation Thread

[Joe Shearer]

We do have chinese members here

I would have liked to drag them in and put them to work on one side. However, that is still almost a month of planning away.

Now that your notes on the 62 experience are in, we need to do a Lessons Learnt exercise, and use that for our planning. This is about 2030, after all. Just give me a little time to recover. It was an exhausting visit to the doctor.

 

[Kumaoni]

Can’t repeat Galwan Mistakes. Need to be careful in patrolling that region, and be wary of any Chinese encroachments.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Can’t repeat Galwan Mistakes. Need to be careful in patrolling that region, and be wary of any Chinese encroachments.

Is it better to be reactive, or should policy be pro-active? If they create tensions at point A, go to pre-determined, pre-planned point B and give them a hard time.

 

[Kumaoni]

Is it better to be reactive, or should policy be pro-active? If they create tensions at point A, go to pre-determined, pre-planned point B and give them a hard time.

I’ll quote Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh on this: “A defensive attitude of mind can at beast avert a defeat- it cannot achieve decisive results”. Make of that what you will.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I’ll quote Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh on this: “A defensive attitude of mind can at beast avert a defeat- it cannot achieve decisive results”. Make of that what you will.

Precisely.

 

[Kumaoni]

Precisely.

If we want, we can be on that defensive, but we need to be well fortified to take a heavy toll on the enemy. Break up attack after attack, and then when they retreat and demoralize, we have to go on the counter attack. This is one mistake we always do; after decisively repulsing attacks, we don’t press home in the broader scheme (not an individual attacks but in theatre level battles), for example, in Longewala, if we pursued Pakistani troopers while they retreated, half of their only division gaurding Sindh would have been decimated, and this would have caused a crisis in Pakistani High Command. Same things in Bara Pind, and Poonch, we didn’t press home the victory and exploit. Need to press all the way and focusing on not just repulsion, but total decimation of enemy forces.

 

[Joe Shearer]

If we want, we can be on that defensive, but we need to be well fortified to take a heavy toll on the enemy. Break up attack after attack, and then when they retreat and demoralize, we have to go on the counter attack. This is one mistake we always do; after decisively repulsing attacks, we don’t press home in the broader scheme (not an individual attacks but in theatre level battles),

Yes, that is a mistake, made by commanders who are not prepared for the unexpected.

for example, in Longewala, if we pursued Pakistani troopers while they retreated, half of their only division gaurding Sindh would have been decimated, and this would have caused a crisis in Pakistani High Command.

That is a very bad example.

The Pakistani attack was a spoiler and it succeeded, although at a cost that nobody in the Pakistan Army had suspected. It succeeded in putting Khambatta off his stride, and ruined his thrust towards Multan.

Same things in Bara Pind, and Poonch, we didn’t press home the victory and exploit. Need to press all the way and focusing on not just repulsion, but total decimation of enemy forces.

All the 1965 examples and the 1971 examples are fraught with controversy.

In any case, be careful of getting the Mods on our backs. They don't like off-topic discussions. Remember the caution issued at the beginning, when opening the thread. We have to discuss this separately.

 

[Joe Shearer]

If we want, we can be on that defensive, but we need to be well fortified to take a heavy toll on the enemy. Break up attack after attack, and then when they retreat and demoralize, we have to go on the counter attack. This is one mistake we always do; after decisively repulsing attacks, we don’t press home in the broader scheme (not an individual attacks but in theatre level battles), for example, in Longewala, if we pursued Pakistani troopers while they retreated, half of their only division gaurding Sindh would have been decimated, and this would have caused a crisis in Pakistani High Command. Same things in Bara Pind, and Poonch, we didn’t press home the victory and exploit. Need to press all the way and focusing on not just repulsion, but total decimation of enemy forces.

If we are to apply these lessons to our simulation exercise, we will be thinking of more than reaction to what the PLA GF are doing.

 

[Kumaoni]

Yes, that is a mistake, made by commanders who are not prepared for the unexpected.



That is a very bad example.

The Pakistani attack was a spoiler and it succeeded, although at a cost that nobody in the Pakistan Army had suspected. It succeeded in putting Khambatta off his stride, and ruined his thrust towards Multan.



All the 1965 examples and the 1971 examples are fraught with controversy.

In any case, be careful of getting the Mods on our backs. They don't like off-topic discussions. Remember the caution issued at the beginning, when opening the thread. We have to discuss this separately.

The point is that merely taking a heavy loss is not enough. You need to follow up with a decisive counter attack to teach the enemy a lesson.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The point is that merely taking a heavy loss is not enough. You need to follow up with a decisive counter attack to teach the enemy a lesson.

We are on the same page. Now let us apply this to the northern frontier at a division level, at a corps level, and at an Army Group level. What do we get?

 

[Joe Shearer]

In fact, war is unlikely. Both sides lack the ability to attack each other in depth. In India, many roads are open to traffic seasonally, and they mainly rely on warehouses and air transportation to maintain logistics.
The Chinese side mainly relies on the G219, and it is difficult to support the first-level attack of the group army only by relying on one road.

We are discussing a hypothetical scenario dated around 2030, later, if players want it later. There are reasons why India should be planning for war, both as a defensive measure, and as a curative measure. The discussion, slightly derailed by my indisposition, should show us what is worth considering.

 

[Angel of War]

Is it better to be reactive, or should policy be pro-active? If they create tensions at point A, go to pre-determined, pre-planned point B and give them a hard time.

we should follow a policy of pro activeness , they strike us at one point , we strike them on another . Exactly like what we did in the south bank in august

 

[Joe Shearer]

Both sides lack the ability to attack each other in depth.

Recognising this is a considerable part of the solution. Once we know there is a problem, we can plan for it.

Let us remember that Hitler decided to invade Russia; in doing so, he made fundamental mistakes.

Historically, on the northern frontier, we have two examples; one was a disaster, where logistics and weather finished off the initial thrust into Tibet, but where the subsequent resistance to a Sino-Tibetan riposte and a pitched battle resulted in the only substantial treaty before the heights of British imperialism were scaled and the second attempt took place.

That second attempt was a bloody affair, and resulted in many things, almost none of which have survived until today. That gave India the right to place trade and commercial representatives within Lhasa, and to rights of passage, and attempted to demarcate the eastern boundary, although it was never properly done.

Both have lessons for us, including lessons in logistics.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In India, many roads are open to traffic seasonally, and they mainly rely on warehouses and air transportation to maintain logistics.

Is this beyond the reach of technology?

 

[Joe Shearer]

The Chinese side mainly relies on the G219, and it is difficult to support the first-level attack of the group army only by relying on one road.

Also on the Qing Hai railroad, again a single line of communication several thousand kilometres away from supply sources.

I have used this analogy before and suggest it again: we have a long skewer opposed to a comb. There are good and bad elements mixed up in this, on the ground.

 

[Kumaoni]

We are on the same page. Now let us apply this to the northern frontier at a division level, at a corps level, and at an Army Group level. What do we get?

Depends on what size they attack us with. In the Northern Region battles will be fought for strategic dominant posts which will be usually held by 15-20 men tops. This means we can expect at least 2 company PLA attacks.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Depends on what size they attack us with. In the Northern Region battles will be fought for strategic dominant posts which will be usually held by 15-20 men tops. This means we can expect at least 2 company PLA attacks.

Again, you have not got it.

Why do we always think of defending against an expected, or an unexpected attack?

 

[Kumaoni]

Again, you have not got it.

Why do we always think of defending against an expected, or an unexpected attack?

What should we do though? We don’t have the logistics nor military capabilities to start this war with China. They have the Tibetan plateau so they are at a bit of a geographical advantage.

 

[Joe Shearer]

What should we do though? We don’t have the logistics nor military capabilities to start this war with China. They have the Tibetan plateau so they are at a bit of a geographical advantage.

Which year are we thinking about? Today? This year, 2022?

Why?

Is that how planning is done, for the next month? Are we planning a college picnic?

 

[Kumaoni]

Which year are we thinking about? Today? This year, 2022?

Why?

Is that how planning is done, for the next month? Are we planning a college picnic?

Not sure what is being asked here.