Indo China War Simulation Thread

[Super Flanker]

I suspect that was due to overwhelming mass, not just technical superiority. In the Indian case, that wouldn't apply; they couldn't focus all their efforts on a relatively narrow frontage.

However, the possibility of switching off the AD grid can be tried. What happens? Does the PLA AF sweep in? Or do we ignore air power on both sides?

There is absolutely no way that Airpower won't come into play here. Both sides (India and China) will most probably dedicate Airpower but at the same time the fight might be between only IA and PLA because we all saw how China and India both didn't use Airpower in 1962 indo-sino war.

I have seen numerous posts on DFI Claiming that IAF has an edge in regions Such as Himalayas as IAF Fighter engines (Russian, US etc) are supposively Superior to Chinese engines as Chinese engines have trouble at higher altitudes?

NOTE : I am talking about Chinese jets armed with WS series of engines.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Joe Shearer said:
Just bullet points.

Drastically reduce head-count.
Smaller formations - the tetra-brigade, or even smaller.
Far better equipment, not our present nanga-bhukha soldiery.
Centralised logistics, communications and medical services.
Very high mobility in the plains.
Very fixed numbers in the high mountains.

Follow Mao - 'flout the enemy strategically, respect him tactically.'
Click to expand...

Joe Shearer said:
DON'T give me those like icons. What do you think?

Hmm, although a lean and mean army is the future, let's look at it from a different viewpoint.

Drastically reduce head-count..

We can surely cut the extra flab, but we need to maintain numbers. Manpower is the biggest factor countries face when going to war. Yes, we can't have bhuka-nanga soldiers with just a rifle running around the battlefield, but if we are going to take China & Pakistan (eventually both of them at the same time), manpower will be crucial.
We cannot be shy of losses, especially since China can always produce more artillery, more aircraft, and more armored vehicles than we can, and they are likely to always maintain superiority over it.

Very fixed numbers in the high mountains.

? Explain ? Mountains are perfect defenses. We need to make the Himalayas a death pit for the Chinese, that need ruthless guerrilla warfare.

Joe Shearer said:
The LAST thing we should do is throw soldiers at them.

Numerical superiority is paramount in winning war, our appetite to throw soldiers at them will offset their advantage of equipment and technology to some extent. The sole reason we are still retaining Galwan valley is because on on 15th June night, our soldiers did not hesitate even a bit to charge into an enemy, superior in number, better equipped, and better positioned.

Soldiers don't kill soldiers.
Artillery kills soldiers.
Bombs kill soldiers.

Will just point out, this is not true always. Afghanistan (with both Soviet and America), and Ukraine now is showing a different case point.

 

[Joe Shearer]

With the previous posts more or less gathered into one space, let us address the geopolitical context, the need for any action, offensive or defensive, and war aims. The ORBAT will follow, some assumptions will be lifted, and that should, it is hoped, set the scene.

 

[hit&run]

AT THIS MOMENT, they have token forces, but can bring in large numbers if they are not distracted by Taiwan. The current situation is that they have four or five airfields with their current front-line a/c, but the bulk of the Western airfields are earmarked for training.

Logistical footprint? Present, but not overwhelming.
Frequency? Rare. They are just letting us see their a/c on the ground, without actually making aggressive moves. Not at all like Taiwan. There have been flights and there have been Indian claims of detecting their stealth fighters, but this is a claim, nobody knows what really happened.
Interception? At the moment, between their AD and their manned interceptions, IAF casualty rates will be high, even though they will get through to their targets some of the time. In air-to-air, remains to be seen. The capability of Chinese pilots is suspect.

The way I read it, we do not need too many packages to deliver read sorties inside TAR. The attrition rates will be tolerable before the objectives of cutting the eastern outbound road from Lhasa is achieved.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The way I read it, we do not need too many packages to deliver read sorties inside TAR. The attrition rates will be tolerable before the objectives of cutting the eastern outbound road from Lhasa is achieved.

Yes, precisely, part of the context will deal with their obvious contempt for the Indian armed forces and their arrogant belief that they are on top of the situation.
It is quite unlikely that they will be prepared for an attack, leave alone attacks on their ground troops after preliminary air strikes, or for a serious effort at meeting their troops in battle.
We will take casualties, but achieve our objectives.

 

[hit&run]

Hmm, although a lean and mean army is the future, let's look at it from a different viewpoint.


We can surely cut the extra flab, but we need to maintain numbers. Manpower is the biggest factor countries face when going to war. Yes, we can't have bhuka-nanga soldiers with just a rifle running around the battlefield, but if we are going to take China & Pakistan (eventually both of them at the same time), manpower will be crucial.
We cannot be shy of losses, especially since China can always produce more artillery, more aircraft, and more armored vehicles than we can, and they are likely to always maintain superiority over it.


? Explain ? Mountains are perfect defenses. We need to make the Himalayas a death pit for the Chinese, that need ruthless guerrilla warfare.


Numerical superiority is paramount in winning war, our appetite to throw soldiers at them will offset their advantage of equipment and technology to some extent. The sole reason we are still retaining Galwan valley is because on on 15th June night, our soldiers did not hesitate even a bit to charge into an enemy, superior in number, better equipped, and better positioned.


Will just point out, this is not true always. Afghanistan (with both Soviet and America), and Ukraine now is showing a different case point.

@mist_consecutive has already made a couple of submissions on those points. Was there any consensus?

 

[Joe Shearer]

@mist_consecutive has already made a couple of submissions on those points. Was there any consensus?

No. I hope to get him, and others, into the discussion, just down the line after the geo-politics and the psychological background.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@mist_consecutive has already made a couple of submissions on those points. Was there any consensus?

Effectively, his view was that we would be attacked, and that would be the only possible occasion for hostilities; that we would be supported by mountainous terrain always being easier to defend than to attack, and that our defensive efforts would be far more manpower-intensive than technology-intensive.

It will be necessary to convince him that a pre-emptive campaign will serve our purpose better, and is not to be seen as suicidal. Also that not being on the defensive, locating ourselves on the highest mountains will be to no purpose. We need to debouch onto the Tibetan plateau and force them to come to us.

Thirdly, in these conditions, logistics would be the bottleneck, and therefore head-count should be limited. That will allow a proper supply of materiel at all times.

 

[hit&run]

No. I hope to get him, and others, into the discussion, just down the line after the geo-politics and the psychological background.

I don't want to speak for others but he made a pertinent point on not reducing the numbers.

High Army attrition secondary to their so-called arrogance and mismanagement of the battle strategies/tactics is a fallacy that many readers including ex-military have been making. Either we stay true to following the objectives or play this morgue accountant's game of counting body bags and remain confused forever. Furthermore, the NATO parameters of war-making applied to us are unjustifiable. Both against Pakistan and China we will have more casualties because we can not afford an air superiority air force. If Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers then Indian linear frontal attacks like we mounted on Kargil Peaks and defensive consolidation on key frontiers should also be seen as the best possible strategy to deny China any respectful fight or capturing of our strongholds.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I don't want to speak for others but he made a pertinent point on not reducing the numbers.

High Army attrition secondary to their so-called arrogance and mismanagement of the battle strategies/tactics is a fallacy that many readers including ex-military have been making. Either we stay true to following the objectives or play this morgue accountant's game of counting body bags and remain confused forever.

This is not understood.

Furthermore, the NATO parameters of war-making applied to us are unjustifiable. Both against Pakistan and China we will have more casualties because we can not afford an air superiority air force.

The point will be borne in mind.

If Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers then Indian linear frontal attacks like we mounted on Kargil Peaks and defensive consolidation on key frontiers should also be seen as the best possible strategy to deny China any respectful fight or capturing of our strongholds.

Points noted. This is not the thread, otherwise it would have been useful to note that the fighting in the Thag La Ridge region, the isolation of Se La and the use of the Bailley Trail were all done with no recourse to human wave tactics.

'Human wave' implies a frontal attack; neither Thag La Ridge, nor Thembang, nor Se La's isolation and attacks on the troops strung out on the roads without shelter were also not frontal attacks.

Walong was a different matter, with considerable confusion that masked any clear tactical plan, and the only clear-cut case of human wave tactics was on display on the western front, at Rezang La and at the locations near Chushul, the Spangur Gap and Gurung Hill.

There is also the question of whether in the simulation Indian troops are proposed to defend or to attack. If attack, the question of the Chinese troops being held off and barred from capturing our strongholds is redundant; it is the Indian troops that will be seeking to capture PLA strongholds.

I will return to these points tomorrow.

 

[Love Charger]

I don't want to speak for others but he made a pertinent point on not reducing the numbers.

High Army attrition secondary to their so-called arrogance and mismanagement of the battle strategies/tactics is a fallacy that many readers including ex-military have been making. Either we stay true to following the objectives or play this morgue accountant's game of counting body bags and remain confused forever. Furthermore, the NATO parameters of war-making applied to us are unjustifiable. Both against Pakistan and China we will have more casualties because we can not afford an air superiority air force. If Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers then Indian linear frontal attacks like we mounted on Kargil Peaks and defensive consolidation on key frontiers should also be seen as the best possible strategy to deny China any respectful fight or capturing of our strongholds.

Shriman , what is linear frontal attack ?

 

[Kumaoni]

First, fortify positions on dominating peaks. We need the tactical high ground. Dig down and let them bash you head on, repulsing attack after attack.

Second, the most overlooked part of war, is logistics. In 1962, Indian troopers on newly established posts were poorly supplied. Similarly, in Kargil, Pakistani troopers on their posts were also poorly supplied after India isolated their posts. Logistics is key especially in areas like Ladakh and Arunachal.

Third, this is just a personal suggestion, but mountainous terrain like Ladakh, it can be suitable for ambushes. Again, not sure if they would work, but they are def. worth giving a try.

Do study PLA tactics. They have a habit of infiltrating behind lines and attacking enemy posts, isolating them and taking them by surprise. They did this in Korean War and 1962. They managed to capture large amounts of Indians in 1962 Becuase of the simple fact they had infiltrated behind forward posts and ambushed withdrawing Indian columns. These tactics were instrumental in causing not just large amounts of casualties but also taking large amounts of POWs.

 

[armyofhind]

Good reading on this topic would be a book called Chimera by Vivek Ahuja.

He used wargamed simulations and wrote the book based on the results.

 

[Kumaoni]

I don't want to speak for others but he made a pertinent point on not reducing the numbers.

High Army attrition secondary to their so-called arrogance and mismanagement of the battle strategies/tactics is a fallacy that many readers including ex-military have been making. Either we stay true to following the objectives or play this morgue accountant's game of counting body bags and remain confused forever. Furthermore, the NATO parameters of war-making applied to us are unjustifiable. Both against Pakistan and China we will have more casualties because we can not afford an air superiority air force. If Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers then Indian linear frontal attacks like we mounted on Kargil Peaks and defensive consolidation on key frontiers should also be seen as the best possible strategy to deny China any respectful fight or capturing of our strongholds.

China never really used himan wave tactics, but infiltration behind the lines.

 

[Love Charger]

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[Angel of War]

What is the source of Chinese ORBAT data?

RAND has established a paper on PLA ORBAT , you can find the PDF copy

 

[Angel of War]

I don't want to speak for others but he made a pertinent point on not reducing the numbers.

High Army attrition secondary to their so-called arrogance and mismanagement of the battle strategies/tactics is a fallacy that many readers including ex-military have been making. Either we stay true to following the objectives or play this morgue accountant's game of counting body bags and remain confused forever. Furthermore, the NATO parameters of war-making applied to us are unjustifiable. Both against Pakistan and China we will have more casualties because we can not afford an air superiority air force. If Chinese Human Wave tactics can find respect among watchers then Indian linear frontal attacks like we mounted on Kargil Peaks and defensive consolidation on key frontiers should also be seen as the best possible strategy to deny China any respectful fight or capturing of our strongholds.

Shriman , what is linear frontal attack ?

Saamne se vaar . Charging ahead and attacking is called frontal linear attack . This is a good old infantry tactic of the 19th century

 

[Love Charger]

Saamne se vaar . Charging ahead and attacking is called frontal linear attack . This is a good old infantry tactic of the 19th century

In a straight line , March slowly

 

[Angel of War]

In a straight line , March slowly

Think of it as a bayonet charge , basically that is a linear frontal attack . Chinese Human waves in Korean war are also an example of that .

 

[Angel of War]

@Joe Shearer How did the PVA manage to give stiff competition to US forces in Korea despite having technological inferiority. Does that somehow prove that numerical superiority can offset Massive technological And infrastructural advantages On the enemy's side ? Can we take some lessons from the korean experience of the PLA in fighting a technologically superior force and use it for ourselves to offset PLA's technological and infrastructural superiority over us ?