Indian Special Forces

[Spadex]

Lol

I just realised that all Marcos wears
Integrated knee and elbow pads
We just didn't noticed that earlier


​

 

[Jedi Operator]

Lol

I just realised that all Marcos wears
Integrated knee and elbow pads
We just didn't noticed that earlier


​

How how?

 

[Col Habib zahir]

Lol

I just realised that all Marcos wears
Integrated knee and elbow pads
We just didn't noticed that earlier


​

 

[Scramjet]

Lol

I just realised that all Marcos wears
Integrated knee and elbow pads
We just didn't noticed that earlier


​

@Tactical Doge made a meme on me for claiming uniformity and vision in marcos' kit

 

[Tactical Doge]

@Tactical Doge made a meme on me for claiming uniformity and vision in marcos' kit

Hey I apologized Scram
Besides, those days are behind me, I'm into Aaramnbh Hai prachand edits now

 

[Scramjet]

I'm into Aaramnbh Hai prachand edits now

Accept my sincere and heartfelt apology instead

 

[jai jaganath]

Lol

I just realised that all Marcos wears
Integrated knee and elbow pads
We just didn't noticed that earlier


​

Sauce or proof ji

 

[Spadex]

Sauce or proof ji

Look at the elbow

 

[jai jaganath]

View attachment 180525


Look at the elbow

This has been identified earlier bro
In other pics these were not visible so they may not prefer it

 

[Spadex]

This has been identified earlier bro
In other pics these were not visible so they may not prefer it

Well they have the provisions to insert it atleast. That's more than enough

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

View attachment 180525


Look at the elbow

Para ji ab toh Sharma ji k ladke se kuch seekho.

 

[Meal Team 6]

SAS 1984- SG guy at 1:55 ?

Looks like we had deep connection with sas and sbs that is now lost.

In 1955 sbs helped us set up diving school at cochin.

In 1981, SG is created around the mandate of sas.

In 1983, 340th Army Independent Brigade was converted into an amphibious assault unit.

In December 1983, an officer from the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Wing of the British Special Air Service arrived in India to provide advice regarding operation sundown to sg . Extensive rehearsals were also carried out.

In 1984,A senior officer from the British Special Air Service was secretly recruited to provide advice for operation blue star after being cleared by then British PM Margaret Thatcher.

Above video is also from 1984.

According to a report by the Sikh Federation of UK, India was one of the biggest purchasers of military equipment for UK between 1981 and 1990. Most of the Foreign Office's documents on India from 1984 are classified in whole or in part.

A group of SG personnel clad in black uniforms, armed with AK-47 rifles and Night vision goggles, began the assault on 6 June 1984.
Bhindranwale was shot dead using ak-47 which were purchased secretly from Europe, were present exclusively with the SG at that time.

In 1987, marcos are raised with the help of sbs and navy seals.

 

[Jedi Operator]

SAS 1984- SG guy at 1:55 ?

Looks like we had deep connection with sas and sbs that is now lost.

In 1955 sbs helped us set up diving school at cochin.

In 1981, SG is created around the mandate of sas.

In 1983, 340th Army Independent Brigade was converted into an amphibious assault unit.

In December 1983, an officer from the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Wing of the British Special Air Service arrived in India to provide advice regarding operation sundown to sg . Extensive rehearsals were also carried out.

In 1984,A senior officer from the British Special Air Service was secretly recruited to provide advice for operation blue star after being cleared by then British PM Margaret Thatcher.

Above video is also from 1984.

According to a report by the Sikh Federation of UK, India was one of the biggest purchasers of military equipment for UK between 1981 and 1990. Most of the Foreign Office's documents on India from 1984 are classified in whole or in part.

A group of SG personnel clad in black uniforms, armed with AK-47 rifles and Night vision goggles, began the assault on 6 June 1984.
Bhindranwale was shot dead using ak-47 which were purchased secretly from Europe, were present exclusively with the SG at that time.

In 1987, marcos are raised with the help of sbs and navy seals.

How do you know that's SG or Indian when theirs's no mention of it here. Even Fijian guys look the same, more so with that hair style.

 

[Meal Team 6]

How do you know that's SG or Indian when theirs's no mention of it here. Even Fijian guys look the same, more so with that hair style.

I was asking , please refer to question mark at the end, also on that same context I was asking about our relations with sas .

 

[Scramjet]

Looks like we had deep connection with sas and sbs that is now lost.

Marcos still enjoy good relations with SBS.
Para SF has bittersweet relations with them due to something that happened back in late 90s.
Anyways let me give out some more stories abt SAS' involvement with Indian SF.

>While the Para Commandos were engaged in battling the LTTE, Brig Michael Rose, Director, SAS from UK came and met Lt Gen AS Kalkat, OFC & GOC Land Forces. Rose subsequently visited Sri Lanka to gain firsthand knowledge of the ongoing special operations. He also invited Gen Kalkat to visit SAS, which the General did at a later date, discovering amongst other things that the SAS had no formal rank structure. Brig (later promoted to General rank) Michael Rose was the Commanding Officer of the SAS when they went into the Iranian Embassy in London when it was taken hostage by terrorists. The hostage rescue operation would become a classic text-book case on how to conduct such special operations and bring the SAS into the limelight for the first time. He would subsequently go to command British Forces in the Falklands and also in Bosnia.

>Every cause needs a champion. If the Indian Special Forces needed one, they found it in Lieutenant Colonel Rustom K Nanavatty, an officer who had been commissioned into the Gorkha Regiment. Lt Col Nanavatty had been selected to go to the United Kingdom for a little-known posting that had survived from the pre-independence days.
The Indian Army Liaison Officer (IALO) in the School of Infantry, Warminster, UK was a little known position that had great value for mid-level career soldiers. It offered them a chance to visit and interact with the British Armed Forces at a professional level and draw lessons that could be used to benefit the Indian Army back home. The post actually provided a window to get an insight into modern armies of the West. For most Indian Army officers it was chance to take a break from the humdrum of daily soldiering and stay in the UK for a year or two and visit the rest of Europe on a tight budget, in line with his parting military briefing to “go have a ball”. But unlike most others, Lt Col Nanvatty was busy trying to get a better understanding of how the SAS worked and operated.
As the IALO, Lt Col Nanvatty was allowed to access any material up to the level of "Confidential” classification and visit any training establishment or formation barring two formations. The restriction on the first formation was the hardest for him to overcome: he was not allowed to visit the SAS Headquarters at Hereford. The British Government also barred him from visiting any area in Northern Ireland since it was still reeling from terrorism. A foreign armed forces officer being sent home as a casualty would be deeply embarrassing, the British authorities informed him.
However, after receiving several requests from a persistent Lt Col Nanavatty, they allowed him to visit the HQ of the Director, SAS (HQ DSAS) at the Duke of York HQ, Chelsea on a special invitation. He had been warned by the hosts that the visit would be cursory at best and the interaction would be limited for security reasons. On February 22, 1985, Lt Col Nanavatty finally arrived at the HQ DSAS to discuss several issues that included:
The role of the Directorate,
Selection and training of the personnel,
The career structure of the officers and soldiers,
Command and control and
Assistance to foreign governments.
Through the day Lt Col Nanvatty was given two presentations and several informal discussions. A film classified as ‘Secret” on the role, selection and the various individual skills that they possessed was shown to him. This was followed by a film demonstrating four of the seven methods of countering a hostage situation that the SAS practiced in those days.
Impressed with what he had seen Lt Col Nanvatty wrote back a detailed five-page report to Army Headquarters along with an assurance from the SAS that they would be “delighted” to host an Indian Army Brigadier since the British Ministry of Defence had cleared it.
Lt Col Nanavtty’s report and his enthusiasm would spark off a churning in New Delhi that was finally beginning to appreciate that there was more to Special Forces than the commandos who were available in the three Para Commando Battalions. Major General Bipin C Joshi, who would later take over as the Chief of Army Staff was posted as the Additional Director General of the Perspective Planning Directorate. Gen Joshi saw merit in the ideas that Lt Col Nanvatty was propounding and after taking over the powerful Military Operations Directorate as DGMO, Lt Gen Joshi agreed that it was time to do a reappraisal of the Para Commandos and prepare a road map that would help them emerge as Special Forces.
After convincing Army HQ, Lt Gen Joshi picked up Brigadier N Bahri, an officer who had been commissioned into the Brigade of Guards, just like Lt Col Megh Singh, who had formed the Meghdoot Force. Brig Bahri was considered as a very balanced, educated and professional soldier. He had an open mind, questioned everything and suffered from no biases. These proved to be an advantage for the three-man committee that had been set up to conduct a seminal study and propose a reorganisation of the Para Commandos. Naturally, Army HQ picked up Lt Col Nanavatty and another veteran Para Commandos, Lt Col Sukhi Mann as the other members of the committee.
The Committee was given four terms of reference:
Organisation
Employment
Manpower
Equipment
They were not asked to look at the force levels since the three existing para-commando battalions were considered adequate to deal with all exigencies. The Committee began work immediately and prepared a comprehensive report that sought to reorient the Para Commandos into true Special Forces.
The result :
Committee felt that since the centralised approach of the other militaries had already proved to be a success there was no need to reinvent the wheel. Centred around this basic recommendation were the other recommendations for manpower selection, training, equipping and tasking.
An elaborate structure was recommended that there was a need to:
Modify the tenure system
Create an All India class composition
Bring in trained soldiers from all Arms and Services
Ensure no Extra Regimental Employment (ERE)
Improve the incentives for the men selected into the Special Forces
The Committee also detailed separate policies for officers and men to ensure that a system was created where the best volunteers could be screened and inducted into the battalions. Every volunteer was now expected to undergo a probation that would last for almost a year along with continuous training in acquiring special commando skills. The tour of duty for volunteers from units other than the Parachute Regiment would be for four years.
For the potential officers, the Committee suggested that a special briefing be held regularly so that they could be interviewed, advised on how to prepare for the grueling months of selection tests and also get special advice on how to plan their careers after a stint with the Special Forces. The Committee felt that these officers could either continue in the Special Forces or go and proliferate their specialised skills that would benefit the other Arms and Services. Interestingly, the Committee recommended that additional career weightage should be given to all the officers and men who had served with the Special Forces.
The Committee had already recommended a structure to impart this special training. A Special Forces Training Wing was to be created, to be headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. This establishment would ensure the imparting of special skills like sniper training, surveillance, combat free-fall training and other Special Forces skills. This establishment would also become the repository of the collective wisdom of the Special Forces units to create an institutionalised memory that would benefit the organisation in the future.
The Committee also felt that certain concrete steps needed to be taken to create a true Special Forces capability. This would be structured under a two-tier system. The first tier would be the Para Commando units for the conduct of theatre specific tactical operations. To achieve this it was proposed that:
Redefine role, missions and capabilities of Para Commando Battalions.
Review existing structure.
Convert only one assault troop per unit into a military combat free fall troop.
Concentrate all underwater diving skills into an independent amphibious team.
Expand Para Commando Cell at Army Headquarters with operations and intelligence functions to remain with the Military Operations Directorate. Assistance and technical control was to be exercised by a Colonel designated as Director Commando Cell.
Institute a Para Commando Training Wing.
Raise one more unit/sub unit to meet the operational requirement of various commands.
Ensure 9 and 10 Para Commando are brought on par with 1 Para Commando where organisation, weapons and equipment and employment are concerned.
Formulate revised individual training policies.
Allot available resources to Headquarters Commands for the conduct of theatre related tactical military special operations tasks based on operational requirements.
In the second tier, the committee felt that a Special Group be created for the conduct of a national level and Army Headquarters related strategic military special operations. Army Headquarters would exercise command and control of these units through a Special Forces Headquarters. This would need several steps to be undertaken, which were:
Define the role, missions and capabilities of this Special Group
Takeover the current responsibilities from the SFF
Establish a Special Forces Headquarter
Establish a Special Forces Training Wing
Ensure that there was proper interface between the Para Commandos and the Special Group. The Para-Commandos would also ensure a regular feed to the Special Group. Note - this special group is not the 4 vikas but a seperate unit that was about to be created.

 

[Johny_Baba]

SAS 1984- SG guy at 1:55 ?

Looks like we had deep connection with sas and sbs that is now lost.

In 1955 sbs helped us set up diving school at cochin.

In 1981, SG is created around the mandate of sas.

In 1983, 340th Army Independent Brigade was converted into an amphibious assault unit.

In December 1983, an officer from the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Wing of the British Special Air Service arrived in India to provide advice regarding operation sundown to sg . Extensive rehearsals were also carried out.

In 1984,A senior officer from the British Special Air Service was secretly recruited to provide advice for operation blue star after being cleared by then British PM Margaret Thatcher.

Above video is also from 1984.

According to a report by the Sikh Federation of UK, India was one of the biggest purchasers of military equipment for UK between 1981 and 1990. Most of the Foreign Office's documents on India from 1984 are classified in whole or in part.

A group of SG personnel clad in black uniforms, armed with AK-47 rifles and Night vision goggles, began the assault on 6 June 1984.
Bhindranwale was shot dead using ak-47 which were purchased secretly from Europe, were present exclusively with the SG at that time.

In 1987, marcos are raised with the help of sbs and navy seals.

This is correct, moreover to that, *they* (=kangies) say it that arrangements for deal for those Augusta Westland VIP choppers was made during Indira era when OP Blue Star was done; but further political turmoil and raising discontent between the two parties kept delaying it and it only got signed officially when UPA arrived in 2004.

 

[Automatic Kalashnikov]

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

 

[abingdonboy]

Marcos still enjoy good relations with SBS.
Para SF has bittersweet relations with them due to something that happened back in late 90s.
Anyways let me give out some more stories abt SAS' involvement with Indian SF.

>While the Para Commandos were engaged in battling the LTTE, Brig Michael Rose, Director, SAS from UK came and met Lt Gen AS Kalkat, OFC & GOC Land Forces. Rose subsequently visited Sri Lanka to gain firsthand knowledge of the ongoing special operations. He also invited Gen Kalkat to visit SAS, which the General did at a later date, discovering amongst other things that the SAS had no formal rank structure. Brig (later promoted to General rank) Michael Rose was the Commanding Officer of the SAS when they went into the Iranian Embassy in London when it was taken hostage by terrorists. The hostage rescue operation would become a classic text-book case on how to conduct such special operations and bring the SAS into the limelight for the first time. He would subsequently go to command British Forces in the Falklands and also in Bosnia.

>Every cause needs a champion. If the Indian Special Forces needed one, they found it in Lieutenant Colonel Rustom K Nanavatty, an officer who had been commissioned into the Gorkha Regiment. Lt Col Nanavatty had been selected to go to the United Kingdom for a little-known posting that had survived from the pre-independence days.
The Indian Army Liaison Officer (IALO) in the School of Infantry, Warminster, UK was a little known position that had great value for mid-level career soldiers. It offered them a chance to visit and interact with the British Armed Forces at a professional level and draw lessons that could be used to benefit the Indian Army back home. The post actually provided a window to get an insight into modern armies of the West. For most Indian Army officers it was chance to take a break from the humdrum of daily soldiering and stay in the UK for a year or two and visit the rest of Europe on a tight budget, in line with his parting military briefing to “go have a ball”. But unlike most others, Lt Col Nanvatty was busy trying to get a better understanding of how the SAS worked and operated.
As the IALO, Lt Col Nanvatty was allowed to access any material up to the level of "Confidential” classification and visit any training establishment or formation barring two formations. The restriction on the first formation was the hardest for him to overcome: he was not allowed to visit the SAS Headquarters at Hereford. The British Government also barred him from visiting any area in Northern Ireland since it was still reeling from terrorism. A foreign armed forces officer being sent home as a casualty would be deeply embarrassing, the British authorities informed him.
However, after receiving several requests from a persistent Lt Col Nanavatty, they allowed him to visit the HQ of the Director, SAS (HQ DSAS) at the Duke of York HQ, Chelsea on a special invitation. He had been warned by the hosts that the visit would be cursory at best and the interaction would be limited for security reasons. On February 22, 1985, Lt Col Nanavatty finally arrived at the HQ DSAS to discuss several issues that included:
The role of the Directorate,
Selection and training of the personnel,
The career structure of the officers and soldiers,
Command and control and
Assistance to foreign governments.
Through the day Lt Col Nanvatty was given two presentations and several informal discussions. A film classified as ‘Secret” on the role, selection and the various individual skills that they possessed was shown to him. This was followed by a film demonstrating four of the seven methods of countering a hostage situation that the SAS practiced in those days.
Impressed with what he had seen Lt Col Nanvatty wrote back a detailed five-page report to Army Headquarters along with an assurance from the SAS that they would be “delighted” to host an Indian Army Brigadier since the British Ministry of Defence had cleared it.
Lt Col Nanavtty’s report and his enthusiasm would spark off a churning in New Delhi that was finally beginning to appreciate that there was more to Special Forces than the commandos who were available in the three Para Commando Battalions. Major General Bipin C Joshi, who would later take over as the Chief of Army Staff was posted as the Additional Director General of the Perspective Planning Directorate. Gen Joshi saw merit in the ideas that Lt Col Nanvatty was propounding and after taking over the powerful Military Operations Directorate as DGMO, Lt Gen Joshi agreed that it was time to do a reappraisal of the Para Commandos and prepare a road map that would help them emerge as Special Forces.
After convincing Army HQ, Lt Gen Joshi picked up Brigadier N Bahri, an officer who had been commissioned into the Brigade of Guards, just like Lt Col Megh Singh, who had formed the Meghdoot Force. Brig Bahri was considered as a very balanced, educated and professional soldier. He had an open mind, questioned everything and suffered from no biases. These proved to be an advantage for the three-man committee that had been set up to conduct a seminal study and propose a reorganisation of the Para Commandos. Naturally, Army HQ picked up Lt Col Nanavatty and another veteran Para Commandos, Lt Col Sukhi Mann as the other members of the committee.
The Committee was given four terms of reference:
Organisation
Employment
Manpower
Equipment
They were not asked to look at the force levels since the three existing para-commando battalions were considered adequate to deal with all exigencies. The Committee began work immediately and prepared a comprehensive report that sought to reorient the Para Commandos into true Special Forces.
The result :
Committee felt that since the centralised approach of the other militaries had already proved to be a success there was no need to reinvent the wheel. Centred around this basic recommendation were the other recommendations for manpower selection, training, equipping and tasking.
An elaborate structure was recommended that there was a need to:
Modify the tenure system
Create an All India class composition
Bring in trained soldiers from all Arms and Services
Ensure no Extra Regimental Employment (ERE)
Improve the incentives for the men selected into the Special Forces
The Committee also detailed separate policies for officers and men to ensure that a system was created where the best volunteers could be screened and inducted into the battalions. Every volunteer was now expected to undergo a probation that would last for almost a year along with continuous training in acquiring special commando skills. The tour of duty for volunteers from units other than the Parachute Regiment would be for four years.
For the potential officers, the Committee suggested that a special briefing be held regularly so that they could be interviewed, advised on how to prepare for the grueling months of selection tests and also get special advice on how to plan their careers after a stint with the Special Forces. The Committee felt that these officers could either continue in the Special Forces or go and proliferate their specialised skills that would benefit the other Arms and Services. Interestingly, the Committee recommended that additional career weightage should be given to all the officers and men who had served with the Special Forces.
The Committee had already recommended a structure to impart this special training. A Special Forces Training Wing was to be created, to be headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. This establishment would ensure the imparting of special skills like sniper training, surveillance, combat free-fall training and other Special Forces skills. This establishment would also become the repository of the collective wisdom of the Special Forces units to create an institutionalised memory that would benefit the organisation in the future.
The Committee also felt that certain concrete steps needed to be taken to create a true Special Forces capability. This would be structured under a two-tier system. The first tier would be the Para Commando units for the conduct of theatre specific tactical operations. To achieve this it was proposed that:
Redefine role, missions and capabilities of Para Commando Battalions.
Review existing structure.
Convert only one assault troop per unit into a military combat free fall troop.
Concentrate all underwater diving skills into an independent amphibious team.
Expand Para Commando Cell at Army Headquarters with operations and intelligence functions to remain with the Military Operations Directorate. Assistance and technical control was to be exercised by a Colonel designated as Director Commando Cell.
Institute a Para Commando Training Wing.
Raise one more unit/sub unit to meet the operational requirement of various commands.
Ensure 9 and 10 Para Commando are brought on par with 1 Para Commando where organisation, weapons and equipment and employment are concerned.
Formulate revised individual training policies.
Allot available resources to Headquarters Commands for the conduct of theatre related tactical military special operations tasks based on operational requirements.
In the second tier, the committee felt that a Special Group be created for the conduct of a national level and Army Headquarters related strategic military special operations. Army Headquarters would exercise command and control of these units through a Special Forces Headquarters. This would need several steps to be undertaken, which were:
Define the role, missions and capabilities of this Special Group
Takeover the current responsibilities from the SFF
Establish a Special Forces Headquarter
Establish a Special Forces Training Wing
Ensure that there was proper interface between the Para Commandos and the Special Group. The Para-Commandos would also ensure a regular feed to the Special Group. Note - this special group is not the 4 vikas but a seperate unit that was about to be created.

IG and the Tories had decently close relations and SAS is highly connected to the executive so are used extensively as per political whims. Back then IG similarly seemed more involved in security matters. I’d be surprised if anyone in the Modi cabinet or Modi himself could name SG, MARCOs, PARA SF or Garuds by name aside from ‘the commandos’

this is the root of the issue and why Indian SFs are so poor across the board.

+I doubt MARCOs have too close a relationship with SBS these days considering MARCOs have to exercise with the Royal Marines.

 

[Scramjet]

IG and the Tories had decently close relations and SAS is highly connected to the executive so are used extensively as per political whims. Back then IG similarly seemed more involved in security matters. I’d be surprised if anyone in the Modi cabinet or Modi himself could name SG, MARCOs, PARA SF or Garuds by name aside from ‘the commandos’

this is the root of the issue and why Indian SFs are so poor across the board.

+I doubt MARCOs have too close a relationship with SBS these days considering MARCOs have to exercise with the Royal Marines.

Absolutely true, the strategic employment of SF lies in the politico-military leadership and not just formation cmdrs.
Speaking about SBS' current relations with marcos, I've heard that newly inducted marcos go through a basic capsule that covers operating the way SAS and SBS does, I don't know the exact name of the capsule but If memory serves right it's mandatory for them, cause NSW was raised with Tier 1 capability aspirations (although there was a *rejected* proposal of increasing their strength to bde sized formation)