Indian Special Forces (archived)

[Vishalreddy3]

5 Para during Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka

 

[Killbot]

Until they get their helps shot out of the sky at night or worse when they crash one right on top on OBL ,. Last I checked our boys clocked several dozens in Myanmar and POK without anyone having a clue death was upon them.

Chill nigga, don't get your panties in a bunch.

But they didn't actually attack until first light... Speaks volumes about training and capabilities ..

 

[Killbot]

Images are from 2016.

Haven't improved all that much on a large scale even now..

 

[rkhanna]

Until they get their helps shot out of the sky at night or worse when they crash one right on top on OBL ,. Last I checked our boys clocked several dozens in Myanmar and POK without anyone having a clue death was upon them.

Chill nigga, don't get your panties in a bunch.

1) please FFS stop saying nigga

2) lets revisit your previous statemnt on the myanmar op. Like i said. it was a basic commando op. Overnight patroling to target over arduous terrain and minefields etc and then the op went conventional. The Company+ sized assault forced went loud and proud and destroyed anything in sight.

Nothing extraordinary about this. A number of Units in the Indian Army could have accomplished this in skill level and difficulty level basis.

KNOW that in Sri Lanka Para Cdo (SF) used to the same op but for days and weeks at a time, living in the bush, cultivating CIs and running rendition missions alongside S&D missions.

Dont get me wrong. SOF units globally do this. But this is bread and butter. This is bare minimum standard.

Our comms are so poor the Unit had to come back to the border and use a Cell Phone to dial a pickup.

We had the political backing of the Myanmar Govt in the op. Why couldnt a 6 man team go do a CTR and call in an Airstrike? Lesser moving parts, smaller footprint. What about Rotary Assets? Not using then was a capability issue, political issue?

Circling back the your comment on the 'mercians'. In a sense i do get what you are saying. They shout louder and they make better movies. But running a DA op against the public enemy number 1, in denied airspace right next to the PA Military Academy took big mofo balls. Whether you like it or not.

And talking about those Helos getting shot out of the sky. Ofcourse they do. Given where they operate attrition is part of the high risk ops they do. But NOTE the HELOS you talk about are a SOF unit on their own. Equivalent in training, skill and VALUE to delta/STG etc. the Capability of the 160th SOAR is the reason why they have such a far reach.

 

[AZTEC]

Good article on India's sniper situation.
The publisher is not one of my favourites but the author, Rahul Bedi, is not bad. He earlier worked for Jane's Defence.

Snipers Only Shoot to Kill

Indian forces have traditionally neglected the sophisticated weapons, but the Army, ITBP and NSG are seeking to swiftly acquire them before the end-December deadline foreclosing the import of sniper rifles kicks in.

thewire.in

Snipers Only Shoot to Kill
Indian forces have traditionally neglected the sophisticated weapons, but the Army, ITBP and NSG are seeking to swiftly acquire them before the end-December deadline foreclosing the import of sniper rifles kicks in.

Sniping is a highly skilled, precision killing business for most armed forces, but one that has been employed desultorily by India’s military, and even more randomly by its paramilitaries, deployed widely along its restive borders and against terrorists on internal security (IS) duties.

But official sources said in recent months, the Army, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), employed along the disputed – and now restive – Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, and the National Security Guard (NSG) are seeking to up their sniping activity by importing small numbers of specialist rifles.

All three organisations are seeking to swiftly acquire these sophisticated weapons before the end-December deadline foreclosing the import of sniper rifles by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) kicks in. Sniper rifles are included in the MoD’s ‘negative list’, issued in early August that embargoes the import of 101 defence items in a bid to fast-track the government’s Atamnirbhar Bharat initiative to achieve self-sufficiency in armaments.

Earlier, in February 2019, the Army had inducted some 30-odd bolt-action .338 Scorpio TGT sniper rifles from Victrix Armaments of Italy and M95 rifles from the US company Barrett as an ‘emergency purchase’, employing them along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir to counter sustained sniping by the Pakistani Army.

A Barrett M95 sniper. Photo: Outisnn/Wikimedi Commons CC BY SA 3.0

Failed tenders

Alongside, India’s MoD is reportedly poised to resurrect its earlier 2018 request for proposal (RfP), or tender, to import 5,719 8.6mm sniper rifles and 5 million rounds of specialised ammunition for both the Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF). The previous RfP had included the import of an equal number of rifles, but double the amount of ammunition or 10.5 million rounds. It had also required transferring technology to the state-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and domestic private sector companies, to locally manufacture an additional 4.60 million 8.6mm ammunition rounds, which posed problems and was eventually responsible for the tender being scrapped.

All four overseas vendors declined to bid on the grounds that transferring technology for the ammunition for a mere 4.6 million rounds was ‘commercially unviable’. The proposed delivery schedule of the rifles – 5,507 for the Army and 212 for the IAF’s Garud Commando force – stipulated by the MoD too posed glitches. The tender had required the shortlisted manufacturer to deliver the first lot of 707 rifles within six months of the contract being signed, and the remaining 4,472 supplied in batches of 1,200 units each over the next 30 months, unaware that such distinct weapons are not bulk-produced.

“The RfP was badly conceived, particularly with regard to the ammunition component, leaving the MoD no choice but to withdraw it,” said Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle (retd), director of Security Risks Asia, a New Delhi-based defence management consultancy. A follow-on RfP is likely to be issued sometime soon, he added.

A previous sniper rifle tender in 2009-2010 was similarly terminated due to the Army’s laughable and amateurish qualitative requirements (QRs) drawn up for them, that failed in mandating accuracy standards at a minimum range of 800 metres and absurdly required them to be fitted with a bayonet.

It was incomprehensible to the handful of vendors to determine why the rifle, purposed for employment at a distance of over 800 metres, needed a bayonet that is normally used by infantry soldiers in close combat. The unclear RfP also failed to differentiate between a bolt action or semi-automatic sniper rifle model, a critical QR determinant.

The Indian Navy, on the other hand, was more professional in its approach and in late 2016, acquired 177 Sako TIKKA t3 TAC 7.62x51mm bolt action sniper rifles from Italy’s Beretta for Rs 20 crore. Selected over UK’s Steel Core Designs Thunderbolt SC-76 model, the Sako rifle was acquired to upgrade the Navy’s Marine Commando (MARCOS) firepower and included 100,000 rounds of 7.62x51mm expert Match grade ammunition. In recent years, the secretive MARCOS have been increasingly employed on anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca and, on occasion even on counter-terrorist operations in Kashmir.

A Sako Tikka T3 rifle. Photo: Millermaster/Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain

Meanwhile, the ITBP, ranged beside the Army along the LAC in eastern Ladakh against China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for its part recently tendered for 358 7.62x51mm bolt-action sniper rifles based on QR’s formulated by the NSG with its relatively extended sniping experience. Its RfP requires the proposed rifles to be fitted with integrated telescopic sights, including for low-light conditions, and the ability to function in temperatures as low as minus 30 degrees Celsius, that prevail in the upper Himalayan reaches of eastern Ladakh during winter. Presently, the ITBP employs the Austrian Steyr SSG-69 bolt-action rifle with a 3,700 metre kill range and the 7.62x54mm Soviet-designed semi-automatic Dragunov SVD sniping rifle with a 1,300 metre range, that first entered Indian Army service in the mid-1980s.

Nonetheless, despite inducting the Dragunov sniper rifle, its employment over decades by the Army was at best ad hoc, confined largely to picking off low-value targets along the LoC in a tit-for-tat competition that raged along the unresolved restive mountainous frontier. But despite inducting the Dragunov sniper rifle, its employment over decades was at best ad hoc, confined largely to picking off low-value targets along the LoC. For, unlike their Western counterparts, the 3,500-4,000 army snipers – around 10 per infantry battalion – remain little better than amateurs compared to their Western, and even Chinese counterparts.

They lack adequate training, suitable weaponry and specialised supplementary paraphernalia like accurate imported Match ammunition, hand-held laser range finders, night sights and related hardware, essential to accomplish this highly skilled and deathly mission. Army shooters were routinely issued inefficient OFB-produced ammunition, which experts dismissed as ‘wholly inaccurate’ and one that defeated the very purpose of sniping.

All that is required of the army’s Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) snipers is merely good marksmanship, and one that gets them temporarily tasked with sniping in careers spanning variegated assignments. Not for them the kudos, fearful glamour or mystique attached to snipers in foreign armies or the espirit d corps of belonging to an elite band.

‘No attempt at building up the ethos’

A special badge to boost the snipers’ image, similar to what prevailed in other world armies, was introduced in the late 1990s by army chief General S. Padmanabhan, but was withdrawn soon after, as it proved unworkable. Earning the prestigious badge required three confirmed sniper kills. But senior officers said non-snipers or part-time snipers, using assault and other rifles, frequently claimed the designated scalps, thereby becoming eligible for the insignia, which was considered improper.

And with the insignia’s abandonment went whatever fleeting support there had been from the Army Headquarters in promoting the tactical efficaciousness of snipers and establishing a dedicated corps of military ‘hit men’ who potentially can alter, not only the course of battles and politics, but also history with their kills.

“There has been no attempt at building up the ethos of sniping in the army or any of the other security agencies barring some Special Forces units, the NSGs Special Action Group (SAG) and the Special Group (SG) of the shadowy Special Frontier Force (SFF),” lamented a retired three-star special forces officer. Training of infantry snipers remains rudimentary, he declared, adding that their skilful employment can impose caution, cause attrition and demoralise the enemy.

After all, snipers – an 18th century term derived from the game bird, snipe, that is difficult to hunt as it efficiently uses camouflage to remain undetected – can end up saving many lives with one well-aimed round by relieving hijacks, hostage situations and even apocalyptic incidents like the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist strike that claimed 166 lives.

Through history, snipers have been grudgingly, albeit fearfully glorified, and in recent years their lethal calling has been the focus of several hauntingly successful Hollywood movies like The Deer Hunter in 1978, which ended up as a metaphor for the Vietnam War itself. Enemy at the Gates is another fictionalised biopic of the legendary Soviet sniper Vasily Zaytsey and WW2 hero participating in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43.

Years later, renegade snipers from opposing sides dominated Yugoslavia’s civil war and these shooters emerged, in a sense, as the deadly leitmotif of the bitter ethnic clash in Eastern Europe through the 1990s that claimed thousands of lives. And, closer home in something long forgotten, many officers from the hapless expeditionary Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s were assassinated by rebel Tamil Tiger snipers using assault rifles. Ironically, some of these snipers had been instructed by India’s Research and Analysis Wing or RAW. The Tiger rebels invariably targeted Indian Army officers, confident that neutralising them would demoralise the Force.

“The sub-conventional warfare that India today faces mandates acquiring certain specialist skills,” retired Lieutenant General Vijay Kapur said, adding that snipers should constitute an essential part of this unconventional response. It is high time, the military analyst declared, that the Indian Army awoke to this reality.

Indian Army’s training for snipers

The Indian Army treats sniping training cursorily. Two man sniper teams – the shooter and his interchangeable buddy or spotter – attend 4-6 weeks elementary and inadequate training capsules at the Infantry School at Mhow in Madhya Pradesh. Unlike in India, the latter in foreign armies is an equally skilled marksman but one who specialises in target and atmospheric observation, handling location security and communications and, in some instances even directing artillery fire and close air support from forward positions.

This instruction at Mhow includes a combination of firing practice and rudimentary attempts to mentally attune the marksman and his buddy to patiently await their quarry through aerobic and yoga lessons and breathing exercises to enhance concentration. Professional snipers abroad, however, are tutored, amongst other rigours, in the art of camouflage and deception, trained to stop breathing and reduce their heartbeats to the barest minimum whilst firing, as even the minutest unsynchronised twitch or movement can prove calamitous in securing their target. They are also trained to control their bladders and Pakistan’s Pathan tribesmen, who were considered by the British as the world’s most patient and competent snipers, use leaves to urinate so as not to make a noise or leave any tell-tale sign of their presence.

Despite a tradition of mythological marksmen like Dronacharya and Arjuna, the Army also had no nucleus of sniper instructors, as none had been nurtured as no foreign, friendly military was willing to instruct Indian soldiers in this speciality. The handful of NSG shooters who, some years ago had undergone sniping instruction abroad in countries like Israel, were too few in number to institutionally amplify this expertise in any meaningful manner. And the first two special forces officers who, after much negotiation and persuasion, attended a snipers intervention course in France in the late 1970s, with the intent of returning home on specialised appointment, were soon diverted to other assignments that did not require their newly acquired skills.

One rare instance, however, of India’s security forces having effectively employed sniping involved NSG sharpshooters during Operation Black Thunder in May 1988 to lift the siege of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by Sikh terrorists. Crouched atop buildings overlooking the Temple complex, NSG sharpshooters with their favoured 7.62X51mm German Heckler & Koch gas-operated semi-automatic PSG1 A1 sniper rifles, eliminated at least five of the besieging well-armed, trained and committed Sikh separatists, successfully bringing the operation to fruition, with no casualties to the security forces. The PSG1 A1s were successfully employed once again by the NSG’s SAG army commandoes during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist siege.

Bolt-action vs semi-automatic-recoil rifles

Meanwhile, in professional sniping circles, the rivalry between a bolt-action and a semi-automatic-recoil or gas operated-sniper rifle has never been satisfactorily resolved, and it’s unlikely it ever will. Experts maintain both types had operational advantages and disadvantages and that large numbers of each kind had been inducted for military and law enforcement tasks around the world.

Users claim that the bolt-action sniper rifle, considered by many shooters as the ‘purist’s’ weapon, is easier to maintain, more reliable, accurate and lighter and with fewer moving parts in its mechanism, is easy to assemble. Whilst firing, its only moving parts were the pin and spring, greatly mitigating any chance of either a malfunction, or any of its rounds being thrown off target.

But some Western, particularly US Army snipers aver that semi-automatic sniping rifles had a definite tactical advantage over the bolt action model. They reason that fundamentally with a semi-automatic rifle, the shooter can keep his eye on the target through his telescope, if a second shot is needed, which he could immediately take.

In contrast, the bolt-action rifle shooter can do one of two things when he misses: chamber a new round into the breech, taking his eye off his objective, thus temporarily losing sight of it; or alternately, continue to observe his target and then cycle the bolt later, but once again crucially losing sight of it. Either way, the bolt-action rifle marksman is unable to take a follow-up shot instantly with the necessary sight correction, by which time his quarry – in all probability, alerted to the danger – shifts or worse, disappears.

Specialists claimed that because of this drawback, many militaries and law enforcement agencies worldwide have switched to semi-automatic sniper rifles, due largely to the rapidity of firing additional, follow-up rounds without reloading. A police semi-automatic sniper rifle, for instance, can be used in situations requiring a single shooter to engage multiple targets in quick succession; his military equivalent can be equally effective using this model in a target-rich environment.

A riveting 1944 German army snipers training black and white film, stresses how the sharpshooter must evaluate the minutest details in his environment, developing primeval instincts of the hunter in the fatal battle of nerves with his victim. He needs to be precise, for once he reveals his firing position, he is vulnerable and needs to either make a getaway or shift location swiftly as the enemy would be seeking him. In multiple target situations, however, snipers can use relocation effectively, not only to spawn chaos and confusion in enemy ranks, but also to eliminate the wind factor which may be more advantageous elsewhere.

The police or paramilitary sniper, on the other hand operating in a controlled environment, tries to get as close to his quarry as is possible and fires normally from a comfortable or flat surface. However, unlike the military sniper, the inherent disadvantage he operates under is that a miss could mean hostage deaths; a miss by a military sniper, on the other hand, could go unnoticed, resulting in no immediate crisis except to the shooter.

In short, one man’s fate comes from another man’s – or sniper’s – wait.

 

[Immanuel]

But they didn't actually attack until first light... Speaks volumes about training and capabilities ..

Silly hill billy. They waited, to attack when the enemy was at his clumsiest. They were already in place through the thick dark of the night. The enemy decided to empty their mags in random firing and the boys made a wise decision to wait till firing subsided. This random firing went on for hours in both cases. Why in the world would they risk direct engagement and risk the mission?

Speaks volumes about your Armchair tactics, stick to twirling around in your chair. Let's not speak about training and capabilities of who risk everything to get the job done.

 

[rkhanna]

Silly hill billy. They waited, to attack when the enemy was at his clumsiest. They were already in place through the thick dark of the night. The enemy decided to empty their mags in random firing and the boys made a wise decision to wait till firing subsided. This random firing went on for hours in both cases. Why in the world would they risk direct engagement and risk the mission?

Speaks volumes about your Armchair tactics, stick to twirling around in your chair. Let's not speak about training and capabilities of who risk everything to get the job done.

Nothing you said here makes sense. Why do you feel that the only way you can prove your point is with insults and snide comments against a member ?

 

[Killbot]

Silly hill billy. They waited, to attack when the enemy was at his clumsiest. They were already in place through the thick dark of the night. The enemy decided to empty their mags in random firing and the boys made a wise decision to wait till firing subsided. This random firing went on for hours in both cases. Why in the world would they risk direct engagement and risk the mission?

Speaks volumes about your Armchair tactics, stick to twirling around in your chair. Let's not speak about training and capabilities of who risk everything to get the job done.

Lol, do you realize how stupid you sound.. They were carrying enough firepower to eliminate that camp. A few stupid abduls shooting blind shouldn't have been a problem, unless it was.. They attacked at first light because they weren't adequately trained in night fighting. Direct engagement was exactly what they did when they started shooting dumbass. You think the raid was over in a minute or two?? Each raid would have taken min. 15-20 minutes. Abduls definitely fired back, but were overwhelmed by volume from our side. They were at their clumsiest not at night, when they couldn't see shit and didn't have night vision equipment (which our guys did), but in the day when they saw a bunch of killers shooting at them...
Being an armchair tactician is way better than being an armchair fanboy with no connect whatsoever to the real world.
Like @rkhanna said, this was a rudimentary op that could have been undertaken by any SOF unit in the world. Heck, PARA (air) could have done so. SF should be doing what they did in the 90s (Ikhwans), not be used in trans LoC raids.

 

[ALBY]

9 th Para SF

IPKF days

 

[Immanuel]

1) please FFS stop saying nigga

2) lets revisit your previous statemnt on the myanmar op. Like i said. it was a basic commando op. Overnight patroling to target over arduous terrain and minefields etc and then the op went conventional. The Company+ sized assault forced went loud and proud and destroyed anything in sight.

Nothing extraordinary about this. A number of Units in the Indian Army could have accomplished this in skill level and difficulty level basis.

KNOW that in Sri Lanka Para Cdo (SF) used to the same op but for days and weeks at a time, living in the bush, cultivating CIs and running rendition missions alongside S&D missions.

Dont get me wrong. SOF units globally do this. But this is bread and butter. This is bare minimum standard.

Our comms are so poor the Unit had to come back to the border and use a Cell Phone to dial a pickup.

We had the political backing of the Myanmar Govt in the op. Why couldnt a 6 man team go do a CTR and call in an Airstrike? Lesser moving parts, smaller footprint. What about Rotary Assets? Not using then was a capability issue, political issue?

Circling back the your comment on the 'mercians'. In a sense i do get what you are saying. They shout louder and they make better movies. But running a DA op against the public enemy number 1, in denied airspace right next to the PA Military Academy took big mofo balls. Whether you like it or not.

And talking about those Helos getting shot out of the sky. Ofcourse they do. Given where they operate attrition is part of the high risk ops they do. But NOTE the HELOS you talk about are a SOF unit on their own. Equivalent in training, skill and VALUE to delta/STG etc. the Capability of the 160th SOAR is the reason why they have such a far reach.

Didn't call you a nigga yet (you're this close). Chill, you can bitch all about comms, equipment, don't bitch about the men who did the Op while sitting on your ass. Again Myanmar op is simple commando op in theory and yes they are N number of units in IA that can do this. However, It was a textbook execution (show me examples of such text book executions from SOF units across the world in this day and age where dozens get slayed), else shove it. I can name only a few units who have the balls, training, ability to have such text book executions.

Pak airspace is not denied airspace for Muricans , during Obama's tenure, drones and other assets violated their airspace more often than Goats were getting raped by ISI goat lickers. Also, even if Pakis would have discovered them while the raid was going on, a quick call from Ombaba to whichever unwashed Abdul was PM at that point would have completely render them harmless. Beggar Pakis don't have the balls to fight one of the hands that feeds.

Myanmar Op was revenge + premptive strike. They started the 50 km trek well inside our own borders since there are spies and others who monitor the skies for Helos, drones etc. They didn't want spooking HVTs at the target site. Sure, we could drop a nice juicy LGB but that's not as personal as warm lead delivered personally. Also, perhaps over 70+ killed.

While there is no denying that Muricans have always displayed balls. Big Mofo balls is also going into Pok at over 7 locations across a 250 km space the same night, fuck shit up , kills dozens of PA regulars + upwards of 100 unwashed abduls and return home safely all with only drone support. While IAF was on high alert, nothing was done to spook the mission. Again, a near perfect textbook execution of what is essentially basic commando op. Ghataks too did a fantastic job too.

Again chill, you and others are bitching about things you have no control over (none whatsoever). God knows we hope for a day when our boys have Gucci gear. All this bitching, comparing etc is getting tiring and ya'll are beginning to sound like ungrateful goats.

 

[Killbot]

Didn't call you a nigga yet (you're this close). Chill, you can bitch all about comms, equipment, don't bitch about the men who did the Op while sitting on your ass. Again Myanmar op is simple commando op in theory and yes they are N number of units in IA that can do this. However, It was a textbook execution (show me examples of such text book executions from SOF units across the world in this day and age where dozens get slayed), else shove it. I can name only a few units who have the balls, training, ability to have such text book executions.

Pak airspace is not denied airspace for Muricans , during Obama's tenure, drones and other assets violated their airspace more often than Goats were getting raped by ISI goat lickers. Also, even if Pakis would have discovered them while the raid was going on, a quick call from Ombaba to whichever unwashed Abdul was PM at that point would have completely render them harmless. Beggar Pakis don't have the balls to fight one of the hands that feeds.

Myanmar Op was revenge + premptive strike. They started the 50 km trek well inside our own borders since there are spies and others who monitor the skies for Helos, drones etc. They didn't want spooking HVTs at the target site. Sure, we could drop a nice juicy LGB but that's not as personal as warm lead delivered personally. Also, perhaps over 70+ killed.

While there is no denying that Muricans have always displayed balls. Big Mofo balls is also going into Pok at over 7 locations across a 250 km space the same night, fuck shit up , kills dozens of PA regulars + upwards of 100 unwashed abduls and return home safely all with only drone support. While IAF was on high alert, nothing was done to spook the mission. Again, a near perfect textbook execution of what is essentially basic commando op. Ghataks too did a fantastic job too.

Again chill, you and others are bitching about things you have no control over (none whatsoever). God knows we hope for a day when our boys have Gucci gear. All this bitching, comparing etc is getting tiring and ya'll are beginning to sound like ungrateful goats.

It was 15 km not 50. But yeah they trekked through a large amount of mine infested forest terrain.

 

[ALBY]

 

[Killbot]

View attachment 62671

What body armour are they wearing? Looks like PCs

 

[Immanuel]

Lol, do you realize how stupid you sound.. They were carrying enough firepower to eliminate that camp. A few stupid abduls shooting blind shouldn't have been a problem, unless it was.. They attacked at first light because they weren't adequately trained in night fighting. Direct engagement was exactly what they did when they started shooting dumbass. You think the raid was over in a minute or two?? Each raid would have taken min. 15-20 minutes. Abduls definitely fired back, but were overwhelmed by volume from our side. They were at their clumsiest not at night, when they couldn't see shit and didn't have night vision equipment (which our guys did), but in the day when they saw a bunch of killers shooting at them...
Being an armchair tactician is way better than being an armchair fanboy with no connect whatsoever to the real world.
Like @rkhanna said, this was a rudimentary op that could have been undertaken by any SOF unit in the world. Heck, PARA (air) could have done so. SF should be doing what they did in the 90s (Ikhwans), not be used in trans LoC raids.

The moment the firing starts, many HVTs would escape out the back door, it was a full frontal assault, they didn't have enough to surround a camp about 1.5 sq km. You have officially become a Paki Nigga (welcome to that group, it's the most unwashed Abdul group) They had gen-2 night vision device, GPS signals don't work there (what was available, yet there is just isn't enough light on the forest floor to keep staring into it). You're the dumb nigga relying on theory. There are no NVDs out there that work 100% in the deepest of jungles with little ambient light. They could have thermal sights but not sure if they had any (not their fault)

Direct Assault with an enemy that is awake VS an enemy with guard down is way better, the risk falls dramatically. Again you wouldn't know while playing COD. Real ops in really tough terrain (thick jungles (over 30 degree temperatures/ humidity of 90%+), steep climbs, land mines, over 30kg battle loads, carrying stretchers, ammo, RPO flame throwers, CT-4). Having casualties in such an op would only slow them down (they cannot leave any man behind).

I never said, no other unit in the IA can't do it. I said, most so called Gucci gear SOF units in the world would face the same challenges and 90% won't be able to do a textbook execution)
Thankfully you dumb Paki niggas can be brushed off with a hot fart.

My goodness, the dumbness of these niggas is astonishing.

 

[AZTEC]

We are missing a key point in the Gucci gear debate - per capita military budget (PCMB).

PCMB is the answer to the question “when will Indian SF get Gucci gear?”. This question haunts pretty much everyone on this thread but, surprisingly, very few have pointed out the centrality of PCMB.

Let’s do some simple math.

For rough comparison, use this formula:
PCMB = [Total military budget] ÷ [Total number of military personnel]

Let’s do a comparison between UK and India, for example. Using the above formula, we get:
1) PCMB of India = 49221 $ per person
2) PCMB of UK = 328277 $ per person

Ratio of PCMB of UK and India is = 328277 ÷ 49221 ≈ 6.7
This means that the PCMB of UK is 6.7 times more than PCMB of India.
This further means that UK spends 6.7 times more than India per person on its military.
This also roughly implies that the SAS receives 6.7 times more money than Para SF per operator.

In other words, a SAS soldier roughly gets 6.7 times more money than a Para SF soldier.

There you go. Problem solved!!

So when someone asks, “when will Para SF receive SAS-level gear?”, tell them: “if and when India increases its PCMB by several times”.

Yes, this calculation is simplistic. I have not incorporated many other factors like purchasing power etc. But this principle of PCMB is true in its essence.

Let me finish my answer with an example:
PCMB helps explain why even Singapore SF is better equipped than Indian SF.

 

[rkhanna]

We are missing a key point in the Gucci gear debate - per capita military budget (PCMB).

PCMB is the answer to the question “when will Indian SF get Gucci gear?”. This question haunts pretty much everyone on this thread but, surprisingly, very few have pointed out the centrality of PCMB.

Let’s do some simple math.

For rough comparison, use this formula:
PCMB = [Total military budget] ÷ [Total number of military personnel]

Let’s do a comparison between UK and India, for example. Using the above formula, we get:
1) PCMB of India = 49221 $ per person
2) PCMB of UK = 328277 $ per person

Ratio of PCMB of UK and India is = 328277 ÷ 49221 ≈ 6.7
This means that the PCMB of UK is 6.7 times more than PCMB of India.
This further means that UK spends 6.7 times more than India per person on its military.
This also roughly implies that the SAS receives 6.7 times more money than Para SF per operator.

In other words, a SAS soldier roughly gets 6.7 times more money than a Para SF soldier.

There you go. Problem solved!!

So when someone asks, “when will Para SF receive SAS-level gear?”, tell them: “if and when India increases its PCMB by several times”.

Yes, this calculation is simplistic. I have not incorporated many other factors like purchasing power etc. But this principal of PCMB is true in its essence.

Let me finish my answer with an example:
PCMB helps explain why even Singapore SF is better equipped than Indian SF.
View attachment 62677

Question we need to ask why are there 9 SF battalions to 5 Para battalions.

 

[AZTEC]

Question we need to ask why are there 9 SF battalions to 5 Para battalions.

Yes, you are correct. There are too many SF battalions, which has resulted in newer battalions being equipped with old weapons like AK-47 initially.

 

[ALBY]

Question we need to ask why are there 9 SF battalions to 5 Para battalions.

Absolutely. Our SF strength is on par with that of US where as the mandate of US forces is dozen times bigger than ours.
People objecting against Gucci gear should revisit the battles of 1962,1st and 3rd Battle of panipat, almost all the battles won by Brits etc and should check what was the main reason for defeats.

 

[samsaptaka]

Until they get their helps shot out of the sky at night or worse when they crash one right on top on OBL ,. Last I checked our boys clocked several dozens in Myanmar and POK without anyone having a clue death was upon them.

Chill nigga, don't get your panties in a bunch.

Are you saying that most of the US SF missions end in failure by quoting those two examples ? (And the UBL one was not even a failure, it was a glitch, a loss of equipment, UBL is still dead, isn't he ?)
Indeed our lads are doing a great job, no one is disagreeing there. But why are you justifying not acquiring superior comms and NVGs and other equipment based on past success ? Warfare is constantly evolving, need to change and adapt, quad nvgs are better than two, but we don't want them just so we can prove we are the 'tough' boys ?

 

[ALBY]

We are missing a key point in the Gucci gear debate - per capita military budget (PCMB).

PCMB is the answer to the question “when will Indian SF get Gucci gear?”. This question haunts pretty much everyone on this thread but, surprisingly, very few have pointed out the centrality of PCMB.

Let’s do some simple math.

For rough comparison, use this formula:
PCMB = [Total military budget] ÷ [Total number of military personnel]

Let’s do a comparison between UK and India, for example. Using the above formula, we get:
1) PCMB of India = 49221 $ per person
2) PCMB of UK = 328277 $ per person

Ratio of PCMB of UK and India is = 328277 ÷ 49221 ≈ 6.7
This means that the PCMB of UK is 6.7 times more than PCMB of India.
This further means that UK spends 6.7 times more than India per person on its military.
This also roughly implies that the SAS receives 6.7 times more money than Para SF per operator.

In other words, a SAS soldier roughly gets 6.7 times more money than a Para SF soldier.

There you go. Problem solved!!

So when someone asks, “when will Para SF receive SAS-level gear?”, tell them: “if and when India increases its PCMB by several times”.

Yes, this calculation is simplistic. I have not incorporated many other factors like purchasing power etc. But this principle of PCMB is true in its essence.

Let me finish my answer with an example:
PCMB helps explain why even Singapore SF is better equipped than Indian SF.
View attachment 62677

There are many nations with low PCMB than ours but with well equipped SFs.Then there are we and our neighbours with shitty equipment. Atleast in SF modernization India-Paki bhai bhai