Indian Special Forces (archived)

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

On what basis do you claim this?

Bhai SSG is a SF.JAKLI is a regular unit.

I am not talking about leadership or motivation.

 

[mayfair]

Bhai SSG is a SF.JAKLI is a regular unit.

I am not talking about leadership or motivation.

Titles and tags may be meaningful, but to a certain extent and only when viewed in the proper context. After all the Afghan National army must have some special forces, fat lot of good it has done to them against Taliban has it? Or for that matter the Nigeria army special forces against Boko Haram.

The name is just that- a name There are scores of Iyengar bakeries in Bangalore, does it mean they are all the same- qualitatively?

As you also said, leadership and motivation are an important qualifier, but let's leave that out for the time being.

Now coming back to the subject of JAKLI vs SSG, I only asked on what basis did you claim that SSG is anyday better than JAKLI?

Such a statement would suggest an absolute conviction that on ANY single day SSG WILL outperform JAKLI and that is because they have. Now such absolute conviction can only come from operational record i.e. past histories in combat.

All I wished to know was in your opinion, what is it about SSG's operational record that makes them better than JAKLI anyday? What have they meaningfully achieved (that JAKLI have not) that allows you to say this with absolute conviction?

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Titles and tags may be meaningful, but to a certain extent and only when viewed in the proper context. After all the Afghan National army must have some special forces, fat lot of good it has done to them against Taliban has it? Or for that matter the Nigeria army special forces against Boko Haram.

The name is just that- a name There are scores of Iyengar bakeries in Bangalore, does it mean they are all the same- qualitatively?

As you also said, leadership and motivation are an important qualifier, but let's leave that out for the time being.

Now coming back to the subject of JAKLI vs SSG, I only asked on what basis did you claim that SSG is anyday better than JAKLI?

Such a statement would suggest an absolute conviction that on ANY single day SSG WILL outperform JAKLI and that is because they have. Now such absolute conviction can only come from operational record i.e. past histories in combat.

All I wished to know was in your opinion, what is it about SSG's operational record that makes them better than JAKLI anyday? What have they meaningfully achieved (that JAKLI have not) that allows you to say this with absolute conviction?

Ok..i said that in a different context.

What i meant was that if you see the training of a SSG and a JAKLI the SSG would have more skill than a JAKLI guy.

I didnt mean to put them on a head on fight and say that SSG will come on top.

Because in battles or wars what matters is the leadership and tactics which the SSG hasnt showed.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Good timing!!!

A documnetary on Commando school which trains Ghataks starts soon.

I wish they make such videos on all Category A schools.

 

[aditya g]

On comparison of SSG vs Para SF (and other Indian SF). An attempt was made earlier by @WARREN SS but let me take a different approach by avoiding X > Y type comparison. Not comprehensive but a few points for debate.

1. Unit organisation.

SSG is far ahead of Indian SF in this regard. Not only is SSG the regiment or regimental centre, it is also a brigade level formation. So it is integrated and self contained, unlike Para SF who does not have a regiment and and neither have its own command.

2. Airborne operations

While SSG guys are obviously trained for parachute, there is no concept of Airborne troops in Pak Army. SSG is exclusively a 'commando' SF and not there is no equivalent of the 50th Ind Para Bde in Pak Army. There is no air delivery concept of Army, IFVs, ambulance etc like we have in Indian Army.

3. Desert warfare

There is no equivalent of the impressive 10 Para SF. They probably train in desert conditions but there is no long range jeep unit in Pak Army.

4. SSG(N) vs MARCOS

There is no debate here, MARCOS is much larger and has access to Indian Navy's assets. MARCOS have rich combat experience since inception in 80s. PN however has Pak Marines battalions which are specialised for creeks warfare and force protection. Somewhat an equivalent of Sagar Prahari Bal and BSF.

5. Direct confrontation

Have SSG and Para SF ever fought each directly? As per Gaurav Savant's book on Kargil, SSG and Para SF did fight each other.

@COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @rkhanna @reddevil9 @Gessler

 

[armyofhind]

On comparison of SSG vs Para SF (and other Indian SF). An attempt was made earlier by @WARREN SS but let me take a different approach by avoiding X > Y type comparison. Not comprehensive but a few points for debate.

1. Unit organisation.

SSG is far ahead of Indian SF in this regard. Not only is SSG the regiment or regimental centre, it is also a brigade level formation. So it is integrated and self contained, unlike Para SF who does not have a regiment and and neither have its own command.

2. Airborne operations

While SSG guys are obviously trained for parachute, there is no concept of Airborne troops in Pak Army. SSG is exclusively a 'commando' SF and not there is no equivalent of the 50th Ind Para Bde in Pak Army. There is no air delivery concept of Army, IFVs, ambulance etc like we have in Indian Army.

3. Desert warfare

There is no equivalent of the impressive 10 Para SF. They probably train in desert conditions but there is no long range jeep unit in Pak Army.

4. SSG(N) vs MARCOS

There is no debate here, MARCOS is much larger and has access to Indian Navy's assets. MARCOS have rich combat experience since inception in 80s. PN however has Pak Marines battalions which are specialised for creeks warfare and force protection. Somewhat an equivalent of Sagar Prahari Bal and BSF.

5. Direct confrontation

Have SSG and Para SF ever fought each directly? As per Gaurav Savant's book on Kargil, SSG and Para SF did fight each other.

@COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @rkhanna @reddevil9 @Gessler

BSF themselves have a commando unit specialized for combat in Rann of Kutch and the Sunderbans.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

On comparison of SSG vs Para SF (and other Indian SF). An attempt was made earlier by @WARREN SS but let me take a different approach by avoiding X > Y type comparison. Not comprehensive but a few points for debate.

1. Unit organisation.

SSG is far ahead of Indian SF in this regard. Not only is SSG the regiment or regimental centre, it is also a brigade level formation. So it is integrated and self contained, unlike Para SF who does not have a regiment and and neither have its own command.

2. Airborne operations

While SSG guys are obviously trained for parachute, there is no concept of Airborne troops in Pak Army. SSG is exclusively a 'commando' SF and not there is no equivalent of the 50th Ind Para Bde in Pak Army. There is no air delivery concept of Army, IFVs, ambulance etc like we have in Indian Army.

3. Desert warfare

There is no equivalent of the impressive 10 Para SF. They probably train in desert conditions but there is no long range jeep unit in Pak Army.

4. SSG(N) vs MARCOS

There is no debate here, MARCOS is much larger and has access to Indian Navy's assets. MARCOS have rich combat experience since inception in 80s. PN however has Pak Marines battalions which are specialised for creeks warfare and force protection. Somewhat an equivalent of Sagar Prahari Bal and BSF.

5. Direct confrontation

Have SSG and Para SF ever fought each directly? As per Gaurav Savant's book on Kargil, SSG and Para SF did fight each other.

@COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @rkhanna @reddevil9 @Gessler

Excellent comparison.

Yes in Kargil and also on the LOC.PARA SF is the only SF which has come head on with them and won.

I will cover some other points like you:-

Unarmed Combat:-Indian SF are taught PTK which is 10 times more lethal than the karate judo which SSG is taught.PTK is a combat system and is very deadly.

Urban combat:-Although SSG was the first ones to pick up the new skills since early 2000s but the Para SF has fined tuned their skill and are as skilled if not better than the SSG and the same goes for Marcos.

However,Para SF is the best equipped unit among these for Urban warfare.They have hand held radars and ex SAG guys.

Guerrilla warfare:-SSG is no good in this.They were training with Lankan Army for this which is trained by the Indian Army.

CIJWS is way way way over the skill of Lankan and Pak army.

Black ops:-Both SSG and Para conduct such ops.Hard to compare the two.

Mountain warfare:-Both SSG and Para are good in this.Years of fighting have hardened them.


However,on a leadership and tactical comparison the SSG has always done blunders thanks to its officers.In Pak Army officers have a princely stature unlike the Indian Army which makes its officers sleep with jawans sometimes and eat the same food.

Pak Light Commando Battalion which is like the Ghatak Commandos may or may not be airborne.I had asked this question to a few pakistanis but they had no answer.

 

[WARREN SS]

On comparison of SSG vs Para SF (and other Indian SF). An attempt was made earlier by @WARREN SS but let me take a different approach by avoiding X > Y type comparison. Not comprehensive but a few points for debate.

Arei Bhai I was Only giving credit Too SSG on their OPs not comparing them with PARAS

I was More Fascinated By Covert Action Division of ISI Similar To our SG or 4th Vikas in Soviet-Afghanistan war

Brig. Dogar, SSG, ISI. in Gardez, Afghanistan. Russian arsenal is on fire in background,after Mujaheddin Shelling. (Discription according to him) CAD in action!

 

[aditya g]

Light Commando Battalion (LCB) seems to be a counter insurgency unit raised by Pak Army corps. "Light" probably because they do not have any heavy weapons like MMGs, 120mm or RCLs on their TOE. Not as Special as SSG but somewhat half way b/w conventional and SSG unit.

Guessing the personnel are drawn from other battalions in the Corps.

 

[aditya g]

Major Mohit Sharma's story as told by Gaurav Savant.

http://blogs.intoday.in/index.php?o...ror-Chakra-Vyuh-in-North-Kashmir.html&blogs=2

The helicopter shuddered as a sudden gust of wind threatened to slam it against the sheer rock face. The pilots, both young officers of the Indian Air Force, were trying to land at a small helipad carved out of the jagged peaks at 13,000 feet in north Kashmir.

With the rotors still whirring, one of the pilots leaned back and opened the door signalling for us - my cameraman and I - to jump out and run straight towards the officers waiting for us. Do not run towards the rear - the tail rotor is almost invisible, he had cautioned earlier. We jumped out as a gust of icy wind almost took my breath away.

But this was an exclusive we were not going to miss. Access to the 'conflict zone', in north Kashmir. Intelligence agencies had warned about the 'mass infiltration'. Early warning posts were talking about the increased movement or hulchul in military parlance across the Line of Control. Sources were talking about terrorists having assembled across the Line of Control, north of Pir Panjal planning section and platoon level (groups between 10 and 30) infiltration.

And the second fortnight of March had been terrible. Two major infiltrations in Gurez and Drangyari Kupwara areas. What was worse, one officer Major Mohit Sharma and seven other ranks of the elite one Para special forces had been killed in the encounter with terrorists.

Not just any soldiers. These were special forces. And that too 1 Para. Considered the Army Commander's own. Our aim was to show to our viewers the area where the operations were taking place. Also to see, how the terrorists had infiltrated and that too in such large numbers - 120 in all. The army, however, says only 31 were combatants, the rest porters and guides.

On the army's grid map Sadhna pass did not look all that menacing nor did the entire Shamsabari range. But on ground this was as bad if not worse than Kargil, where I had covered the conflict in 1999.

Now the army is well-deployed here in north Kashmir. But like in Kargil, it were the nullahs and passes where ambushes were laid, traditional infiltration routes guarded and patrolled. The terrorists used the treacherous high altitude avalanche prone mountains to infiltrate.

Caught off guard again? Initially yes! 120 men cannot sneak across the Line of Control undetected. Somewhere the systems failed completely. Foot patrolling, anti-infiltration obstacle system (the 12-feet high fence was completely buried in snow), sensors, helicopter reconnaissance all failed. But sources say there was intelligence available and ambushes were laid. So what happened?

Apparently, the Lashkar-e-Taiba guide sent by Abu Saad, the Rajwar Lashkar commander to get the new group and reinforcements lost his way. This was a blessing in disguise for the terrorists. They evaded the army's elaborate trap. But the army tracked them. At Drangyari 'contact' happened just before dawn. The army 'let them have it'. But under the cover of darkness, the group split and melted. This was on March 20. The same night, special force commandoes including the team led by Major Mohit Sharma of the 1 Para SF was helidropped 'behind enemy lines'.

But unknown to the army, the terrorists were watching the entire helidrop operations. The brave major and his team were hunting the terrorists. The terrorists had the advantage of height. They were well hidden behind rocks. Suddenly the hunter was the hunted. The brave major and his team are learnt to have put up a fierce firefight. But the terrorists had the advantage of height, element of surprise and cover.

The next morning over a dozen army teams fanned out. They hunted the terrorists, killing 25 in all, over the next 10 days. Six terrorists were killed in an avalanche but so were eight soldiers.

The recoveries were huge - 13,000 rounds of AK ammunition, one RPG, 25 AK-47 rifles, hundreds of grenades, 32 kgs of explosives. The terrorists were extremely 'well-kitted' and trained to fight and survive in high altitudes. Multi-layered high altitude clothing, snow boots, detailed six grid maps, GPS, satellite phones, radio sets...the works. All pointing towards the direct involvement of the Pakistani security forces.

But there are very important lessons here for the army. While it is good, troops are now helidropped to deal with terrorists at high altitudes (imagine climbing for 9 hours at 12,000 feet and then fighting) it has to be back to the basics. High altitude jungle warfare training, tracking and evasive tactics - the basics need to be second nature. We cannot afford to lose even a single soldier in this war against terror. We cannot afford to be trapped in terror's Chakra Vyuh.

The army also needs to ensure better back up. Heliborne fire power is a must. It is nobody's point that the army is not looking after its soldiers. But the army needs to do much more. The Generals are Generals because they are now meant to fight battles in South Block and ensure the fighting force gets the best back up money can buy.

It is a war out there. It will only get worse as the snow melts. For the army it is hunting season. But the hunter must not become the hunted. EVER!

May 13, 2009 Posted by Gaurav C. Sawant
​

Some feel that this particular operation was where ParaSF actually fought SSG and not some brainwashed Jehadi, or at least SSG level jehadis

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Major Mohit Sharma's story as told by Gaurav Savant.

http://blogs.intoday.in/index.php?o...ror-Chakra-Vyuh-in-North-Kashmir.html&blogs=2

The helicopter shuddered as a sudden gust of wind threatened to slam it against the sheer rock face. The pilots, both young officers of the Indian Air Force, were trying to land at a small helipad carved out of the jagged peaks at 13,000 feet in north Kashmir.

With the rotors still whirring, one of the pilots leaned back and opened the door signalling for us - my cameraman and I - to jump out and run straight towards the officers waiting for us. Do not run towards the rear - the tail rotor is almost invisible, he had cautioned earlier. We jumped out as a gust of icy wind almost took my breath away.

But this was an exclusive we were not going to miss. Access to the 'conflict zone', in north Kashmir. Intelligence agencies had warned about the 'mass infiltration'. Early warning posts were talking about the increased movement or hulchul in military parlance across the Line of Control. Sources were talking about terrorists having assembled across the Line of Control, north of Pir Panjal planning section and platoon level (groups between 10 and 30) infiltration.

And the second fortnight of March had been terrible. Two major infiltrations in Gurez and Drangyari Kupwara areas. What was worse, one officer Major Mohit Sharma and seven other ranks of the elite one Para special forces had been killed in the encounter with terrorists.

Not just any soldiers. These were special forces. And that too 1 Para. Considered the Army Commander's own. Our aim was to show to our viewers the area where the operations were taking place. Also to see, how the terrorists had infiltrated and that too in such large numbers - 120 in all. The army, however, says only 31 were combatants, the rest porters and guides.

On the army's grid map Sadhna pass did not look all that menacing nor did the entire Shamsabari range. But on ground this was as bad if not worse than Kargil, where I had covered the conflict in 1999.

Now the army is well-deployed here in north Kashmir. But like in Kargil, it were the nullahs and passes where ambushes were laid, traditional infiltration routes guarded and patrolled. The terrorists used the treacherous high altitude avalanche prone mountains to infiltrate.

Caught off guard again? Initially yes! 120 men cannot sneak across the Line of Control undetected. Somewhere the systems failed completely. Foot patrolling, anti-infiltration obstacle system (the 12-feet high fence was completely buried in snow), sensors, helicopter reconnaissance all failed. But sources say there was intelligence available and ambushes were laid. So what happened?

Apparently, the Lashkar-e-Taiba guide sent by Abu Saad, the Rajwar Lashkar commander to get the new group and reinforcements lost his way. This was a blessing in disguise for the terrorists. They evaded the army's elaborate trap. But the army tracked them. At Drangyari 'contact' happened just before dawn. The army 'let them have it'. But under the cover of darkness, the group split and melted. This was on March 20. The same night, special force commandoes including the team led by Major Mohit Sharma of the 1 Para SF was helidropped 'behind enemy lines'.

But unknown to the army, the terrorists were watching the entire helidrop operations. The brave major and his team were hunting the terrorists. The terrorists had the advantage of height. They were well hidden behind rocks. Suddenly the hunter was the hunted. The brave major and his team are learnt to have put up a fierce firefight. But the terrorists had the advantage of height, element of surprise and cover.

The next morning over a dozen army teams fanned out. They hunted the terrorists, killing 25 in all, over the next 10 days. Six terrorists were killed in an avalanche but so were eight soldiers.

The recoveries were huge - 13,000 rounds of AK ammunition, one RPG, 25 AK-47 rifles, hundreds of grenades, 32 kgs of explosives. The terrorists were extremely 'well-kitted' and trained to fight and survive in high altitudes. Multi-layered high altitude clothing, snow boots, detailed six grid maps, GPS, satellite phones, radio sets...the works. All pointing towards the direct involvement of the Pakistani security forces.

But there are very important lessons here for the army. While it is good, troops are now helidropped to deal with terrorists at high altitudes (imagine climbing for 9 hours at 12,000 feet and then fighting) it has to be back to the basics. High altitude jungle warfare training, tracking and evasive tactics - the basics need to be second nature. We cannot afford to lose even a single soldier in this war against terror. We cannot afford to be trapped in terror's Chakra Vyuh.

The army also needs to ensure better back up. Heliborne fire power is a must. It is nobody's point that the army is not looking after its soldiers. But the army needs to do much more. The Generals are Generals because they are now meant to fight battles in South Block and ensure the fighting force gets the best back up money can buy.

It is a war out there. It will only get worse as the snow melts. For the army it is hunting season. But the hunter must not become the hunted. EVER!

May 13, 2009 Posted by Gaurav C. Sawant
​

Some feel that this particular operation was where ParaSF actually fought SSG and not some brainwashed Jehadi, or at least SSG level jehadis

This is the kind of operations which happen in Hafruda and Lolab.Some people come here and disrespect Para not knowing shit about what goes on in such operations in the high altitude terrain.

SSG operators are known to cross over the LOC but they are not serving operators but the ones who have taken an early retirement for the cover to be a ISI operative.

 

[aditya g]

.................................

 

[rkhanna]

.................................

Random titbit. The above is also the reason why Indian SF dont train/interact with the SAS anymore. (other brit SOF relations are continuing).

In 95. The SAS came to India full off piss and vinegar and told anybody who would listen the Indian SF efforts were fruitless because they were incompetent. Political pressure allowed the SAS to operate almost freely. The SAS spent weeks getting lost in the mountains and were quitely sent back home with a pat on the back.

 

[sthf]

@rkhanna That's interesting. Never heard about it. Is the source available? However I do know that SAS came looking for Laden in Kashmir after Brits fucked up in Tora Bora and SAS did provide some sniper support during Operation Khukri.

 

[mayfair]

Political pressure allowed the SAS to operate almost freely. The SAS spent weeks getting lost in the mountains and were quitely sent back home with a pat on the back.

We must have been really spineless to allow SAS to roam freely and map the terrain in the sensitive region.

Allah knows how much of that info would have found its way to the Amreekis, Cheenis and Napakis.

 

[rkhanna]

We must have been really spineless to allow SAS to roam freely and map the terrain in the sensitive region.

Allah knows how much of that info would have found its way to the Amreekis, Cheenis and Napakis.

Those were different days brother. 1995 we were just recovering from a BoP crises. Just starting out in life. We were at the mercy of the countries we had borrowed from.

 

[rkhanna]

@rkhanna That's interesting. Never heard about it. Is the source available? However I do know that SAS came looking for Laden in Kashmir after Brits fucked up in Tora Bora and SAS did provide some sniper support during Operation Khukri.

I have heard this from a person who was on the ground first hand. The source unfortunately is now no longer with us.

In Kukhri we utlized D Squadran Chinooks and their Air Crews. Do not know about any sniper. First I hearing about it. For BinLaden it was not brits but a Joint Task Force (brit/Americans/Polish). that was more intelligence gathering than boots on the ground.

 

[mayfair]

Those were different days brother. 1995 we were just recovering from a BoP crises. Just starting out in life. We were at the mercy of the countries we had borrowed from.

We had faced down bigger pressures before. 1995 was when the economy had stabilised a bit, even if the reforms had been stalled.

No, there is more to this than that. Someone in the GoI or in the babudom, slyly and deliberately allowed the no-friend-of-ours SAS to enter and roam around a highly sensitive region, unsupervised.

I can only imagine how many infiltration and ingress routes, troop deployments and potential hideouts were mapped in this "fruitless survey" and found its way to the Amreekis, Cheenis and the Napakis.

 

[aditya g]

We had faced down bigger pressures before. 1995 was when the economy had stabilised a bit, even if the reforms had been stalled.

No, there is more to this than that. Someone in the GoI or in the babudom, slyly and deliberately allowed the no-friend-of-ours SAS to enter and roam around a highly sensitive region, unsupervised.

I can only imagine how many infiltration and ingress routes, troop deployments and potential hideouts were mapped in this "fruitless survey" and found its way to the Amreekis, Cheenis and the Napakis.

Imagine how Indian Army Para guys would have felt.

Foreign troops operating on our soil - disgraceful.

 

[Immanuel]

Just a question. How can an infantry unit be better than a SF unit. Yes, an infantry unit is good, but aren't SF better trained than them?

And you have the point below. So, what am I missing?

Infantry Units, specially the sons of the soil are people born in the relevant regions. Ladhak scouts for instance have spent their entire life in the region, if gear level is equal, these badasses are a nightmare to any force in that terrain. They are well acclimated and can hold their own against the likes of 9th Para SF.

SF is better trained overall but Infantry certainly in India are quite badass.