Indian Ocean Developments

[shankarosky]

the most critical part of indian ocean namely arabian sea is and will remain in full control of indian navy as far as china is concerned -its oil lifeline and they will normally dony do anything to endanger that lifeline to its economy.USN wants india to paly that role so I think in foreseeable future India will have the upper hand

 

[marcos]

Is there anything to bother about Chinese bases in Indian ocean? Those bases can help China in securing its trade route during peace time and ofcourse little bit spying on Indian Navy's movement. Among these base only one in Coco Island (if Chinese base really exist there) has something to worry about because of its proximity of Andaman. Don't think Bangladesh, Mayanmar or Srilanka will have enough courage to allow China to use those bases during any conflict with India. Even if that happens Iandian Airforce would not have much problem to annihilate those bases within hours. It will not be possible for China with their single Air-craft carrier (under construction now) to re-enforce and protect those bases.

 

[Singh]

x-post

http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/naval-forces-navy/6513-turfed-out-our-own-backyard.html#post86628

Turfed out of our own backyard​

In all the world, the Indian Navy is one of just two navies still growing. The other is the Chinese Navy. It is no accident that the rise of the two Asian giants is accompanied by a return to their original status as maritime powers. China had its Admiral Zheng Ho and the Grand fleet that came to collect tribute from the littoral countries of Asia — except India. India’s maritime power overseas is more long lasting, as the Pallavas under Jayavarman inspired the building of Angkor Wat, the largest planned metropolis in the world of 700 AD. The Chinese Army surprisingly is growing smaller as it models itself on the US Army, relying more on UAVs, wide band connectivity, air mobile troops and helicopter gunships. Not surprisingly, most countries seeking strategic partnerships with India are looking either at its soft power (knowledge and culture) or its overseas power projection capability based on its Navy.

The Indian Navy has travelled a long, rough and lonely road to get to where it is, and having got this far, is in danger of losing its way. But to start at the beginning, it was not even a navy in 1947. Endangered by 250 brilliant teak ships built in Bombay by the Wadias, British monopolists forced Wadia to shut down by abolishing the Indian Navy in 1868 and off-sourcing India’s maritime defence to the Royal Navy, from Singapore. The British partially made amends in 1947 by loaning to India, senior officers to fill the posts of admirals, naval planners and technology teachers for almost ten years, under the paternal eye of Lord Mountbatten. Doctrine, strategy and tactical documents came with the British officers and led the Navy to look for a future where India would once again be a maritime power.

That vision did not have place for Pakistan, a preoccupation that tied down the funding of the army and air force for sixty years. It led to bizarre acquisitions like the fighter aircraft that the air force bought, that could only fly for 35 minutes and the recruiting of lakhs of infantry soldiers to implement the ridiculous political directive of not losing ‘an inch of sacred territory . The navy paid a heavy price, by having its budget reduced to 12 per cent of the defence budget, but kept its head and pursued its long term strategic goal.

Having come this far, it is in danger of losing its way, as the challenges of the 21st century demand even more courageous decisions than were taken by the admirals of the 1950s and ‘60s. The threat comes from the aftermath of the attack on Mumbai and by India’s limited response to the growing menace of piracy off the Horn of Africa. When Mumbai occurred, the Navy had long felt that the 14 agencies operating at sea should at some stage have a coordinating head. Instead of dealing with the arguments already on the file, the national security apparatus gave the responsibility for coastal security to the Navy, with vaguely defined charters to the coast guard. Similarly, off Somalia, the government for long resisted doing anything at all despite UN resolutions exhorting states to coordinate naval forces to suppress piracy. It even, at one stage, prevented a naval ship close to the scene from intervening in attacking pirates who had hijacked an Indian crew. Under the pressure of UN resolutions, a Contact Group on Somalia Piracy (CGSP) met in January, where the coordination of operations has been handed over to the UK, the judicial aspects to Denmark and the industry aspects to the US. All this has occurred in what is called the ‘Indian’ ocean.

The Indian Navy lost a golden opportunity off Somalia, by not being permitted to join the international coalition and lead it, instead of patrolling one end of it in sulky isolation. The Europeans will never fight piracy — they can’t. Every time a pirate is shot, a judicial commission comes all the way from London or Berlin to conduct an enquiry. No pirate has been sentenced adequately, because the eventual concern is the pirate’s human rights. The UN resolution actually permits naval forces to enter Somalian territorial waters and ‘territory’ to suppress piracy. The blue water aspirations of the Indian Navy should have inspired it to the lead International Task Force 151 with the INS Jalashwa — with marine commandos, and army snipers and military police embarked, with powers of arrest — to free the hijacked ships in the ports of Eyl and Hobyo.

The responsibilities for coastal security after 26/11 may also lead the Navy into losing its way in an area which is really that of the coast guard’s. Just as the army lost its way in counter-insurgency, with the attraction of raising 60 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles, and neglected technological modernisation, the Navy might do the same. To prevent another Mumbai, a blue water navy should really go and pick up Hafiz Sayed, or Dawood or Tiger Memon. If they can’t be found in Pakistan, wait till they come to Dubai. After all, the most brilliant tactical action in Afghanistan was fought by US Navy Seals. The ultimate kingpin of Afghan drug smuggling, Haji Juma Khan who allegedly employs Mullah Omar, is now in a Manhattan jail, put there by the US drugs suppression agency.

Blue water navies don’t patrol the coast in peacetime, doing police work, when the coast guard is available. The Europeans may be happy doing that, for they have no war to prepare for. The Indian Navy is the only punitive instrument the government has in the great swing of power from the West to the East. The Indian Ocean is the theatre of the future. The current vision should be to dominate it strategically. The policeman’s duty is important, but let us not lose our way.

 

[sandeepdg]

India has already pocketed Maldives. No Chinese base will come up there. The US will also put pressure as Maldives is close to Diego Garcia.
So far all the pearls the Chinese have stringed are non military in nature. It is a move to ensure supplies in times of war including oil.

You are wrong, Yusuf. The Chinese have already inked a pact with Maldives to establish a naval base on the Marao islands in the north way back in 2001. The Marao naval base is expected to become operational by 2010. India, as of now has expressed its desire to set up a listening post and monitoring station in Addu Atoll in southern Maldives. The deal has not been confirmed as yet.

http://www.***********/forums/strat...aldives-against-india-some-help-pakistan.html

 

[RAM]

Maritime Multilateralism: China's Strategy for the Indian Ocean

Maritime Multilateralism: China's Strategy for the Indian Ocean

Article by Vijay Sakhuja

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been tirelessly working to dispel the ‘China threat’ perception, which appears to be increasing concomitantly with the country's rapid economic and military rise. Beijing argues that China's growing initiatives in the Indian Ocean are for 'peaceful purposes' (China.org.cn., June 3). Yet, in recent years, many China watchers in India have captured another side of Beijing's foray that depicts China carving into the Indian Ocean's security architecture by regular incursions into the region and the recent naval deployment in the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy. These initiatives appear based on a strategy that pivots on energy sea-lane security, which can be broadly characterized by the ‘string of pearls’ theory, ‘Malacca dilemma’, sale of military hardware at friendly prices to Indian Ocean littorals, maritime infrastructure developments in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong), road/energy pipeline networks and electronic surveillance installations in Myanmar (Burma). The thrust of these traditional security and economic initiatives are complemented by naval diplomacy involving maritime multilateralism with Indian Ocean littorals, which Chinese leaders believe can facilitate the regional perceptions that China's intent in the region is benign. Indeed, these goodwill visits and naval exercises by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are an important tool to further China’s attempts to portray its presence in the Indian Ocean as benign. It has effectively created conditions to develop a broad and substantive agenda for building relations with other nations. In some cases, these initiatives have the potential to translate into strategic partnerships that would consolidate its presence and expand its engagements with the Indian Ocean littorals.

Multinational Naval Exercises
China’s forays in the Indian Ocean date back to 1985 when the PLAN made port calls to South Asian ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka [1]. Pakistan emerged as an important partner in South Asia for China and today their cooperation covers a wide spectrum of political, economic and strategic issues including the sale and joint development of military hardware and nuclear cooperation. Both sides have also engaged in bilateral/multilateral naval exercises. Commenting on the first ever joint exercise with the Pakistani Navy held off the coast of Shanghai in 2003, Rear Admiral Xiu Ji, a Chinese navy official observed that the exercises were ‘the first [for China] with any foreign country’ (Defencetalk.com, October 21, 2003). Two years later, the second bilateral exercise was held in the Arabian Sea in November 2005 (Voanews.com, November 24, 2005). In 2007, Pakistan hosted a multinational naval exercise, Aman 2007 (Peace 2007), off Karachi and invited the PLAN to join the exercises. Beside the Pakistani Navy ships, warships from Bangladesh, China, France, Italy, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and the United States engaged in maneuvers in the Arabian Sea (Xinhua News Agency, March 9, 2007). Interestingly, the Commander of the Chinese flotilla Luo Xianlin was designated as the tactical commander for the joint maritime rescue exercise and the PLAN missile frigate ‘Lianyungang’ was entrusted with the coordination of the exercise (Chinaview.cn, March 10, 2007). The exercises were significant since it provided the PLAN with the opportunity to coordinate complex maneuvers with other naval forces. In 2009, the PLAN once again participated in Aman 2009, which was held in the Arabian Sea, and this time it carried out exercises along with 19 foreign naval ships (Theasiandefence.com, March 17).

Although the PLAN has engaged in bilateral and multinational naval exercises, it is important to point out that deployments for multinational operations are relatively different and more complex. Conducting multinational operations involves structured communication procedures, synergy among different operational doctrines, establishing mutually agreed rules of engagement (RoE), helicopter controlling actions, and common search and rescue procedures, which the PLAN is still developing.

Shifting Geography of Peace Mission

A close partnership between China and Russia is evident in the maritime domain and rests on joint naval exercises, Chinese acquisition of Russian naval hardware including ships, submarines and aircraft and high-level naval exchanges [2]. In 1999, the two navies conducted a joint naval exercise that involved the Russian Pacific Fleet and the PLAN's Eastern Fleet (China Daily, July 8, 2004) and the 2001 joint exercises included Russian strategic bombers. Peace Mission 2005, another naval exercise involving the PLA Navy and the Russian Navy was conducted under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the six-nation security group. The exercises were conducted off the East Russian coast-Shandong Peninsula in northeastern China (News.bbc.co.uk, August 18, 2005). Peace Mission 2007 focused on counter-terrorism and was conducted on land (En.rian.ru July 24, 2007).

Interestingly, the two sides utilized their presence in the Gulf of Aden and conducted Blue Peace Shield 2009, a joint exercise involving counter piracy operations, replenishment-at-sea, and live firing (Defencetalk.com, September 18; Taiwan News, September 17). The exercise showcased Chinese intention to be more transparent in its deployment, test interoperability with foreign navies and the PLAN’s ability to engage in a range of operations in distant waters.

Engaging Straits of Malacca Littorals

China has adopted diplomacy as a tool to ally apprehensions among the Straits of Malacca littorals thus setting aside their fears that Beijing may deploy its navy in times of crisis to escort Chinese flagged vessels transiting through the Strait. Further, China is averse to any extra regional attempts to deploy naval vessels in the Strait for the safety of merchant traffic transiting. For instance, in 2000, it strongly objected to Japanese attempts to deploy vessels to patrol the Straits of Malacca where shipping had been threatened by piracy (Sspconline.org, April 11, 2005). Instead, it has offered financial and technological assistance to improve the safety and security of merchant traffic transiting the Strait of Malacca. In 2005, during the International Maritime Organization (IMO) meeting in Jakarta, China reiterated its position of supporting the littoral states in enhancing safety and security in the Strait (Xinhua News Agency, September 7, 2005; China Brief, April 12, 2006). In 2005, China offered to finance the project for the replacement of navigational aids damaged during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the estimated cost for the project is pegged at $276,000 [3].

Benefits of Multinational Exercises for PLAN

Multinational naval operations are fast gaining higher priority in the PLAN’s strategic thinking. There are at least three reasons. The first relates to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the international disaster relief operations in Southeast Asia-South Asia. PLAN’s conspicuous absence in the operations had exposed the limitation of a rising power and its navy. As a result, China was excluded from the core group comprising the United States, Australia and India who quickly deployed their ships for relief efforts. The Chinese Navy's absence might also be attributed to its lack of experience in working with multinational forces.

The second reason for participation in multinational exercises is prospects for interoperability with international navies. Further, these operations assist the PLAN in identifying international trends in naval weaponry, gathering information on operating procedures and gaining a better understanding of the changing nature of naval warfare. The third reason is that multinational exercises help China showcase to the international naval community its military industrial prowess and PLAN technological sophistication.

Yet, China embraces selective maritime multilateralism. For instance, China did not participate in the U.S. Naval War College's International Sea Power Symposium in Newport (Bernama [Malaysia], October 1). This year's event is the 40th anniversary and provides an occasion for the heads of the world's navies and coast guards to discuss issues of mutual interest (Navy.mil, October 8). The 2009 Symposium focused on common maritime challenges and explored prospects for enhancing maritime security cooperation, including combating piracy.

Impediments to Chinese Maritime Multilateralism

Several Chinese initiatives in the Indian Ocean have stirred considerable unease among some regional powers, particularly India, which has a tendency to perceive every Chinese move in the region as a step toward its ‘strategic encirclement.’ Indian strategists have often argued that China’s naval capability is fast growing and would soon be capable of conducting sustained operations in the Indian Ocean supported by the maritime infrastructure being built in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma). Indian fears are accentuated by a suggestion by a Chinese admiral to Admiral Timothy J. Keating, then-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) of dividing the Indo-Pacific region into two areas of responsibility between the United States and China (Navyseals.com, May 6, 2007).

According to the Indian press, the Chinese naval officer stated, “You, the United States, take Hawaii East and we, China, will take Hawaii West and the Indian Ocean. Then you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if something happens here, we will let you know” (Indian Express, May 15).

New Delhi has not been receptive to Chinese requests to join Indian Ocean multilateral maritime security initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the trilateral grouping of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA), which has a significant maritime component in its interactions. IONS is an initiative by 33 Indian Ocean littorals wherein their navies or the principal maritime security agencies discuss issues of maritime security, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief (HADR) throughout the Indian Ocean Region (Indiannavy.nic.in, February 15, 2008). The PLAN had approached the Indian Navy to ‘explore ways to accommodate Beijing as either an observer or associate member’; however, New Delhi turned down the request because, in its perspective, there was ‘no strategic rationale to let China be associated with IONS as it was strictly restricted to littoral states of the Indian Ocean’ (Indian Express, April 21).

The IBSA trilateral grouping is an offshoot of the broader South-South cooperation started in 2003. Although cooperation in the security domain was not envisaged at its inception, maritime security issues (sailing regatta, trilateral naval exercises IBSAMAR, and high-level naval exchanges) have gradually gained momentum in the discussions. China has been exploring the possibility of joining IBSA, but the fact that “IBSA’s common identity is based on values such as democracy, personal freedoms and human rights” preclude its membership (The Wall Street Journal, April 7).

In response, China craftily has attempted to dent the IBSA architecture and wean some of the actors away through bilateral political-military engagements much to the consternation of other partners. Beijing has adopted a sophisticated strategy to build-up bilateral military relations with Brazil, and Brasilia has offered to help train Chinese naval pilots on NAe São Paulo, which is a Clemenceau class aircraft carrier (China Brief, June 12). According to discussions (August 2009) that this author had with some Indian naval analysts, there are fears that the above collaboration could well be the springboard for reciprocity involving the training of Brazilian naval officers in nuclear submarine operations by the PLAN and joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. Further, these initiatives would add to China’s power projection capability and could be the catalyst for frequent forays in the Indian Ocean.

Although the Chinese strategy of maritime multilateralism is premised on cooperative engagements, Beijing is leveraging its naval power for strategic purposes. The development of military maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean would provide China access and a basing facility for conducting sustained operations and emerge as a stakeholder in Indian Ocean security architecture. Maritime multilateralism has so far produced positive gains for China and would be the preferred strategy for conduct of its international relations in the future, particularly with the Indian Ocean littorals.

[The views expressed in the above article are the author’s own and do not reflect the policy or position of the Indian Council of World Affairs.]

China News: Vijay Sakhuja: Maritime Multilateralism: China’s Strategy for the Indian Ocean | China Digital Times (CDT)

Maritime Multilateralism: China's Strategy for the Indian Ocean - The Jamestown Foundation

 

[bsn4u1985]

Indian Ocean: Ruling the Waves


After decades of investment and planning, India has finally acquired the ability to indigenously build and operate a nuclear-powered submarine, a feat accomplished by only five other countries, Harsh V Pant comments for ISN Security Watch.

By Harsh V Pant for ISN Security Watch

The INS Arihant, as the nuclear submarine is called, will now undergo up to two years of testing and sea trials before being accepted for service by the Indian Navy.

Indian naval expansion is being undertaken with an eye on China, and Arihant notwithstanding, India has nautical miles to go before it can catch up with its powerful neighbor, which has made some significant advances in the waters surrounding India.

Just a few months back, China’s growing naval capability was on full display as it paraded its nuclear-powered submarines for the first time as part of the celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy. Gone is the reticence of yore when China was not ready to even admit that it had such capabilities. Chinese commanders are now openly talking about the need for nuclear submarines to safeguard the nation’s interests, and the Chinese navy, once the weakest of the three services, is now the focus of attention of the military modernization program that is being pursued with utmost seriousness.

China’s navy is now considered the third-largest in the world, behind only the US and Russia and superior to the Indian navy in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The PLA navy has traditionally been a coastal force, and China has had a continental outlook to security. But with a rise in its economic might since the 1980s, Chinese interests have expanded and acquired a maritime orientation with intent to project power into the Indian Ocean.

China is investing far greater resources in the modernization of its armed forces in general and its navy in particular than India seems either willing to undertake or capable of sustaining at present. China’s increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet could eventually be one of the world’s largest, and with a rapid accretion in its capabilities, including submarines, ballistic missiles and GPS-blocking technology, some are suggesting that China will increasingly have the capacity to challenge the US.

Senior Chinese officials have indicated that China would be ready to build an aircraft carrier by the end of the decade as it is seen as being indispensable to protecting Chinese interests in oceans. Such intent to develop carrier capability marks a shift away from devoting the bulk of the PLA’s modernization drive to the goal of capturing Taiwan.

With a rise in China’s economic and political prowess, there has also been a commensurate growth in its profile in the Indian Ocean region. China is acquiring naval bases along the crucial choke-points in the Indian Ocean, not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region.

China realizes that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage that it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower - and there is enough evidence to suggest that China is comprehensively building up its maritime power in all dimensions.

It is China’s growing dependence on maritime space and resources that is reflected in the country's aspiration to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean region. China’s growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation.

Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India - something that comes out clearly in a secret memorandum issued by the PLA General Logistic Department director: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians [...]. We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.”

Given the immense geographical advantages that India enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will find it very challenging to exert as much sway in the Indian Ocean as India can. But all the steps that China will take to protect and enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean region will generate apprehensions in India about Beijing’s real intentions, thereby engendering a classic security dilemma between the two Asian giants.

Tensions are inherent in such an evolving strategic relationship as was underlined in an incident earlier this year when an Indian kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as they tried to test for weaknesses in each others’ sonar systems. The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine to the surface, which was strongly denied by the Indian navy.

Unless managed carefully, the potential for such incidents turning serious in the future remains high, especially as Sino-Indian naval competition is likely to intensify with the Indian and Chinese navies operating far from their shores. The battle to rule the waves in the Indian Ocean may have just begun.

Harsh Pant is a lecturer at King's College London. His research interests include WMD proliferation, US foreign policy and Asia-Pacific security issues.

Indian Ocean: Ruling the Waves / ISN

 

[tony4562]

Hi, I'm chinese and it's my first post ever here. Here is my 2cents.

The indian ocean will be ruled for the foreseeable future, by US and her allies. Both India and China will however become more visible and active in this region, not in the contest of challenging the US though. Russia, as it slowly recovers, might also want to have a say here, but her interests in this region are probably quite limited since these days Russia is pretty much a raw material/energy exporter.

I don't think the chinese navy will or is even interested in establishing a permanent presence in the indian ocean so lang the shipping lane is protected by the US. PLAN's main focus is undoubtly taiwan, another goal is to break out from the first island chain (that's why she has carrier ambitions). You need to realize that EU is China's biggest trading partner, the US imports more from China than from anyone else, China is also the biggest trading partner of Japan, S.Korea and interestingly India. How often do you go to war with your top trading partner? Another thing, most chinese trade goods, particularly oil is not carried by chinese ships. Someone made an analysis and showed that less than 10% of China's oil consumption is carried by Chinese tankers through the indian ocean. So the talk of cutting of Chinese trade in the indian ocean by the indian navy is plain silly. Further more this would not sit well with the gulf countries, and EU countries that do trade. And finally, for long time to come, India will not have the ships needed to intercept the majority of Chinese merchant ships (for that you need to have 50 or more destroyers+frigates).

Also in the scenario US's influence wanes in the indian ocean, India will not run amok here, with or without chinese presense. India is surrounded by muslim countries, some have deep pockets, some have quite strong military and certainly none of them wishes to see America getting replaced by India.

My final thought, all those talks about individual military items or technologies (such as AESA vs PESA) is silly. No war will ever by decided by a few conventional weapons. Evething will come down to economy, and in this regard I can only expect China to get stronger and stronger. Currently China's GDP in nominal terms is 1/3 of that of US, in PPP terms 60%, and still growing. China overtaking US's as world's No.1 car market gives a taste of what is about to come. India's growing too, but over the next 2 decades, the gap between India and China will only widen whereas the gap between China and US will narrow. Once China's GDP reaches 6 times the size of India's (currenty the ratio is about 3.5 times, but in many categories, such as cars, electronics, meat, cement, etc, China already consumes 5 times or more than India) by perhaps 2025, indians will flood Chinese labour market, and this India vs China war scenario will be gone for good.

 

[tony4562]

why am I shown with a vietnamese flag?

 

[sandeepdg]

by perhaps 2025, indians will flood Chinese labour market, and this India vs China war scenario will be gone for good.

Oh really , please give a sane reason as why you dream like that ?? Indian labours don't need to venture anywhere else when we have a massive economy and which is growing..... only place Indian labours prefer to go is the gulf as there's good money to be made there... so do the chinese, vietnamese, pakis etc.

 

[AJSINGH]

Hi, I'm chinese and it's my first post ever here. Here is my 2cents.

The indian ocean will be ruled for the foreseeable future, by US and her allies. Both India and China will however become more visible and active in this region, not in the contest of challenging the US though. Russia, as it slowly recovers, might also want to have a say here, but her interests in this region are probably quite limited since these days Russia is pretty much a raw material/energy exporter.

I don't think the chinese navy will or is even interested in establishing a permanent presence in the indian ocean so lang the shipping lane is protected by the US. PLAN's main focus is undoubtly taiwan, another goal is to break out from the first island chain (that's why she has carrier ambitions). You need to realize that EU is China's biggest trading partner, the US imports more from China than from anyone else, China is also the biggest trading partner of Japan, S.Korea and interestingly India. How often do you go to war with your top trading partner? Another thing, most chinese trade goods, particularly oil is not carried by chinese ships. Someone made an analysis and showed that less than 10% of China's oil consumption is carried by Chinese tankers through the indian ocean. So the talk of cutting of Chinese trade in the indian ocean by the indian navy is plain silly. Further more this would not sit well with the gulf countries, and EU countries that do trade. And finally, for long time to come, India will not have the ships needed to intercept the majority of Chinese merchant ships (for that you need to have 50 or more destroyers+frigates).

Also in the scenario US's influence wanes in the indian ocean, India will not run amok here, with or without chinese presense. India is surrounded by muslim countries, some have deep pockets, some have quite strong military and certainly none of them wishes to see America getting replaced by India.

My final thought, all those talks about individual military items or technologies (such as AESA vs PESA) is silly. No war will ever by decided by a few conventional weapons. Evething will come down to economy, and in this regard I can only expect China to get stronger and stronger. Currently China's GDP in nominal terms is 1/3 of that of US, in PPP terms 60%, and still growing. China overtaking US's as world's No.1 car market gives a taste of what is about to come. India's growing too, but over the next 2 decades, the gap between India and China will only widen whereas the gap between China and US will narrow. Once China's GDP reaches 6 times the size of India's (currenty the ratio is about 3.5 times, but in many categories, such as cars, electronics, meat, cement, etc, China already consumes 5 times or more than India) by perhaps 2025, indians will flood Chinese labour market, and this India vs China war scenario will be gone for good.

look we are not here to fight wars with China ,infact china keeps on provoking us ,as when we say "who rule indian ocean" by that we mean that who will protect the sea lanes and security in Indian ocean and that rule is not for waging wars with china.India does not pose any threats to any country ( hell we have a record for not invading any country in last 1000 years of our exsistence)
except countries like pakistan ( which thinks India is her man enemy)

 

[kuku]

Center for a new american security

CONTESTED COMMONS: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Chapter 6: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Commons in the 21st Century
By Robert D. Kaplan

http://www.cnas.org/node/4012 download

A nice read.

PRC will flood the Indian Ocean with a lot of vessels in the coming decades, it will be in the top of its naval power focus.
This will require Indian Navy to increase its surveillance platforms many folds just to have a clear picture and to increase its surface combatants by a lot more it would need a cheap and capable escort along with a lot of high end warships to counter the presence in the Indian Ocean Region, diplomatic ties with nations in the region will be the basis of any deployment far away from our nation. While the navy will also have to cooperate with the PRC for more secure seas, after all as our economy grows the sea routes will be far more busy.

 

[ankur]

can IN really displace USN in the IOR?if not what are the alternatives do we have for wresting the control of the seas?

 

[Yusuf]

No the IN cannot displace the USN in the IOR. Alternative? If you cant beat it, join it. Cooperation between the IN and the USN has already started. The two are working on interoperability so that they can secure sea lanes of communication in the IOR particularly neat the choke point of the Mallaccas.

 

[ankur]

that means we will be at the mercy of the mighty USN all the times and reguraly subjected to arm-twisting.that's sad.

 

[Kinshuk]

Why would we be at the mercy? I think we should have strong presence in the Indian Ocean, and If Allies like US Russia are placed in IOR, I don't see any reason to feel bad about.. We are already co-operating with USN. Instead of crying ours ours, we should have more allies, of-course I am not saying we should let others dominate. But the Idea of ruling seems vague to me.

Regards,

KS

 

[Yusuf]

Mercy for what? Its in everyones interests that the sea lanes are open, otherwise trade will collapse. Why else do you think the US is maintaining such a presence here?

 

[ankur]

i am saying because US can't be trusted after a certain limit and is not good if we play the dominant role in the IOR?

 

[Kinshuk]

i am saying because US can't be trusted after a certain limit and is not good if we play the dominant role in the IOR?

Where is the idea of trust applicable here? Are you suggesting that they gonna attack us one fine day?

 

[Rage]

As long as our interests converge, there are no qualms about 'being at the mercy' of the USN. The fact is, that with 12 carrier battle groups and 2 under construction, the USN far outstrips the rest of the world in power projection. They will remain 'at their mercy' regardless, and have so for the last 60 years. In politico-strategic terms, that is the 'suprastructure' in which we operate, and maximizing our gains and reducing our liabilities for the foreseeable future, will depend on optimizing behavior within that suprastructure. The Indian Ocean is a vast space, about 73,556,000 square kilometres in area, and no single country has the ability to single-handedly 'administer' that quarter. Certainly not we, nor do we have any intention to. Our foremost priority is securing our massive coastline and 2.8 million sq km maritime zone, followed closely by power projection and defense of our protectorates in the Maldives and Mauritius, combating piracy on our shipping lanes, surveillance and counter-intelligence and projection power within a comfortable maritime 'buffer'-zone. Which is why a cooperative regional approach to maritime and naval security within a multilateral, 'acceptable' framework is key. Which is why India has had very different responses to multilateral initiatives proposed by the US, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the “Thousand Ship Navy” concept, essentially supporting those sanctioned by the United Nations, and remaining averse to any US-proposed initiatives.

 

[Kinshuk]

i am saying because US can't be trusted after a certain limit and is not good if we play the dominant role in the IOR?

We can play a co-operative role in the IOR, and on the other hand, we should be able to defend our country from any kind of misadventure. Please advise what's the meaning of dominant role that you are proposing?