Indian nuclear submarines

sayareakd

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Power to size ratio also matters. the other SSBN are huge compared to say Typhoon class. Arihant is a midget compared to that.
Our baby boomer is made for firing nukes at enemies with stealth using vadt ocean. That is the purpose. It can stay undetected for months after trials are completed sucessfuly.

Now lets take an example of cars. We have very fast super cars and the regular maruti. Purpose is same to reach the destination. As long as purpose is reached, for nation as ours with other prorities like development and raising standard of masses. Arihant is doing the same job, for what it is made for in futur effectively.

Btw neither the BARC nor the DRDO nor IN would have allowed underpower sub in first place.
 

power_monger

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It is still an SSBN and SSBNs do not have to be very fast . They are meant to lurk in the open ocean not chase anybody down .
If there is ever an SSN designed I'm sure that it will either have a more powerful reactor or will be smaller or both ... If you want a crude comparison of P/W the P/W is equal to that of the Triomphant .
But the Akula has so much more power it's not even funny .
Stealth,Endurance and payload matters for SSBN.Nothing else. The hindu article although being rubbish has put enough doubt in our minds.Time to move on guys. Our SSBN arihant is perfectly alright.
 

Illusive

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Our baby boomer is made for firing nukes at enemies with stealth using vadt ocean. That is the purpose. It can stay undetected for months after trials are completed sucessfuly.

Now lets take an example of cars. We have very fast super cars and the regular maruti. Purpose is same to reach the destination. As long as purpose is reached, for nation as ours with other prorities like development and raising standard of masses. Arihant is doing the same job, for what it is made for in futur effectively.

Btw neither the BARC nor the DRDO nor IN would have allowed underpower sub in first place.
Actually my reply was to your question weather arihant is underpowered or not, so according to its size the power is good and about the stealth part, yeah nuke subs have that advantage, but surely the stealth level wont be at the level of american subs. I hope we add Pump jet propulsion in our future SSBN's and SSN's.

 

right wing

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,no operating nuke pwrs leads to gadolinium n rare metal poisioning,lowers neutron multiplication,,affects core function n power output...it needs to be mastered unless u want to re open ur core every 2 yrs
 
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sorcerer

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Can India Accommodate the INS Arihant?

The latest reports on India's first indigenously built nuclear submarine INS Arihant suggest that the project only began sea trials last month. Successive trials over a nine-month period will give way to weapons testing on board the vessel, and the submarine will only be deployed for active patrol duty in 2016.
The high-tech vessel project has already been in R&D for well over two decades, having incurred exponential overrun costs and delayed delivery schedules.

This delay, however, could work in the favor of the government of Narendra Modi. Specifically, it could enable it to make much-needed reforms to India's nuclear doctrine, to effectively accommodate the Ariha
nt.

Given New Delhi's uncertain mindset on nuclear deterrence, the Indian nuclear doctrine has not been touched since its hurried inception in 1998. Contextualizing the geo-political changes that have occurred in South Asia, and globally, this underscores the reluctance of Indian politicians – leery of being lumped together with Pakistan and North Korea – to come anywhere near the controversial issue. This is in contrast to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, for instance, all which have evolved their doctrines over an extended time period. In fact, for a nuclear power that is only 14 years old, New Delhi has certainly set a benchmark for political resistance on nuclear weapons. Modi will have to come to terms with this, and push for reform to the nuclear doctrine before India finally projects its nuclear prowess in the Indian Ocean region.

The main elements of India's nuclear policy revolve around No First-Use (NFU), massive second strike capability, and credible minimum deterrence. I have previously considered the implications of India's credible minimum deterrence.

A massive second strike capability policy, coupled with NFU, gives India a politically neutral, operationally ready stance to project its nuclear power. The second-strike capability clause, however contains a sub clause that deals with command and control delegation.
Herein lies the problem. For land based silos, or gravity bombs loaded on aircraft, the command and control hierarchy can be maintained in all but the most dire circumstances. For a sea-based asset, where deterrence is primarily achieved by long-term radio silence, and launching control is delegated to seniority on board the vessel, the existing command and control model is not applicable. Just like Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons (TnWs), New Delhi will essentially be delegating launch control to field officers on board the submarine, massively increasing the probability of incidental firing. Also, as a designated "second-strike" capacity asset, the Nuclear Command Authority cannot effectively and credibly implement fail-safe measures such as a Permissive Action Link (PAL), two-man rule, or a no-lone zone on board the vessel.

India, like Pakistan, is known to keep its nuclear warheads de-mated from the delivery mechanisms. For the INS Arihant to fulfill its operational responsibility, SLBMs mounted with nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on the vessel. But for a country that allows minimal to almost zero participation of the military echelon in political and strategic matters, beyond the doctrinal headache the question is how exactly does the Modi government plan to deploy INS Arihant as a credible second-strike asset. Having never allowed an experienced serving defense personnel to sit in on a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, is the government ready to bestow the responsibility of managing nuclear weapons onto senior naval officers? Or will a politician be perpetually stationed on board the INS Arihant?

In this political setup, New Delhi is well placed to finally reform its nuclear doctrine, in a way that reflects its geopolitical ambitions. Given its investment in long-range ICBM development, and its ambitious decision to establish a ballistic missile defense shield, shifting from a second-strike capacity to a pre-emptive nuclear posture seems possible for India.
In a defensive realist paradigm, states need only exercise a containment-centric doctrine until they elevate above the anarchic system. For all practical purposes, India would have reached that milestone in the military arena, when the INS Arihant finally goes underwater.

Also, for its 7,515 km long coastline, a single nuclear submarine is not enough. India has already started construction of INS Aridhaman, the second vessel in the Arihant class, and plans to have a total of four boats by 2020.
Thus, "credible minimum deterrence" would have already started another arms race in the region, before India can actually attain a credible second strike capability. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi unveiled an alternative blueprint for India's nuclear doctrine in 2012, and one of its salient points was substituting "credible minimum deterrence" with "credible minimal deterrence," allowing the country to avoid getting fixated on a numerical value, and simply continue arming per geo-political requirements.

While they're at it, why not ditch NFU as well? It is quite debatable as to when global zero will finally be achieved. Until then, the only point of differentiation among the major powers is their policies on first use. New Delhi will never be able to escape its current geopolitical squeeze, unless it changes the geo-strategic dynamics on its terms.

Wishful thinking apart, the new government has closed the door on that possibility, deeming NFU a "party legacy" (the Bhartiya Janta Party was in power when India went nuclear in 1998). Should all four Arihant class vessels be operational by the time India's next general elections are held, this will be a major point of discussion.

The INS Arihant is a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, reported to be modeled on the Russian Akula-class vessels. The theoretical potency of the vessel can be gauged by the assistance Russia gave India in this project, which extended to leasing a nuclear attack submarine – the INS Chakra II – to India and training the initial submarine crew. Unfortunately, because Russia is a party to the Missile Control Treaty Regime (MCTR), New Delhi could not arm the INS Chakra II with developmental SLBMs for R&D purposes. Consequently, India still does not have a capable ballistic missile with which to arm the INS Arihant, vastly undermining the submarine's utility as a sea-based deterrent. Thus, the Defence Research and Development Organisation will need yet more time before it can produce a quality SLMB to put on the vessel.

Amit R. Saksena is an independent researcher from New Delhi. He tweets @arsaksena.
Can India Accommodate the INS Arihant? | The Diplomat
 

Bheeshma

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4 Arihant class and 2 Akulas should be possible by 2020. No news on sea trial etc? Hopefully after A-5 cannister test they will do a K4 launch from Arihant.
 

Lions Of Punjab

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VANQUISHER OF ENEMIES - INS ARIHANT: H I SUTTON'S COVERT SHORES REPORT

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

INS Arihant is the first of a class of ballistic missile submarines for the Indian Navy. Undoubtedly built with extensive Russian design assistance, she is all the same an indigenous product incorporating many Indian systems and of course Indian ballistic missiles. In fact the use of Russian submarine design assistance and nuclear power-plant design assistance was something of a risk reduction exercise.

India has experience of operating nuclear submarines but has never built one until now. The Indian Navy leased a Project-670 CHARLIE-I class SSGN from 1987 to 1991 and currently leases a Project-971I Improved-AKULA class SSN from Russia. The prioritization of SSBNs over SSNs is natural and mirrors all nations who have developed nuclear submarines to date. It is particularly similar to France who joined the nuclear club slightly later than US, USSR and UK and so consequently at a time when SSBNs were already the norm and went straight for an SSBN without building a simpler SSN first. SSNs did not join the French Navy until eight years after the first SSBN. India has strong military ties France and Germany for submarine building, but Russia won out when it came to assisting India in her indigenous SSBN program. It's not the first time one country has helped another in this endeavour; the US Navy provided assistance to the Royal Navy with Polaris, and the USSR gave assistance to China (that back fired!). But in the modern context this level of assistance is unparalleled.

Observations:

From the couple of decent photographs of the boat with both show the starboard quarter (front right), we can deduce that the forward section of the hull is based directly upon the Russian KILO Class diesel attack submarine. India operates 9 Soviet built Project-877EKM KILOas the Sindhughosh Class. The upper sonar casing and torpedo tube arrangement look to be identical. The sail is also essentially similar although necessarily raised slightly because the casing gets deeper as it goes aft to accommodate the main missile silos. The forward hydroplanes are remounted on the sail rather than on the forward casing, which also entails minor rearrangements, but overall the sail can be said to be the same hat of the KILO. It features an open bridge at the top, a bad-weather bridge with windows and a sonar array in the forward part of the sail. The distance from the bow to the sail is also the same as on he KILO, another telling observation.


So the forward hull is essentially that of the KILO design. There are six torpedo tubes which have to be reloaded through the top two from a platform which extends out of the forward hull. The torpedo room will be on the upper deck immediately behind the torpedo tubes and in front of the sail. Following the KILO layout, the top two tubes are likely configured for wire guided torpedoes (e.g. TEST-71ME-NK) and the lower four for self-guiding rounds (e.g. 53-65K). The lower tubes are reloaded using a fast automated reloading system. Eighteen torpedoes can be carried in total, although patrols probably occur with fewer.

Although conceivably possible, it is unlikely that Arihant is equipped to fire KLUB cruise missiles or other exotic weapons through her torpedo tubes. As a nuclear deterrent she would not be utilised to lunch conventional cruise missile attacks during a war and would only carry torpedoes as a means of self defense.
Beneath the torpedo tubes is a large sonar dome designed for a circular sonar such as the CIM-400E "Rubicon-M" (SHARK TEETH) fitted the Sindhughosh Class. Behind this the main pressure hull starts, which is divided onto three floors. Like other Russian designs the KILO is a double-hull design which means the pressure hull is encased in an outer hull. This allows the reinforcing frames to be on the outside of the pressure hull. Beneath the sail is the control room.

Pocket Boomer:

Arihant is about 30% longer than the KILO with a reported length of 110m. The reason is that there are two additional sections inserted behind the sail, the first being the missile section for Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBNs). It has to be at least 11m from keel to the top of the casing to accommodate the 10m long ballistic missiles. The depth of the missiles necessitates the hunchback appearance which is characteristic to SSBNs. This section is also likely to include maintenance space and ballast tanks to take in water to compensate for the weight of the missiles when they are fired. Behind this is the second additional section containing the reactor. This section requires control stations and heavy lead radiation shielding so it is probably a 'plug in' hull section with only a tunnel connecting the forward compartments with the extreme aft just like on Western nuclear submarines.

We can also guess that this section would have a large water intake mounted beside it to allow the secondary cooling loop to operate without pumps within certain performance envelopes. Behind it will be the steam turbine, electric motors and auxiliary diesels. The tail of the boat is open to speculation but most depictions show a conventional cruciform tail rather than the KILO's distinctive rudder arrangement which has a large fin underneath and no vertical fin on top. I have illustrated the aft fin configuration on relatively recent Russian designs including a towed array tube built in to the upper fin. The result is a very long boat which is much bigger than the diesel-electric attack submarines in Indian service, and similar in length to the much heavier Akula Class boat loaned from Russia:


12 x K-15 Sagarika SLBNs (700km range, 1,400km with reduced warhead) < Nuclear capable Or/
4 x K-4 SLBNs (3,500km range) < Assumed nuclear equipped


Note that the K-15 (in Pic) is a smallish single warhead missile which is viewed as an interim solution. Because of its small diameter three tubes can be fitted within the space for a single K-4 missile tube, hence the 12 missiles in total. Individually the K-15 is loosely equivalent to the first generation Soviet SLBNs except that it is far more compact and can be fired from underwater making it a much better system (as you'd expect fifty years on!). But it is far less potent than other modern SLBNs in service. It does not have MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles) so measured in number of warheads the gap to other SLBNs is even greater, which is where the K-4 SLBN comes in to the equation. This is similar in size and range to other SLBNs and can apparently carry MIRVs. The range makes a big deal; with the K-15 missile Arihant would have to be somewhere in the Arabian Sea in order to threaten Karachi, well within the reach of the Pakistani Navy. Whereas with the K-4 it could be somewhere in the Bay of Bengal which is almost the Indian Navy's private sea.


Only four can be carried however, which again is many fewer than other active SSBNs:
Type-092 Class, China 12 x JL-1A SLBNs(2,500km range) (Considered obsolete)
Type-094 Class, China 12 x JL-2 SLBNs(8 to 14,000km range)
Triomphant Class, France 16 x M51 SLBNs(8 to 10,000km range)
Borei Class, Russia 16 x RSM-56 Bulava SLBNs (10,000km range)
DELTA-III Class, Russia 16 x SS-N-18 STINGRAY SLBNs (6,500km range)
DELTA-IV Class, Russia 16 x SS-N-23 SKIFF SLBNs (9,300km)
Vanguard Class, UK 16 x Trident-II D5 SLBNs (7,000 to 12,000km range)
Typhoon Class, Russia 20 x RSM-56 Bulava SLBNs (10,000km range)
Ohio Class, USA 24 x Trident-II D5 SLBNs (7,000 to 12,000km range) All range stats require a pinch of salt
Maybe the Indian Navy has done something very clever indeed by sacrificing the number of missiles carried. There is a school of thought that nuclear wars can be won, and that the country who lobs the most missiles wins. There is another school of thought that nuclear war ismad and cannot be won, but in order to ensure this is true a deterrence must be sufficiently weighty to convince a crazy enemy that the war is unwinnable. By either school of thought Arihant is at a disadvantage. But Arihant's deterrent isn't pointed at USA or Russia, it is pointed at Pakistan and to an extent China and possibly any middle eastern countries who might tool-up in the near future. The bulk of India's nuclear deterrent is land based (as is China's and Pakistan's) so the Arihant is merely a diversification of capabilities which supplements the main force. In addition to this, nuclear bombs are expensive and slow to produce so, combined with the need to test technologies it is economical to only fit four tubes. More than enough to guarantee the destruction of several cities.

The reduction in war load also allowed the use of the smaller KILO class hull which again was a risk reduction. The question will be how many more Arihants will enter service? At least four will be required to maintain a constant at-sea vigilance. But if India wants to switch it up to 'full capability' SSBNs they'll need to start building a completely new design with all the costs and delays that is likely to entail.

 

Lions Of Punjab

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GOING NUCLEAR AT SEA

Almost six years ago, in Visakhapatnam, Gursharan Kaur, wife of then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, cracked a coconut on the hull of India's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Subsequently named the INS Arihant or "destroyer of enemies", the vessel was the result of decades of efforts by India's nuclear scientists. For many years, bureaucratic languor, technical challenges and chronic difficulties in nuclear reactor miniaturisation appeared to ensure that progress would be painstakingly slow. Indeed, at one stage, it became unclear whether the project would see the light of day.

In August 2013, when the Arihant's nuclear reactor finally went critical, the event was thus widely hailed, both in India and abroad, as a major technological and symbolic milestone. Currently undergoing sea trials, the Arihant is destined to be the first vessel in a flotilla of up to five indigenously produced SSBNs, and it has been reported that a sister vessel, the INS Aridhaman, is nearing completion. Since the Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests in 1998, the Indian government has repeatedly iterated its desire to attain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, structured around what nuclear strategists refer to as a triad, that is, a mixture of aircraft, land-based mobile missiles and naval assets. India's nuclear doctrine states that it is a no-first-use power, and it is in this light that one must view the importance attached to the sea-based leg of its nuclear deterrent.

Indeed, the survivability and overall resiliency of India's nuclear arsenal has become a growing concern for military planners in New Delhi, particularly as Beijing continues to make rapid advances in missile, space and cyber technology. Nuclear submarines, provided they are sufficiently quiet, are still considered to be the most survivable of nuclear platforms, due to their mobility and discretion. Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike. The development of the Arihant and its successors therefore constitutes the next logical step in Delhi's quest for an assured retaliatory capability.

It is important to note, however, that while the launch of India's first indigenous SSBN constitutes a great accomplishment, it is also only the first step in what promises to be a long and onerous process. India's naval nuclear journey has only just begun.

Going forward, the Indian navy will face three sets of nuclear challenges. The first set is in the technological domain, as the navy struggles to acquire the capability for continuous at-sea deterrence. The second set of difficulties will need to be addressed within the navy itself, as its officers begin to grapple with the importance of their service's new nuclear role. Finally, Indian naval planners will also have to contend with their Pakistani counterparts' development of what can best be described as a "naval nuclear force-in-being".

When the Arihant is finally commissioned, it will be fitted with 12 Sagarika K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Sagarika, however, only has a strike radius of about 750 to 800 km, which many analysts rightly consider inadequate. Indeed, with such a short range, the Arihant could not reach Islamabad, let alone China's strategic centres. The DRDO is currently working on two longer-range SLBMs: the 3,500-km range K-4, which recently underwent a successful test launch from an underwater pontoon, and the 5,000-km range K-5, which is still in the design phase. According to sources, the Arihant is fitted with four universal tube launchers, which can each carry either three K-15 missiles or one K-4 missile. Observers have raised questions, however, over the compatibility of the K-4's height with the submarine's 10.4-m hull. If the length of the K-4 cannot be shortened, the Arihant may need to be retrofitted with a hydrodynamic outer development, or "bump." Even if the DRDO's engineers do succeed in squeezing the K-4 aboard, the missile's range remains somewhat unsatisfactory. It would require India's nuclear submariners to operate on the northeastern fringes of the Bay of Bengal in order to effectively target China's major metropolises, rather than within the more sanitised waters abutting India's eastern seaboard. The K-5 is rumoured to stand at a height of about 12 m, which rules out its deployment aboard the Arihant. The second major technological limitation is that of the Arihant's nuclear reactor. Reportedly based on first- or second-generation Soviet technology, the 83-megawatt pressurised water reactor has a short refuelling cycle, thus limiting the length of the Arihant's deterrent patrols.

In short, in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent with regard to China, India will need to deploy larger SSBNs with greater missile carriage capacity and more powerful nuclear reactors. The fourth planned submarine in the series is projected to possess such characteristics, but it may take more than a decade for it to be successfully developed and launched, and even longer for it to be commissioned. While India's submarine fleet has been taking shape, Delhi has also conducted a series of test firings, starting in 2000, of Dhanush-class short-range ballistic missiles from surface ships. For the time being, however, it appears that the Dhanush programme is merely a stopgap measure until the SSBN fleet comes into full fruition.

Second, history has shown that all newly nuclear navies face some difficult tradeoffs. As India's SSBN fleet gradually grows in size and importance, the challenge will be to ensure that the navy's new nuclear role develops alongside, rather than to the detriment of, its conventional missions. As in all nuclear navies, a debate will no doubt unfold within the service as to how many resources and platforms should be devoted to the ballistic missile submarine fleet's protection. Tough decisions may need to be made, particularly if India's underwater environment becomes more contested. India's nuclear command and control procedures will also almost certainly undergo a revision, as the SLBMs will be canisterised and ready for launch, rather than de-mated.

Finally, India's naval and nuclear planners will also have to contend with the progressive materialisation of a nuclearised Pakistani navy — albeit one with much less orthodox characteristics and undergirded by a very different nuclear posture. Indeed, Islamabad aims to eventually disperse nuclear-tipped cruise missiles across a variety of naval platforms, ranging from surface ships in the short term to conventional diesel-electric submarines in the long term. Unlike India, Pakistan's naval nuclear ambitions are fuelled primarily by the sense of a growing conventional imbalance in the maritime domain. By nuclearising — or by appearing to nuclearise — a large portion of their fleet architecture, Pakistani military planners hope to neuter India's growing naval power, inject ambiguity and acquire escalation dominance in the event of a limited conflict at sea. Since Independence, Indian naval officers have been accustomed to operating within a purely conventional maritime setting. Dealing with such a prospective adversary will no doubt necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the navy's operational concepts. Perhaps more importantly, it will also require an effort on the part of both countries to further institutionalise the maritime component of their relations so as to ensure that in future, isolated incidents don't spiral out of control.

The writer, a nonresident fellow in the South Asia Programme at the Atlantic Council, is author of the report 'Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean'.

Going nuclear at sea | The Indian Express | Page 99
 
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sayareakd

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In 2005, then finance minister P. Chidambaram, a member of the apex political committee steering the classified project, wondered why the Arihant, costing over a billion dollars (Rs.6,200 crore), carried only four missiles. The project team doubled the missile load on three subsequent vessels.
One private sector official says the $12-billion project will have a force multiplier effect of $40 billion on the Indian economy, generating over a million skilled jobs and sustaining the ecosystem that has grown around the ATV project.

The Modi government signals a new push into the Indian Ocean with a diplomatic offensive and naval expansion to counter China's growing presence : Special Report - India Today
 

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