J-10 has, but not LCA. LCA's information has been quite consistent. Like I said, go back and start reading. You will also realize how my own opinion has changed since then. I was a LCA supporter too, in 2009, but at the time IOC was promised in 2010.
There is no more any LCA.Its officially tejas since 2001.
Stop using the word. LCA was a concept for replacing the short ranged interceptor Mig-21 with a Mirage-2000 type multi role fighter from the project definition stage , since 1984.
It's first authentic spec was given by Distinguished IAF Airmarshal WOOLON , also a HAL chairman ,
LCA Tejas - Featured Articles: The Light Combat Aircraft Story by Air Marshal MSD Wollen (Retd)
The specs he gave out was ,
topspeed-mach 1.5 at stratosphere, (service ceiling, I suppose),
super sonic at seal level,
4 ton external stores,
minimum weight -5.5 tons,
loaded weight -8.5 tons,
maximum take off weight -12.5 tons.
Max ITR -30 deg, Max STR-17 deg,(this STR was same the one achieved by F-16 A with much smaller wing area, hence much higher wing loading than tejas)
G loads not specified.
Range-http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/military-aviation/47398-combat-aircraft-technology-evolution-8.html
Everything about range is discussed here.
A naval variant was also planned.
So LCA (Now officially Tejas ) program was never about finding a plane to replace the role of Mig-21, It was about building a plane to replace legacy Mig-21s with modern 4.5th gen fighter with relaxed static stability, 4 channel all digital fly by wire , low RCS , composite air frame all glass cockit, low wing loading compound or cranked delta,along with a fully dedicated naval platform as well with High ITR for the missile age.None of this was present on Mig-21
Note all these imprints are present every other modern 4.5th gen or 5th gen fighter program initiated by any major power during the developmental time of tejas and after it
There can be no dispute on the above facts as there are official links to substantiate the spec in tejas governmental website, where a long nd detailed article was posted which listed out all the challenges that ADA -HAL combine is undertaking which is more than what any experienced fighter maker like SAAB did at that time for grippen.
Also the distinguished Air marshal has said that considering the tech challenges involved the realistic time line for finishing tejas is 2010. Even for that 2010 dead line , Air mashal Woolen did not take into account requirement creep by IAF like replacing the lesser weight lesser launch stress inducing R-60 with higher weight , higher launch stress inducing more deadly R-73 at the extreme wing tip pylon in 2004 and a whole lot of other new requirements which led to FSED phase-II in 2004, which added another couple of years to the delay.
Any one well versed in structural engineering on the stress loads and force couples of cantilever beam will understand , that to cater to the higher load requirement at the extreme edge of the wing a substantial amount of structural strengthening has to happen at the place where wing and fuselage meet.
According to scientific advisor to PM Parthasarathy and another distinguished expert who wrote a column of tejas this R-73 change and many other spec creep by IAF necessitated FSED phase -II in 2004 with entirely new redesigning of the wing structure.
The case to support the indigenous LCA programme
Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri
The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective
There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence "system," or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.
The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc 560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD.
This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.
It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of 4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA's ASR and PDD called for, was modest.
After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that "go-ahead" covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of 2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational 'go' date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.
Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another 2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.
At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.
Consequently, in "generational terms" the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine
And by 2009 first Navy and then IAF asked for another set of incremental performance which necessitated mk-2 program.
Now by 2014 december we are racing towards FOC with first induction SP-1 doing ground run and the SP-2 in the final stages of production .
SO what are the specs of tejas (still LCA according to you) Now?
1. top speed at service ceiling ---mach 1.6(which is an increase over original requirement of mach 1.5)
2.Empty weight ----6.5 ton (original target 5.5 ton), the reason for increase is R-73 new requirement which led to entirely newer wing design,plus as decklander stated in one of his posts that stringent the rolling TO requirement which necessitated higher sink rate , to achieve this the undercarriage and fuselage needed to be extra strong(clarification needed on this aspect).
3.take off clean --9.8 tons(original target 8.5 tons , the 9.5 ton weight now include gun ammo, litening pod, all seven pylons, along with two r-73 missiles weighing 75 kg each.
note all these stuffs were added to external stores category in grippen C/D , but in tejas these weights are added to take off clean or loaded weight which ever is proper )
4.max take off weight---13.2 tons(original 12. 5 tons, Max take off weight has only increased, not decreased . So you can not hold it as design flaw. )
5. Weapon load----3.5 tons(note this does not include--gun ammo, litening pod, all seven pylons, along with two r-73 missiles weighing 75 kg each, So a shortfall of 0.35 ton at the most. if we include the weight of the litening pod then it comes very close to original 4 ton weapon load. So where is the shortfall?. In grippen C/D this weapon load is shown as high because they have included gun ammo, litening pod, all seven pylons, along with two WVR missiles weighing all in weapon load. So in reality the tejas mk-1 and grippen C/D have equal internal fuel, equal weapon load, and almost the same range of internal fuel.)
So there is no reason for a 2009 LCA supporter to turn a critic in 2014!!!!
besides that now it can do in flight pressure refueling in three minute flat which significantly increases its endurance and range acting as a force multiplier in defending home skies,
A potent HMDS enabled R-73 deadly WVR combo,
A radar with capacity to track at 100 plus Km range,
A pilot praise worthy Fly by wire system(even SAAB crashed their first grippen prototype due to fly by wire software faults and abandoned their own effort and contracted a US firm for doing fly by wire )
capability to port any Russian long range air to air missile that is presently on Su-30 MKI.
On STR front- tejas did complete a vertical loop in Aero india-2013 in twenty seconds , the same time taken by RAFALE, it took 25 seconds to complete
a horizontal loop with 6G and 20 deg AOA restriction.
Now AOA is opened up till 24 deg in IOC-2, For FOC G limit will go to 8G, So its timings will only get better with FOC, Since it has class leading HMDS R-73 high off boresight Visually cued WVR missile , which is not present even in RAFALE now .
any shortfall in STR does not matter at all, I have posted excerpts from greek air force chief which clearly state that lesser STR is no handicap for Greek Mirage-2000 pilots as the high Instantaneous turn rate provided by low wing loading delta wing of Mirage always gives it a first look , first shoot ability in close combat
.Incidentally the greek airforce Mirage-2000 has way lower TWR and a bit higher wing loading than tejas . So with tejas mk-1 scoring over Mirage-2000 on these two critical counts it will be even deadly along with HMDS R-73 missile combo.
For Mk-2 IAF is going to get,
ASEA radar, fully retractable refueling probe,9G limit, and way better high thrust engine , 5 ton weapon load, increased internal fuel load, better aerodynamics via better Length /Diameter ratio with increased fuselage length, and way higher ITR and STR as well.
So why complain?
