India Pakistan conflict along IB and LoC (July 2021 onwards)

[FalconSlayers]

2 Pakistani terrorists 72ed in Thanamandi

 

[Love Charger]

2 Pakistani terrorists 72ed in Thanamandi

Good going

 

[avknight1408]

 

[pankaj nema]

 

[Col Habib zahir]

they didn't look like a normal kashmiri terriost btw it's ours guns which they are holding pm90

 

[Poseidon]

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’
Today, Pakistan military will outmatch Indian military in a war by a convincingly huge margin. The main reason for this is the mindless abrogation of Article 370 and the creation of two separate Union Territories from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For the uninitiated, both India and Pakistan follow the 1980s Air-Land Battle war concept, where the focus is on battles, and hence attrition. Given the high value assets close to the border on either side both armies try to ensure that no inch of land is lost, as even a tactical concession of land becomes a matter of national prestige. Another feature of this war concept is that the enemy area is artificially divided into tactical and operational levels: Tactics for battles, and operations for campaign or war. The outcome at the operational level of war depends on (a) outcome of the series of battles fought, (b) the highest strategic level of war which determines wider choices in planning and execution, and (c) morale of troops whose bedrock is realistic training.

Both militaries traditionally have been matched at the operational level which determines war outcome. This is why India has not been able to obliterate the military line created on 1 January 1949 in all wars that the two have fought. In the 1971 war, the Ceasefire Line was re-named Line of Control by give and take of territory by both sides.
The six-lakh Pakistan Army has been able to match the 13-lakh Indian Army at operational level for two reasons. One, the creation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for internal and external intelligence in 1948 was a masterstroke. The use of tribals for the October 1947 offensive in Kashmir and their indiscipline by stopping in Baramulla for loot and ravaging rather than moving swiftly to capture the Srinagar airport, convinced the Pakistan Army of the need for ISI to tame and discipline irregulars in war with India with larger strength. Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf called these irregulars Mujahids which he used in the 1999 Kargil conflict as his first line of defence. Mujahids along with rangers (paramilitary led by regular officers and with army ethos) more than made up for Pakistan Army’s relatively lesser regular troops in war of attrition on the frontline.
And two, Pakistan has much stronger strategic level which directly impacts the operational level of war. Unlike in the case of India, the Pakistan Army controls its nation’s nuclear and security policy and would brook no interference. Moreover, Pakistan army chief is in command of all field formations and the other two services chiefs listen to him. In India, while the army chief too is in command of all field formations, he is one amongst the three chiefs, and is susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference. Under the Constitution, the civilian defence secretary is responsible for the defence of India. Worse, now the three services’ chiefs are principal staff officers to the four-star Chief of Defence Staff. Given this, quicker decision making by the Pakistan military adds to its advantage at the operational level.



Moreover, Indian Army’s 30 years involvement in Counter Terror operations (CT ops) has rendered it unfit for conventional war. There is a huge difference between fighting CT ops and training for conventional war. The latter involves combined arms operations. If the Indian Army was doing the latter sincerely, it would have built credible counter offensive capabilities which would have compelled the Pakistan Army to review its proxy war strategy.
The dramatic changes in J&K on 5 August 2019 has weakened Indian military no end. The rejection of Ladakh union territory by China, the creation of new maps by India, and the announcement by the Union home minister in the Parliament that Aksai Chin would be reclaimed, has spurred need for combined operations by the PLA and the Pakistan military in the new war theatre comprising Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.

Exercise Warrior
The interoperability (ability to fight together) developed by the PLA and Pakistan military since a decade by Shaheen series of exercises by the two air forces, and Warrior series of exercises between their Special Forces will be put to use in the new single theatre. The Pakistan military would get real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Position, Navigation, and timing (PNT for missiles accuracy) by Beidou satellites system. China’s humongous cyber war capabilities could inordinately delay Indian Army’s mobilisation plans, and the Air Traffic Control towers could go haywire impacting on IAF’s fighters’ performance.
Moreover, since the Indian Air Force’s operational gaps got exposed on 27 February 2019 during Pakistan Air Force’s operation Swift Retort, both PAF and Pakistan Army are expected to perform well in electronic warfare, and electro-spectrum management. Helped by the PLA, Pakistan has built formidable air defences, and is likely to use Chinese-built drones as its second air power. Unlike Indian military, the Pakistan military platforms with most equipment of Chinese origin would have excellent operational sustenance to maintain long periods of intense rates of air and ground firepower.

The Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) set up under the PAF in August 2020 with Chinese support would throw up operational surprises. While cognitive electronic warfare would be some time away, use of Artificial Intelligence by PAF jets in closing the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster than the IAF especially for stand-off precision fire is likely. This, coupled with the fact that the PAF has better pilot to aircraft ratio would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Unless the IAF integrates cyber and electronic warfare in its attack profile, and is fully networked, it stands little chance in war.
Finally, two biggest issues. One, the limited IAF assets would be divided in two war theatre, and against two enemies with dramatically different war concepts. The two war theatres would be Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, POK, and Gilgit-Baltistan; and Arunachal Pradesh. The former would be combined operations between Pakistan army and air force, and PLA’s Xinjiang military command. This would be one-front reinforced war against India. The second war theatre would be under the Tibet Military Command.

Moreover, the Pakistan military will fight war of attrition, while the PLA would fight war of cognition where attrition would be a side issue. It would be impossible for the Indian army and air force to fight two entirely different wars especially when it is ill-prepared for the PLA war.

Exercise Shaheen – © Yasir Minhas/PAFFALCONS.com
The PLA war would start and finish at the operation level. Comprising of multi-domain operations involving four battlespaces—physical, virtual, information, and cognition—, it would bypass the line of contact that the Indian Army has been holding and hopes to fight on. Once the PLA achieves dominance in the virtual and information battlespaces, the physical battlespace comprising the army and the air force would be as good as lost.
With imaginative war concepts, the PLA would render Indian boots on the ground irrelevant. Unlike what the Indian Army leadership believes, human soldiers for occupation of large swaths of territory are not essential. If this sound unreal, it only shows lack of understanding of PLA’s war that it has been preparing for against the Indian military since the 2017 Doklam crisis.

The other big issue would the massive advantage that the ISI would have in the Kashmir Valley. Unlike the 1965 war when Kashmiris came to India’s rescue by turning in Pakistan army’s Mujahids under operation Gibraltar, it would be the opposite in the next war between India and Pakistan.

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan

forceindia.net

 

[Love Charger]

9

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’
Today, Pakistan military will outmatch Indian military in a war by a convincingly huge margin. The main reason for this is the mindless abrogation of Article 370 and the creation of two separate Union Territories from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For the uninitiated, both India and Pakistan follow the 1980s Air-Land Battle war concept, where the focus is on battles, and hence attrition. Given the high value assets close to the border on either side both armies try to ensure that no inch of land is lost, as even a tactical concession of land becomes a matter of national prestige. Another feature of this war concept is that the enemy area is artificially divided into tactical and operational levels: Tactics for battles, and operations for campaign or war. The outcome at the operational level of war depends on (a) outcome of the series of battles fought, (b) the highest strategic level of war which determines wider choices in planning and execution, and (c) morale of troops whose bedrock is realistic training.

Both militaries traditionally have been matched at the operational level which determines war outcome. This is why India has not been able to obliterate the military line created on 1 January 1949 in all wars that the two have fought. In the 1971 war, the Ceasefire Line was re-named Line of Control by give and take of territory by both sides.
The six-lakh Pakistan Army has been able to match the 13-lakh Indian Army at operational level for two reasons. One, the creation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for internal and external intelligence in 1948 was a masterstroke. The use of tribals for the October 1947 offensive in Kashmir and their indiscipline by stopping in Baramulla for loot and ravaging rather than moving swiftly to capture the Srinagar airport, convinced the Pakistan Army of the need for ISI to tame and discipline irregulars in war with India with larger strength. Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf called these irregulars Mujahids which he used in the 1999 Kargil conflict as his first line of defence. Mujahids along with rangers (paramilitary led by regular officers and with army ethos) more than made up for Pakistan Army’s relatively lesser regular troops in war of attrition on the frontline.
And two, Pakistan has much stronger strategic level which directly impacts the operational level of war. Unlike in the case of India, the Pakistan Army controls its nation’s nuclear and security policy and would brook no interference. Moreover, Pakistan army chief is in command of all field formations and the other two services chiefs listen to him. In India, while the army chief too is in command of all field formations, he is one amongst the three chiefs, and is susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference. Under the Constitution, the civilian defence secretary is responsible for the defence of India. Worse, now the three services’ chiefs are principal staff officers to the four-star Chief of Defence Staff. Given this, quicker decision making by the Pakistan military adds to its advantage at the operational level.



Moreover, Indian Army’s 30 years involvement in Counter Terror operations (CT ops) has rendered it unfit for conventional war. There is a huge difference between fighting CT ops and training for conventional war. The latter involves combined arms operations. If the Indian Army was doing the latter sincerely, it would have built credible counter offensive capabilities which would have compelled the Pakistan Army to review its proxy war strategy.
The dramatic changes in J&K on 5 August 2019 has weakened Indian military no end. The rejection of Ladakh union territory by China, the creation of new maps by India, and the announcement by the Union home minister in the Parliament that Aksai Chin would be reclaimed, has spurred need for combined operations by the PLA and the Pakistan military in the new war theatre comprising Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.

Exercise Warrior
The interoperability (ability to fight together) developed by the PLA and Pakistan military since a decade by Shaheen series of exercises by the two air forces, and Warrior series of exercises between their Special Forces will be put to use in the new single theatre. The Pakistan military would get real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Position, Navigation, and timing (PNT for missiles accuracy) by Beidou satellites system. China’s humongous cyber war capabilities could inordinately delay Indian Army’s mobilisation plans, and the Air Traffic Control towers could go haywire impacting on IAF’s fighters’ performance.
Moreover, since the Indian Air Force’s operational gaps got exposed on 27 February 2019 during Pakistan Air Force’s operation Swift Retort, both PAF and Pakistan Army are expected to perform well in electronic warfare, and electro-spectrum management. Helped by the PLA, Pakistan has built formidable air defences, and is likely to use Chinese-built drones as its second air power. Unlike Indian military, the Pakistan military platforms with most equipment of Chinese origin would have excellent operational sustenance to maintain long periods of intense rates of air and ground firepower.

The Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) set up under the PAF in August 2020 with Chinese support would throw up operational surprises. While cognitive electronic warfare would be some time away, use of Artificial Intelligence by PAF jets in closing the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster than the IAF especially for stand-off precision fire is likely. This, coupled with the fact that the PAF has better pilot to aircraft ratio would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Unless the IAF integrates cyber and electronic warfare in its attack profile, and is fully networked, it stands little chance in war.
Finally, two biggest issues. One, the limited IAF assets would be divided in two war theatre, and against two enemies with dramatically different war concepts. The two war theatres would be Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, POK, and Gilgit-Baltistan; and Arunachal Pradesh. The former would be combined operations between Pakistan army and air force, and PLA’s Xinjiang military command. This would be one-front reinforced war against India. The second war theatre would be under the Tibet Military Command.

Moreover, the Pakistan military will fight war of attrition, while the PLA would fight war of cognition where attrition would be a side issue. It would be impossible for the Indian army and air force to fight two entirely different wars especially when it is ill-prepared for the PLA war.

Exercise Shaheen – © Yasir Minhas/PAFFALCONS.com
The PLA war would start and finish at the operation level. Comprising of multi-domain operations involving four battlespaces—physical, virtual, information, and cognition—, it would bypass the line of contact that the Indian Army has been holding and hopes to fight on. Once the PLA achieves dominance in the virtual and information battlespaces, the physical battlespace comprising the army and the air force would be as good as lost.
With imaginative war concepts, the PLA would render Indian boots on the ground irrelevant. Unlike what the Indian Army leadership believes, human soldiers for occupation of large swaths of territory are not essential. If this sound unreal, it only shows lack of understanding of PLA’s war that it has been preparing for against the Indian military since the 2017 Doklam crisis.

The other big issue would the massive advantage that the ISI would have in the Kashmir Valley. Unlike the 1965 war when Kashmiris came to India’s rescue by turning in Pakistan army’s Mujahids under operation Gibraltar, it would be the opposite in the next war between India and Pakistan.

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan

forceindia.net

I agree with the last paragraph though

 

[Brood Father]

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’
Today, Pakistan military will outmatch Indian military in a war by a convincingly huge margin. The main reason for this is the mindless abrogation of Article 370 and the creation of two separate Union Territories from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For the uninitiated, both India and Pakistan follow the 1980s Air-Land Battle war concept, where the focus is on battles, and hence attrition. Given the high value assets close to the border on either side both armies try to ensure that no inch of land is lost, as even a tactical concession of land becomes a matter of national prestige. Another feature of this war concept is that the enemy area is artificially divided into tactical and operational levels: Tactics for battles, and operations for campaign or war. The outcome at the operational level of war depends on (a) outcome of the series of battles fought, (b) the highest strategic level of war which determines wider choices in planning and execution, and (c) morale of troops whose bedrock is realistic training.

Both militaries traditionally have been matched at the operational level which determines war outcome. This is why India has not been able to obliterate the military line created on 1 January 1949 in all wars that the two have fought. In the 1971 war, the Ceasefire Line was re-named Line of Control by give and take of territory by both sides.
The six-lakh Pakistan Army has been able to match the 13-lakh Indian Army at operational level for two reasons. One, the creation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for internal and external intelligence in 1948 was a masterstroke. The use of tribals for the October 1947 offensive in Kashmir and their indiscipline by stopping in Baramulla for loot and ravaging rather than moving swiftly to capture the Srinagar airport, convinced the Pakistan Army of the need for ISI to tame and discipline irregulars in war with India with larger strength. Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf called these irregulars Mujahids which he used in the 1999 Kargil conflict as his first line of defence. Mujahids along with rangers (paramilitary led by regular officers and with army ethos) more than made up for Pakistan Army’s relatively lesser regular troops in war of attrition on the frontline.
And two, Pakistan has much stronger strategic level which directly impacts the operational level of war. Unlike in the case of India, the Pakistan Army controls its nation’s nuclear and security policy and would brook no interference. Moreover, Pakistan army chief is in command of all field formations and the other two services chiefs listen to him. In India, while the army chief too is in command of all field formations, he is one amongst the three chiefs, and is susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference. Under the Constitution, the civilian defence secretary is responsible for the defence of India. Worse, now the three services’ chiefs are principal staff officers to the four-star Chief of Defence Staff. Given this, quicker decision making by the Pakistan military adds to its advantage at the operational level.



Moreover, Indian Army’s 30 years involvement in Counter Terror operations (CT ops) has rendered it unfit for conventional war. There is a huge difference between fighting CT ops and training for conventional war. The latter involves combined arms operations. If the Indian Army was doing the latter sincerely, it would have built credible counter offensive capabilities which would have compelled the Pakistan Army to review its proxy war strategy.
The dramatic changes in J&K on 5 August 2019 has weakened Indian military no end. The rejection of Ladakh union territory by China, the creation of new maps by India, and the announcement by the Union home minister in the Parliament that Aksai Chin would be reclaimed, has spurred need for combined operations by the PLA and the Pakistan military in the new war theatre comprising Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.

Exercise Warrior
The interoperability (ability to fight together) developed by the PLA and Pakistan military since a decade by Shaheen series of exercises by the two air forces, and Warrior series of exercises between their Special Forces will be put to use in the new single theatre. The Pakistan military would get real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Position, Navigation, and timing (PNT for missiles accuracy) by Beidou satellites system. China’s humongous cyber war capabilities could inordinately delay Indian Army’s mobilisation plans, and the Air Traffic Control towers could go haywire impacting on IAF’s fighters’ performance.
Moreover, since the Indian Air Force’s operational gaps got exposed on 27 February 2019 during Pakistan Air Force’s operation Swift Retort, both PAF and Pakistan Army are expected to perform well in electronic warfare, and electro-spectrum management. Helped by the PLA, Pakistan has built formidable air defences, and is likely to use Chinese-built drones as its second air power. Unlike Indian military, the Pakistan military platforms with most equipment of Chinese origin would have excellent operational sustenance to maintain long periods of intense rates of air and ground firepower.

The Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) set up under the PAF in August 2020 with Chinese support would throw up operational surprises. While cognitive electronic warfare would be some time away, use of Artificial Intelligence by PAF jets in closing the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster than the IAF especially for stand-off precision fire is likely. This, coupled with the fact that the PAF has better pilot to aircraft ratio would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Unless the IAF integrates cyber and electronic warfare in its attack profile, and is fully networked, it stands little chance in war.
Finally, two biggest issues. One, the limited IAF assets would be divided in two war theatre, and against two enemies with dramatically different war concepts. The two war theatres would be Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, POK, and Gilgit-Baltistan; and Arunachal Pradesh. The former would be combined operations between Pakistan army and air force, and PLA’s Xinjiang military command. This would be one-front reinforced war against India. The second war theatre would be under the Tibet Military Command.

Moreover, the Pakistan military will fight war of attrition, while the PLA would fight war of cognition where attrition would be a side issue. It would be impossible for the Indian army and air force to fight two entirely different wars especially when it is ill-prepared for the PLA war.

Exercise Shaheen – © Yasir Minhas/PAFFALCONS.com
The PLA war would start and finish at the operation level. Comprising of multi-domain operations involving four battlespaces—physical, virtual, information, and cognition—, it would bypass the line of contact that the Indian Army has been holding and hopes to fight on. Once the PLA achieves dominance in the virtual and information battlespaces, the physical battlespace comprising the army and the air force would be as good as lost.
With imaginative war concepts, the PLA would render Indian boots on the ground irrelevant. Unlike what the Indian Army leadership believes, human soldiers for occupation of large swaths of territory are not essential. If this sound unreal, it only shows lack of understanding of PLA’s war that it has been preparing for against the Indian military since the 2017 Doklam crisis.

The other big issue would the massive advantage that the ISI would have in the Kashmir Valley. Unlike the 1965 war when Kashmiris came to India’s rescue by turning in Pakistan army’s Mujahids under operation Gibraltar, it would be the opposite in the next war between India and Pakistan.

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan

forceindia.net

Even LKG student can write a better essay on cow than this stupid article with no meaning whatsoever
This article was going round and round in circle without any substance or premise
The article suggests that India will be overwhelmed by Pakistan in conventional war but then it went to explain the reason that India cannot fight china and Pakistan together ..Duhh..he can't even get the premise right

He suggests that it was because of 370 that Pakistan hold advantage , I was searching for a why but couldn't find anything except for a garbage article with nothing to substantiate this

He then goes on to say that it was because of CI operation that India is on backfoot against pakistan ..This assertion is false nonetheless but even in his own judgement he is wrong by miles because even Pakistan is fighting CI against Taliban and BLA.

This article should go in a meme or better as a shitwipe ..

 

[Brood Father]

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’
Today, Pakistan military will outmatch Indian military in a war by a convincingly huge margin. The main reason for this is the mindless abrogation of Article 370 and the creation of two separate Union Territories from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For the uninitiated, both India and Pakistan follow the 1980s Air-Land Battle war concept, where the focus is on battles, and hence attrition. Given the high value assets close to the border on either side both armies try to ensure that no inch of land is lost, as even a tactical concession of land becomes a matter of national prestige. Another feature of this war concept is that the enemy area is artificially divided into tactical and operational levels: Tactics for battles, and operations for campaign or war. The outcome at the operational level of war depends on (a) outcome of the series of battles fought, (b) the highest strategic level of war which determines wider choices in planning and execution, and (c) morale of troops whose bedrock is realistic training.

Both militaries traditionally have been matched at the operational level which determines war outcome. This is why India has not been able to obliterate the military line created on 1 January 1949 in all wars that the two have fought. In the 1971 war, the Ceasefire Line was re-named Line of Control by give and take of territory by both sides.
The six-lakh Pakistan Army has been able to match the 13-lakh Indian Army at operational level for two reasons. One, the creation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for internal and external intelligence in 1948 was a masterstroke. The use of tribals for the October 1947 offensive in Kashmir and their indiscipline by stopping in Baramulla for loot and ravaging rather than moving swiftly to capture the Srinagar airport, convinced the Pakistan Army of the need for ISI to tame and discipline irregulars in war with India with larger strength. Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf called these irregulars Mujahids which he used in the 1999 Kargil conflict as his first line of defence. Mujahids along with rangers (paramilitary led by regular officers and with army ethos) more than made up for Pakistan Army’s relatively lesser regular troops in war of attrition on the frontline.
And two, Pakistan has much stronger strategic level which directly impacts the operational level of war. Unlike in the case of India, the Pakistan Army controls its nation’s nuclear and security policy and would brook no interference. Moreover, Pakistan army chief is in command of all field formations and the other two services chiefs listen to him. In India, while the army chief too is in command of all field formations, he is one amongst the three chiefs, and is susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference. Under the Constitution, the civilian defence secretary is responsible for the defence of India. Worse, now the three services’ chiefs are principal staff officers to the four-star Chief of Defence Staff. Given this, quicker decision making by the Pakistan military adds to its advantage at the operational level.



Moreover, Indian Army’s 30 years involvement in Counter Terror operations (CT ops) has rendered it unfit for conventional war. There is a huge difference between fighting CT ops and training for conventional war. The latter involves combined arms operations. If the Indian Army was doing the latter sincerely, it would have built credible counter offensive capabilities which would have compelled the Pakistan Army to review its proxy war strategy.
The dramatic changes in J&K on 5 August 2019 has weakened Indian military no end. The rejection of Ladakh union territory by China, the creation of new maps by India, and the announcement by the Union home minister in the Parliament that Aksai Chin would be reclaimed, has spurred need for combined operations by the PLA and the Pakistan military in the new war theatre comprising Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.

Exercise Warrior
The interoperability (ability to fight together) developed by the PLA and Pakistan military since a decade by Shaheen series of exercises by the two air forces, and Warrior series of exercises between their Special Forces will be put to use in the new single theatre. The Pakistan military would get real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Position, Navigation, and timing (PNT for missiles accuracy) by Beidou satellites system. China’s humongous cyber war capabilities could inordinately delay Indian Army’s mobilisation plans, and the Air Traffic Control towers could go haywire impacting on IAF’s fighters’ performance.
Moreover, since the Indian Air Force’s operational gaps got exposed on 27 February 2019 during Pakistan Air Force’s operation Swift Retort, both PAF and Pakistan Army are expected to perform well in electronic warfare, and electro-spectrum management. Helped by the PLA, Pakistan has built formidable air defences, and is likely to use Chinese-built drones as its second air power. Unlike Indian military, the Pakistan military platforms with most equipment of Chinese origin would have excellent operational sustenance to maintain long periods of intense rates of air and ground firepower.

The Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) set up under the PAF in August 2020 with Chinese support would throw up operational surprises. While cognitive electronic warfare would be some time away, use of Artificial Intelligence by PAF jets in closing the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster than the IAF especially for stand-off precision fire is likely. This, coupled with the fact that the PAF has better pilot to aircraft ratio would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Unless the IAF integrates cyber and electronic warfare in its attack profile, and is fully networked, it stands little chance in war.
Finally, two biggest issues. One, the limited IAF assets would be divided in two war theatre, and against two enemies with dramatically different war concepts. The two war theatres would be Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, POK, and Gilgit-Baltistan; and Arunachal Pradesh. The former would be combined operations between Pakistan army and air force, and PLA’s Xinjiang military command. This would be one-front reinforced war against India. The second war theatre would be under the Tibet Military Command.

Moreover, the Pakistan military will fight war of attrition, while the PLA would fight war of cognition where attrition would be a side issue. It would be impossible for the Indian army and air force to fight two entirely different wars especially when it is ill-prepared for the PLA war.

Exercise Shaheen – © Yasir Minhas/PAFFALCONS.com
The PLA war would start and finish at the operation level. Comprising of multi-domain operations involving four battlespaces—physical, virtual, information, and cognition—, it would bypass the line of contact that the Indian Army has been holding and hopes to fight on. Once the PLA achieves dominance in the virtual and information battlespaces, the physical battlespace comprising the army and the air force would be as good as lost.
With imaginative war concepts, the PLA would render Indian boots on the ground irrelevant. Unlike what the Indian Army leadership believes, human soldiers for occupation of large swaths of territory are not essential. If this sound unreal, it only shows lack of understanding of PLA’s war that it has been preparing for against the Indian military since the 2017 Doklam crisis.

The other big issue would the massive advantage that the ISI would have in the Kashmir Valley. Unlike the 1965 war when Kashmiris came to India’s rescue by turning in Pakistan army’s Mujahids under operation Gibraltar, it would be the opposite in the next war between India and Pakistan.

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan

forceindia.net

The content of the article is same as below pic

 

[Waanar]

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’
Today, Pakistan military will outmatch Indian military in a war by a convincingly huge margin. The main reason for this is the mindless abrogation of Article 370 and the creation of two separate Union Territories from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

For the uninitiated, both India and Pakistan follow the 1980s Air-Land Battle war concept, where the focus is on battles, and hence attrition. Given the high value assets close to the border on either side both armies try to ensure that no inch of land is lost, as even a tactical concession of land becomes a matter of national prestige. Another feature of this war concept is that the enemy area is artificially divided into tactical and operational levels: Tactics for battles, and operations for campaign or war. The outcome at the operational level of war depends on (a) outcome of the series of battles fought, (b) the highest strategic level of war which determines wider choices in planning and execution, and (c) morale of troops whose bedrock is realistic training.

Both militaries traditionally have been matched at the operational level which determines war outcome. This is why India has not been able to obliterate the military line created on 1 January 1949 in all wars that the two have fought. In the 1971 war, the Ceasefire Line was re-named Line of Control by give and take of territory by both sides.
The six-lakh Pakistan Army has been able to match the 13-lakh Indian Army at operational level for two reasons. One, the creation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for internal and external intelligence in 1948 was a masterstroke. The use of tribals for the October 1947 offensive in Kashmir and their indiscipline by stopping in Baramulla for loot and ravaging rather than moving swiftly to capture the Srinagar airport, convinced the Pakistan Army of the need for ISI to tame and discipline irregulars in war with India with larger strength. Pakistan army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf called these irregulars Mujahids which he used in the 1999 Kargil conflict as his first line of defence. Mujahids along with rangers (paramilitary led by regular officers and with army ethos) more than made up for Pakistan Army’s relatively lesser regular troops in war of attrition on the frontline.
And two, Pakistan has much stronger strategic level which directly impacts the operational level of war. Unlike in the case of India, the Pakistan Army controls its nation’s nuclear and security policy and would brook no interference. Moreover, Pakistan army chief is in command of all field formations and the other two services chiefs listen to him. In India, while the army chief too is in command of all field formations, he is one amongst the three chiefs, and is susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference. Under the Constitution, the civilian defence secretary is responsible for the defence of India. Worse, now the three services’ chiefs are principal staff officers to the four-star Chief of Defence Staff. Given this, quicker decision making by the Pakistan military adds to its advantage at the operational level.



Moreover, Indian Army’s 30 years involvement in Counter Terror operations (CT ops) has rendered it unfit for conventional war. There is a huge difference between fighting CT ops and training for conventional war. The latter involves combined arms operations. If the Indian Army was doing the latter sincerely, it would have built credible counter offensive capabilities which would have compelled the Pakistan Army to review its proxy war strategy.
The dramatic changes in J&K on 5 August 2019 has weakened Indian military no end. The rejection of Ladakh union territory by China, the creation of new maps by India, and the announcement by the Union home minister in the Parliament that Aksai Chin would be reclaimed, has spurred need for combined operations by the PLA and the Pakistan military in the new war theatre comprising Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.

Exercise Warrior
The interoperability (ability to fight together) developed by the PLA and Pakistan military since a decade by Shaheen series of exercises by the two air forces, and Warrior series of exercises between their Special Forces will be put to use in the new single theatre. The Pakistan military would get real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Position, Navigation, and timing (PNT for missiles accuracy) by Beidou satellites system. China’s humongous cyber war capabilities could inordinately delay Indian Army’s mobilisation plans, and the Air Traffic Control towers could go haywire impacting on IAF’s fighters’ performance.
Moreover, since the Indian Air Force’s operational gaps got exposed on 27 February 2019 during Pakistan Air Force’s operation Swift Retort, both PAF and Pakistan Army are expected to perform well in electronic warfare, and electro-spectrum management. Helped by the PLA, Pakistan has built formidable air defences, and is likely to use Chinese-built drones as its second air power. Unlike Indian military, the Pakistan military platforms with most equipment of Chinese origin would have excellent operational sustenance to maintain long periods of intense rates of air and ground firepower.

The Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC) set up under the PAF in August 2020 with Chinese support would throw up operational surprises. While cognitive electronic warfare would be some time away, use of Artificial Intelligence by PAF jets in closing the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster than the IAF especially for stand-off precision fire is likely. This, coupled with the fact that the PAF has better pilot to aircraft ratio would work to Pakistan’s advantage. Unless the IAF integrates cyber and electronic warfare in its attack profile, and is fully networked, it stands little chance in war.
Finally, two biggest issues. One, the limited IAF assets would be divided in two war theatre, and against two enemies with dramatically different war concepts. The two war theatres would be Ladakh, Siachen, Kashmir, POK, and Gilgit-Baltistan; and Arunachal Pradesh. The former would be combined operations between Pakistan army and air force, and PLA’s Xinjiang military command. This would be one-front reinforced war against India. The second war theatre would be under the Tibet Military Command.

Moreover, the Pakistan military will fight war of attrition, while the PLA would fight war of cognition where attrition would be a side issue. It would be impossible for the Indian army and air force to fight two entirely different wars especially when it is ill-prepared for the PLA war.

Exercise Shaheen – © Yasir Minhas/PAFFALCONS.com
The PLA war would start and finish at the operation level. Comprising of multi-domain operations involving four battlespaces—physical, virtual, information, and cognition—, it would bypass the line of contact that the Indian Army has been holding and hopes to fight on. Once the PLA achieves dominance in the virtual and information battlespaces, the physical battlespace comprising the army and the air force would be as good as lost.
With imaginative war concepts, the PLA would render Indian boots on the ground irrelevant. Unlike what the Indian Army leadership believes, human soldiers for occupation of large swaths of territory are not essential. If this sound unreal, it only shows lack of understanding of PLA’s war that it has been preparing for against the Indian military since the 2017 Doklam crisis.

The other big issue would the massive advantage that the ISI would have in the Kashmir Valley. Unlike the 1965 war when Kashmiris came to India’s rescue by turning in Pakistan army’s Mujahids under operation Gibraltar, it would be the opposite in the next war between India and Pakistan.

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan

forceindia.net

Two things I will agree with are-

1-Indian Army does seem to focus a lot more on COIN and less on preparing to fight a peer force.

2-Kashmiris will help Pakistanis.

Rest is either unfounded or pairing PLA up with Pakistan which is definitely an uncomfortable scenario for us.

 

[FalconSlayers]

Two things I will agree with are-

1-Indian Army does seem to focus a lot more on COIN and less on preparing to fight a peer force.

2-Kashmiris will help Pakistanis.

Rest is either unfounded or pairing PLA up with Pakistan which is definitely an uncomfortable scenario for us.

Plus the fact that this article is giving orgasms to Pakistanis.

 

[Kalkioftoday]

If only india could follow this guy's footstep in the next indo-pak war than a lot of military/geopolitical/civilizational problem could be solved.

 

[Brood Father]

Two things I will agree with are-

1-Indian Army does seem to focus a lot more on COIN and less on preparing to fight a peer force.

2-Kashmiris will help Pakistanis.

Rest is either unfounded or pairing PLA up with Pakistan which is definitely an uncomfortable scenario for us.

Wrong on both the counts
Only a small unit of Indian armed forces are in COIN and they are being rotated regularly , so in a way it's good that our soldiers are trained in both the form of fighting. In actual war we might have to fight in cities or villages some captured by enemies so it is very good practice. If at all I feel instead of RR every unit of Indian army should have COIN unit incase the situation goes out of hand from the CRPF(instead of calling Para units all the time)
Also soon CRPF and BSF will take care of more of the COIN operations

Kashmir is very small part and it can't do zilch in the full blown war , During Kargil Kashmiris was also favoring Pakistan , what happened..This is Pakistani fantasy that during full blown war Kashmiris will help pakistani cause and this has been proven false all the time , reality is Kashmiris cant do jack shit as number of CRPF and BSF can easily handle them
Moreover like in 1965 India opened a new front even today their 6 lakh army won't be able to defend Kashmir , Lahore and now Karachi so please don't give heed to this article as it makes no sense

The only place where India is worried vis a vis Pakistan is Jammu border , thier India is at disadvantage as Pakistan is occupying the better position and can seriously pose a challenge to Akhnoor but then again this is not 65 , we can easily pose a challenge in Lahore and Karachi

 

[Rudra7678]

How Pakistan military is now an overmatch for the Indian armed forces

Pravin Sawhney

In the 2017 book, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power (co-authored with Ghazala Wahab), I wrote: ‘Let alone China, India cannot even win a war with Pakistan.’

Also Pravin Sawhney

 

[Waanar]

Wrong on both the counts
Only a small unit of Indian armed forces are in COIN and they are being rotated regularly , so in a way it's good that our soldiers are trained in both the form of fighting. In actual war we might have to fight in cities or villages some captured by enemies so it is very good practice. If at all I feel instead of RR every unit of Indian army should have COIN unit incase the situation goes out of hand from the CRPF(instead of calling Para units all the time)
Also soon CRPF and BSF will take care of more of the COIN operations

Kashmir is very small part and it can't do zilch in the full blown war , During Kargil Kashmiris was also favoring Pakistan , what happened..This is Pakistani fantasy that during full blown war Kashmiris will help pakistani cause and this has been proven false all the time , reality is Kashmiris cant do jack shit as number of CRPF and BSF can easily handle them
Moreover like in 1965 India opened a new front even today their 6 lakh army won't be able to defend Kashmir , Lahore and now Karachi so please don't give heed to this article as it makes no sense

The only place where India is worried vis a vis Pakistan is Jammu border , thier India is at disadvantage as Pakistan is occupying the better position and can seriously pose a challenge to Akhnoor but then again this is not 65 , we can easily pose a challenge in Lahore and Karachi

A- I said "Seems to focus more on COIN", not "Does focus more on COIN".
B- I said they will support Pakistan. I never said it will amount to anything.
Only idiots think a bunch of wannabe gayhardis will even mildly disturb a brigade's push. Not to mention the relaxed ROEs and it's effect on pacifying the lil c**nts.

 

[vidhwanshak]

Two things I will agree with are-

1-Indian Army does seem to focus a lot more on COIN and less on preparing to fight a peer force.

2-Kashmiris will help Pakistanis.

Rest is either unfounded or pairing PLA up with Pakistan which is definitely an uncomfortable scenario for us.

If "Kashmiris will help Pakistanis", then https://scroll.in/article/811468/the-killing-fields-of-jammu-when-it-was-muslims-who-were-eliminated. This would solve the issue.

As for point 1, Pakistan also hasn't fought a conventional war for a long time. They are just the same as us. If we have Kashmir, they have Balochistan. Their Afghanistan border is also volatile.
India just needs to administer a brutal defeat to Pakis and they will break.
The only "military" concern is China.

 

[vidhwanshak]

If "Kashmiris will help Pakistanis", then https://scroll.in/article/811468/the-killing-fields-of-jammu-when-it-was-muslims-who-were-eliminated. This would solve the issue.

As for point 1, Pakistan also hasn't fought a conventional war for a long time. They are just the same as us. If we have Kashmir, they have Balochistan. Their Afghanistan border is also volatile.
India just needs to administer a brutal defeat to Pakis and they will break.
The only "military" concern is China.

ONE MORE THING THAT THIS SO CALLED VETERAN PRAVIN IS NOT CONSIDERING:

CAN PAKIS AFFORD THE WAR?

 

[hit&run]

Also Pravin Sawhney

View attachment 117742

Anything good is done without Modi, everything bad is because of Modi. Political kutta hai ye, upper se IsI se credit card miltey hain.

 

[hit&run]

A- I said "Seems to focus more on COIN", not "Does focus more on COIN".
B- I said they will support Pakistan. I never said it will amount to anything.
Only idiots think a bunch of wannabe gayhardis will even mildly disturb a brigade's push. Not to mention the relaxed ROEs and it's effect on pacifying the lil c**nts.

Yes, when tanks will start rolling average arsonist Abdul will hide inside near by pussy. Jails will be emptied and every traitor will be made stand in line naked. Kashmiri jihadis should pray that war doesn't happen.

 

[Kalkioftoday]

Also Pravin Sawhney

View attachment 117742

Something in my mind telling me this is the truth. Same thing happened during 1962/67 war when the civilian leadership along with the top brass of military ordered a officer to vacate some height but the officer refused even though he and his men was outnumbered. Civilians leaders are coward especially the guys in our foreign ministry. We rarely had brave men in our civilian offices, i hope GobiJi could tackle China the way he tackle Pappu