Reversing China’s ascendancy
Stalemate in Ladakh
Lt. Gen (retd) Prakash Menon,
- NOV 11 2020, 01:40 IST
- UPDATED: NOV 11 2020, 02:26 IST
In the present situation, the primary goal of foreign policy has to be about disabusing China of the notion that India can be coerced through the use of military force.
Historically, the failure to leverage military gains has been the bane of India’s diplomatic and foreign policy exertions -- the return of prisoners of war in 1971-72 being a prime example. In the Ladakh situation, India must not confuse between military and strategic advantage. The former is about the advantage over military forces, and the latter is about using the advantage to advance goals of its foreign policy.
In the present situation, the primary goal of foreign policy has to be about disabusing China of the notion that India can be coerced through the use of military force. While the objectives for China’s attempts at coercion will remain speculative, strategic logic indicates that the primary reason lies in the framework of the ongoing struggle for supremacy between China and America. China has, in all probability, weaponised the Sino-Indian border situation in the process of establishing itself as the Asian hegemon. Psychological ascendency is the objective.
Sino-Indian relations, like all political relations, are ultimately shaped by political power, which in international relations is an outcome of a psychological relationship between those who employ it and those over whom it is employed. Post-Doklam, India acquiesced in China’s military occupation of the plateau, less the face-off site, and passed it off as a matter of no real concern and of little military value. With a pliant media, then it was able to sell a narrative of Doklam as a victory. But in the arena of Sino-Indian psychological relations, where it mattered most, China understood that India can be pressured and its strategic behaviour manipulated as long as it did not cause domestic political embarrassment.
It is possible that China’s calculations for Ladakh were based on its experience in Doklam. India, they reckoned, would underplay and seek reconciliation. Modi seemed to have attempted to follow the Chinese script, when he told the all-party meeting on June 19, “no one has intruded into our territory.” However, the earlier loss of lives in Galwan on June 15 had already changed the national mood and such a mirage could not be sustained and the domestic political discourse turned hostile to the government.
What followed was the upping of the ante against China that was primarily aimed at the domestic polity. Banning of Chinese apps and other economic and security-related measures to portray animosity against China quickly followed. A much-needed change in the stance towards strengthening the US-India-Japan-Australia Quad also followed.
Militarily, the pre-emptive occupation of a segment of the Kailash range on the night of August 29-30 and a higher perch at Finger 4 on the north bank of the Pangong Tso indicated a bold and proactive shift in politico-military stance. India’s tactical bargaining power improved, and the talks aimed at de-escalation and disengagement continue. In all probability, both the forces will have to brave the severe high-altitude winter.
Militarily, the border situation may become stalemated and physically frozen. Politically, this can be a psychological advantage for India, if it conveys through deeds and actions that China’s military power will be contested. So far, India has done that and therefore the Chinese would be seeking a face-saving de-escalation and disengagement. However, India should now dig in its heels and not view the issue as purely a matter of military dynamics. Instead, the bottom line should be that de-escalation must be preceded by China adhering to its agreements and signifying its willingness to fulfilling its commitment on finalisation of the LAC alignment
Prolonged deployment of additional Indian forces has military and financial implications. It is also going to be difficult for the Chinese as their sources of logistic sustainment are at much greater distances, though they have the required financial and infrastructure capacity. The hardiness of Indian troops would to some extent mitigate the hardships of weather and high altitude. Chinese troops are relatively less experienced, and their first high altitude winter could test their resilience.
India should not be in any hurry to merely solve the issue militarily and seek only the restoration of the status quo ante, which would provide short-term relief. But it should keep the field open for another Chinese military move next summer and the attempt to vindicate its action as one that is defensive and meant to counter China’s aggressive designs.
The fallacy underlying the masking of China’s political intentions and its attempt to pass off the matter as a problem created by both the militaries must be brought out. In the Wuhan Joint Statement, China seemed to have succeeded in getting India to agree to blaming the militaries and thereby accepting to provide guidance to the military. There should be no doubt about the hand of Xi Jinping, as the one-point source of power in China in the creation of the present crisis.
India’s military has, through speedy mobilisation and proactive deployment, stopped China in its tracks for the time being. The military situation is better kept frozen and only then can India politically take advantage to convey its political resolve to China and change the contours of the psychological ascendancy achieved by the Chinese, post-Doklam.
India can no longer afford to base its strategic path on short-term domestic political gains. The process of the global geopolitical churn cannot be met by strategic myopia. Pursuing the long-term national interest is imperative. The Ladakh military situation must be politically leveraged to advance the goals of policy. Making China realise the limitations of its military instrument is a good starting point.
(The writer is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru, and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat)
Historically, the failure to leverage military gains has been the bane of India’s diplomatic and foreign policy exertions -- the return of prisoners of war in 1971-72 being a prime example. In the Ladakh situation, India must not confuse between military and strategic advantage. The former is...
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if i remember correctly the Chinese crossed over the LAC buffer and started building roads and camps right upto "triangle base" , its a triangle looking area . its on our side of LAC right at edge.
its obviously nonsense .
deescalation finally happens but sadly 
