This scenario has been talked about by some of our ex-generals whose opinion was that ingress was certainly feasible but egress would be impossible. The ex-generals also have repeatedly said that with 3 divisions China cannot hope to smash its way through.
Like our judges play the tareekh pe tareekh game, China is playing the drill pe drill game. After some time the novelty wears off and people start wondering if PLA will be permanently conducting drills only.
Employment of a battalion-size force is possible by para drops. The same size of the force is feasible to be employed as a heliborne force, both in conjunction with the main attack by about six divisions. Or this force can be used to seize a bottleneck, block the main road, size forward, ALGs or airstrips or attack a VP such as an HQ etc but I have doubt of their being linked up by ground forces in an acceptable time frame.
Such forces though can be used at critical junctures of operations possibly to launch an attack from the reverse direction in conjunction with the main force. But a brigade-size force would be very difficult even if the Chinese may have air assets to do so. The terrain may not permit it. Chinese would be required to use acclimatized troops for such an operation which means they will have to lift troops from the plateau with only half of the lifting capability of aircraft or helicopters. They would require double the air effort. A large number of those aircraft would be brought down by IAF and AD assets.
Such a force can not be launched without Chinese AF gaining a favourable air situation over the tactical area as also if it is a light AD environment. Both do not seem to be anywhere near possibilities. Availability of a large number of reserves with IA would further seal any possibility of such an operation.
Chinese though can use such forces in defensive roles such as the occupation of critical features in the face of advancing Indian Army when they advance towards Rutog / SiquanHe.
Chinese are stagging a drama or practising their troops.
