Talking Crap. As usual.
In short, even after withdrawl was ordered from Pangong Tso mutually, IA maintained few points (with MOSTs) for surveillance, area denial & provision of a firm base for further occupation of important & tactically advantageous points /deny same to PLA should things go South. These points left Chinese camps in a vulnerable situation as also rendered their defences untenable (as also Lines of Communications) in case of a war.
These have been vacated now as GoI is of opinion that you can manage situation taking one sub-sector at a time.
That is, needless to say, a mistake.
@mist_consecutive The basic problem with using satellite imagery to draw conclusions and labelling some info as incorrect using them is that the smart adversary will show you what you need to see. (This is with reference to your comment on my tweet)
In 1999 during Kargil, IA ended up with 05 Armoured Divisions as per US' Intelligence Assessment (based predominantly on satellite imagery). Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, they were given the prospect of facing 02 x Armoured Divisions opposite Sindh and 02 in Chicken Neck area then. Needless to say, US thought 02 additional armored divisions were positioned after it very positively identified tanks, support vehicles & even thermal signature from these "ghost divisions"
Story got repeated in 2002 when US was again fooled into believing 01 armored division was where it was actually not.
Conversely, a small team ie a section/stick is hard to detect on commercial/military grade satellites in that terrain (E. Ladakh) if it is trained to defeat it. Especially if their task is to survive & direct Air/Artillery strikes to defeat enemy by destruction of the concentration area.
On Gogra-Hot Spring. A quick look through the thread ... old encroachments remain, no new ingress remains. That was what my lament was about. We delinked Pangong Tso from all other areas & gave up a major advantage. But not unexpected, it is our national policy to seek peace by losing land.