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Photon

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"Janes understands that the company has two indigenous engine options for the Warrior. One is HAL's PTAE-7, a 400 kg, 3.43 kN single spool turbojet developed in the 1980s. The second is HTFE-25, a 25 kN turbofan under development by HAL.

Janes reported previously that the HTFE-25 has a twin-spool, mixed-flow, low bypass configuration. The low pressure spool consists of a three-stage low-pressure fan driven by single-stage low-pressure turbine, and the high pressure spool consists of a five-stage high-pressure compressor driven by a single-stage high-pressure turbine.

The company said that it hopes to certify the engine by 2025.

“As the CATS Warrior is a twin-engined design, we believe that using two HTFE-25 engines will give the UCAV the necessary performance to match frontline combat aircraft,” the HAL source said"



 

The Saffron Knight

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Where is this why can't we test plane engines here
The Cryogenic Engine (CE)-20 develops a nominal thrust of 186.36 kN with a specific impulse of 442 seconds in vacuum. The engine operates on gas generator cycle using LOX / LH2 propellants combination. The major subsystems of the engine are thrust chamber, gas generator, LOX and LH2 turbo pumps, igniters, thrust & mixture ratio control systems, Start-up system, control components and pyro valves.

High Altitude Test facility, ISRO Propulsion Complex (IPRC), Mahendragiri

cryogenic_gslv_mkiii.jpg
 

Anandhu Krishna

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PLA increasing border threat is China’s way of distracting India from building good Navy

Without a major shift in our security strategy, our Navy will lose its current edge. We will end up constrained by China, both on land and at sea.

SHYAM SARAN 23 March, 2022


The importance of a strong Navy for India has been acknowledged since Independence but this has not been translated into practice. India is a peninsula jutting out into the Indian Ocean and has a coastline of 7,000 km. It lies astride the main sea lines of communication, westwards towards the Arabian Sea and eastwards towards the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea. It lies at the centre of the new strategic ocean space of the Indo-Pacific, dominating the maritime routes which connect the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. But this locational advantage can only be sustained and expanded upon through the maintenance of a strong Navy relative to the naval forces deployed in the Indian Ocean by other major powers.

Currently, there is a renewed focus on India’s land frontiers due to the heightened military threat from China. However, in terms of overall strategy, India needs to hold the line at its contested land borders, while it expands its presence in the maritime domain, where it has the locational advantage that it lacks on its land borders. China is attempting to tie us down on land so that it can prevent, or at least slow down India’s expansion in a domain that favours the latter. Our response should be to double down on expanding our Navy because we enjoy an edge over China but this is a diminishing asset.

China’s growing influence

A few years back, the Indian Navy planned a fleet of 200 ships by 2027, which would include three aircraft carriers. Its current strength is 137 vessels, with only one aircraft carrier in service. This figure has been revised downwards to 170 by that date. China has a 355-vessel fleet. In the last decade, its navy has added as many vessels as India’s total naval strength. It is already larger than the US navy. While the Chinese navy’s focus is on the western Pacific Ocean, its objective is to deploy a navy which will have a dominating presence globally.

Maintaining a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean is an integral component of this global strategy. Towards that end, China has also established naval port facilities at a number of Indian Ocean locations. These include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka. It is developing the deep-water port at Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal coast. While these are billed as commercial facilities, they can easily be put to military uses. It has established a military base, including naval facilities, at Djibouti in Africa.

In 2015, I came across an interesting 16-character mission statement for the Chinese navy: ‘Select locations meticulously, make deployments discreetly, give priority to cooperative activities and penetrate gradually.’

If we observe the Chinese naval developments over the past few years, one can see how seriously and methodically this overall directive is being implemented.


Navy doesn’t stand where Army, Air Force do

The resources allocated to the Indian Navy have been increasing over the past several years but have never been anywhere near the allocations to the Army and the Air Force. The maximum percentage of the annual defence budgets allocated to the Navy has ranged between 14% and 17%. The National Security Advisory Board, which I had the privilege of chairing between 2013-15, had recommended that this percentage should rise to at least 30% by 2030. This now seems unlikely. There is a view that without a major shift in our national security strategy, our Navy is likely to lose even its current, but slender edge, in a decade. We will end up constrained by China, both on land and at sea.

While India may still possess a significant naval capability, its overall maritime capability is abysmal. There has been a complete neglect of shipbuilding. The few existing shipyards cater almost entirely to the Navy. China has the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, constituting 40% of the world total. The output of Indian shipyards in global terms is a miniscule 0.045%. Only 10% of Indian-flagged ships have been built in Indian shipyards. Some of the world’s largest ports are located in China. The port of Shanghai is the largest in the world and handles 514 million tonnes of general cargo and 43.3 million units of container traffic yearly. India’s largest port — Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust at Nhava Sheva — handles only 68.5 million tonnes of general cargo and 5.5 million units of container traffic annually. The contrast is glaring. It should also be noted that despite years of effort, 25% of India’s containerised ocean-going cargo must be trans-shipped through international ports of Colombo (48%), Singapore (22%) and Port of Klang in Malaysia (10%). India may be a naval power; it certainly does not qualify as a maritime power.

India must be a credible power, both vis-à-vis its adversaries and its friends and partners. It should synergise its maritime development plans with its naval expansion plans. For example, it should build its shipbuilding industry to cater to both civilian and military requirements. It should leverage its close and friendly relations with Japan and South Korea, each commands 25% of the global shipbuilding and possesses cutting-edge technologies, to establish a modern shipbuilding industry in India. This should be a priority in the Prime Minister’s atmanirbharta mission and should be supported with the kind of incentives included in the PLI scheme.

It ought to be announced that by 2030, 30% of defence allocations will go to the Navy and the target of a 200-ship fleet will be achieved by that date, if not by 2027. Among the armed forces, the Navy is unique in having a well-respected Design Bureau. This should be given a bigger role in fleet planning and technology development. The US had offered to collaborate with India in the design and construction of its planned aircraft carrier. This offer should be taken up in earnest as a contribution to capacity building.

India must not lose its edge in the Indian Ocean. Its value as a Quad partner would also be enhanced by its ability to maintain this edge.

Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary and a Senior Fellow CPR. Views are personal.
 

India Super Power

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PLA increasing border threat is China’s way of distracting India from building good Navy

Without a major shift in our security strategy, our Navy will lose its current edge. We will end up constrained by China, both on land and at sea.

SHYAM SARAN 23 March, 2022


The importance of a strong Navy for India has been acknowledged since Independence but this has not been translated into practice. India is a peninsula jutting out into the Indian Ocean and has a coastline of 7,000 km. It lies astride the main sea lines of communication, westwards towards the Arabian Sea and eastwards towards the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea. It lies at the centre of the new strategic ocean space of the Indo-Pacific, dominating the maritime routes which connect the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. But this locational advantage can only be sustained and expanded upon through the maintenance of a strong Navy relative to the naval forces deployed in the Indian Ocean by other major powers.

Currently, there is a renewed focus on India’s land frontiers due to the heightened military threat from China. However, in terms of overall strategy, India needs to hold the line at its contested land borders, while it expands its presence in the maritime domain, where it has the locational advantage that it lacks on its land borders. China is attempting to tie us down on land so that it can prevent, or at least slow down India’s expansion in a domain that favours the latter. Our response should be to double down on expanding our Navy because we enjoy an edge over China but this is a diminishing asset.

China’s growing influence

A few years back, the Indian Navy planned a fleet of 200 ships by 2027, which would include three aircraft carriers. Its current strength is 137 vessels, with only one aircraft carrier in service. This figure has been revised downwards to 170 by that date. China has a 355-vessel fleet. In the last decade, its navy has added as many vessels as India’s total naval strength. It is already larger than the US navy. While the Chinese navy’s focus is on the western Pacific Ocean, its objective is to deploy a navy which will have a dominating presence globally.

Maintaining a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean is an integral component of this global strategy. Towards that end, China has also established naval port facilities at a number of Indian Ocean locations. These include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka. It is developing the deep-water port at Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal coast. While these are billed as commercial facilities, they can easily be put to military uses. It has established a military base, including naval facilities, at Djibouti in Africa.

In 2015, I came across an interesting 16-character mission statement for the Chinese navy: ‘Select locations meticulously, make deployments discreetly, give priority to cooperative activities and penetrate gradually.’

If we observe the Chinese naval developments over the past few years, one can see how seriously and methodically this overall directive is being implemented.


Navy doesn’t stand where Army, Air Force do

The resources allocated to the Indian Navy have been increasing over the past several years but have never been anywhere near the allocations to the Army and the Air Force. The maximum percentage of the annual defence budgets allocated to the Navy has ranged between 14% and 17%. The National Security Advisory Board, which I had the privilege of chairing between 2013-15, had recommended that this percentage should rise to at least 30% by 2030. This now seems unlikely. There is a view that without a major shift in our national security strategy, our Navy is likely to lose even its current, but slender edge, in a decade. We will end up constrained by China, both on land and at sea.

While India may still possess a significant naval capability, its overall maritime capability is abysmal. There has been a complete neglect of shipbuilding. The few existing shipyards cater almost entirely to the Navy. China has the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, constituting 40% of the world total. The output of Indian shipyards in global terms is a miniscule 0.045%. Only 10% of Indian-flagged ships have been built in Indian shipyards. Some of the world’s largest ports are located in China. The port of Shanghai is the largest in the world and handles 514 million tonnes of general cargo and 43.3 million units of container traffic yearly. India’s largest port — Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust at Nhava Sheva — handles only 68.5 million tonnes of general cargo and 5.5 million units of container traffic annually. The contrast is glaring. It should also be noted that despite years of effort, 25% of India’s containerised ocean-going cargo must be trans-shipped through international ports of Colombo (48%), Singapore (22%) and Port of Klang in Malaysia (10%). India may be a naval power; it certainly does not qualify as a maritime power.

India must be a credible power, both vis-à-vis its adversaries and its friends and partners. It should synergise its maritime development plans with its naval expansion plans. For example, it should build its shipbuilding industry to cater to both civilian and military requirements. It should leverage its close and friendly relations with Japan and South Korea, each commands 25% of the global shipbuilding and possesses cutting-edge technologies, to establish a modern shipbuilding industry in India. This should be a priority in the Prime Minister’s atmanirbharta mission and should be supported with the kind of incentives included in the PLI scheme.

It ought to be announced that by 2030, 30% of defence allocations will go to the Navy and the target of a 200-ship fleet will be achieved by that date, if not by 2027. Among the armed forces, the Navy is unique in having a well-respected Design Bureau. This should be given a bigger role in fleet planning and technology development. The US had offered to collaborate with India in the design and construction of its planned aircraft carrier. This offer should be taken up in earnest as a contribution to capacity building.

India must not lose its edge in the Indian Ocean. Its value as a Quad partner would also be enhanced by its ability to maintain this edge.

Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary and a Senior Fellow CPR. Views are personal.
That's what I want to say our enemies our bureaucrats our politicians have made us stuck in a chakravyu jahan hum yaha dhyan nahi de sakte nahi waha
In coming years even Navy will come to Army and airforce stage where shortage of vessels helis aircrafts will be visible
We can't divert our attention anywhere each and every sector giving us huge problems
Slowly our funds diversion will get messed up causing a total chaos and making us vulnerable and time is passing quick and our working output is on constant decrease
 

shuvo@y2k10

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is this true or some western bakchodi ??

View attachment 146411
Western Bakchodi.

The Feb 12, 2019 test was of our ABM system. It tested a PDV missile against a simulated target. It was 100% successful.

The March 27, 2019 test was of ASAT missile, under project Shakti. Our ASAT interceptor has a upper stage and kill vehicle based on PDV. The test was against a real target (satellite), and it was a hi-to-kill test. It also was 100% successful.
 
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mist_consecutive

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because I heard that many major systems trials for products from bharat forge will get fully completed by april mid and then there wont be any excuse left for the gov which has been talking about indiginious production alot to not induct them
Alright, hope you are correct. With the current trajectory and bureaucratic red tape, I have very little hope.
 
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