Now that's not true. If you only look at the things you want to look at, you can reach any conclusion you like. Not so after viewing things in totality.
Start with WW1 and how Britain laid the foundation for a war to take place in order to destroy Germany.
Between 1907 and 1909 Britain invited Germany twice to agree to a general curtailment of construction, provided that Britain was assured numerical superiority in this respect. Twice Germany refused. Wilhelm II further said:
"We simply are Central Europe and it is quite natural that other and smaller nations tend toward us. To this the British object because it absolutely knocks to pieces their theory of the Balance of Power, i.e. their desire to play off one European power against another at their own pleasure, and because it will lead to the establishment of a united continent."
The premise was, from Germany’s angle, correct, but the inference erroneous: again, Britain had been fatally underestimated. Germany counterproposed twice in 1909: first, in April, the diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse suggested that the parties seal a naval convention, provided that Britain acquiesced to a ‘benevolent neutrality’ in case of Germany’s engagement in a continental war.
In other words, the Reich demanded that Britain play the role of the passive spectator; second, in December, the Germans offered anew to trade a limitation of tonnage for British neutrality and the agreement on fixed naval ratios. Twice Britain refused. And what was more, she resolved to scale up production so as to assemble two Dreadnoughts, Britain’s new, much perfected destroyers, for every German warship.
One last overture was made to Russia in 1911 during the parleys at Potsdam, which had been officially scheduled to deal with the penetration of German capital in the Middle East, and lasted several months: Germany declared herself willing to rein in Austria’s intrigues in Eastern Europe if Russia proved amenable to withdrawing her support from an eventual hostile policy instigated by Britain against Germany.
The Kaiser obtained a stretch of railway in Mesopotamia – the other, broken, tracts of Germany’s long sighted and formidable blueprint were bartered away to Britain and France – but no guarantee of neutrality on the part of Russia.
In 1912 Britain signed a secret naval convention with France, and the latter did likewise with Russia. Secretly, unbeknownst to the Houses and most ministers, Lord Grey of the Foreign Office exchanged with Cambon, the French ambassador in London, a series of letters in which, on the basis of classified military conventions drafted by the General Staff of both countries, Britain, in case of war, pledged intervention on the side of France.
In these days, the strategists of Germany’s General Staff were at work rehearsing and fine-tuning the Schlieffen Plan. This plan had been drawn up in 1905, and, after 1906, modified by Schlieffen’s successor, the younger Helmuth von Moltke, the nephew of the victorious general at Sedan in 1871.
The plan aimed at settling the war with a single, potent, blow. Schlieffen assumed that Germany would be engaged on two fronts: France to the West, Russia to the East; the former having to be annihilated before the latter could mobilize. Any fighting of extended duration, which would have predictably drained the embattled and resource-poor Reich, was to be avoided, and replaced instead by a stubborn resistance in the East, and a stationary contingent facing France, to make room for the pearl of the plan: ‘a great wheeling wing going through Holland and Belgium and coming down on the flank and rear of the French armies by passing west of Paris.’
The British had intelligence of the plan, down to its minute details: ‘unbeknownst to anyone in Berlin, [the Schlieffen Plan] had come into the possession of the French army in 1906, thanks to a traitor bought for sixty
thousand francs.’ Indeed, Belgium was going to provide the cornerstone of Britain’s diplomatic pretext for the commencement of hostilities.
Britain counted on Germany’s inevitable violation of Belgian neutrality as soon as Moltke was to launch the Schlieffen blitzkrieg. Already, in 1906, the British General Staff, with the full logistical, and secret, cooperation of its Belgian counterpart, was involved in simulated maneuvers across Belgium featuring the deployment of a British Expeditionary Force on the continent– which, indeed, would have been regularly fielded in August 1914 under the command of Sir John French to aid the French armies against Germany’s Parisian offensive. The public was never informed of such plans.
By the spring of 1914 the Entente was ready to ambush the Germans. On May 29, 1914, Edward House, President Wilson’s chief advisor from Texas and America’s éminence grise behind the Anglo-American imperial covenant, reported from Europe: ‘Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria’.
After Archduke Franz Ferdinand was murdered, on July 6, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey, informed the German ambassador that Russia was yet unprepared to intervene, and that Britain had no binding obligation vis-à-vis either Russia or France: a deliberate lie.
Two days later, the British Foreign Minister assured the Russians that, according to ‘very reliable military sources’, the Germans were rapidly conveying divisions to the East, and that the situation looked upon the Reich with disfavor: an even bigger lie.
All such deceiving signals issued by the Foreign Office in cross-directions behind closed doors were accompanied in Britain by a public show of phony attempts at mediation in the name of peace, initiated with an eye to deceiving the multitudes. Britain had always been careful to spin the international tangle so as to drive the opponent in the position of the assailant, and reserve for herself the role of the peace-loving defender. This was a psychological artifice tailored for mass seduction, and the Germans had no knowledge or understanding of such tricks.
Eventually, after war between France, Germany and Russia had broken out, Britain came full circle: knowing that Moltke was ready to thrust Ludendorff’s fusiliers through Belgium, the British government solemnly declared that it could not possibly tolerate the violation of Belgium’s neutrality; it then professed its unconditional adherence to peace, and, shameless, assured the public that it had signed no secret compacts with either France or Russia.
Just like that, the web was spun and Germany entered it like a great buzzing fly and became the "aggressors of WW1".
The same goes for WW2 as well, which I'll keep for another post.