China protests PM's visit to Arunachal, India says its an integral part.

nimo_cn

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nimo_cn,

India also is actively engaged in PR is very successful in portraying China as an aggressive nation with the CCP party doing anything to remain in power as a totalitarian regime.
Does India gain anything by doing these?
 

AJSINGH

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let chinese shout whatever they want to ,Arunachal is india's and will remain with india
 

Daredevil

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Dalai Lama an honoured guest, Manmohan tells China

Dalai Lama an honoured guest, Manmohan tells China

Times Now 25 October 2009, 03:14pm IST

NEW DELHI: In a significant development, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh snubbed China on Sunday after he reiterated that the exiled spiritual leader Dalai Llama is an honoured guest of India and is free to travel anywhere he wishes to.

The PM issued this statement right after his meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao.

China had raised strong objections to the Dalai Llama's proposed visit to the monastery town of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh earlier.
China had also gone on to object to the Prime Minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh during campaigning for the recently held assembly elections in the state.
 

ppgj

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Neighbourly Caution
Srikanth Kondapalli28 October 2009, 12:00am IST

Neighbourly Caution - Edit Page - Opinion - Home - The Times of India

Rhetorical statements and ground realities indicated growing tensions between New Delhi and Beijing from the time ambassador Sun Yuxi claimed in
November 2006 that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was disputed territory. A series of incidents from then on led to the current levels of deterioration in relations. An estimated 270 border transgressions in 2008, logistical improvements in Tibet, a rise in China's defence budget (to a whopping $70 billion), its successful conduct of an anti-satellite test in 2007 and issuing of visas to Kashmir students have all coincided with India's decision to despatch 60,000 troops and deploy two squadrons of Su-30 MKI multi-role fighter aircraft in Arunachal Pradesh and construct 11 strategic roads connecting the trans-Himalayan border regions.

As tensions mounted, dilemmas emerged on what policy to adopt. A touch-me-not status quoist policy is not possible for India or China when both are emerging powers in Asia and beyond. Conversely, active engagement would be detrimental to a relatively weaker country subjected to asymmetries. Containment by any party in this age of globalisation could prove costly with the possible emergence of an arms race. New Delhi had proposed a stop-gap "enough-space-in-Asia" arrangement, but this is an increasingly unviable proposition. Conversely, the balancing that China has successfully done since 1962 offers possibilities.

The Chinese leadership appears to be following an ancient Chinese strategy: "do not attack in all directions" but judiciously counter only the perceived and prioritised primary contradiction. Today, India appears the main target, at least of the Chinese military and media, while moderate and constructivist Chinese voices are being curbed. According to a study, 90 per cent of netizens in China expressed strong resentment against Indian positions on the border dispute and the Tibet issue.

Chinese military constituents have stuck to old positions that India is a hegemon in South Asia, now rising and dominating the Indian Ocean. The suggested (and in many cases implemented) policies are to prop up Islamabad and actively enter the Indian Ocean. The Chinese naval commander reportedly suggested to the US Pacific Command that the Indian Ocean should be left to the Chinese navy.

Following its ancient strategy, China vilified and attacked Japan under Junichiro Koizumi. It also targeted Taiwanese leader Chen Shuibian, accusing him of furthering the independence movement. After the pro-unification Kuomintang came to power in Taipei in March 2008 and recently the Democratic Party of Japan in that country, Beijing's ire has increasingly shifted to New Delhi. It is not clear how long this rivalry between the two will continue but it appears that till New Delhi kowtows to Beijing, China is likely to use all leverages against India, from coercion to strategic domination, or even the US card.

However, despite current movements across the borders, it is unlikely the relationship will deteriorate into open conflict. The leaderships of these two rising Asian powers with vast strategic depth, would be loath to exercise conventional or nuclear military options though on the conventional front, India appears to enjoy a slight edge. The 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests and the operationalising of ballistic missiles brought about strategic parity between the two countries, changing the nature of warfare between them. China's reported targeting of nearly 50-60 Indian strategic hubs or cities and the success of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation in testing intermediate-range missiles and a ballistic missile defence system point to the emergence of mutual deterrence. But it needs to be pointed out that conflict, even if subdued, did erupt between nuclear states: US-Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 or China-Soviet Union in 1969.

Open conflict between India and China has low probability as the leaderships plan to overcome misperceptions and act, if possible, through a proposed 'hotline'. At the Yekaterinburg meeting in June, this suggestion was mooted by the Chinese side and reiterated during special representative Dai Bingguo's visit to New Delhi in August. This is an important instrument in averting 'accidental' happenings and some, in fact, trace the 1962 skirmishes to misperceptions and lack of proper communications between the two sides.

Again, due to the relative economic interdependence of the two countries (with trade touching $52 billion last year), liberals suggest a softening in relations as stakes are created in each other's markets. This proposition needs to be analysed further given New Delhi's reluctance to open up the Indian market to the influx of cheap Chinese goods. Also, a free trade area proposal from China was rejected and Chinese investments close to security establishments in India were disallowed.

Finally, there appears to be a realisation that direct confrontation at the political, diplomatic or military levels could sap the two countries, making them miss the "Asian century". The costly wars Europe fought for more than 100 years brought it down from its high power pedestal by 1945. This is a clear, if jarring, reminder for both countries.

The writer is professor in Chinese studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
 

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