Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT)

nitesh

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More Arjun orders after comparative trials with T-90s

New Delhi, Feb 12 (PTI) The Army is likely to place more orders for indigenous DRDO-developed Arjun tanks after completion of the comparative trials it would be put through with the Russian-origin T-90 tanks later this year.

"After completion of the comparative trials between Arjun and T-90s. We are waiting for it. Then we will decide on future orders (of Arjun for the Army)," Defence Production Secretary R K Singh told reporters here today.

Both the tanks would be put through tests to record their performances in various weather, terrain and night-and-day conditions to determine which one of them is effective in the middle of this year.


The Army, which is at present looking for a futuristic main battle tank for induction and operation after 2020, has already indicated that it would not place any more orders for Arjun apart from the 124 already ordered in 2004
 

nandu

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ARJUN MBT:

Unit Cost : Rs.17.29 Cr/System
Weight : 58.5 Ton
Length : 10.638 mt
Width : 3.864 mt
Height : 2.32 mt
Ground clearance : 0.45 -0.50meters
Ground Pressure : 0.84 kg/cm²
Crew : 4
Armor : Steel/Composite Kanchan armour
Primary Armament : 120 mm rifled gun
LAHAT anti-tank missile (Range-Up to 8 KM)
Secondary armament : HCB 12.7 mm AA MG
Mag 7.62 mm Tk715 coaxial MG
Loading : manual
Engine : MTU 838 Ka 501 10-cyl diesel
1,400 hp (1,040 kW)
Power/weight : 26 hp/tonne
Transmission Type : Fully Automatic
Suspension : hydroneumatic
Fuel capacity : 1,980 liters
Operational range : 360 KM
Speed : 72 km/h Road
40 km/h Cross country
Acceleration(0-32 km): 10 Sec.
Fuel Consumption : 5.5 Lt./KM on road
9.6 Lt./KM on cross country
Firing Range : 100m to 6000m
Rate of fire : 6-8 rounds/min
Maximun Elevation : -9 to +20º.
Ammunition Types : APFSDS, HEAT or HESH
Ammunition : 39 x 120mm projectiles
3,000 x 7.62mm ammunition
1,000 x 12.7mm ammunition
12 x smoke grenades
Night Vision : Thermal imaging
NBC Protection : YES
Gun control system : Electro-hydraulic
Fire control system : Director type
Radio : GPS based navigation systems & sophisticated frequency
hopping radios
Navigation : VEDSAR GPS-based
Jamming : ARENA
Obstacle negotiation : Fording depth -1.4 m
Trench width - 2.43 m
Vertical obstacle - 0.914 m
Maximum gradient - 35°


T-90S MBT

Unit Cost : Rs.14 Cr/System
Weight : 46.5 Ton
Length : 9.53 mt
Width : 3.78 mt
Height : 2.22 mt
Ground clearance : 0.40 meters
Ground Pressure : 0.87kg/cm²
Crew : 3
Armor : Steel/Composite Kontakatt-5
Primary Armament : 125 mm smoothbore gun
9M119 ATGM (Range100 m to 6 km)
Secondary armament : 12.7 mm AA MG
7.62 mm coaxial MG
Loading : Automatic
Engine : V-96 12-cyl diesel
1,250 hp (919 kW)
Power/weight : 26.9 hp/tonne
Transmission Type : Mechanical
Suspension : torsion bar
Fuel capacity : 1,600 liters
Operational range : 550 KM
Speed : 65 km/h Road
45 km/h Cross country
Acceleration(0-32 km): 12 Sec
Fuel Consumption : 3.9 Lt./KM on road
7.2 Lt./KM on cross country
Firing Range : 100m to 5000m
Rate of fire : 6-8 rounds/min
Maximun Elevation : -5 to +15º.
Ammunition Types : APFSDS, HEAT, HEF
Ammunition : 43 x 125mm projectiles
2,000 x 7.62mm ammunition
300 x 12.7mm ammunition
12 x smoke grenade
Night Vision : ESSA (Thales Optronique Catherine-FC TI)
Hit Probablity : 85% FRHP on 3m x 3m target at 1600m
NBC Protection : YES
Gun control system : Electro-hydraulic
Fire control system : 1A45T Irtysh computerized system
Radio : R-163-50U
R-163-50U + R-163-50K
Navigation : TNA"Gamma" GPS/GLONASS
Jamming : Shtora-1 EOCMDAS
Dazzle painting
"Nakidka" thermal/radar/optical shroud

Obstacle negotiation : Fording depth -1.2 m
Trench width - 2.8 m
Vertical obstacle - 0.85 m
Maximum gradient - 30°

Here is few stats in which Arjun looks good and better in some than T-90S.
 

ppgj

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Monday, 28 July 2008

It’s War! And you can win it for the Arjun…

If so many of you are willing to argue so passionately for the Arjun (more than a hundred intensely argued posts on my article below) I’ll keep putting out the facts. And here is the first bunch of clarifications… about some of the misconceived arguments being made in some of the posts.

Falsehood No. 1: “70 Arjuns have been rolled out in 8 years!”

Wrong. These 70 tanks have taken less than two years to manufacture. The Arjun’s series production didn’t start in 2000… it only began last year. And the Arjun production line is already very close to producing its installed capacity of 50 tanks a year.

Falsehood No. 2: “Quality speaks for itself.”

Wrong. Quality speaks for itself only when the system is actually in service. But when the equipment is being evaluated, quality is entirely subjective. It is easily buried… in trial reports, which are subject to various pressures and pulls. If the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces makes it clear that the Arjun tank isn’t what they want, if the brigade, division and corps commanders of the units conducting the trials let it be known that they don't think the Arjun should look good, only the occasional stubbornly upright CO will insist that it's a quality tank. Most will make sure that the trial report buries the tank.

And the problem today is that most of those senior officers haven't seen the Arjun today; they still remember the Arjun of 10, 5, even 3 years ago. So perception and institutional memory is loaded against the Arjun.

Secondly, trials can be structured in a manner that tilts the scale dramatically against the equipment being tried out. In the case of contentious equipment like the Arjun tank, the best way to make trials somewhat objective is to hold "comparative trials"… in which two or three pieces of equipment are put through identical routines. Even that can be fiddled, but it is far more difficult to do so.

Falsehood No. 3: “T-90 production delays are due to the Ordnance Factory Board.”

Wrong. The T-90 is still not at the point of production. And that's because the Russian manufacturers haven’t transferred technology. My earlier article (see below) explains the exact position.

Falsehood No. 4: “The army is not taking over the Arjuns because they are defective.”

Wrong. The army is not taking over those tanks, period. They haven’t yet undergone a transfer inspection, so nobody on the planet knows whether they are defective or not.

That having been said… those tanks might well be of a standard below that of the "Pre-Production Series (PPS) Arjuns. That is because of the well-known difficulties in transitioning from "prototype to production”. That involves changing the mode of production from single piece production to mass production; this gives rise to quality control issues all over the world.

As an example, when the T-72 started being manufactured at HVF Avadi, the quality of those indigenous T-72s (called the Ajeya) was so bad that one of our frontline regiments --- 88 Armoured Regiment, an excellent outfit being commanded by an outstanding officer --- was officially declared “Unfit for War”. It was unprecedented! No armoured regiment had ever been declared “unfit for war” before that. And the reason was simple: productionising the T-72 threw up problems of quality control during mass production.

The Arjun could well face similar problems. But they weren’t used to cut down on the T-72 programme, and --- if they happen with the initial batch of Arjuns --- they shouldn’t be used to curtail the Arjun programme either. It’s an issue that happens, and then gets resolved with a little bit of effort.

Falsehood No. 5: Buying the Arjun is equivalent to “sending soldiers to their deaths in sub-standard equipment”.

Firstly, we haven't yet established that the Arjun is sub-standard. If the army's reluctance to hold comparative trials is any indication, it might well emerge that the T-72s and the T-90s are the substandard equipment in this ball game.

Secondly, the armoured corps is not going to war in a hurry, so we have the time to experiment and nurture an indigenous tank. The last time tankmen went to war was in 1971. If you ask any senior officer when the next time will be, they won’t have an answer. So India DOES have the time to accept the Arjun, iron out any production wrinkles (and we are only ASSUMING that there will be some) and, very importantly, to absorb the know-how for operating the Arjun.

Okay, I’m wrong in the above para. The last time tankmen were sent to their deaths was when barrels started bursting in the T-72 (and it wasn’t only “made in India” barrels), which turned out to be happening because when we started making the barrels, we weren’t tempering them to the right temperature. But that problem got resolved, it wasn’t used to scuttle the T-72 programme.

Not one Arjun barrel has given the slightest problem yet. But other tank parts might, and they must be fixed at leisure… and we have the time to do that.

Falsehood No. 6: “Offer the Arjun for exports. If it’s good, other countries will buy it.”

Wrong. Traditionally, when a new weapons system comes out, prospective buyers observe how it functions in service with its home military. If the Indian Army turns its back on the Arjun, nobody else will even look at it.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/07/its-war-and-you-can-win-it-for-arjun.html

Thursday, 31 July 2008

Nailing some more falsehoods about the Arjun tank... and some about the T-90!

False argument No 1: The Arjun tank, after decades of failure, can’t suddenly have turned the corner!

It hasn’t “suddenly turned the corner”. It turned the corner very gradually, from around mid-2004. A major landmark came in early 2005, when the problem of the hydro pneumatic suspension unit (HSU) was licked. And in June 2005, the Arjun was to prove its capability in comparative trials in the Mahajan Field Firing Ranges (MFFR); the army agreed to comparative trials involving 5 Arjuns, 5 T-72s and 5 T-90s.

That turned out to be a total fiasco! The Arjun’s electronics packed up in the heat and the trials were over even before they began. The generals who came, including the Western Army Commander, laughed all the way back to their helicopters. The chief, who was to fly in for the trials was rung up and told not to take the trouble.

THAT WAS THE TURNING POINT.

The CVRDE put in a huge effort to heat-harden its electronics, which is something that bears fruit today. While the T-90 is now looking for air-conditioners, the post-2005 electronics in the Arjun can function flawlessly through 60 degrees.

In summer 2006, stringent firing trials by 43 Armoured Regiment established --- in the words of the army’s own trial team --- that the "accuracy and consistency of the Arjun tank was proved beyond doubt".

Later that year, the MoD stated to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence that, "Arjun's firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks."

In summer 2007, when the army was being pressured to conduct comparative trials, the DGMF raised another objection: the Arjun should be able to drive for 20 minutes in six feet of water. By the end of 2007, the CVRDE managed that as well.

In the Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT), which was held in five phases over the first half of this year, the Arjun had problems in the transmission system (not the MTU engine as widely reported, but the Renk transmission) during the first three phases. Engineers from Renk GMbH, Germany came and fixed that and in the last two phases, which were the really tough, heavy desert, hot weather phases, the Arjun performed flawlessly.

The process of turning the corner has been a slow one, but it symbolises exactly why one should go for an Indian tank: each drawback was analysed by our engineers, fixed according to the users’ instructions, and then delivered back to the users without charging them a penny. Contrast that with the problems with the T-90’s electronics. Nobody is fixing that problem; instead, the Russians are trying to sell us air-conditioners. Added expense, and an inefficient solution compared to heat-hardening the electronics, the way the CVRDE did.

False argument No 2: The manufacturers of T-90 have 5 decades of experience under their belt. The T-90 is drawn from the bloodline of T-72 and T-55, both of which are battle proven.

Even the Russians are not buying into the myth of the T-90. That tank entered service with the Russian Army around 1996 and, till today, there are barely 250 T-90s defending Mother Russia! India has more T-90s in service than the Russian Army… and once we implement the full contract, we will have 6 times more T-90s than the Russian Army.

I wonder why the Russian Army isn’t accepting such a blue-blooded tank with such a fine pedigree??? The Russian Army prefers to use: 2144 numbers of T-72s, 3044 numbers of T-80s, 689 numbers of T-62s (plus 3000 more in storage), and even 1000 rickety old T-55s.

Sorry, but there are no more orders from Russia for T-90s.

False argument No 3: The soldiers who operate the Arjun doubt its capabilities as a frontline tank.

The Arjun tank has been operated by 43 Armoured Regiment since over a decade; 43 is delighted with the tank. I have a very close friend who commanded that regiment and he always argued that a regiment of Arjun tanks was worth two regiments of T-72s. And this was even before the Arjun turned the corner!

After the firing trials in June 2006, 43 Armoured Regiment pronounced itself delighted with the Arjun’s firing performance. As I said above, 43 Armoured Regiment endorsed in its trial report, “The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun has been proved beyond doubt.” The brigade commander, Brigadier Chandra Mukesh, himself from 43 Armoured Regiment, endorsed that report whole-heartedly.

But the DGMF was quick to strike back. Barely three months after that report, the commanding officer of 43 Armoured Regiment, Colonel D Thakur, was confronted by then DGMF, Lt Gen DS Shekhawat. Several eyewitnesses have described to me how Colonel Thakur was upbraided by Lt Gen Shekhawat for “not conducting the trials properly”. Fortunately for Colonel Thakur, his brigade commander, Brigadier Chandra Mukesh, intervened and argued strongly that the trials had been conducted in accordance with procedure.

Talk to the crewmen, the drivers, gunners, operators… and you’ll get an even clearer endorsement. They all love the modular construction of the Arjun, which makes maintenance so easy. Changing a T-72 engine takes a full day; changing an Arjun engine takes a couple of hours.

Minister of State for Defence Production, Rao Inderjeet Singh recounts, “I’ve spoken, off the record, to officers who have gone through the trials. Even the crews (from 43 Armoured Regiment)… who have been testing the tank… I forced them to choose between the Russian tanks and the Arjun. I said, you’ve driven this tank and you’ve driven that tank (the T-90). Now mark them out of ten, which tank is better? And I’ve found that the Arjun tank was given more numbers than the T-90 tank.”

False argument No 4: The army has several objections to accepting the Arjun. Somebody writes, “After all, this is NOT pakistan where the generals are not accountable to anyone.”

The most astonishing part of the Arjun story is that the army (read DGMF) really doesn’t have a clear list of objections to the Arjun. Their objections vary from day to day, and with who they are talking to. Some of their objections --- such as that of the Arjun’s 60-ton weight --- run counter to the army’s own GSQR.

What is clear is that the MoD is happy with the Arjun. According to the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence’s last annual report for 2007-08, the MoD testified before the Committee that the Arjun tank was:

• “A product unique in its class”, and “an improved system over the T-72.”
• “Rs 6-8 crores cheaper than its contemporary system in the West”.
• “Far superior (in firing accuracy) to the other two tanks (T-72 and T-90)”.
• “Driven for over 60,000 kms and fired more than 8,000 rounds. There was no problem.”

So you judge: if that's what the MoD is saying... aren't the generals conveying an entirely false impression?

False argument No 5: The Arjun failed the AUCRT this summer

As I mentioned above, the Arjun performed creditably during the AUCRT, once Renk solved the transmission system problem.

But what is far more important is the fact that AUCRT is not a “performance trials”. It is not possible for a tank to “pass” or “fail” the AUCRT. The purpose of the AUCRT is to run a small number of tanks for thousands of kilometres and make them fire hundreds of rounds, basically putting them through their entire service lifespan in a few months. The aim of doing this is to evaluate what spares get consumed during the life-span of the tank; what maintenance and overhaul tasks should be scheduled at what stage of a tank’s life; an AUCRT evaluates a tank’s logistical needs, not its operational performance.

But when the transmission gave some problems in the first three phases of AUCRT, the DGMF was quick to seize the chance to bad-mouth the tank, and to convey the false impression that the Arjun had “failed its trials”.

THE ONLY TRIALS THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY EVALUATE THE ARJUN’S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY --- AND THAT TOO IN COMPARISON TO ITS RUSSIAN RIVALS --- ARE COMPARATIVE TRIALS, ORGANISED BY A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT VESTED INTERESTS IN THE OUTCOME. THAT MUST BE DEMANDED BY THE MoD.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/07/nailing-some-more-falsehoods-about.html
 
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Armand2REP

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ppgj said:
False argument No 2: The manufacturers of T-90 have 5 decades of experience under their belt. The T-90 is drawn from the bloodline of T-72 and T-55, both of which are battle proven.

Even the Russians are not buying into the myth of the T-90. That tank entered service with the Russian Army around 1996 and, till today, there are barely 250 T-90s defending Mother Russia! India has more T-90s in service than the Russian Army… and once we implement the full contract, we will have 6 times more T-90s than the Russian Army.

I wonder why the Russian Army isn’t accepting such a blue-blooded tank with such a fine pedigree??? The Russian Army prefers to use: 2144 numbers of T-72s, 3044 numbers of T-80s, 689 numbers of T-62s (plus 3000 more in storage), and even 1000 rickety old T-55s.

Sorry, but there are no more orders from Russia for T-90s.
False argument... Russians have been buying the T-90S about 50 units per year for the last few years. Once they are done exporting to India they plan on increasing purchases to over 100 units annually. Uralvagonzavod has plenty of capacity and they need to keep the line going. The lack of purchases wasn't that Russia didn't want it, it was that they couldn't afford it.
 

Agantrope

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Hi PPJ, nice enlightment. I want to add some more points about the arjun production line. It is capable of producing more than 80 tanks in a year if the numbers of orders are giving overwhelmingly. Quality is control is one of the best in the world.
 

ppgj

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(Photo at left: Mahajan Ranges, Rajasthan, 29th June 2006. Major General BS Grewal, GOC 33 Armoured Division, posing with his target after firing two rounds from an Arjun tank. The holes made by the armour piercing rounds are visible in the upper part of the bulls-eye. With Gen Grewal is Maj Gen HM Singh, the officer who has spearheaded the Arjun's development for 28 years)

(Photo at right: The same day, Maj Gen Shiv Jaswal, Chief of Staff, 10 Corps with his target. This was the first time he had ever driven or fired a tank)

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/06/arjun-tank-acquires-growing-fan-club.html

note - the full article has been posted already.
 

ppgj

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an old article of 2008 from the hindu business line...

Give Arjun a fighting chance

The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including the Arjun battle-tank, should not be squandered away in pursuit of technology pipe-dreams or mindless fascination for foreign equipment, says R. SUNDARAM.



Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers. Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all along; and the Army is now looking for state-of-the-art requirements 20 years hence. This is a legitimate desire if there is no urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of T-55s and T-72s.

Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.

Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list. We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.

Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.

Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.

Army’s Involvement In Development



Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with. The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees. The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.

Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.

Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.

T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.

The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.

Parliamentary Committee Report

It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.

Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.

However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.

MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)

Arjun’s Woes

However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.

All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.

This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.


Continued lack Of Synergy

However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.

Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.

Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.

(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072550320800.htm
 

ppgj

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I want to add some more points about the arjun production line. It is capable of producing more than 80 tanks in a year if the numbers of orders are giving overwhelmingly. Quality is control is one of the best in the world.
agree. as you rightly pointed out production can only be increased if the induction numbers increase otherwise it becomes economically unviable. though DRDO is a govt. organisation, they too are accountable because it is public money.

quality in arjun has never been in doubt except for a section of the army who, unfortunately, are deciding the induction. even this will increase as bulk production starts with more addons coming along and onto futuristic MBT mark 2/3. hope MR.Anthony shows the same resolve of MR.George Fernandes, the ex defence minister.

it is wise to remember merkava story. when M1 came, it was more a basic MBT. but their army and the govt supported it and you see M2/3 etc.. which make them formidable.
 

Agantrope

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It is better not to worry about the IA is intaking the Arjun MBT or not, MoD can give this thing to the BSF or any other paramilitary forces. This makes more sense when the relations between MoD and IA is getting strained on this front. IT is possible for BSF to operate the 250-300 arjuns in the Rajasthan and West Bengal makes more sense. This can be compared to the Marine Corps of the US having their own Air-Wing
 

sayareakd

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Agantrope, BSF has got its own air wing, plus they have got motors, Hovercraft, Artillery.
 

rakesh

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More Arjun orders after comparative trials with T-90s

New Delhi: The Army is likely to place more orders for indigenous DRDO-developed Arjun tanks after completion of the comparative trials it would be put through with the Russian-origin T-90 tanks later this year.

"After completion of the comparative trials between Arjun and T-90s. We are waiting for it. Then we will decide on future orders (of Arjun for the Army)," Defence Production Secretary R K Singh told reporters here today.

Both the tanks would be put through tests to record their performances in various weather, terrain and night-and-day conditions to determine which one of them is effective in the middle of this year.

The Army, which is at present looking for a futuristic main battle tank for induction and operation after 2020, has already indicated that it would not place any more orders for Arjun apart from the 124 already ordered in 2004.

"The Request for Proposals (as tenders are called in defence parlance) does not state that the orders will be restricted to the 124 tanks," Singh said to a question in this regard.

In the last couple of years, the Avadi-based Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) delivered a total of 45 tanks to the Army to complete a regiment, which is under going conversion trials by personnel at present.

Singh said both Arjuns and T-90s were "good" tanks in their own class and that the former's performance was found to be good, when he visited HVF to witness the tank's production and operation.


http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=12366
 

gb009

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an old article of 2008 from the hindu business line...

Give Arjun a fighting chance

The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including the Arjun battle-tank, should not be squandered away in pursuit of technology pipe-dreams or mindless fascination for foreign equipment, says R. SUNDARAM.



Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers.
Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all along;
This has been mentioned again & again and I don't know why. 3 GSQRs - 1972, 1982 & 1985. Its been 25 years after the last GSQR. Besides since DRDO had no experience designing a tank before this, the period from 1972 - 1985 would have surely given them some experience.

Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.
What is path breaking in Arjun? None of the technologies mentioned are present on it (if they are then I take this back). DRDO does not have as much experience as these super powers but what they are developing and what we are developing is different. Besides how many components in Arjun have been obtained from other countries. When building futuristic tanks Russsia is not goving to source the engine, thermal imaging etc from other countries. It will have to develop these own its own, this again would take more time.

Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list.
We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.
So does he mean IA chooses tanks because they appear exciting in a demo DVD? It did feel that way to me and with just a single line he has made the IA look like a bunch of fools. If not then what is he implying? This was the stupidest point. Made this article look like its been written by a 3 year old. Somewhere below its been said that IA inducted T72/T90 just after 2/3 years of testing etc. So IA was watching the demo DVD all that time. Pun intended ( at the writer only).

Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.
Army can provide feedback and I think it has been doing that. Only thing I can say is may be they were/are too critical in their feedbacks and not very positive. I hope thats what the author means. Besides its a very generic statement from a personal point of view. He has not given any points to support it but thinks everyone agrees with him anyway.

Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.
What does this signify?



From this it looks like the Chinese have the best tank in the world. What purpose does this picture serve.

Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with.
Has lower speed than that of T90 (as posted by zraver on pge5 or so). May be I am mistaken, not very sure.

[/B]The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees.
If he went into politics later, I guess it only lowers his credibility. I feel its very hard for an honest man to grow in Indian politics :). Just my thoughts though.

The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.[/B]
First good point. If this is the case then Arjun should definetly have not ended up so far from what the army want (as is their claim). But we don't know how much influence he had in shaping the decisions being taken.

Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arjun_(tank)
All tests except the last one show how Arjun did badly in trials. Of course many would argue that IA did this purposefully, but it has not been proven. So then what else could IA do than repeatedly test Arjun when it kept failing.


Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.
You really can't blame the IA can you, the demo DVD must have been really long. On a serious note does show IA's inclination towards foreign equipment, or rather the equipment it has already been using for sometime.

T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.

The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.
I suppose they have to be phased out of updated. Can't keep them the way they are.

Parliamentary Committee Report

It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.

Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.
Lot of boasting and makes one feel like DRDO knows better about the needs of IA than the IA.

However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.
It should cost less. Any idea what is the hourly wages of a worker in a tank factory in US vs that of a worker in HVF? Yet to be indigenised does not mean can't be indigenised.

MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)

Arjun’s Woes

However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.

All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.

This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.


Continued lack Of Synergy

However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.

Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.

Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.

(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072550320800.htm


Wanted to make some more points but tired. I am sure many of Arjun supporters on this forum would do a much better job at writing a similar one. The article basically feels very generic. Not an article of high quality.
 

sayareakd

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There were some unconfirm reports that



ELBIT Revolving 10 Ready Round Automatic Magazine with computer auto selection choices

Microprocessor controlled, fully automated, electrically driven, 120 mm magazine rounds. The system is located in an isolated space of the turret and is designed to protect the crew in case of ammunition
explosion. The system is easy to operate from the crew compartment. Also, the tank loader can select
ammunition out from TEN choices of 120mm ready rounds in the revolving magazine.
this autoloader was being tested on ARjun tank by Israeli's and it worked perfectly on the tank.
 
Last edited:

gb009

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Question : In a normal (don't know if such a term can be applied here) tank battle where lets say 1 or 2 regiments of arjun go against a similar number of alkhalids, how long would such a battle last (usually)? How many rounds would a tank fire on an average? I was just thinking in case of a war will the Arjun crew be required to load the auto loader (mentioned in the previous post) while engaged in a fight with an enemy tank? Will the autoloader on T 90 (I guess it has around 20 rounds) be enough or will that need reloading too? In case of an infantry face off we know soldiers can go at each other for hours/days, each hiding behind rocks or similar protection. What happens in case of tanks? Do they use similar tactics or do they just run towards each other all guns blazing(may be the best tank win)?
 

Ritwik

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Falsehood No. 5: Buying the Arjun is equivalent to “sending soldiers to their deaths in sub-standard equipment”.

Firstly, we haven't yet established that the Arjun is sub-standard. If the army's reluctance to hold comparative trials is any indication, it might well emerge that the T-72s and the T-90s are the substandard equipment in this ball game.

Secondly, the armoured corps is not going to war in a hurry, so we have the time to experiment and nurture an indigenous tank. The last time tankmen went to war was in 1971. If you ask any senior officer when the next time will be, they won’t have an answer. So India DOES have the time to accept the Arjun, iron out any production wrinkles (and we are only ASSUMING that there will be some) and, very importantly, to absorb the know-how for operating the Arjun.

Okay, I’m wrong in the above para. The last time tankmen were sent to their deaths was when barrels started bursting in the T-72 (and it wasn’t only “made in India” barrels), which turned out to be happening because when we started making the barrels, we weren’t tempering them to the right temperature. But that problem got resolved, it wasn’t used to scuttle the T-72 programme.

Not one Arjun barrel has given the slightest problem yet. But other tank parts might, and they must be fixed at leisure… and we have the time to do that.
This is a ridiculous argument. This might hold for a country not facing any immediate threats, but for a nation like India where the possibility of a flash war exists in the face of another Mumbai-type attack, the Indian army cannot afford to identify and fix problems "at leisure".

Nobody wants a repeat of operation parakram where the army's equipment and tactics weren't ready for full scale war.

Mr. Shukla makes some thought-provoking points, but his advocacy of the Arjun has become a campaign and consequently, his reports lack balance.
 

notinlove

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an old article of 2008 from the hindu business line...

Give Arjun a fighting chance

The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including the Arjun battle-tank, should not be squandered away in pursuit of technology pipe-dreams or mindless fascination for foreign equipment, says R. SUNDARAM.



Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers.
This has been mentioned again & again and I don't know why. 3 GSQRs - 1972, 1982 & 1985. Its been 25 years after the last GSQR. Besides since DRDO had no experience designing a tank before this, the period from 1972 - 1985 would have surely given them some experience.


What is path breaking in Arjun? None of the technologies mentioned are present on it (if they are then I take this back). DRDO does not have as much experience as these super powers but what they are developing and what we are developing is different. Besides how many components in Arjun have been obtained from other countries. When building futuristic tanks Russsia is not goving to source the engine, thermal imaging etc from other countries. It will have to develop these own its own, this again would take more time.

Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list.
So does he mean IA chooses tanks because they appear exciting in a demo DVD? It did feel that way to me and with just a single line he has made the IA look like a bunch of fools. If not then what is he implying? This was the stupidest point. Made this article look like its been written by a 3 year old. Somewhere below its been said that IA inducted T72/T90 just after 2/3 years of testing etc. So IA was watching the demo DVD all that time. Pun intended ( at the writer only).


Army can provide feedback and I think it has been doing that. Only thing I can say is may be they were/are too critical in their feedbacks and not very positive. I hope thats what the author means. Besides its a very generic statement from a personal point of view. He has not given any points to support it but thinks everyone agrees with him anyway.


What does this signify?




From this it looks like the Chinese have the best tank in the world. What purpose does this picture serve.


Has lower speed than that of T90 (as posted by zraver on pge5 or so). May be I am mistaken, not very sure.


If he went into politics later, I guess it only lowers his credibility. I feel its very hard for an honest man to grow in Indian politics :). Just my thoughts though.


First good point. If this is the case then Arjun should definetly have not ended up so far from what the army want (as is their claim). But we don't know how much influence he had in shaping the decisions being taken.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arjun_(tank)
All tests except the last one show how Arjun did badly in trials. Of course many would argue that IA did this purposefully, but it has not been proven. So then what else could IA do than repeatedly test Arjun when it kept failing.



You really can't blame the IA can you, the demo DVD must have been really long. On a serious note does show IA's inclination towards foreign equipment, or rather the equipment it has already been using for sometime.


I suppose they have to be phased out of updated. Can't keep them the way they are.

Parliamentary Committee Report


Lot of boasting and makes one feel like DRDO knows better about the needs of IA than the IA.


It should cost less. Any idea what is the hourly wages of a worker in a tank factory in US vs that of a worker in HVF? Yet to be indigenised does not mean can't be indigenised.

MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)

Arjun’s Woes

However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.

All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.

This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.


Continued lack Of Synergy

However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.

Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.

Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.

(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072550320800.htm


Wanted to make some more points but tired. I am sure many of Arjun supporters on this forum would do a much better job at writing a similar one. The article basically feels very generic. Not an article of high quality.


All the best, you just poked the Hornet's nest ...lets see how you fare ... oooooooooooooooooooo
 

sayareakd

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Question : In a normal (don't know if such a term can be applied here) tank battle where lets say 1 or 2 regiments of arjun go against a similar number of alkhalids, how long would such a battle last (usually)? How many rounds would a tank fire on an average? I was just thinking in case of a war will the Arjun crew be required to load the auto loader (mentioned in the previous post) while engaged in a fight with an enemy tank? Will the autoloader on T 90 (I guess it has around 20 rounds) be enough or will that need reloading too? In case of an infantry face off we know soldiers can go at each other for hours/days, each hiding behind rocks or similar protection. What happens in case of tanks? Do they use similar tactics or do they just run towards each other all guns blazing(may be the best tank win)?

This will depend upon the tactics used by either side, their is no definate answer to this, but if CLGM/LAHAT specifications are to be believe, then it is war winning weapon system.

Just imagine that you have 8 km max range compare that to Pakistan al khalid missile having 5 km range (same missile which can be fired by T 90S tank) only difference is CLGM can be used in non line of sight mode whereas the missile fired from the Al khaldi and T 90S travels on the beam of laser which the firing tank has to constantly focus on the target (meaning thereby that tank has to keep in sight the target).

Now look at the advantage of having CLGM fired from Arjun, while the target is painted by other tank or soilder, UAV or IFV or even recon team or commandos. Arjun dont have to expose itself to enemy, whereas the Alkhalid and T 90S has to expose itself to enemy while firing its missile.
 

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