AMCA - Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (HAL)

[Indx TechStyle]

we should make an small and seperate organization for reverse engineering and i heard india is going to buy osprey

And this organisations employees must include veterans of defense industry.

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

And this organisations employees must include veterans of defense industry.

Yes and Reservation should be dismantled

 

[Anirbann Datta]

BE IN the subjected matter please.

 

[scatterStorm]

Yes, 2025 is the worst case. Lets go by it. At that time INS Vishal'll be closed to induction too. I don't want Rafale-M. 90% works of N-AMCA would have finished by then & it should support EMALS. IAF & IN'll get a high level of stealth aircraft if current vlo design translates to production version accurately.

I hope they do bruh, I hope they just don't scrape such a bird with potential.

 

[scatterStorm]

Mere a 3D Model of Actual Design
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...m-combat-aircraft-hal.36/page-98#post-1192854
The Aircraft seems to be heavily drawn from Tejas.

Fuselage of Tejas seems to be enlarged (obvious for a medium combat aircraft) and modified for facilitating twin engines.
Extra fins for aerodynamic designs, which is common in F-35, J-20 and J-31.
Still design can be modified a little to be identical to the F-22.

I conclude, a nice design to absorb or reflect RADAR waves here and there, though not as stealthy as F-35.
What do you say @ersakthivel?

Fuselage is not proper VLO, I hope they make the surface of AMCA as smooth and flat, F35 is not flat from bottom and therefore has just LO characteristics, hence lacks true stealth as far as the airframe goes.

 

[scatterStorm]

Potentially, AMCA can be used for BrahMos-A and Nirbhay ALCM.
Thing about which I'm more concerned about the inconsistency in internal weapon bay design.
Just look at the picture.

It's good for carrying AIM or Vympel etc. American and Russian Missiles but not enough deep to carry our bulky weapons like Sudarshan LGB.
Either sacrifice stealth or make the weapons more advanced and smaller or let entire ego of indigenous 5G plane shatter by using foreign armament because your country can't make weapons for a 5G fighter which could make it end up like LCA.

We need to further work hard for improving indigenous armaments like AAMs, ALCMs and LGBs etc.. Redesigning the plane will push it's development 4-5 years behind the schedule
Plus I'm eagerly waiting for Uttam AESA RADAR as I can't tolerate a foreign AESA on indigenous plane.

Though, if we could take some techs from Rafael to modify, will be very good.

Potentially, AMCA can be used for BrahMos-A and Nirbhay ALCM.
Thing about which I'm more concerned about the inconsistency in internal weapon bay design.
Just look at the picture.

It's good for carrying AIM or Vympel etc. American and Russian Missiles but not enough deep to carry our bulky weapons like Sudarshan LGB.
Either sacrifice stealth or make the weapons more advanced and smaller or let entire ego of indigenous 5G plane shatter by using foreign armament because your country can't make weapons for a 5G fighter which could make it end up like LCA.

We need to further work hard for improving indigenous armaments like AAMs, ALCMs and LGBs etc.. Redesigning the plane will push it's development 4-5 years behind the schedule
Plus I'm eagerly waiting for Uttam AESA RADAR as I can't tolerate a foreign AESA on indigenous plane.

Though, if we could take some techs from Rafael to modify, will be very good.

Agreed, one way to counter such situation is :

• To design armaments that fit inside those internal bays.
• Miniaturizing stuff especially weapons is always difficult, USAF and Lockheed Martin had particular trouble in coming up with armaments that could fit in F22 in F35.

It's nice to have our own radar, but right now let's just go with either NIIP or partner with Israel or french to manufacture a better AESA radar custom built for AMCA.

 

[scatterStorm]

AMCA isn't that easy project...you need airframe that can take any pressure at high G's..
Engines..capable of supercruise wothout afterburners..
stealth
internal weapon bay
missiles shape should be changed for internal bay requirements
Sensor Fusion like missile warning system,IRST,AESA radar,Optronics pod..etc
Data Fusion from different platforms like GPS/IRNSS ground link,data link b/w planes etc...
Code for every thing..estimated would be 6-8 million line(f-22 & f-35 has more than 8 million lines of code)
And lot more...

Coding is not a problem, lot's of talented individuals in the industry, if ISRO is able to mange and put up a probe near mars in one go, I am assuming it won't be a problem, I have pals working for internships in HAL and BHEL form institutes like IIT and NIT's, I've seen there coding skills, not mention the veterans who are already mentoring them.

 

[tharun]

Coding is not a problem, lot's of talented individuals in the industry, if ISRO is able to mange and put up a probe near mars in one go, I am assuming it won't be a problem, I have pals working for internships in HAL and BHEL form institutes like IIT and NIT's, I've seen there coding skills, not mention the veterans who are already mentoring them.

Seriously coding isn't a problem? Writing code for aircraft is different from normal coding....
Never heard of f-22 and f-35 having problems with software bugs...
Most code written on C++ or ada language..it's not that easy

 

[scatterStorm]

I Say we should buy rafale F 35 and Su 35 And Reverse engineer them and should incorporate their best features in amca like engine and radar and as india did it with russias sam 2 and now india is very good in missile technology and india has cheap labour as well this should decrease the cost

Any tom, dick and harry like organizations can reverse engineer airframes, but your can't reverse engineer avionics and engines, they are specific for every aircraft which suits there agenda, mission objectives, environment etc Chinkies copied the F35 and F22 airframe, combines them to form J31 but they haven't figured out the engines and probably avionics too! They have still far to go and so we do too.

 

[scatterStorm]

Seriously coding isn't a problem? Writing code for aircraft is different from normal coding....
Never heard of f-22 and f-35 having problems with software bugs...
Most code written on C++ or ada language..it's not that easy

Please specify what's normal in coding ... logic or Programming Languages, cuz if you are talking about C++, ADA and more procedural or functional programming languages then I must stop you there as they are just tools, to do what? To make systems that should behave autonomously and probably solve problems so that pilot don't have to do the heavy lifting. I also must add that such onboard mission computers don't specifically use C++ or ADA etc they have there own programming language because former programming languages mentioned are used to solve more general and complex problems. So here generality is not needed, more like specificity is used so that they can interpret and understand only the things a fighter jet should supposed to do. I must tell you that space missions have sometimes same complexity than making a bird fly in the air, probably sometimes space missions are a bit more complex.

Regarding F22 and F35,

1. F22 was built around 19th century, it's program computer is as old as the 90s era computer but still can churn code like a super computer!
2. Why? Because they are mission computers and are specifically designed to do only one task but with precision and so you can imagine there are millions of such task and there respective functions for controlling banking, high G turns etc all computing in parallel because in the end they are computers and what they do, they calculate.
3. F35 is the new deal, probably a decade ahead tech with more challenges in air theater hence has more lines of code than F22 and thus more complexity appended to it, no wonder such bugs.
4. Further if you are trying to build a Omni role fighter, like Lockheed is doing, trying to achieve everything possible, which they can't nothings perfect, than sure things will go sideways, hence those bugs.

I hope I've cleared out the misconceptions, I could be wrong somewhere but that's what I know.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Fuselage is not proper VLO, I hope they make the surface of AMCA as smooth and flat, F35 is not flat from bottom and therefore has just LO characteristics, hence lacks true stealth as far as the airframe goes.

I hope that design isn't frozen yet so that we can improve it further.
It's better than previous design (that 3D model chocolate colour) for whose link @Akask kumar asked for.
It looked like if somebody has succeeding in designing fifth generator in WW2 era but still unable to remove trendy anomalies of 40s and 50s.
A fighter with round fuselage and long nose, reminds of that era.
Fortunately, this design was replaced by one with improved structure what I provided.
I don't know if any new design has been there further after this one.
So, don't forget to tell me.

Agreed, one way to counter such situation is :

• To design armaments that fit inside those internal bays.
• Miniaturizing stuff especially weapons is always difficult, USAF and Lockheed Martin had particular trouble in coming up with armaments that could fit in F22 in F35.

Or we can make foldable armament, like a foldable version of Astra AAM.
F-22 and F-35 carry more rockets than J-20 with almost same size of bay because they are foldable.

It's nice to have our own radar, but right now let's just go with either NIIP or partner with Israel or french to manufacture a better AESA radar custom built for AMCA.

Well, if Uttam Radar performs okay, it will be preferred.
Suppose that in competition, Uttam gets 16 out of 20 against Israeli getting 19 points, Uttam will be preferred by GoI for sure.
It may not be best in the world, but it has a respectable performance and

it's ours.
Mark my words. if Uttam does okay, foreign Radars won't be there on MCA. At least, this is our attitude most of the times and that's good of industry as well.

 

[Anupu]

I hope that design isn't frozen yet so that we can improve it further.
It's better than previous design (that 3D model chocolate colour) for whose link @Akask kumar asked for.
It looked like if somebody has succeeding in designing fifth generator in WW2 era but still unable to remove trendy anomalies of 40s and 50s.
A fighter with round fuselage and long nose, reminds of that era.
Fortunately, this design was replaced by one with improved structure what I provided.
I don't know if any new design has been there further after this one.
So, don't forget to tell me.

Or we can make foldable armament, like a foldable version of Astra AAM.
F-22 and F-35 carry more rockets than J-20 with almost same size of bay because they are foldable.

Well, if Uttam Radar performs okay, it will be preferred.
Suppose that in competition, Uttam gets 16 out of 20 against Israeli getting 19 points, Uttam will be preferred by GoI for sure.
It may not be best in the world, but it has a respectable performance and

it's ours.
Mark my words. if Uttam does okay, foreign Radars won't be there on MCA. At least, this is our attitude most of the times and that's good of industry as well.

Uttam won't work on AMCA. It's may work on LCA but AMCA needs a more capable system.

 

[Anupu]

I have a question if anyone can tell me. What is the total projected cost of AMCA program?

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Uttam won't work on AMCA. It's may work on LCA but AMCA needs a more capable system.

But that too can be developed over the Uttan Platform.

I have a question if anyone can tell me. What is the total projected cost of AMCA program?

No budget has been released yet.

 

[Anupu]

But that too can be developed over the Uttan Platform.

No budget has been released yet.

I am talking about any projected costs, not the final budget. Anyways there are rumours of a GaN-based AESA being worked on by LRDE if such a program exists it would be classified. But I don't think it would be an extension over Uttam.

 

[Akask kumar]

I hope that design isn't frozen yet so that we can improve it further.
It's better than previous design (that 3D model chocolate colour) for whose link @Akask kumar asked for.
It looked like if somebody has succeeding in designing fifth generator in WW2 era but still unable to remove trendy anomalies of 40s and 50s.
A fighter with round fuselage and long nose, reminds of that era.
Fortunately, this design was replaced by one with improved structure what I provided.
I don't know if any new design has been there further after this one.
So, don't forget to tell me.

Or we can make foldable armament, like a foldable version of Astra AAM.
F-22 and F-35 carry more rockets than J-20 with almost same size of bay because they are foldable.

Well, if Uttam Radar performs okay, it will be preferred.
Suppose that in competition, Uttam gets 16 out of 20 against Israeli getting 19 points, Uttam will be preferred by GoI for sure.
It may not be best in the world, but it has a respectable performance and

it's ours.
Mark my words. if Uttam does okay, foreign Radars won't be there on MCA. At least, this is our attitude most of the times and that's good of industry as well.

true..stealth planes dnt have round parts .. all of them have some precise tilted cuts to bounce off micro wave from radar in different direction..
But that pic is breathe taking beautiful.. its my wallpaper (atleast for few weeks)

 

[scatterStorm]

I hope that design isn't frozen yet so that we can improve it further.
It's better than previous design (that 3D model chocolate colour) for whose link @Akask kumar asked for.
It looked like if somebody has succeeding in designing fifth generator in WW2 era but still unable to remove trendy anomalies of 40s and 50s.
A fighter with round fuselage and long nose, reminds of that era.
Fortunately, this design was replaced by one with improved structure what I provided.
I don't know if any new design has been there further after this one.
So, don't forget to tell me.

Or we can make foldable armament, like a foldable version of Astra AAM.
F-22 and F-35 carry more rockets than J-20 with almost same size of bay because they are foldable.

Well, if Uttam Radar performs okay, it will be preferred.
Suppose that in competition, Uttam gets 16 out of 20 against Israeli getting 19 points, Uttam will be preferred by GoI for sure.
It may not be best in the world, but it has a respectable performance and

it's ours.
Mark my words. if Uttam does okay, foreign Radars won't be there on MCA. At least, this is our attitude most of the times and that's good of industry as well.

1. Have we frozen the designs for our AMCA or it's currently undergoing more iterations in design?
2. I am assuming you are talking about foldable fins and not the entire missile or bombs, it should be done as it greatly enhance space within IWBD on our amca.
   
3. Uttam as a home brewed AESA is good, but IMO we should collab on AESA, given the results of Brahmos, Barak 8 ( granted they are both missiles ) but a radar could also be made, then learning from it, improve Uttam down the line and fit some squadrons with Uttam.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Have we frozen the designs for our AMCA or it's currently undergoing more iterations in design?

I don't know.

I am assuming you are talking about foldable fins and not the entire missile or bombs, it should be done as it greatly enhance space within IWBD on our amca.

Uttam as a home brewed AESA is good, but IMO we should collab on AESA, given the results of Brahmos, Barak 8 ( granted they are both missiles ) but a radar could also be made, then learning from it, improve Uttam down the line and fit some squadrons with Uttam.

Agreed.
Please enter a message with at least 30 characters.

 

[Superdefender]

[Here I am posting an article by an American author (Name at the end). The article contains very negative analysis (with very little positive analysis) of Indian capabilities as a fighter jet producer. I shall say that he is mocking. The author has presented same hawkish view on Tejas fighter too under the light-weight component, but I have given the medium part only. Strong heart needed to read. About: Rafale and thereafter AMCA. Are you agreed with his views?]




T H E M E D I U M - W E I G H T C O M P O N E N T



THE RAFALE

Such a conclusion naturally refocuses attention on the Indian government’s prospective

decision in regard to filling out the medium segment of its air arm. The Indian Air Force

(IAF), at least in its recent history, had no medium-weight combatants; its diverse fighter

assets were clumped mostly at the lightweight end, with the Su-30MKI the sole representative

at the heavy end of the spectrum. With the reformulation of the Medium Multirole

Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement—born out of the original effort to expand the

lightweight Mirage 2000 force—the IAF began to review a series of twin-engine fourth generation-

plus aircraft such as the Rafale, the Typhoon, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and

the MiG-35 as well as lighter single-engine fourth-generation-plus fighters such as the F-16

and the JAS-39 Gripen. (The F-16 comes in just barely past the medium-weight mark, and

the Gripen definitively subsists as a lightweight combatant even in its heavier NG guise.)

Given the evolving force ratios involving China and Pakistan, the IAF initially sought to

acquire 126 aircraft under the aegis of its MMRCA competition, while holding out hope

for 74 more aircraft later. The resulting purchase would have sufficed to equip close to

ten squadrons with advanced fourth-generation-plus aircraft, whose distinguishing characteristics

include high agility, reduced radar signatures, active electronically scanned array

(AESA) radars, sensor fusion, high-capacity and secure data links, enhanced defensive avionics

suites, and advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry. A single large acquisition of this kind held the promise of simplifying the IAF’s logistics and maintenance, allowing

the force to focus on a single platform, rather than creating the congeries of aircraft that

exist, for example, in its lightweight segment. With such ambitions, the IAF conducted a

lengthy and detailed evaluation of six candidates before selecting the Rafale, with the Typhoon

as a backup in case the contract with Dassault Aviation could not be concluded for

any reason.

The selection of the Rafale as the winner of the MMRCA competition confirmed the suspicion

of several well-placed Indian observers that the IAF in the end picked the aircraft

it wanted in the first place: a French fighter as the preferred Western counterpart to its

Russian aircraft, given the service’s long and ultimately happy experience with the Mirage

2000.46 Whether this conjecture is in fact true is hard to judge from the outside, but the IAF

did conduct an elaborate contest among the contenders before short-listing its final choices.

Unfortunately for the Indian air arm, however, the competition collapsed because, after

long and frustrating negotiations between the Indian and French governments as well as

between the IAF and Dassault Aviation, the Modi government aborted the original tender

and settled for an off-the-shelf purchase of just 36 aircraft as a consolation prize for Paris,

while declaring its intention to continue searching for an additional 90 aircraft on more

favorable terms.

The Rafale debacle, ultimately, occurred because the aircraft’s extraordinarily high unit and

life-cycle costs made it impossible for the Indian government to follow through on its original

intent to purchase the entire complement of 126 aircraft. But the seeds of the problem

lay in the two-step Indian acquisition procedure itself: requiring the IAF to first choose an

airplane that met its technical standards without any formal information about costs, and

then selecting the lowest-priced competitor—based on costs, technology transfer offers,

and offset proposals—from only among those that survived the first-stage triage. In doing

so, the Indian government and its air arm could neither judge the total expected costs of

their selection against all the other rivals a priori nor assess whether their differences in marginal

price were worth the trade-offs in technology and performance. It is not surprising,

therefore, that when the price data for the Rafale were finally revealed, sticker shock set in

as the total cost proved much larger than the IAF or the Indian government could afford.

Confronted by this fact, the then defense minister, A. K. Antony, apparently tried to revisit

the methodology that resulted in the Rafale’s selection in the first place—after cost negotiations

had already begun. That was the clearest indication of both a flawed procedure and a

political attempt at second-guessing the IAF’s technical judgment. But no exit from the impasse

could be found. Other complications also unhelpfully intervened: Dassault Aviation

balked at plowing back 50 percent of the total costs as direct offsets, assuming the risks of

co-production with Indian public sector partners, and transferring technology at the levels

demanded by India—all requirements stated in the IAF’s original request for proposals.

None of this should have come as a revelation. Information about the Rafale’s high unit

costs was freely available in the trade literature. And common sense at any rate should have

suggested that amortizing the huge development expenditures—running into many billions

of dollars—of a sophisticated fighter such as the Rafale over a very small number of

platforms would have driven up the unit costs tremendously. Because Dassault Aviation is

a relatively small original equipment manufacturer in the global fighter market, the unit

costs of its aircraft are on average much higher than, for example, those of its American

competitors with their larger production runs. Higher unit costs usually imply fewer sales;

fewer sales imply less revenue; and less revenue, in turn, implies a greater unwillingness to

part with the already modest profits by accepting higher offset obligations, assuming greater

product liability, and transferring maximal technology.

The IAF, obviously, should have known all this before the MMRCA competition was initiated.

But its desire for the latest and most aerodynamically agile airplane of known pedigree,

combined with the Indian government’s two-stage procurement procedure, permitted

the service to downselect the two most expensive contestants at a time when cheaper alternatives

would have enabled it to buy multirole fighters that were just as good, while saving

resources to enable the transition to a fifth-generation combat force.

In any event, the IAF unfortunately will soon have to cope with the challenge of integrating

another small contingent of 36 Rafales in what is already an overdiversified fighter

force, one that now includes a medium-weight segment in addition to the lightweight and

heavyweight components acquired previously. Make no mistake: the Rafale is a superb multirole

fighter that is still in the early stages of what will be a long, thirty-year operational life.

Although it lacks an AESA radar and its MICA-series (the French acronym for interception,

combat, and self-defense missile) air-to-air missiles are most capable at shorter ranges

compared with similar U.S. and Chinese weaponry, these limitations will be rectified at some

point. The French Air Force and French Navy, for example, are beginning to field a new AESA

radar, the RBE2, on their Rafales, and it is likely that the Indian aircraft also will be equipped

with a variant of this system.

Mitigating the Rafale’s heavy maintenance burdens will be more challenging, but Dassault

Aviation historically has always come through where spare parts and depot-level support are

concerned, albeit at a high price. The enormous costs of support seem to be preventing the

Indo-French negotiations for the 36 aircraft from coming to closure, and while it is likely that

the impediments will eventually be resolved, nothing will change the fundamental realities

about the Rafale’s high unit and life-cycle costs.

This fact notwithstanding, when the envisaged upgrades are completed, the Rafale, an

already impressive combat aircraft, will become even more imposing in its F3R variant,

thanks to its superb sensor fusion and targeting capabilities, formidable defensive avionics,

highly effective swing-role performance, and reduced radar signatures. Beyond the nagging

doubts about whether Dassault Aviation can quickly deliver the 36 aircraft contracted

because of the limitations in its manufacturing capacity, the Rafale’s biggest handicap obviously

is its horrendous break-the-bank price.

Recent information suggests that the aircraft’s unit costs have been negotiated to around

$220 million, a reduction from the earlier price tag of approximately $300 million that

killed the original MMRCA program, but still high nonetheless. The most authoritative

information available in the Indian press indicates that the total program costs of procuring

36 Rafales will be about $9 billion—close to one-fourth of India’s 2015–2016 defense

budget. If the Modi government’s earlier allocation of $4.7 billion for the aircraft alone is

any indication, the unit flyaway costs of the Rafale would still be remarkably high: about

$131 million per aircraft in comparison to, for example, about $75 million apiece for a U.S.

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in 2014.55 With support and other costs thrown in, the Rafale

ends up closer to $250 million each.





ALTERNATIVES BEYOND THE RAFALE

Despite these sobering numbers, it would be a blessing if, deus ex machina, the IAF could

somehow lay its hands on 90 more Rafales, because such an addition would mitigate its

problems of a diverse inventory while at the same time increasing its combat capabilities

considerably. Unfortunately because of the costs involved, this option appears unavailing.

And the government of India, at any rate, has cast its net wide, seeking to procure the remaining

90 fighters from among any of the original contestants in the MMRCA competition.

By all accounts, the Indian defense minister seems to believe that all these rival aircraft

are more or less comparable in capability, and hence he is focused on an acquisition that

prioritizes low unit and life-cycle costs, transfer of technology, and above all the Make in

India program. In fact, the cheapest airplanes that can be co-produced in India appear to

be the object of the current search because these twin objectives simultaneously satisfy the

nation’s budgetary constraints and its industrial policy goals.

While the IAF is sympathetic to these objectives, it understandably has other interests as

well: it still seeks the best multirole aircraft that the treasury can afford, but above all it

wants the impending acquisition to support the indigenous development of the Advanced

Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a stealth fighter that the service hopes will become the

medium-weight mainstay of the IAF beyond 2025.

Satisfying these criteria will take the Indian Ministry of Defense over the terrain already

plowed during the MMRCA competition. The MiG-35 would still be a poor choice because

the IAF is adamant—and for good reason—that it needs a new line of Western equipment

as a technological hedge, given the prevailing dominance of Russian fighters in the

IAF. Furthermore, only Western aircraft can provide the IAF with the advanced counters

required to cope with the Russian platforms, sensors, and weapons now appearing in the air

forces of its adversaries.

The Typhoon would obviously meet this criterion, but its high unit costs place it in the

same unfavorable position as the Rafale. What is equally problematic is that the Typhoon,

although impressive for its acceleration, supersonic maneuverability, and high top speed,

now lags behind the Rafale where new sensors and the diversity of weapons carried are

concerned. This failure to maintain its originally intended schedule of improvements is

partly due to its poor sales record abroad, its divided governmental sponsors and service

customers, and the competition posed by the F-35, which has also been sought by many of

the same European air forces now flying the Typhoon. Finally, the Eurofighter consortium

that makes the Typhoon has no experience in developing fifth-generation stealth aircraft

and, consequently, its value to the IAF’s AMCA program is minimal.

That leaves the Gripen NG, the F-16IN, and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as possibilities,

and each has different strengths and weaknesses. The Gripen NG will be an impressive aircraft

when operational, but even when it becomes mature technologically, it would remain

a lightweight rather than medium-weight fighter. This is not necessarily a disadvantage,

because the F-16IN is similar in this respect. The F-16IN is actually two aircraft in one,

depending on its configuration. Without conformal fuel tanks, it remains one of the most

agile air combat aircraft ever built, and its primary sensors and weapons outclass even those

of the Gripen today. It will likely be cheaper than the Gripen, and although the version

offered to India is far superior to that operated by Pakistan, the IAF still has reservations

about acquiring an airplane that is in Islamabad’s inventory. Nonetheless, the manufacturer,

Lockheed Martin, is committed to transferring the entire F-16 production line to India if

the aircraft is selected for procurement. This provision makes the F-16IN extremely attractive

as a project for the Make in India program—an offer that rivals Saab’s in this respect.

Beyond that, the prospect of helping to service the thousands of F-16s still operational

worldwide would instantly make India pivotal to the global aviation supply chain, while

ironically putting it in the odd position of possibly having to support future aircraft sales

to its rival, Pakistan.

Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, in contrast to the Gripen NG and the F-16IN, is a twinengine,

medium-weight aircraft and a formidable strike fighter whose greatest strengths lie in the

surface attack and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missions. Because the Super Hornet

will continue to equip the U.S. Navy’s carrier air wings until at least 2035, it is unlikely

that Boeing’s co-production offers for this aircraft would match those of Lockheed Martin’s

F-16IN for reasons relating to both corporate strategy and U.S. governmental restrictions.

Even so, any manufacturing related to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in India would create

new opportunities to build a network of secondary and tertiary suppliers, thus increasing

India’s integration into the international aerospace industry while simultaneously enlarging

its industrial base. The fact that the Super Hornet’s costs are likely to be comparable to the

Gripen NG should only make it more attractive to India’s Defense Ministry from a financial

point of view. And, finally, selecting the Super Hornet offers a further benefit: it opens the

door to the Indian Navy acquiring and operating the same aircraft on its next-generation

large-deck aircraft carriers.

All three aircraft, then, would satisfy India’s cost constraints; all three are highly capable

multirole fighters; all would surpass the IAF’s expectations for advanced technology to

counter its rivals; all will continue to enjoy growth potential, at least where their avionics

and weapons complements are concerned; and all three can also be manufactured in India,

with Saab and Lockheed Martin likely being more flexible than Boeing on this score. Only

the two U.S. primes, however, have a clear edge where the rapid production of the fighters

is concerned—an issue that should be of importance to the IAF but is perhaps not of equal

urgency to the government of India.60 As far as program costs and operational effectiveness

are concerned, therefore, any of these three fighters would fit the bill, though if the Gripen

NG is selected, the Indian government would in effect be jettisoning the medium-weight

component of its air force in favor of a functional mix of mainly light and heavy aircraft.





TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE AMCA PROGRAM

Irrespective of the finalist chosen, then, the big imponderable remains technology transfer.

If the Indian government and the IAF expect that co-production in India will automatically

translate into a “full” divestiture of critical technologies in materials, sensors, weaponry, or

software code—as opposed to production line capacities—they are likely to be disappointed.

The same goes for expectations of assistance in regard to stealth technology. Of the three

original equipment manufacturers under consideration, Lockheed Martin, having been the

prime contractor for both the F-22 and the F-35, possesses the deepest experience where

comprehensive fifth-generation fighter aircraft design is concerned. Boeing also plays in

this game, as demonstrated by its collaboration with Lockheed Martin on the F-22 and its

experience in designing Joint Strike Fighter prototypes. Saab comes in a poor third where

stealth is concerned: although the Gripen NG will have extensive radar cross-section reduction

treatments, no European manufacturer has the capacity to design a sophisticated fifthgeneration

fighter with organic stealth capabilities.

If it is therefore assumed that the Lockheed Martin proposal has an edge at least where

future support for the IAF’s AMCA program is concerned, Indian decisionmakers should

think again. Despite Lockheed Martin’s ample experience in designing and manufacturing

stealth fighters, this expertise is tightly controlled by the U.S. government. Any assistance

from an American company for the AMCA effort will therefore have to be negotiated subsequently

by the two governments, and the record thus far has not been promising.

The South Korean KF-X program is a great case in point: The Republic of Korea, a close

ally of the United States, set out in 2002 to build its own stealth fighter, similar to what

India proposes to do through its AMCA program. Lockheed Martin was expected to support

this endeavor as part of a package deal that involved the South Korean purchase of 40

F-35 Lightning stealth fighters. Although the company agreed to provide assistance within

the limits of its commercial interests, the U.S. government has refused to transfer four critical

technologies—the AESA radar, electronic-warfare systems, infrared search and tracking

capabilities, and targeting pods. And it is still unclear whether Washington will permit

integration of the 21 other technologies approved for transfer with the South Korean, European,

or Israeli alternatives now being considered.

If it is therefore assumed that the Lockheed Martin proposal has an edge at least where

future support for the IAF’s AMCA program is concerned, Indian decisionmakers should

think again. Despite Lockheed Martin’s ample experience in designing and manufacturing

stealth fighters, this expertise is tightly controlled by the U.S. government. Any assistance

from an American company for the AMCA effort will therefore have to be negotiated subsequently

by the two governments, and the record thus far has not been promising.

The South Korean KF-X program is a great case in point: The Republic of Korea, a close

ally of the United States, set out in 2002 to build its own stealth fighter, similar to what

India proposes to do through its AMCA program. Lockheed Martin was expected to support

this endeavor as part of a package deal that involved the South Korean purchase of 40

F-35 Lightning stealth fighters. Although the company agreed to provide assistance within

the limits of its commercial interests, the U.S. government has refused to transfer four critical

technologies—the AESA radar, electronic-warfare systems, infrared search and tracking

capabilities, and targeting pods. And it is still unclear whether Washington will permit

integration of the 21 other technologies approved for transfer with the South Korean, European,

or Israeli alternatives now being considered.62

The moral of the story should be clear: stealth technology remains among the most tightly

controlled American capabilities because of both the clear combat edge it provides and the

huge U.S. lead in this area. Any expectation that the AMCA program would therefore be

able to access American expertise merely because India purchased the F-16IN earlier would

prove to be unfounded. This does not constitute an argument against the purchase of the F-

16IN, which is a formidable combat aircraft available at a great price and that would make

India a significant player in the international aviation market. But it does require the IAF,

and the Indian government more generally, to think carefully about the character of the

AMCA program—because the alternatives here are fraught.

Clearly, the IAF needs a stealthy fifth-generation follow-on fighter if it is to cope successfully

with the Chinese J-20 and J-31, at least one of which is poised to enter the People’s

Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) early in the next decade. The Indian effort at cooperating

with Russia to develop a heavy stealth platform, the PAK-FA (Perspektivny Aviatsionny

Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii), is in trouble and hence the need for the AMCA, a

medium-weight alternative, becomes more urgent. The AMCA would have been essential

even if the PAK-FA program had proceeded swimmingly because the steady shift toward

fifth-generation combatants implies that the IAF would eventually need stealth fighters in

both weight classes. The imperative of not simply having a large enough air force but, more

important, possessing an air arm with the largest proportion of sophisticated aircraft makes

the case for a second stealthy fighter more compelling. But the Russian experience thus far

should reinforce the point that all foreign manufacturers, not just American, would be very

loath to part with their stealth technologies, at least for the foreseeable future and not until

more revolutionary cloaking capabilities, such as free space plasma, become fully mature.

Although India has boldly displayed models of a future AMCA design that includes a highly

shaped fuselage and planform, the country’s capacity to build a fifth-generation fighter

indigenously from scratch is actually nonexistent. India has, no doubt, been developing

bits and pieces of stealth-related technology, pursuing research in areas such as low probability

of intercept radars, radar absorbent coatings, canopy treatments, conformal antennas,

and engine masking, but Indian aircraft designers are still not capable of producing those

organic stealth designs that integrate highly shaped airframes, enclosed engines, embedded

sensors, internal weapons, and low-emission radars in a unified package. India’s choices,

then, consist of attempting to develop such capabilities domestically, with foreign assistance

whenever possible, or simply purchasing complete stealth fighters from any willing sellers.

Russia has already agreed to sell the PAK-FA to India, and the United States is open to entertaining

Indian requests for the F-35, but neither country is likely to help India to develop

indigenous stealth technologies—any protestations to the contrary notwithstanding—for

understandable national security reasons.

Consequently, the IAF is faced with the choice of accepting an indigenous product that is

likely to be inferior in combat capability or purchasing a cutting-edge stealth fighter that

will advantage it in conflict but will provide few benefits in terms of technology transfer and

could come with significant technology security protection obligations. If India chose the

latter route, the U.S. F-35 would be a perfect fit for the AMCA requirement: the unit costs

of the aircraft have already come down to somewhere in the region of $100 million apiece,

rivaling the Rafale, and the U.S. Air Force variant in the eighth low-rate initial production

lot is targeted at $95 million each. The F-35’s stealth, sensors, and weapons are unmatched

in the air-to-ground role for which it is optimized, and its extremely low frontal signatures

give it immense advantages in the air-to-air role as well. Finally, the aircraft’s overall worth

seems to be confirmed by the international aviation market, since F-35s are expected to

constitute more than 60 percent of all the new Western combat aircraft sold during 2016–

2020—a trend that is likely to persist as the aircraft is further upgraded over time.

None of this may prove to be sufficiently persuasive to the IAF or to the government of India,

given their deep-rooted desire for an indigenously produced follow-on medium-weight

stealth fighter. But that only deepens the old dilemma confronting the air service: how does

it balance the national (and sometimes its own) demand for self-sufficiency with its imperative

for operational superiority over its adversaries? If the inclination to produce a stealthy

AMCA indigenously wins out, India would enjoy some technology gains overall, but the

end product is likely to resemble a Tejas redux.

Successfully building a stealth fighter requires an enormous depth of research and design

expertise—not to mention excellence—in diverse areas, such as materials, electronics, and

engine technology. It also entails possessing deep experience in systems integration, a capability

developed only though the clear and uninterrupted progression of ever more complex

aircraft production programs, in addition to nurturing highly specialized capabilities in the

specific technology areas required to produce a platform that synergizes very low observable

stealth with advanced fighter performance. And it imposes extraordinary demands on

manufacturing capability because stealth aircraft are fabricated to incredibly tight tolerances

in the face of finicky materials and difficult geometries, not to mention the high maintenance

demands that inevitably follow.

India’s record on all these counts is not impressive—and that is putting it charitably. Consequently,

the expectations entertained in the Indian defense research and development

establishment about its ability to produce not simply a stealth combatant but one that can

overwhelm comparable adversaries in combat are likely to fall terribly short, with disastrous

consequences for the air force. If, after all the effort and investment, India finally manages

to produce indigenously nothing more than an expensive but substandard stealth fighter,

the national gains in technology progression will not have been worth the cost in potential losses

of lives and material in combat. Given these realities, the Indian government ought to consider

carefully the strategy underlying its AMCA program. It should start by honestly assessing what

any foreign partnership might provide in support of its goal of building an advanced stealthy platform.

Then it must consider whether the IAF—and the nation at large—is better served by the

outright purchase of a capable combatant or yet another Sisyphean effort at producing an

anemic simulacrum at home.

Pretending that the advent of counterstealth capabilities would free the Indian government

from making a choice here is not tenable either. For starters, it is simply not clear whether the

current efforts at detecting stealth aircraft will succeed. Even if they only progress, it implies that

the competition between stealth aircraft and counterstealth capabilities will further intensify,

leaving nonstealthy combat aircraft at a distinct disadvantage when facing stealthy

adversaries. Consequently, the IAF will have to move toward acquiring stealth fighters at some

point—especially as the Chinese J-20 begins to enter the PLAAF in substantial numbers—with the

only question being whether India acquires superior counterparts from a foreign source or settles

for inferior combatants developed indigenously.

Author: Ashley J. Tellis

Source Article: TROUBLES, THEY COME IN BATTALIONS

Subject/About: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force

© 2016 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

[tharun]

[Here I am posting an article by an American author (Name at the end). The article contains very negative analysis (with very little positive analysis) of Indian capabilities as a fighter jet producer. I shall say that he is mocking. The author has presented same hawkish view on Tejas fighter too under the light-weight component, but I have given the medium part only. Strong heart needed to read. About: Rafale and thereafter AMCA. Are you agreed with his views?]




T H E M E D I U M - W E I G H T C O M P O N E N T



THE RAFALE

Such a conclusion naturally refocuses attention on the Indian government’s prospective

decision in regard to filling out the medium segment of its air arm. The Indian Air Force

(IAF), at least in its recent history, had no medium-weight combatants; its diverse fighter

assets were clumped mostly at the lightweight end, with the Su-30MKI the sole representative

at the heavy end of the spectrum. With the reformulation of the Medium Multirole

Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement—born out of the original effort to expand the

lightweight Mirage 2000 force—the IAF began to review a series of twin-engine fourth generation-

plus aircraft such as the Rafale, the Typhoon, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and

the MiG-35 as well as lighter single-engine fourth-generation-plus fighters such as the F-16

and the JAS-39 Gripen. (The F-16 comes in just barely past the medium-weight mark, and

the Gripen definitively subsists as a lightweight combatant even in its heavier NG guise.)

Given the evolving force ratios involving China and Pakistan, the IAF initially sought to

acquire 126 aircraft under the aegis of its MMRCA competition, while holding out hope

for 74 more aircraft later. The resulting purchase would have sufficed to equip close to

ten squadrons with advanced fourth-generation-plus aircraft, whose distinguishing characteristics

include high agility, reduced radar signatures, active electronically scanned array

(AESA) radars, sensor fusion, high-capacity and secure data links, enhanced defensive avionics

suites, and advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry. A single large acquisition of this kind held the promise of simplifying the IAF’s logistics and maintenance, allowing

the force to focus on a single platform, rather than creating the congeries of aircraft that

exist, for example, in its lightweight segment. With such ambitions, the IAF conducted a

lengthy and detailed evaluation of six candidates before selecting the Rafale, with the Typhoon

as a backup in case the contract with Dassault Aviation could not be concluded for

any reason.

The selection of the Rafale as the winner of the MMRCA competition confirmed the suspicion

of several well-placed Indian observers that the IAF in the end picked the aircraft

it wanted in the first place: a French fighter as the preferred Western counterpart to its

Russian aircraft, given the service’s long and ultimately happy experience with the Mirage

2000.46 Whether this conjecture is in fact true is hard to judge from the outside, but the IAF

did conduct an elaborate contest among the contenders before short-listing its final choices.

Unfortunately for the Indian air arm, however, the competition collapsed because, after

long and frustrating negotiations between the Indian and French governments as well as

between the IAF and Dassault Aviation, the Modi government aborted the original tender

and settled for an off-the-shelf purchase of just 36 aircraft as a consolation prize for Paris,

while declaring its intention to continue searching for an additional 90 aircraft on more

favorable terms.

The Rafale debacle, ultimately, occurred because the aircraft’s extraordinarily high unit and

life-cycle costs made it impossible for the Indian government to follow through on its original

intent to purchase the entire complement of 126 aircraft. But the seeds of the problem

lay in the two-step Indian acquisition procedure itself: requiring the IAF to first choose an

airplane that met its technical standards without any formal information about costs, and

then selecting the lowest-priced competitor—based on costs, technology transfer offers,

and offset proposals—from only among those that survived the first-stage triage. In doing

so, the Indian government and its air arm could neither judge the total expected costs of

their selection against all the other rivals a priori nor assess whether their differences in marginal

price were worth the trade-offs in technology and performance. It is not surprising,

therefore, that when the price data for the Rafale were finally revealed, sticker shock set in

as the total cost proved much larger than the IAF or the Indian government could afford.

Confronted by this fact, the then defense minister, A. K. Antony, apparently tried to revisit

the methodology that resulted in the Rafale’s selection in the first place—after cost negotiations

had already begun. That was the clearest indication of both a flawed procedure and a

political attempt at second-guessing the IAF’s technical judgment. But no exit from the impasse

could be found. Other complications also unhelpfully intervened: Dassault Aviation

balked at plowing back 50 percent of the total costs as direct offsets, assuming the risks of

co-production with Indian public sector partners, and transferring technology at the levels

demanded by India—all requirements stated in the IAF’s original request for proposals.

None of this should have come as a revelation. Information about the Rafale’s high unit

costs was freely available in the trade literature. And common sense at any rate should have

suggested that amortizing the huge development expenditures—running into many billions

of dollars—of a sophisticated fighter such as the Rafale over a very small number of

platforms would have driven up the unit costs tremendously. Because Dassault Aviation is

a relatively small original equipment manufacturer in the global fighter market, the unit

costs of its aircraft are on average much higher than, for example, those of its American

competitors with their larger production runs. Higher unit costs usually imply fewer sales;

fewer sales imply less revenue; and less revenue, in turn, implies a greater unwillingness to

part with the already modest profits by accepting higher offset obligations, assuming greater

product liability, and transferring maximal technology.

The IAF, obviously, should have known all this before the MMRCA competition was initiated.

But its desire for the latest and most aerodynamically agile airplane of known pedigree,

combined with the Indian government’s two-stage procurement procedure, permitted

the service to downselect the two most expensive contestants at a time when cheaper alternatives

would have enabled it to buy multirole fighters that were just as good, while saving

resources to enable the transition to a fifth-generation combat force.

In any event, the IAF unfortunately will soon have to cope with the challenge of integrating

another small contingent of 36 Rafales in what is already an overdiversified fighter

force, one that now includes a medium-weight segment in addition to the lightweight and

heavyweight components acquired previously. Make no mistake: the Rafale is a superb multirole

fighter that is still in the early stages of what will be a long, thirty-year operational life.

Although it lacks an AESA radar and its MICA-series (the French acronym for interception,

combat, and self-defense missile) air-to-air missiles are most capable at shorter ranges

compared with similar U.S. and Chinese weaponry, these limitations will be rectified at some

point. The French Air Force and French Navy, for example, are beginning to field a new AESA

radar, the RBE2, on their Rafales, and it is likely that the Indian aircraft also will be equipped

with a variant of this system.

Mitigating the Rafale’s heavy maintenance burdens will be more challenging, but Dassault

Aviation historically has always come through where spare parts and depot-level support are

concerned, albeit at a high price. The enormous costs of support seem to be preventing the

Indo-French negotiations for the 36 aircraft from coming to closure, and while it is likely that

the impediments will eventually be resolved, nothing will change the fundamental realities

about the Rafale’s high unit and life-cycle costs.

This fact notwithstanding, when the envisaged upgrades are completed, the Rafale, an

already impressive combat aircraft, will become even more imposing in its F3R variant,

thanks to its superb sensor fusion and targeting capabilities, formidable defensive avionics,

highly effective swing-role performance, and reduced radar signatures. Beyond the nagging

doubts about whether Dassault Aviation can quickly deliver the 36 aircraft contracted

because of the limitations in its manufacturing capacity, the Rafale’s biggest handicap obviously

is its horrendous break-the-bank price.

Recent information suggests that the aircraft’s unit costs have been negotiated to around

$220 million, a reduction from the earlier price tag of approximately $300 million that

killed the original MMRCA program, but still high nonetheless. The most authoritative

information available in the Indian press indicates that the total program costs of procuring

36 Rafales will be about $9 billion—close to one-fourth of India’s 2015–2016 defense

budget. If the Modi government’s earlier allocation of $4.7 billion for the aircraft alone is

any indication, the unit flyaway costs of the Rafale would still be remarkably high: about

$131 million per aircraft in comparison to, for example, about $75 million apiece for a U.S.

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in 2014.55 With support and other costs thrown in, the Rafale

ends up closer to $250 million each.





ALTERNATIVES BEYOND THE RAFALE

Despite these sobering numbers, it would be a blessing if, deus ex machina, the IAF could

somehow lay its hands on 90 more Rafales, because such an addition would mitigate its

problems of a diverse inventory while at the same time increasing its combat capabilities

considerably. Unfortunately because of the costs involved, this option appears unavailing.

And the government of India, at any rate, has cast its net wide, seeking to procure the remaining

90 fighters from among any of the original contestants in the MMRCA competition.

By all accounts, the Indian defense minister seems to believe that all these rival aircraft

are more or less comparable in capability, and hence he is focused on an acquisition that

prioritizes low unit and life-cycle costs, transfer of technology, and above all the Make in

India program. In fact, the cheapest airplanes that can be co-produced in India appear to

be the object of the current search because these twin objectives simultaneously satisfy the

nation’s budgetary constraints and its industrial policy goals.

While the IAF is sympathetic to these objectives, it understandably has other interests as

well: it still seeks the best multirole aircraft that the treasury can afford, but above all it

wants the impending acquisition to support the indigenous development of the Advanced

Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a stealth fighter that the service hopes will become the

medium-weight mainstay of the IAF beyond 2025.

Satisfying these criteria will take the Indian Ministry of Defense over the terrain already

plowed during the MMRCA competition. The MiG-35 would still be a poor choice because

the IAF is adamant—and for good reason—that it needs a new line of Western equipment

as a technological hedge, given the prevailing dominance of Russian fighters in the

IAF. Furthermore, only Western aircraft can provide the IAF with the advanced counters

required to cope with the Russian platforms, sensors, and weapons now appearing in the air

forces of its adversaries.

The Typhoon would obviously meet this criterion, but its high unit costs place it in the

same unfavorable position as the Rafale. What is equally problematic is that the Typhoon,

although impressive for its acceleration, supersonic maneuverability, and high top speed,

now lags behind the Rafale where new sensors and the diversity of weapons carried are

concerned. This failure to maintain its originally intended schedule of improvements is

partly due to its poor sales record abroad, its divided governmental sponsors and service

customers, and the competition posed by the F-35, which has also been sought by many of

the same European air forces now flying the Typhoon. Finally, the Eurofighter consortium

that makes the Typhoon has no experience in developing fifth-generation stealth aircraft

and, consequently, its value to the IAF’s AMCA program is minimal.

That leaves the Gripen NG, the F-16IN, and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as possibilities,

and each has different strengths and weaknesses. The Gripen NG will be an impressive aircraft

when operational, but even when it becomes mature technologically, it would remain

a lightweight rather than medium-weight fighter. This is not necessarily a disadvantage,

because the F-16IN is similar in this respect. The F-16IN is actually two aircraft in one,

depending on its configuration. Without conformal fuel tanks, it remains one of the most

agile air combat aircraft ever built, and its primary sensors and weapons outclass even those

of the Gripen today. It will likely be cheaper than the Gripen, and although the version

offered to India is far superior to that operated by Pakistan, the IAF still has reservations

about acquiring an airplane that is in Islamabad’s inventory. Nonetheless, the manufacturer,

Lockheed Martin, is committed to transferring the entire F-16 production line to India if

the aircraft is selected for procurement. This provision makes the F-16IN extremely attractive

as a project for the Make in India program—an offer that rivals Saab’s in this respect.

Beyond that, the prospect of helping to service the thousands of F-16s still operational

worldwide would instantly make India pivotal to the global aviation supply chain, while

ironically putting it in the odd position of possibly having to support future aircraft sales

to its rival, Pakistan.

Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, in contrast to the Gripen NG and the F-16IN, is a twinengine,

medium-weight aircraft and a formidable strike fighter whose greatest strengths lie in the

surface attack and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missions. Because the Super Hornet

will continue to equip the U.S. Navy’s carrier air wings until at least 2035, it is unlikely

that Boeing’s co-production offers for this aircraft would match those of Lockheed Martin’s

F-16IN for reasons relating to both corporate strategy and U.S. governmental restrictions.

Even so, any manufacturing related to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in India would create

new opportunities to build a network of secondary and tertiary suppliers, thus increasing

India’s integration into the international aerospace industry while simultaneously enlarging

its industrial base. The fact that the Super Hornet’s costs are likely to be comparable to the

Gripen NG should only make it more attractive to India’s Defense Ministry from a financial

point of view. And, finally, selecting the Super Hornet offers a further benefit: it opens the

door to the Indian Navy acquiring and operating the same aircraft on its next-generation

large-deck aircraft carriers.

All three aircraft, then, would satisfy India’s cost constraints; all three are highly capable

multirole fighters; all would surpass the IAF’s expectations for advanced technology to

counter its rivals; all will continue to enjoy growth potential, at least where their avionics

and weapons complements are concerned; and all three can also be manufactured in India,

with Saab and Lockheed Martin likely being more flexible than Boeing on this score. Only

the two U.S. primes, however, have a clear edge where the rapid production of the fighters

is concerned—an issue that should be of importance to the IAF but is perhaps not of equal

urgency to the government of India.60 As far as program costs and operational effectiveness

are concerned, therefore, any of these three fighters would fit the bill, though if the Gripen

NG is selected, the Indian government would in effect be jettisoning the medium-weight

component of its air force in favor of a functional mix of mainly light and heavy aircraft.





TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE AMCA PROGRAM

Irrespective of the finalist chosen, then, the big imponderable remains technology transfer.

If the Indian government and the IAF expect that co-production in India will automatically

translate into a “full” divestiture of critical technologies in materials, sensors, weaponry, or

software code—as opposed to production line capacities—they are likely to be disappointed.

The same goes for expectations of assistance in regard to stealth technology. Of the three

original equipment manufacturers under consideration, Lockheed Martin, having been the

prime contractor for both the F-22 and the F-35, possesses the deepest experience where

comprehensive fifth-generation fighter aircraft design is concerned. Boeing also plays in

this game, as demonstrated by its collaboration with Lockheed Martin on the F-22 and its

experience in designing Joint Strike Fighter prototypes. Saab comes in a poor third where

stealth is concerned: although the Gripen NG will have extensive radar cross-section reduction

treatments, no European manufacturer has the capacity to design a sophisticated fifthgeneration

fighter with organic stealth capabilities.

If it is therefore assumed that the Lockheed Martin proposal has an edge at least where

future support for the IAF’s AMCA program is concerned, Indian decisionmakers should

think again. Despite Lockheed Martin’s ample experience in designing and manufacturing

stealth fighters, this expertise is tightly controlled by the U.S. government. Any assistance

from an American company for the AMCA effort will therefore have to be negotiated subsequently

by the two governments, and the record thus far has not been promising.

The South Korean KF-X program is a great case in point: The Republic of Korea, a close

ally of the United States, set out in 2002 to build its own stealth fighter, similar to what

India proposes to do through its AMCA program. Lockheed Martin was expected to support

this endeavor as part of a package deal that involved the South Korean purchase of 40

F-35 Lightning stealth fighters. Although the company agreed to provide assistance within

the limits of its commercial interests, the U.S. government has refused to transfer four critical

technologies—the AESA radar, electronic-warfare systems, infrared search and tracking

capabilities, and targeting pods. And it is still unclear whether Washington will permit

integration of the 21 other technologies approved for transfer with the South Korean, European,

or Israeli alternatives now being considered.

If it is therefore assumed that the Lockheed Martin proposal has an edge at least where

future support for the IAF’s AMCA program is concerned, Indian decisionmakers should

think again. Despite Lockheed Martin’s ample experience in designing and manufacturing

stealth fighters, this expertise is tightly controlled by the U.S. government. Any assistance

from an American company for the AMCA effort will therefore have to be negotiated subsequently

by the two governments, and the record thus far has not been promising.

The South Korean KF-X program is a great case in point: The Republic of Korea, a close

ally of the United States, set out in 2002 to build its own stealth fighter, similar to what

India proposes to do through its AMCA program. Lockheed Martin was expected to support

this endeavor as part of a package deal that involved the South Korean purchase of 40

F-35 Lightning stealth fighters. Although the company agreed to provide assistance within

the limits of its commercial interests, the U.S. government has refused to transfer four critical

technologies—the AESA radar, electronic-warfare systems, infrared search and tracking

capabilities, and targeting pods. And it is still unclear whether Washington will permit

integration of the 21 other technologies approved for transfer with the South Korean, European,

or Israeli alternatives now being considered.62

The moral of the story should be clear: stealth technology remains among the most tightly

controlled American capabilities because of both the clear combat edge it provides and the

huge U.S. lead in this area. Any expectation that the AMCA program would therefore be

able to access American expertise merely because India purchased the F-16IN earlier would

prove to be unfounded. This does not constitute an argument against the purchase of the F-

16IN, which is a formidable combat aircraft available at a great price and that would make

India a significant player in the international aviation market. But it does require the IAF,

and the Indian government more generally, to think carefully about the character of the

AMCA program—because the alternatives here are fraught.

Clearly, the IAF needs a stealthy fifth-generation follow-on fighter if it is to cope successfully

with the Chinese J-20 and J-31, at least one of which is poised to enter the People’s

Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) early in the next decade. The Indian effort at cooperating

with Russia to develop a heavy stealth platform, the PAK-FA (Perspektivny Aviatsionny

Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii), is in trouble and hence the need for the AMCA, a

medium-weight alternative, becomes more urgent. The AMCA would have been essential

even if the PAK-FA program had proceeded swimmingly because the steady shift toward

fifth-generation combatants implies that the IAF would eventually need stealth fighters in

both weight classes. The imperative of not simply having a large enough air force but, more

important, possessing an air arm with the largest proportion of sophisticated aircraft makes

the case for a second stealthy fighter more compelling. But the Russian experience thus far

should reinforce the point that all foreign manufacturers, not just American, would be very

loath to part with their stealth technologies, at least for the foreseeable future and not until

more revolutionary cloaking capabilities, such as free space plasma, become fully mature.

Although India has boldly displayed models of a future AMCA design that includes a highly

shaped fuselage and planform, the country’s capacity to build a fifth-generation fighter

indigenously from scratch is actually nonexistent. India has, no doubt, been developing

bits and pieces of stealth-related technology, pursuing research in areas such as low probability

of intercept radars, radar absorbent coatings, canopy treatments, conformal antennas,

and engine masking, but Indian aircraft designers are still not capable of producing those

organic stealth designs that integrate highly shaped airframes, enclosed engines, embedded

sensors, internal weapons, and low-emission radars in a unified package. India’s choices,

then, consist of attempting to develop such capabilities domestically, with foreign assistance

whenever possible, or simply purchasing complete stealth fighters from any willing sellers.

Russia has already agreed to sell the PAK-FA to India, and the United States is open to entertaining

Indian requests for the F-35, but neither country is likely to help India to develop

indigenous stealth technologies—any protestations to the contrary notwithstanding—for

understandable national security reasons.

Consequently, the IAF is faced with the choice of accepting an indigenous product that is

likely to be inferior in combat capability or purchasing a cutting-edge stealth fighter that

will advantage it in conflict but will provide few benefits in terms of technology transfer and

could come with significant technology security protection obligations. If India chose the

latter route, the U.S. F-35 would be a perfect fit for the AMCA requirement: the unit costs

of the aircraft have already come down to somewhere in the region of $100 million apiece,

rivaling the Rafale, and the U.S. Air Force variant in the eighth low-rate initial production

lot is targeted at $95 million each. The F-35’s stealth, sensors, and weapons are unmatched

in the air-to-ground role for which it is optimized, and its extremely low frontal signatures

give it immense advantages in the air-to-air role as well. Finally, the aircraft’s overall worth

seems to be confirmed by the international aviation market, since F-35s are expected to

constitute more than 60 percent of all the new Western combat aircraft sold during 2016–

2020—a trend that is likely to persist as the aircraft is further upgraded over time.

None of this may prove to be sufficiently persuasive to the IAF or to the government of India,

given their deep-rooted desire for an indigenously produced follow-on medium-weight

stealth fighter. But that only deepens the old dilemma confronting the air service: how does

it balance the national (and sometimes its own) demand for self-sufficiency with its imperative

for operational superiority over its adversaries? If the inclination to produce a stealthy

AMCA indigenously wins out, India would enjoy some technology gains overall, but the

end product is likely to resemble a Tejas redux.

Successfully building a stealth fighter requires an enormous depth of research and design

expertise—not to mention excellence—in diverse areas, such as materials, electronics, and

engine technology. It also entails possessing deep experience in systems integration, a capability

developed only though the clear and uninterrupted progression of ever more complex

aircraft production programs, in addition to nurturing highly specialized capabilities in the

specific technology areas required to produce a platform that synergizes very low observable

stealth with advanced fighter performance. And it imposes extraordinary demands on

manufacturing capability because stealth aircraft are fabricated to incredibly tight tolerances

in the face of finicky materials and difficult geometries, not to mention the high maintenance

demands that inevitably follow.

India’s record on all these counts is not impressive—and that is putting it charitably. Consequently,

the expectations entertained in the Indian defense research and development

establishment about its ability to produce not simply a stealth combatant but one that can

overwhelm comparable adversaries in combat are likely to fall terribly short, with disastrous

consequences for the air force. If, after all the effort and investment, India finally manages

to produce indigenously nothing more than an expensive but substandard stealth fighter,

the national gains in technology progression will not have been worth the cost in potential losses

of lives and material in combat. Given these realities, the Indian government ought to consider

carefully the strategy underlying its AMCA program. It should start by honestly assessing what

any foreign partnership might provide in support of its goal of building an advanced stealthy platform.

Then it must consider whether the IAF—and the nation at large—is better served by the

outright purchase of a capable combatant or yet another Sisyphean effort at producing an

anemic simulacrum at home.

Pretending that the advent of counterstealth capabilities would free the Indian government

from making a choice here is not tenable either. For starters, it is simply not clear whether the

current efforts at detecting stealth aircraft will succeed. Even if they only progress, it implies that

the competition between stealth aircraft and counterstealth capabilities will further intensify,

leaving nonstealthy combat aircraft at a distinct disadvantage when facing stealthy

adversaries. Consequently, the IAF will have to move toward acquiring stealth fighters at some

point—especially as the Chinese J-20 begins to enter the PLAAF in substantial numbers—with the

only question being whether India acquires superior counterparts from a foreign source or settles

for inferior combatants developed indigenously.

Author: Ashley J. Tellis

Source Article: TROUBLES, THEY COME IN BATTALIONS

Subject/About: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force

© 2016 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Author is indeed an indian with a with american bull shit in brain.......